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This study is a critical examination of a mythology held by a particular population of the 
political, economic, cultural and academic elite in Canada that the Canadian political landscape is 
secular.  This mythology also holds that religious worldviews are detrimental, if not antithetical, to a 
modern, liberal Western democracy.  In that context, Canada appears to have a “fourth solitude”, a 
cohort whose religious worldview motivates and, in some cases, informs their political activities.  
They form a solitude because they operate in the political world, for the most part, without public 
mention of how and why they are motivated by their religious ideals to take part in the political 
landscape.  This lack of public discourse is not about people being afraid to mention their religious 
worldviews per se but about an atmosphere that makes it difficult to discuss those worldviews as 
pertinent and rational in the context of the public sphere.  The study explores why this might be so 
and what the societal ramifications of the existence of such a solitude might be. Using 
environmental legislation as a focal point, this study looks at secularization theories, environmental 
and legal histories and a case study to identify and analyze the intersection of religious worldviews 
with the political process, policies and ensuing legislation.   
The goal of this research is to show how religious voices within the political landscape of a 
modern liberal democracy are extant and that they are not inherently detrimental to democracy or to 
the modern State.  In fact, further argument will demonstrate that denying the legitimacy of those 
voices in the public sphere undermines current ideals of plurality and secularity.  Furthermore, it will 





marginalization of religious worldviews as a core tenet of modernity can have the effect of 
suppressing or at least by-passing moderate religious voices and thus allow for the voices of 
extremism to be co-opted by those in power in ways that are not transparent, depriving the polis of 
the data it may need to make informed choices in the public sphere.  
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 The subject of this study is a critical examination of a mythology held by a particular 
population of the political, economic, cultural and academic elite in Canada that the 
Canadian political landscape is secular.  This mythology also holds that religious worldviews 
are detrimental, if not antithetical, to a modern, liberal, Western democracy.  In that context, 
I put forth the argument that Canada appears to have a “fourth solitude”, a cohort whose 
religious worldview motivates and, in some cases, informs their political activities.  They 
form a solitude because they operate in the political world, for the most part, without public 
mention of how and why they are motivated by their religious ideals to take part in the 
political landscape.  This lack of public discourse is not about people being afraid to mention 
their religious worldviews per se but about an atmosphere that makes it difficult to discuss 
those worldviews as pertinent and rational in the context of the public sphere.  The study 
explores why this might be so and what the societal ramifications of the existence of such a 
solitude might be.   
The goal of this research is to show how religious voices within the political 
landscape of a modern liberal democracy are extant and that they are not inherently 
detrimental to democracy or to the modern State.  In fact, further argument will demonstrate 
that denying the legitimacy of those voices in the public sphere undermines current ideals of 
plurality and secularity.  Furthermore, it will be argued that the persistence of perpetuating a 
mythology of secularity that posits the marginalization of religious worldviews as a core tenet 
of modernity can have the effect of suppressing or at least by-passing moderate religious 
voices and thus allow for the voices of extremism to be co-opted by those in power in ways 
that are not transparent, depriving the polis of the data it may need to make informed 
choices in the public sphere.  
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Scope and Focus 
Since the Canadian political landscape is vast and a dissertation is supposed to be 
narrow, the study will use Canadian environmental policy and legislation at the federal level 
as the context for exploration. The environment is arguably one of the last issues for which 
it is acceptable to publicly hold a religious point of view while also lobbying for political 
position.  By looking at the ways in which religious worldviews have often combined with 
political savvy  to bring environmental issues to the fore without threatening an imposition 
of a theocracy, this study hopes to extrapolate that such might be the case in other arenas of 
the political sphere.  Although federal environmental legislation will be looked at somewhat 
closely as a genre, the study will ultimately focus on the Species at Risk Act (SARA). 
Status of current research:   
Some work has been done on the lack of correlation with denominational beliefs and 
one’s stance on environmental issues. No study has been done that examines the crafting 
and lobbying of and around environmental legislation that incorporates the religious beliefs 
of the players involved.  It is my belief that such a study will reveal a microcosm of the 
greater whole in Canadian politics.  This microcosm, I will show, includes passionate people 
of faith quietly using their religious scruples and the teachings of their respective institutions 
as partial motivators for the political work they do.   
Beginnings  
The problem that led to the formulation of my inquiry lies in the rise of the religious 
right in the United States in the early 1980’s and the subsequent literature addressing a global 
rise in religious fundamentalism.  Martin Marty, the American church historian, has 
remarked that this rise in fundamentalism took sociologists, religious scholars and historians 
by surprise and quite a respectable body of research has risen in response.  In Canada the 
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response from the mainstream intellectual elite has been one of surprise and suspicion.  A 
bevy of literature, from theological to sociological, meant to keep the creeping power of the 
religious right from seeping across our borders, arose that affirmed Canada’s inherent 
secularism—defined narrowly, in Charles Taylor’s terms, as the absence of religion from the 
public sphere.  But in the 1990’s, a school of thought arose that challenged the notion that 
“religion has become a matter of purely private concern,”1 and argued that religion 
(specifically Christianity) moved “decisively out of the centres of power represented by 
government and economics, and into civil society”.2 This shift, argues Van Die, has placed 
religious institutions and voices to the voluntary sector of public life where they remain an 
enriching entity in our democracy.  The current research fails to examine the religious voices 
and institutions within the centres of power, named by Van Die as government and 
economics.  To be sure, religious institutions no longer form what Van Die refers to as a 
“shadow establishment”, but neither have they been relegated quite so neatly into the 
voluntary sector.   Indeed, non-Christian religions never were part of a “shadow 
establishment”, something that often gets overlooked in the discussion. This notion is 
intriguing in itself and further work should be done to explore its implications.  What is 
needed now is a model that promotes openness to constructive diversity that is inclusive of 
religion.  Only then can Canada truly be called secular; “… a condition in which our 
experience of and search for fullness occurs…something we all share, believers and 
unbelievers alike.” 3 
In addition, the current research has not yet looked upon the emergence of 
environmental policy and legislation as a rich source of understanding how a disparity of 
communities work together fruitfully under the aegis of a secular society.  The only way of 
knowing whether or not voices raised from within the polis are constructive is for them to 
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be heard and measured against the communal standards society has set in place.  Voices that 
are not heard or that are devalued before being weighed soberly are lost and their owners 
disenfranchised without a democratic hearing.  It is in the environmental debates and the 
ensuing legislation and policies that we are seeing public discourse shaped, in part, by 
religious motivations.  Current conventional wisdom says that, in order to have legitimacy in 
the current political climate, religious motivation cannot be the stated primary motivator.  
However, that same scientific evidence, from which many people of faith have learned to 
argue in the public sector, has also been derided and attempts made to de-bunk it.  The 
responses to this derision have been quite interesting: what has happened in some sense is a 
two-pronged approach with the scientists who claim legitimacy from the venerable 
institutions of learning untainted by sponsorship money on one flank and on the other, the 
religiously motivated who have stepped back into the fray as unabashedly religious and have 
made this a moral issue—supported by legitimate science, but a moral issue nonetheless.   
Definitions 
 There will obviously be terms which will be defined in context; however, some terms 
that are used with great regularity are defined below in the interest of clarity and ease of 
reference. 
Religion 
 Definitions of religion abound and each scholar must choose to accept or reject 
definitions based on their own work, the arguments of others, and their own philosophical 
school of thought.  However, in a work that is fundamentally about religion, a paragraph 
outlining just what that term might mean in context is warranted.  As Bron Taylor remarks 
in the Introduction to The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, “Despite (a) reluctance to impose 
a definition of religion…any study has to be guided by a consistent set of standards and has 
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to be clear about its subject matter.”4  This is especially so when one is dealing not only with 
Western religious traditions, i.e. Christianity, Judaism and Islam but with Aboriginal 
worldviews.  At the outset, it must be stated that it is difficult to actually define religion in 
terms of Aboriginal traditions because the term connotes a type of taxonomy that is foreign 
to Aboriginal worldviews.  That being the case, and the definitions of religion so numerous it 
is perhaps helpful for purposes of clarification to discuss just what religion is not in the 
context of this study, as well as what it is.  
 The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature takes its understanding of religion from David 
Chidester, and, as such, defines it very broadly as “that definition of human experience 
engaged with sacred norms, which are related to transformative forces and powers and 
which people consider to be dangerous and/or beneficent and/or meaningful in some 
ultimate way.”5  While, at first glance, this definition seems to serve the needs of a work that 
encompasses both Western and North American Aboriginal religious worldviews, it is far, 
far too broad for the purposes of this study.  In terms of Aboriginal worldviews within the 
context of this study, the above definition, while it certainly addresses the non-linear nature 
of those worldviews, it is still not specific enough for the purposes of this study.  Here, 
Aboriginal worldviews are examined specifically in the context of embeddedness with the 
natural world and are defined functionally in the pertinent chapter. 
In addition, the above definition is so broad as to encompass phenomenon outside 
the purview of this study.  With this definition, anything from baseball to hockey to market 
capitalism can claim religious status and be analyzed accordingly.6  These are all interesting 
and pithy exercises in social and cultural commentary but again, they are tangential to the 
heart of the present work, whose primary purpose is to examine traditional Western religious 
worldviews in the context of the Canadian political landscape to discover whether or not 
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they are detrimental to the legislative process.  Any definition of religion for the purposes of 
this study must establish firmer parameters in order not to be too unwieldy. 
 As well, religion in this study is not simply a collective of rituals and symbols. Nor is 
it merely a concept or series of concepts around which large numbers of people unite—
although these are important parts of a religion.  It is not merely an ethical system (although 
it encompasses this) or an economic theory.  Nor, for the purposes of this study, is religion 
defined as a system of faith.  Although some scholars do use the terms interchangeably, I 
argue that this is too limiting for the purposes of this study.7  Although faith is, most 
certainly an important component in many religious worldviews, to use the terms 
interchangeably would deny the complex role that religion plays in the spheres of human 
interaction of which this study is concerned.  Faith is, by definition, believing without 
actually having concrete evidence to support that belief.  Religion, as stated above, can be 
about faith, but it is also about being a certain way in the world. And it is also about 
responding to the larger existential questions mentioned previously.8   
 Religion, in this study, is taken to incorporate the institutions, communities and 
individual practices that work in concert with rituals and symbols to provide answers to the 
larger questions of existence (i.e. Why are we here? What is our purpose? Why do we die? 
What happens before/after this life begins/ends?).  It is also taken etymologically:  from Re- 
to do again and from lig- to tie or bind.  In the Aboriginal sense this means the rituals, 
symbols and beliefs that unite community daily, monthly, yearly—eternally. In the Aboriginal 
sense, this phenomenon is integral to life itself and therefore cannot accurately be spoken of 
as distinct from all other aspects of being in the world. From the Western (Christian) 
perspective, religion has become distinct from other ways of being.  But, it is still taken to be 
a way of being in the world that transcends mundane human existence by proposing 
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standards of being in relationship that ennoble rather than degrade human potential.  This 
way of being is both communal and individual.  That the communal aspect is also, in part, 
institutional is vital.  Traditional Western Christianity is inherently institutional and that 
aspect plays into the argument of how religious worldviews remain relevant in the modern 
political landscape.  This definition is not all encompassing.  But it does serve as contrast to 
other definitions that are so encompassing as to allow for every activity for which a person, 
community, or country feels passion to be labeled as “religion”—thus making my job 
fantastically unwieldy.  In this study the phrase “religious worldview” is used extensively.  
Having outlined what is meant by “religion”, I will now turn to an explanation of 
“worldview”. 
Worldview 
“Worldview” is used here in the sense that Ninian Smart applied it—as a framework 
of ideas and beliefs through which an individual interprets and interacts with the world.9  A 
“religious worldview” is a way of being in the world that is fundamentally religious—that is, 
religion is an integral component of the way a person conceives of him or herself as an agent 
in the world.  It is understood in this study that having a religious worldview does not 
preclude one from having other, equally integral worldviews—one can embrace a religious 
and a scientific worldview, for example.  Therefore, a religious worldview is not the only 
component of one’s overall worldview, but it is an integral fact of it.10  
Political Landscape 
The term “political landscape” is used to connote the realm of political institutions 
and those within those institutions who have political power in Canada—including (but not 
limited to) elected officials, Senators, Members of Privy Council, and political appointees 
who run, among other things, the Prime Minister’s Office and higher-level civil servants 
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such as deputy ministers.11 Although the individuals listed above theoretically also inhabit 
the public sphere in their professional capacities, they will be considered (with two or three 
exceptions that will be addressed in later chapters) as inhabitants of the political landscape.  
These institutions, and the political landscape itself, are distinct from the public sphere.   
Public and Private Spheres 
This work uses the concept of the private sphere to mean, quite simply, that which is 
not in the public sphere.  That is, the spaces in which people live and move and have their 
being when they are in the relative privacy of their own home and with their family and 
intimate friends.  The private sphere is outside the purview of the State and also 
encompasses personal concerns as opposed to public ones.   It should be noted from the 
outset that this study posits that the boundaries between the public and the private are 
permeable and that the actions and concerns held in private often affect the public ones and 
vice versa.   
Public sphere is used in two ways in this study.  First, it is used to refer to the spaces 
in society and in one’s life that are public.  This means interactions with the community, 
institutions and activities of the state that define society (government, educational 
institutions, etc.).  This will be the definition referred to most often in the work. 
The second definition of public sphere is more complex and will be referred to 
explicitly as “Taylor’s construct of the public sphere” when used.  This definition is taken 
from Charles Taylor’s discussion in A Secular Age,12 which itself incorporates elements of 
Jürgen Habermas’ The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,13 and Michael Warner’s The 
Letters of the Republic.14 Taylor defines the public sphere as “…a meta-topical space, in which 
members of society (can) exchange ideas and come to a common mind.15  As such, it 
(constitutes) a meta-topical agency, but one which is understood to exist independent of the 
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political constitution of society and completely in profane time.”16  Taylor explains meta-
topical as common space that is non-local, meaning that it transcends the physical common 
space that people may share while participating in a purposeful activity: “…it knits together a 
plurality of such spaces into one larger space of non-assembly.”17  Thus, Rex Murphy’s 
political editorial on last night’s news goes from a late-night discussion with one’s partner 
before bed to someone else’s book club conversation the following afternoon to anonymous 
comments on the CBC’s website and so on.  There is a common space wherein the topic is 
being discussed and analyzed, but the places in which those conversations occur are 
myriad.18 
The public sphere is also extra-political and therefore distinct from the political 
landscape.  The public sphere is where discussions and debates over issues arise in the 
common mind.  The classical understanding of this is that what arises from the public sphere 
is enlightened, informed debate that has not been influenced by the will of those in power 
and is thus truly the will of the people and should be taken seriously by government in a 
paradigm that posits that the people are sovereign.19  That this is the actual case (now or at 
any time since the 18th century when the concept of a public sphere arose) is debatable and 
not particularly relevant for the purposes at hand.  What is important to understand is that 
the public sphere exists with the idea that “political power must be supervised and checked 
by something outside.”20  The public sphere, through reasoned debate (in theory), tempers 
political power21—it is “…a discourse of reason on and to power, rather than by power.22 
That the public sphere exists in profane time is important, in part, because it leads 
into notions of secularity.  Taylor uses the concept of profane time as one way to 
differentiate what happened with the rise of the public sphere in the 18th century from other 
occurrences of places and spaces of public discourse.  Using a very early definition of secular 
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that referred to something as ‘of the age’, that is, pertaining to profane time,” Taylor argues 
that the notion of the public sphere that arose in the 18th century incorporated a sense of 
profane time as opposed to “high time”—that is, time that was outside of the temporal 
continuum and akin to the notion of eternity.23  This is significant for it links with the notion 
that human society did not necessarily need to justify itself in a framework proscribed by 
either a deity or a system of laws that linked humanity to a higher plane or purpose.24  Taylor 
writes, in the context of the public sphere, that “modern ‘secularization’ can be seen from 
one angle as the rejection of higher times and the positing of time as purely profane.  Hence, 
the public sphere is not dependent upon the precepts of transcendent legitimators (i.e. God 
or myths of origin that legitimate societal legal systems) but upon the authority it grants itself 
by virtue of its social imaginary.  In other words, “…common agency (i.e. the public sphere) 
arises simply in and as a precipitate of common action.”25  This is important in terms of this 
study for part of the intention of this work is to explore current meanings of the term 
“secular” in order to determine whether or not the Canadian political landscape is or is not 
secular.  Thus one connotation of secular is that it denotes societies which see themselves as 
operating firmly in temporal time and space without needing to be legitimized by cultural 
myths and/or religious authority.26  Definitions of secularization are key components to the 
discourse on secularization theory. 
Methodology 
 The study explores the topic from four distinct vantage points: Canadian Church 
History, Environmental History, Secularization Theory, History of Canadian Environmental 
Policy and Legislation, and a Case Study incorporating the story of the Species At Risk Act 
and two of the major players in that story. 
Canadian Church History 
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  Canada grows ever richer with religious plurality.  As well, Canadian religious history 
is not complete without a judicious exploration of the contributions of a multiplicity of 
religious worldviews.  However, except for an exploration of Aboriginal worldviews—which 
are inherently what Westerners would call “religious”—this particular study concentrates on 
Christianity as the focal point of discussions regarding religious worldviews.  This is done 
entirely for the sake of brevity and it is hoped that in a later work the contributions of other 
religious worldviews can be examined.  
 The chapter on Canadian Church history will set the foundation for an historical 
understanding of the Church, in many of its manifestations, in Canada—pre- and post-
Confederation.  The purpose here is to use an understanding of the position of the Church 
with the State and with the population at large to undergird a later discussion regarding the 
ways in which Christian religious worldviews have influenced and continue to influence 
environmental policy and legislation in Canada.  Key components of this chapter will be 
issues of Establishment and Disestablishment; the fall of the Gallican and the rise of the 
Ultramontane Church in Quebec; fragmented Prostestantism; the rise and fall of Churches 
as shadow establishments in Canada; and the fundamental theological threads of dominion 
and sustainability that inform notions of how humanity relates to the natural world—a key 
issue in the development of environmental policy and legislation. 
Environmental History 
 This chapter provides background for a context of the development of 
environmental policy in Aboriginal communities and in the communities formed by 
Europeans in what later became known as Canada.  This portion of the study explores 
chronologies of environmental policies for the Aboriginal, the (mainly Western) European, 
and the Canadian communities.  The discussion moves within a framework informed, in 
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part, by environmental history and bioregionalism.  The overall contention of the chapter is 
that culture and space create place and that this notion is inextricably intertwined with 
ideology in the composing of public policy.27   
 This chapter introduces the notions of “embeddedness” and “disembeddedness” to 
discuss the relationship human beings have with the natural world.  It argues that there are 
varying degrees of an understanding of human embeddedness in the natural world and that 
those understandings are profoundly shaped by religion.  The argument imagines a spectrum 
with whole embeddedness on the one end and complete disembeddedness on the other.  At 
the former end are Aboriginal worldviews which envision complete and egalitarian 
relationships in the natural world.  This is a non-hierarchical, holistic model wherein 
humanity does not stand above, below or outside of the natural world.  In this conception, 
humanity is no more special or valuable than is the rest of the cosmos.  This does not mean 
that humanity does not have particular gifts (such as consciousness) that give it 
responsibilities that are different from that of Raven or Turtle (for example) but those 
responsibilities have no more value than those of Raven of Turtle.  It is a worldview of 
radical egalitarianism.  On the other end of the spectrum (and embodied by some particular 
Christian paradigms) is situated a worldview that sees humanity as being, by nature, above 
the natural world, even as they are doomed to inhabit it.  Humanity is in the world but not 
of it.  In this paradigm, the universe operates as a hierarchy where the natural world is 
conceived as a place of punishment and travail where humanity has been banished until such 
time as they might find themselves reunited in their “true home” with God.  The 
relationship that humanity has with the natural world in this purview is that of dominator—
humanity is seen as having been given the mandate to use the natural world to its own ends, 
to advance human flourishing.  The nuances of these two oppositional points of view, the 
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variety of imagined states of human embeddedness or disembeddedness in the natural world, 
and the theological notions of dominion and stewardship will also be investigated.   
 In the context of the discussion of dominion and stewardship, this chapter takes the 
opportunity to follow, in a very cursory way, the development of modernity through a 
discussion of Charles Taylor’s observations regarding the rise of social imaginaries that 
stemmed from the Reformation and revolved around issues of creating order out of chaos 
and maintaining equilibrium while scientific thought and European ethnocentrism developed 
and intertwined with the rise of modernity.  The chapter argues that this modern social 
imaginary gave rise to a theologically supported worldview of domination that has been 
dominant in Canadian environmental policy from before Confederation.  
Secularization Theory 
 It is important to note at the outset that the issue of whether or not religion is 
actually in decline in the West—a key point of contention in the field of secularization 
studies—will not be addressed in this work.  Many fine studies have been done in a variety 
of fields (religion, sociology, anthropology, history, political science, to name but a few) 
utilizing surveys and maps and other quantitative data and scholars continue to argue the 
interpretation of that data.  The interpretation and conclusions are important, but outside 
the purview of this study which is more interested in which (if any) theory of secularization 
might be most helpful in advancing its exploration.  Hence, the chapter on secularization 
theory is an exploration of a few of the varieties of secularization theory, their history, and 
the major proponents of each theory.   
 The categories being explored are the “classical” or what Charles Taylor refers to as 
the “orthodox”; the neosecularizationists; and the postsecularizationists.  Orthodox 
secularization theory is represented in this study by Steve Bruce (God is Dead) who states that 
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secularization should be defined as the inevitable decline of religion in modern society due to 
a number of factors. The proponents of this definition do not necessarily agree with the 
premise that religion will completely disappear, but do argue that religion is becoming and 
will continue to become less influential, authoritative and relevant in both public and private 
spheres.  This theory sees religion in society as functional.  There are nuances to these 
arguments, of course, that will be explored in depth in the chapter.   
 Neosecularizationists is a term coined by David Yamane (“Secularization on Trial: In 
Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm”), a sociologist at Wake Forest University who 
builds on the work of José Casanova (Public Religions in the Modern World), Mark Chaves 
(“Secularization as Declining Religious Authority”) and Olivier Tschannen (“Sociological 
Controversies in Perspective”) to construct a definition of secular that is founded on the 
importance of differentiation but limits the definition to differentiation of structures and 
institutions.  Thus, the presumption of differentiation as leading to the decline of individual 
religious belief and practice is abandoned in this construction, “what has changed,” writes 
Tschannen (72), “is not so much the individual’s relationship to religion as the position of 
religion within the social structure.”  For these proponents, all in varying degrees with 
nuances that will be explored, differentiation is secularization.28   
 Postsecularizationists, epitomized by Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, refute the 
contention that religion is declining in response to modernity and argue that the separation 
of church and state actually increases religious activity.  Postsecularizationists are in the line 
with other scholars, like Jeffrey Hadden, who assert that secularization theory needs to be 
abandoned as its tenets are false.  This version of secularization theory is built, in part, upon 
rational choice theory and the idea that religion in the Western world can be thought of as its 
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own supply-side economy where “deregulated” religions compete in a religious market for 
adherents. 
 After exploring these three varieties of secularization theories, the chapter will trace 
the history of secularization as a theory to provide context for discussion of the 
contemporary field.  Charles Taylor’s discussion of secularization and secularization theory 
serves as a bridge at this juncture of the chapter to both analyze the orthodox and the 
neosecularizationists (the former in light of Steve Bruce, the latter in light of Jose Casanova) 
and to introduce a further discussion of what secularization means in the context of 
modernity and the structures of the modern public sphere.  A discussion of privatization and 
the ways in which public spheres might operate differently in late or post-modernity is also 
included here, relying on Taylor, Casanova, David Martin and Danièle Hervieu-Léger for 
substantiation and illumination.  
 The exploration turns again to Taylor with the introduction of the concept of Michel 
Foucault’s term “unthought” and some space is given in this chapter to considering the ways 
in which this concept might serve to facilitate an analysis of how religion operates as a factor 
of secularization in the Canadian political landscape.  This discussion is part of a larger 
discussion of the Canadian political landscape and it is here that the study explores if, how 
and why there is a Canadian elite which accepts an orthodox definition of secularization and 
what the ramifications of this acceptance might be on Canada’s political landscape.  Several 
consequences are introduced:  one in regards to what it means to hold such a definition in an 
increasingly multi-cultural and pluralist society such as Canada.  Another consideration might 
be that such a definition precludes the policing of those who hold political power as 
holistically as might be needed due to foundational biases that preclude taking religion in the 
public sphere seriously.  
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History of Canadian Environmental Policy and Legislation 
 The purpose of this chapter is to build upon the history and theory of the previous 
chapters and begin to draw information together for the final analysis in chapter five.  
Environmental law is a modern concept with roots in 19th century tort law.  Environmental 
legislation, however, begins with property law—the first laws that delineated human 
relationships with one another and with land.  As well, Canadian environmental law cannot 
be fully discussed without mentioning treaties made between Europeans and Canada’s 
Aboriginal Nations.  This chapter also concerns itself with the ways in which Western legal 
systems in general developed.  This last necessitates a brief discussion of Natural Law which 
will, contrary to most discussions, centre on the works of Hans Grotius and John Locke 
rather than delve into any detailed analysis of Saints Augustine and Aquinas (although some 
small space is given to the aforementioned in the interest of intelligibly furthering the 
narrative).  This decision was made mainly in the interests of brevity but also with the 
understanding that notions of property law that are key to both Grotius and to Locke are 
more directly relevant to the discussion at hand than those of Augustine and Aquinas. 
 The chapter will begin by defining environmental law and its function within the 
Canadian legal sphere.  One, if not the, paramount issues of Canadian environmental law is 
that of scope and jurisdiction.  As will be seen in chapter five, scope and jurisdiction are the 
point where environmental groups, via the courts, most often gain traction in environmental 
matters.  This chapter lays the conceptual and legal ground work for that further discussion.  
As well, although these have historically been seen as federal/provincial issues, Aboriginal 
voices are becoming increasingly important in discussions around jurisdiction and scope.  
Another important component of environmental law in Canada is regulatory oversight and 
some space is given to its consideration.  
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 The next section in this chapter will consider the development of Western legal 
theory, specifically the points of legitimation and natural law.  The question of what makes a 
legal system possible from a pre-modern and a modern context is explored mostly using 
Grotius and Locke as points of comparative contact.  Natural law is an important 
consideration in this discussion because points of its development allowed for the eventual 
consideration that societies could exist independent of a divine mandate or of a divinely-
sanctioned legal code.  This important turn in history will be briefly discussed in the broader 
context of the development of modern, Western, legal thought.  This then leads to a 
discussion of authority—once the legitimacy of a system is established, by what right do laws 
get made and are people governed?  The development of British common law is discussed in 
this component, as well as an exploration of Deism and scientific method and how these 
worked, with the rise of humanism and individualism to inform the emerging government 
and legal theories of early modernity. 
 This chapter also explores a facet of modernity in the context of a discussion around 
private property—two closely intertwined conceptions that are mutually exclusive but when 
defined in tandem are more comprehensible.  The particular facet of modernity discussed 
here is that of categorization which itself arises from inductive reasoning, whereby one 
creates generalizations from particulars.  This chapter argues that this particular way of 
looking at the world is supported by and supports a view of human disembeddedness in the 
natural world that informs, among other things, a particular philosophy of legal theory and 
of environmental law.  The aspect of right relationship is raised in this section and the ways 
in which it undergirds the above philosophy of legal theory is investigated. 
 Private property is brought into the discussion as aspects of the modern state 
confirmed by Locke and Grotius as natural and necessary for human society.  Locke and 
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Grotius vary slightly in their opinions and that variance is analyzed in order that its 
implication for modern Canadian society can be extrapolated.  The main point derived from 
this part of the discussion is the impact of individualism and social construct and imaginary 
that the philosophies of Grotius and Locke had; and, in turn, the profound ramifications 
that the theological and sociological shift in which they participated had for the crafting and 
implementation of law, including the crafting and implementation of treaties which will be 
discussed in this same section of the chapter. In this way, the spectrum of embeddedness 
and disembeddedness is introduced as a point of contrast between European and Aboriginal 
systems of legal though and worldviews. 
 The penultimate section of chapter four examines Canadian environmental law in 
particular in light of the previous discussions and theoretical frameworks.  Situating the 
discussion in the broader context of one of the themes of modernity and the modern social 
imaginary which is to create order out of chaos, this section of the chapter asserts that 
environmental law at its most basic lies at the heart of that conversation.   
 One way in which order is discussed in this section is by looking at the ways in which 
the reasons and purposes for environmental laws changed over the course of the twentieth 
century.  This also necessitates a brief discussion of government responsibility and the text 
looks back to an earlier expostulation of the social gospel in Canada to underpin the 
discussion. 
 The final section of chapter four looks at the development of modern (since 1960) 
environmental law in Canada.  Interwoven with the historical information is the notion that 
environmental law is as reflective of ideas regarding democracy as it is of ideas on how to 
deal with the environment.  The impetus of environmental law is grassroots, by and large, 
and this section explores what that means even as it looks baldly at the legislation emerging 
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during this era.  Four phases of legislation are noted and discussed in this section:  Phase 
One is the Fisheries Act and the tools of property law, criminal law and torts; Phase Two is 
waste control and clean-up laws; Phase Three is toxins and control laws and a recognition 
that environmental protection is a long term process; Phase Four is discussed further in 
chapter five and deals with comprehensive approaches involving environmental assessment 
and planning and managing regimes.  This phase is also concerned with international as well 
as domestic environmental issues. 
Case History: The Species at Risk Act 
 This chapter provides a case study, a microcosm in which the important question of 
the relevance, import and existence of religious worldviews in the Canadian political 
landscape can be examined.  The first part of this chapter is a discussion of Canadian 
environmental policy and legislation that will provide the context for the story of the Species 
at Risk Act (SARA).  The second part examines the story of the SARA itself and the third 
part offers an analysis, via personal interviews, transcripts of standing committee meetings, 
legal briefs, and writings of two key players in the SARA story: the Honourable David 
Anderson and Ms. Elizabeth May. 
 Part two of chapter five shows how religious worldviews are present in a general way 
in the environmental policies of a government.  This is done by examining the written 
policies of the federal Liberals between the years of 1993 and 2004 and by an analysis of the 
implementation of those policies.  The policies of the preceding Progressive Conservatives 
regarding environmental issues are also examined as a precursor to the more in-depth 
exploration.   
 The background of the SARA is then explained, beginning with the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity.  The story of the SARA is intertwined with the socio-
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economic and political climate of the 1990’s which saw a shift to the right in terms of social 
and monetary policy.  The recession of this same period also plays a part.  As well, the 
Quebec Referendum of 1995, where Quebeckers were given the opportunity to vote on 
whether or not to remain part of Canada, looms large in the background story of the SARA.  
It will be seen that questions of national unity and fiscal responsibility in many ways seemed 
to be more important to the polis than did issues concerning the environment and that 
general phenomenon and its ramifications for environmental legislation as a whole will be 
discussed at length as a theme to the entire chapter.  The SARA is then followed from its 
introductory White Paper in the early 1990’s to its eventual proclamation in 2002.   
 Following the story of the SARA, the chapter introduces Mr. Anderson and Ms. 
May, explores the SARA from each of their perspectives and offers an analysis regarding 
their individual participation in the public sphere and their religious worldviews.  It is hoped 
that by telling and analyzing the story of SARA and two of the characters at the heart of its 
plot that it will be possible to see that not only are religious worldviews extant, but that when 
they are acknowledged as overall components of the political whole, they are beneficial 
rather than detrimental to the Canadian political landscape. 
 
Justification/Application of Theory:  
The application of Charles Taylor and José Casanova’s commentaries (see above) 
regarding secularist theory is necessary and appropriate in considering an analysis as set out 
above.  Secularization theory, in general, argues that western culture has become secular (in 
the sense that public space has divested itself of religion) and, as such, religion is not any 
more of a serious “player” in the setting of public policy as it once was.  Taylor, Casanova 
and Van Die all caution against this broad sweeping assumption.  To take Van Die one step 





                                                          
significant role in public policy—although not in the same institutional way it once did.  To 
introduce religion as a necessary and legitimate voice within the public as well as the 
voluntary sphere will contribute to the current debate over the relevance of secularist theory 
and religion in Canadian society by allowing scholars to re-evaluate what is meant by 
religion, what is its actual place within the public sphere and, what should its place be in an 
evolving democracy.   This, in concert with Charles Taylor’s “conditions of belief”, could 
also highlight models of societal discourse already extant that need only to be brought to the 
fore to encourage the legitimizing by the polis of disparate voices within the Canadian 
franchise. 
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Chapter One: Church and State in Canada 
To understand the ways in which Christian religious worldviews have influenced 
environmental policy and legislation, it is necessary to understand the history of the Church 
in Canada and its relationship with the populace in general and with the State in particular.  
What becomes apparent is that the mid-18th century marks a watershed whereby the elite in 
both Upper and Lower Canada (somewhat less so in Atlantic Canada and the Northwest) 
struggle in earnest to redefine the place of institutional religion within the State.  This is not 
to say that the general polis is uninterested or uninformed in or about the debate.  Rather, 
that the conversations that have immediate impact on the workings of government (and of 
course, to which we are privy) in terms of power and the shaping of policy and legislation 
happen, for the most part, from the top.  This is hardly a remarkable observation, but it is 
imperative that it be understood for this lays groundwork for a later argument that religion 
continues to matter for both the general polis and for the elite on into the present day.  
Establishing missions to the Aboriginals, the continual waxing and waning of authority over 
the general populace of New France and then Lower Canada by the Catholic Church, the 
struggle by that same body against the establishment of the Church of England after the 
British Conquest, the fragmented Protestant churches’ resistance to that same establishment, 
the demise of the Gallican and the rise of the Ultramontane Church, the development and 
demise of the churches as shadow establishments are all key components to understanding 
the relationship Christian churches have had with the State during Canada’s history.  A 
history of the Church in Canada also assists in the understanding of the ways in which the 
fundamental theological threads of dominion and sustainability made their way across the 
Atlantic.  While this section will deal almost exclusively with the question of Church and 
European established governments within Canada, there will be a brief discussion of the 
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ways in which Aboriginal worldviews and the Church had contact, collided and formed 
relationships.1   
The modern nation of Canada is the product of two western European powers each 
with their own religious establishment.  Incorporated into that is the history of the 
relationship each power had with Aboriginal nations before Confederation and the ongoing 
negotiations after Confederation.  Traditionally, churches in Canada have functioned as 
shadow establishments, or informal as opposed to formal, establishments sanctioned by the 
State.2  These churches have traditionally held strong links to the political, economic and 
cultural elites within Canada, even though Canada has no official establishment church.  To 
be sure, sectarianism has played a role in Canada’s history—Methodism and the thwarting of 
the Church of England’s claims to religious priority are but one example—but the large 
churches have dominated the landscape from at least the eighteenth century.  The Roman 
Catholic Church is the largest of these and this exploration will begin with that story, in 
particular the history of ultramontanism.   
Roman Catholicism 
According to the 2001 census data, 43.2% of Canadians who profess to be either 
Roman Catholic or Protestant (72%) identify themselves as Roman Catholic. In Quebec, 
especially the Roman Catholic Church, enstated by the Crown in the Quebec Act of 1774 
and the Constitution Act of 1791, held a sort of “moral monopoly” until the mid-20th 
century.  Conservative and ultramontanistic, the Church reigned as a virtual theocracy in 
Quebec, its influence fading slightly in the last and first decades of the 18th and 19th centuries 
and then coming clearly back into power after 1837 to reign once more until the Quiet 
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Revolution in the 1960’s.3  The importance of the Catholic Church for Canada as a whole 
can be glimpsed in a recounting of some earlier history.    
The first settlers in New France were Roman Catholic.  In the early 16th century, 
Jaques Cartier had erected a cross on the banks of the St. Lawrence and read the gospels to 
the natives of Hochelaga—indications that his voyages were, in part, in the interests of 
winning converts amongst the Aboriginals.  But it was not until Samuel Champlain’s voyages 
and settlements that the Church set solid, permanent foot on Canadian soil.   
In order to understand the Catholicism that came to Canada with the settlers of New 
France, one must look to Europe, the Protestant Reformation, the Council of Trent and to 
what is commonly called Tridentine Catholicism or Catholicism of the early modern period.  
Father Robert Bireley, S.J., a Jesuit Historian and President of the American Catholic History 
Association argues that this period “can best be understood within (a) pattern of the 
Church’s regular need to accommodate to a changing world”.4  This is significant, for the 
changes in the social imaginary of Europe in this period were reflected in the changes within 
the church and had real repercussions for the ways in which Catholicism took root and was 
practiced in New France.      
The Protestant Reformation was arguably central in the shift of the social imaginary 
of Europe in the 16th century.5  Reformers promoted the exclusivity of scripture (sola 
scriptura) as God’s revelation to humanity and the duty of individual Christians to read and 
interpret the Scripture with the aid of the Holy Spirit.  The centrality of God and God’s 
magnificence and grace were magnified while the belief in the capacity of human beings to 
influence their salvation by rituals or religious customs was soundly rejected.  The hierarchy 
that had been put in place by the Church that gave primacy to clergy and religious orders in 
the eyes of God was also rejected for the ostensibly more egalitarian belief that salvation was 
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available to the lay person in the world at large. In addition, the Reformers elevated the state 
of marriage to one of spiritual dignity, disdaining the claims that celibacy was closest to 
Godliness.  Preaching of the Word was central to worship as discernment of the Word was 
in everyday life.  But most important to the point at hand was the rejection of ecclesiastical 
authority: pope, council, bishop, priest.6  The radical nature of this rejection can be seen 
when it is remembered that the Church heretofore had been acknowledged as the voice of 
God on Earth and Christ’s sanctioned vehicle for salvation.  To be sure, the behaviour of 
the upper echelons of the Church hierarchy had not endeared them to the masses, nor been 
in any way exemplary enough as a body to command the respect that had been given by the 
people in earlier times. However, the Church as institution was still seen as a divine presence 
and belief in its ultimate authority as an institution did not fade easily from collective 
memory.  The aftermath of the rejection of that authority is the thread that will be followed 
in the ensuing discussion. 
The convening of the Council of Trent in 1545 coalesced into a general plan of 
reform for the international Catholic Church and was in many ways the Catholic response to 
the Protestant Reformation.7  Doctrinal issues were addressed and disciplinary reforms 
undertaken that encompassed liturgy (including preaching), training and residency of clergy 
and bishops.  Bireley also points out that these changes were not only attempts to make 
Catholic Christianity more relevant, but also to establish order out of the chaotic beginnings 
of the 16th century.8  This is important in that it shows Catholics as well as Protestants had 
this desire to create order out of chaos—assuring that there was both a French and an 
English impetus along these lines.  Different ecclesiologies still resulted in a fundamental 
theology that recognizes a divine mandate for order—as well as an understanding that this 
order must be imposed from the top down.  This translates later into particular prescriptions 
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and requirements for defining property rights, ownership and policies over how the natural 
environment is to be viewed and treated. 
As Choquette (and others) have pointed out, these reforms were hard to implement 
for a variety of reasons9--the intractability of some clergy, the low-level of religious 
education among the laity, and the lack of autonomy of the Catholic Church.10  Political, if 
not ecclesiastical, power over the churches was wielded by the monarchs. 
However, the Church was not completely without the clout of a nation-state.  As the 
nation-states began to consolidate and centralize power over their geographical area, the 
Catholic Church did the same.  Pope Nicholas V saw the need for a well-organized, 
established papal state and made that so in 1450 by establishing residence in Rome.  The 
church was losing income through the loss of its holdings in Europe (as the other nation- 
states consolidated their power) and compensated by imposing taxes within the papal state.  
Jean Delumeau reports that “by 1600 the popes disposed of a state that administratively was 
the equal, if not the superior of any other state in Europe.”11  This bolstered the Papacy’s 
status and power within the Church but that did not translate to actual power within the 
other States of Europe.  One chief reason for this was the Church’s need for the support of 
those states “first against conciliarism and then against the Reformation”12 The States had 
the power, still, to nominate their own bishops, thus assuring loyalty to the State first and 
secondly, to Rome.13  The power to nominate bishops (and to assign clergy) was not 
inconsiderable and was a key political tool; one which was vied for vigorously during 
Canada’s early development, especially after the British Conquest.   
The Catholic Church in France was caught up in a revival movement in the 17th 
century in the years between the Wars of Religion (1559-1598) and the Thirty Years’ War 
(1618-1648).  This was at the same time that the decrees from the Council at Trent were 
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being implemented in France.  Two central players in the revivals were François de Sales and 
Pierre de Bérulle, each of which came from disparate ends of the theological spectrum.  De 
Sales taught “the possibility of becoming saintly in all walks of life by the mere fulfillment of 
one’s duty, providing it was done in the love of God and neighbour.”14  Bérulle developed a 
more austere school centred on “the sovereign majesty of God”.  Fulfillment of one’s duty 
in love was not enough to achieve salvation, as God was removed from the grasp of 
humanity and could only be reached via His son Jesus Christ.  “The spiritual road required 
much self-denial and asceticism in order for the disciple to become worthy…”15  New 
religious congregations sprung up at this time that reflected the reforms.  Of these, the 
Gentlemen of Saint-Sulpice (Suplicans) joined with the Jesuits, the Recollet Friars and the 
Capuchins as the four major male religious congregations active in early New France.  In 
addition, Duke Henri de Lévy’s secret society The Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement (1627-1665) 
produced many of the leaders of the early Canadian church.  This group was made up of 
“influential, wealthy and devoted men and women, both clerical and lay, who wanted to 
work discreetly in the interests of the Catholic Church.”16  The revivals and implementation 
of reforms and the new religious congregations are reflective of people within an institution 
struggling to engage and shape that institution to their own needs and to the perceived needs 
of society as a whole.  And, as Choquette points out, the Catholics were fundamentally 
united in “authority and discipline around the teachings and the church structures endorsed 
by Rome…”17  The disagreements were mostly centred on conflicting interests and 
jockeying for position by these groups within the Church.  But the authority of the 
institution as such was not in question—even if there was a question as to whether Rome or 
the national church headed by the monarch was the ultimate authority.  This contrasts 
deeply with the decentralized Protestant movements where the ecclesiastical authority was 
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not Rome interpreted through the ruler of the nation state but rather the Church sanctioned 
and established by the State18 and interpreted (except in the case of Anglicanism)19 by a 
variety of congregations.  It was also at this time (1632-1657) that a state-supported church 
with essentially a Jesuit monopoly was in operation in New France.20 
It is important to note that the settlers of New France were, for the most part, 
Roman Catholics and not Huguenots or other Protestants.  This is significant, for it 
solidified the religious divide between French and British Canada, a fact upon which I will 
expand below.  Protestants and Catholics had both been a presence in New France from 
1604 (founding of Acadia) until 1627 when Cardinal Richelieu’s government excluded 
Protestants from New France under the creation of the Company of New France.  After 
Cardinal Richelieu revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685, the effort to eradicate Protestants 
from New France became more concentrated—especially under the Jesuits.  As well, the 
heightened persecutions encouraged Huguenots to look elsewhere and North American 
immigration concentrated in South Carolina, New York and Massachusetts.  This is 
significant, again, because it solidified a religious component to the divide between French 
and British that was historically fraught and undergirded nationalism on both sides.  To be 
sure, the Protestant presence was still in New France, but it was comparatively miniscule 
until the mid-18th century. 
While the Jesuits had a mandate to eradicate religious dissenters in the form of 
Protestants, they also, along with the other religious congregations, had a duty to evangelize 
the Aboriginal population.21  This missionary zeal was not only borne out of the 
fundamental Christian dictum to “make believers of all people”22 but also out of the firm 
belief that Europeans were superior to the Aboriginals.  This European superiority, came not 
only from their conviction that they had cornered the market on spiritual “truth”, but from 
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their demonstrated ability to create order out of chaos and what they saw as their advanced 
technology.  This technology, they believed, was such that it enabled them to understand the 
world more clearly than the Aboriginals and therefore it was intuitively obvious that they 
understood God most completely.  For the very mind of God could be discerned by the 
observation of the natural world.  This observation had enabled the European to develop 
technologies that allowed them to subdue the natural world in ways that they believed to be 
superior to the Aboriginal understanding.  
It is here that the discussion regarding population numbers of the Aboriginals 
becomes important.  Canada in the 17th century was not as densely populated as it had been 
a century before.  It is quite likely that the French did not observe any signs of wide-spread 
agriculture or what we would refer to as systematic resource management.  This perceived 
inability of the Aboriginal peoples to use the natural world in ways that would be akin to 
those of the Europeans only exacerbated the disdain for the Aboriginal worldview.23  Thus, 
what Choquette calls the “powerful, aggressive, and conquering religious force” that was the 
Catholic missionary presence in New France can be seen as being supported by a dominion 
theology that insists on cultivating and civilizing not only the natural world but the peoples 
within it.  The Aboriginals were seen as embedded in the natural world and, as such, were 
conceived of as savages.24  Thus, collision of cultures in the form of an environmental crisis 
(disease brought by the Europeans) had ramifications for the ways in which the natural 
world of Canada was perceived.  The reduction in numbers decreased somewhat the visible 
impact of Aboriginals on the land and, in part, enabled the Europeans to see them as they 
did (uncivilized and ill-equipped to manage the tremendous heritage of natural resources 
bestowed upon them).   
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For the Europeans, the wilderness of Canada, the mythological “forest primeval” 
attracted people with its romanticism and parallels with the Garden of Eden, but also 
frightened them with its hidden mysteries and (presumably) demons.  Cultivation of the land 
was necessary not only for economic but spiritual reasons—God had mandated humanity to 
till the land and reap the riches therein.  To leave it in a state of what they would have 
perceived as unruliness was to go against everything they had been taught about God’s 
wishes and their own newly found capabilities for mastery.  That they included the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada in this program of cultivation is not unremarkable as, in some 
ways, they were seen as part and parcel of the unruliness that filled the New World.  In fact, 
the desire to “civilize” the Aboriginal populations of New France is not so very far from the 
early reformers’ need to subdue carnivals and other religious festivals of the Middle Ages in 
order to create a more ordered society.25 
As has been mentioned, the Church in France at the time of the establishment of 
New France was operating in the mode of Gallicanism.  Gallicanism, according to 
Choquette was  
…the particular form of nationalism of French Catholics, an 
attitude that amounted to the belief that the Catholic Church 
in France was French before being Roman, insuring thereby 
the autonomy of the Church of France before Roman 
authority, but simultaneously entailing dependence of the 
church on the French State.26 
In addition, Gallicanism of the 17th and 18th century was perceived as being intertwined with 
a particularly strict and harsh form of Catholicism promoted by Cornelius Jansen.27  Jansen’s 
teachings arose out of a kind of determinism that was sceptical of free will and which held a 
very dim view of humanity’s ability to emerge from their sinful predilections—even with 
God’s help.  The teachings, as a consequence, prescribed harsh and rigorous discipline.28  It 
is important to point out, however, that the teachings of de Sales in the 17th century revivals 
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countered and at some points overcame the darker and more pessimistic understanding of 
human nature proffered by the Jansenists. 
 Jansenist ideology was present in Canada, although unofficially, in the persons of 
some of the Church hierarchy.  The second bishop of Quebec, Jean Baptiste de Saint-Vallier 
produced a compendium of church teachings rife with the “theological and spiritual 
pessimism and rigor” of the movement.29  It was also present in the Sulpician fathers and 
contributed to the animosity between them and the Jesuits. 
 Gallicanism was perceived to be inextricably intertwined with Jansenist ideology, and 
groups that opposed the pessimism and low anthropology30 of the Jansenists used the 
movement to assert their own agenda of centralized authority in Rome in addition to a more 
optimistic theology that promoted the fundamental goodness of redeemed Christians.31  The 
most prominent of these groups was the Jesuits. 
 The political history of the Gallicanist factions and what later came to be known as 
the ultramontanist factions is fascinating but too lengthy for the purposes of this study.  
Suffice it to say that the appointment of bishops and the implementation of the tenets of the 
Council of Trent became integral in the positioning of each faction and in the eventual 
outcome of the clash of ideologies.  The Church was responsible for the education and 
social welfare of the settlers (not to mention their spiritual welfare) and the influence that 
they had was considerable.32 
 Historians divide the history of the French Church in Canada between the years 
before and after 1663, when the monarchy in France revoked the charter of the Company of 
New France and made New France a French province.  New France under the Company 
and under the Jesuits who themselves were supported by the colonial governments was a 
place still populated by Europeans with enchanted worldviews.  This was a time, as 
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Choquette writes, of “miracles, martyrs and mysticism”; God spoke through a variety of 
ways, including natural disasters.33  The fact that New France was not densely populated and 
that the settlers were on the whole more rural than urban played an important part in this as 
well.  It should also be noted that the authority of the church was upheld by the colonial 
government and vice versa.  This hierarchical social imaginary was also supported by the 
seigniorial system that had been transplanted from France. 
 Between 1663 and 1673, the population of New France doubled—some of this 
being achieved by the importing of a bevy of women into the colony and an ensuing baby 
boom.  The number of clergy also dropped.  But, as Choquette and others have noted, the 
Catholicism practiced by the colonists in New France was not entirely clergy-driven, as the 
worldview was still not dis-enchanted.  Festivals, relics, pilgrimages were all part of the daily 
lives and understandings of the people—who saw these as necessary attributes in a life that 
was controlled by unseen forces who could only be kept at bay by an omnipotent God.  In 
addition, as it moved into the 18th and 19th centuries, the Jansenist pessimism and 
Gallicanism began to be replaced by a more benign view of God, even as the 
authoritarianism present in the monarchical hold over the church gave way to a pontifical 
centralization.  From the beginning, the Church in Canada was intertwined with the State—
whether it be the French monarchy, Rome, or the British Empire.  Even as ultramontanism 
became entrenched on Canadian soil, the Church still maintained its ties and influence with 
the government of the day; all the while ensuring its firm embededness with French 
Canadian nationalism. 
Ultramontanism is, in part, a reaction to modernity.  The term itself means “beyond 
the mountains” and was applied, at first, to French Catholics who looked beyond the Alps to 
Rome for the answers to their church’s problems and questions.34  In their desire to separate 
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the Church in France from what they saw as stifling government control, the persons in this 
movement sought to make Rome the ultimate in church authority.  They hoped that in this 
way the Church would not be influenced or subjugated by the government and that the 
taking on of ecclesiastical authority by Rome would effect a balance of powers, giving the 
church more say and influence then they felt it now had.  The movement had started out 
slowly, in the seventeenth century and gained momentum after the French Revolution and 
the “various horrors” associated with it during the 1790’s.35  The first leader of the 
movement during mid-nineteenth century ultramontanism was Father Félicité de Lamennais.  
Father Lamennais was critical of individual reason, rationalism, and atheism and strongly in 
favour of a strong, autonomous Church.36   He saw Catholicism as the Universal Church and 
believed in the necessity for humankind of a theocracy.  The way to ensure these, he 
believed, was to free the Church from government auspices, establish freedom of religion 
(or, more specifically, freedom for the Church to run schools in the way they saw best), and 
champion freedom of the press.  All liberal ideas.  But not meant in any way, shape or form 
to liberalize society.  What he wanted, and what his followers wanted, was the freedom to 
create a theocracy outside the purview of the modern nation state.  The ideal towards which 
Lemannais and his followers strove was not that much different than the ideal of Calvin—
which could only have been made manifest from the interior of a disestablished Church.  
Autonomy would lead to theocracy, if Lemannais had anything to say about it.  And he had a 
great deal to say.  What is so interesting here is that Lemannais embraces the tenets of 
liberalism for very conservative ends.  But, in the beginning, he was so misunderstood that, 
to his shock, Pope Gregory XVI condemned his thoughts in 1832.  When Lemannais 
produced a book in answer to Gregory XVI’s condemnation—stating that the Pope’s 
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authority did not include the political sphere, Gregory condemned that in 1834 and Father 
Lemannais abandoned the Church and eventually, Christianity. 
Choquette makes an important observation when he notes that Gregory XVI’s 
condemnations—in the form of encyclicals, firmly established the Roman Catholic Church 
as being against the liberal ideology that ensued from the American and French Revolutions.  
The Roman Catholic Church had taken a stand on liberalism and modernity—against 
republicanism and the conception of what it meant to be an autonomous citizen of a 
modern nation-state.37  Thus, the hallmarks of ultramontanism were: anti-liberal and 
conservative, theocratic and hence, pope-centric—as the Pope was the Vicar of Christ on 
Earth and His voice of authority, anti-scholarly, pietistic, aggressively missionary, intolerant 
and censorious.  In addition, this form of Catholicism taught a rigid moral code, based on 
the firm belief in the depravity of human beings where “obedience was the foremost virtue, 
and sexual misbehaviour the leading sin.” 38 In the end, the ultramontane Church adopted a 
“Roman” style of worship that was elaborate and ornate.  It became hostile to modern ideas 
and insisted upon the privileged place of the church in society.39  Some other precepts of 
ultramontanism were:  that the church should be free from the authority of the state, that the 
pope was infallible, that education should be controlled by the church, that citizens should 
be obedient and that Catholicism should come before patriotism in the hearts and minds of 
the people.40  It was this ideology that Jean-Jacques Lartigue brought with him as the first 
bishop of Montreal. 
  Ultramontanism took root in Lower Canada between 1820 and 1830 and was fully 
entrenched by the second half of the century—taking hold, in part, due to the fallout of the 
1837 Rebellion. It arrived in the person of Jean-Jacques Lartigue the first bishop of Montreal 
and was perpetuated by his eventual successor, Ignace Bourget.  Lartigue established a 
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cathedral and a seminary in which ultramontanism was preached and taught.  Although 
Lartigue was not officially recognized as bishop until 1836, due to a variety of political 
machinations, he was able to influence a generation of priests who in turn spread the 
ideology to their congregations. In that time he laid the foundations for the success of 
ultramontanism in Canada.   
The power relationship that existed between church and state under Gallicanism was 
less unequal that that experienced between the Catholic Church of Lower Canada and the 
British Crown and, as such, was more conducive to an agreeable working relationship.  The 
Gallican church had status and a position in the state (keeper of the spiritual health of the 
nation, and providing for the care of the sick, the poor and the uneducated of society).  The 
state had resources and power and the capacity for providing security.   
 Under the British crown, the Church had no status as their belief system was seen as 
heretical and their religious practices as superstition and idolatry.  Their position was less 
dignified because they lacked the moral or historic authority that they had held under the 
French system.  In this paradigm, the Church had a much more difficult time refusing to do 
the bidding of the state for fear that they would lose everything.41 Under the Gallican 
system, the power to excommunicate was as real as the political connections one might have 
formed at court or the family alliances one might have.   
Bishop Lartigue took up his bishopric (in title, if not in recognition by his entire 
flock or of the government) on the heels of Bishop Plessis’ alliance with the crown against 
the Parti Canadien and by the Lower Canadian’s proven loyalty during the War of 1812.  And 
this was the reality of the political situation.  The Catholic Church in Lower Canada was not 
independent, it was subject to the whims and will of the British crown.  The British 
government had to be consulted and had to approve the appointment of priests and of 
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bishops.42  When Bishop Plessis wished to divide the diocese of Quebec, he not only had to 
convince the Vatican, but the British crown as well.  To be sure, this subjugation to the 
crown was not new, but the power dynamic inherent in the new system was.  The Church 
existed by the grace of the British and because it was politically expedient for the moment.  This 
lack of independence from the State fostered a disconnect between the Church hierarchy 
and the populace.  In addition, it also made for fertile ground for the kind of ultramontanism 
that eventually flourished. 
 The 1837 Rebellion was a turning point for the Catholic Church in Lower Canada.  
The Parti Canadien,  a group of middle-class French Canadians who wanted to take power 
away from the Catholic Church and from the Anglophone merchant elite, were seeking 
legislative and fiscal reform.  They also, as Choquette writes, “…fought for greater political 
rights and an increased role in society for (themselves), thereby supplanting the clergy in its 
role of intermediary between the people and the colonial government.”43 A variety of 
incidents led to a full-fledged rebellion which was subsequently put down by the British. 
 Lartigue spoke against the rebellion, from his ultramontane convictions that to rebel 
against legitimate authority was wrong.  Whether or not the rebels saw the crown as 
legitimate authority was immaterial to Lartigue.   
 Again, the philosophical discussion between the Gallicans and the Ultramontanists 
was perpetuated by the political situation in which the French Roman Catholic Church 
found itself after the British Conquest of New France.  The Articles of Capitulation for both 
Quebec and Montreal grant “the full exercise of the Roman religion”44 but the Treaty of 
Paris goes on to state those freedoms are granted “as far as the laws of Great Britain 
permit.”45 Since the Catholics of Great Britain had yet to be emancipated, this statement was 
confusing at best and at the very worse, rather ominous.  Further legal study by the law 
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officers of the crown resulted in a relief of the ambiguity—treaty law trumped statute law 
and, as such, Canada’s Catholics were free to practice their faith without fear of reprisal. 
 All of that was, of course, on paper.  In actuality, the first governors of Lower 
Canada were enjoined by the crown and by the Anglican Church to Anglicanize the 
population of Lower Canada as quickly as possible.  These entreaties went largely unheeded, 
however, as many of the governors found it more politically tactful to work at building 
alliances with His Majesty’s reluctant new subjects.   
 The Church hierarchy was aware of this motive, of course, and walked a fine line 
themselves, between deference to the new ruling class and maintaining an identity as a 
people and a Church.  The plight of the Acadians was fresh in collective memory and Lower 
Canada did not want to suffer the same fate. 
When New France was taken over by the British Crown, Roman Catholicism was 
integral to its very being.  At the time, of course, Roman Catholics in Britain were under 
proscription and the Canadians waited warily to see what the Crown would decide.  What 
emerged was a policy of pragmatism that was to serve the country and the Roman Catholic 
Church well.  The various documents from 1759 to 1762 clearly grant Roman Catholics the 
freedom to practice their religion, although as mentioned, the clause “as far as the laws of 
Great Britain will permit” made the church’s freedoms seem somewhat tenuous.  In fact, 
General Murray was instructed by the Crown to lay the groundwork for the establishment of 
the Anglican Church in Quebec and for the conversion of the population.  Murray 
disregarded these instructions, preferring to err on the side of political stability and domestic 
tranquility.  Carleton, his successor did the same.  On the Roman Catholic end, the Church 
prayed for the British monarch in its liturgy, went into official mourning upon the King’s 
death and sang the Te Deum in honour of the marriage and coronation of King George III.  
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Carleton stressed this spirit of loyalty and cooperation displayed by the Canadians and 
lobbied the Crown to enshrine this freedom of religion in the Quebec Act of 1774 in order 
that His Majesty’s royal person and government might gain their continuing affections.46 The 
Act did grant freedom to practice Roman Catholicism and the right to collect tithes from the 
Catholic population—a provision that put the Roman Catholic Church on somewhat of the 
same footing as any other established church.47  Most importantly, however, the Quebec Act 
revoked the policy of Anglicization.  Although an edict was issued to Carleton in 1775, 
revoking many of the privileges and reinstating the policy of Anglicanization, Carleton 
simply ignored it and the Roman Catholic Church went about its business.  The goodwill 
built up between the governor and the Canadian Roman Catholic church paid off 
handsomely for the Crown in 1774/1775 when the first American Congress asked the 
Canadians to join in their rebellion.  That same Congress had issued a bitter retort to the 
Quebec Act, accusing the Crown of granting emancipation to a detestable religion.  When 
that same Congress promised freedom of religion to the Canadians if they agreed to help, 
the Canadians understandably said “no”.  Furthermore, when Carleton became alarmed at 
the early effectiveness of the rebellion he enlisted the aid of the Church.  Sermons were 
preached and a directive ordered that the Canadians repay King George’s gentle government 
by remaining loyal to the Crown.  In addition, the clergy threatened to excommunicate any 
Canadien found to be supporting the rebels.  The full power of the church was integral in 
routing any hope the Americans had for support in Canada for their revolution. 
However, it must be pointed out that while the Church hierarchy worked hand in 
glove with the British, not all of the Canadiens were so sanguine.  Despite pastoral letters to 
the contrary, some of the Canadiens had stood with the American forces or, at the very least, 
showed a marked lack of interest in supporting the British against the Americans.  Although 
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Bishop Briand denounced those who had been disobedient as mostly “poor wretches, 
beggars and drunkards,”48 he was dismayed at the blatant disregard for his authority.  Gil 
Chausse writes in A Concise History of Christianity in Canada that, although this disregard for 
Briand’s wishes was not reflective of “…a wish to call into question their adherence to 
Catholicism...(a) breath of freedom had touched them.”49  This “breath of freedom”—in the 
form of letters from the American Congress and an appeal by the Comte d’Estaing—writes 
Chausse, ensured that the Canadiens would from then on prove to be reluctant in their 
defence of king, country or in their obedience to Church leaders in this regard.50  This is 
significant in that it shows the Canadiens as less servile to the Church than is often thought.  
The significance for the purposes of this study are that it shows a tradition or trend of 
independence of thought of the polis and a gap between the understandings and desires of 
the elite within the Church and the State and those who are being governed.  This gap in 
understanding between what the elite think the polis ought to believe and what the polis itself 
does believe widens with time. 
In addition to the issues of authority, the Catholic bishops had other problems.  The 
Anglican bishop of Québec, Jacob Mountain, was intent on forcing the issue of 
establishment and worked tirelessly towards that end from his arrival in 1793.  He was 
supported by a small number of key British officials who also were eager to subjugate the 
Catholic Church in favour of the Church of England.  Mountain was keen for the governor 
to enforce the rules of establishment in Quebec.  He and his cohorts attempted to establish 
Protestant schools and also endeavoured to have the governor appoint clergy.51  These 
attempts and others might eventually have worked, but another war changed the fortunes of 
the Catholic Church and thwarted Mountain’s efforts at Anglicization.  The War of 1812 and 
the unflagging loyalty of Bishop Plessis was rewarded in the end by his being recognized as 
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the “bishop of the Roman Catholic Church of Quebec” and being given a seat on the 
Legislative Council.52  The consequence of this was that the British government in essence 
acknowledged that the Roman Catholic Church was, in fact, the Church in Quebec.  This 
acknowledgement had many ramifications—one of which was that the Catholic Church 
(especially after Confederation) had an ear of government and for years stood shoulder to 
shoulder with the Anglican Church as a shadow establishment, rather than in the shadow of 
the Church of England. 
Thus, although the aforementioned practice of compromise and cooperation was not 
the only facet of church/state relations, it was one aspect that in part went a long way 
towards securing the future of the Canada we know today.  It also made way for a social 
imaginary that had within it an element of pragmatism towards religion.  The early governors 
were keenly aware of the power religion held over the polis.  They were skilled in using that 
power in a way that was politically savvy.  If they had discounted the strategic importance of 
religion, Canada might look very different today.   From the beginnings, religion was a key 
element to keeping peace and maintaining political stability—it was a force to take seriously 
and to reckon with.  What often gets lost in this analysis, though, is the fact that religion was 
such a powerful force that people believed in the transcendent good of their religious 
principles.  The laws set down by the government were seen to be reflective and derivative 
of God’s laws.  This ideal was a perception that remained with the populace, even as 
religious practice itself became more of a personal choice and less of a social given. 
The struggle for power between the Catholic Church in Lower Canada and the lay 
intelligentsia is another key component in understanding the relationship between Church 
and State in Canada.  Influenced strongly by the precepts of the Enlightenment and by the 
French Revolution, many leaders of the Legislative Assembly had a vision for Lower Canada 
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that differed from that of the Catholic Church.  Fiercely egalitarian, they were committed to 
a society in which lay voices, not clergy, held authority in temporal matters.53  To this end, 
they introduced both the Assembly Schools Act of 1829 (which created a system of schools 
that were under the auspice of the Assembly, not the Church, and which were supervised by 
trustees who were democratically elected), and the Parish Councils (or Notables) bill of 1831 
which gave landholders positions on parish councils.  This last was to give the laity leverage 
and say in their own governance and “…thereby lessen the influence of the clergy in the 
running of parish councils and among the people with a view eventually to gaining the upper 
hand over the church.”54  The church hierarchy bitterly opposed these measures, concluding 
rightly that taking the education and governance of the people out of the hands of the 
Church would deprive that institution of its ability to mould society as it saw fit. 
The struggle for the right to represent the general populace and to craft a society that 
would best suit them escalated until its conclusion in 1837.  Driven by the leadership of 
Louis-Joseph Papineau, the leader of the Patriote Party in Montreal, the political leadership 
strove to separate themselves from British colonial rule.  Worried that Papineau’s rhetoric 
would result in armed conflict against the British crown, Bishop Lartigue intervened and 
pleaded cooler heads to prevail and armed revolution to be eschewed.  He issued a pastoral 
letter based on moral grounds reminding the faithful, among other things, that “Catholics 
were forbidden to oppose with force the legitimate authorities, to whom they owed respect 
and obedience.”55  The rebellion that followed was quashed and the leaders discredited by 
the spectacular failure of the endeavour.  Chausse raises two very important points here:  
First, that Bishop Lartigue was against independence because he believed that an 
independent Lower Canada would become “puppets of their American neighbours” and that 
could not be good for Catholics.56  Second, that the effects of the Bishop’s actions towards 
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the rebellion, while not good for church numbers in the short run, was a tremendous success 
for the Church in the long run.  The Church supported the people who had been thrown 
into prison during the rebellion, and intervened with the British authorities on the question 
of united Upper and Lower Canada.  “Through its good deeds,” wrote Bishop Bourget, “the 
Church managed to restore that trust in their clergy which the people had lost for a while.”57  
Most importantly, the Church re-established itself as the voice of authority with the 
government, as it had been pre-1791.  It had also assured Britain of its loyalty, an important 
factor in maintaining the newly re-acquired voice of authority.   As well, this period saw the 
beginning of ultramontanism as the church firmly took hold of power and eschewed the 
tenets of liberalism and democracy in favour of an authoritarian, theocratic, French 
nationalistic model. 
Even as new religious congregations were formed, they were populated almost 
exclusively by men and women of “ultramontane conviction”.  They staffed the schools, ran 
the hospitals, preached to the faithful and engulfed the religious revival that began in 
Montreal in 1840 with the popular and wildly successful Bishop Forbin-Jansion who 
preached to thousands, inviting them to come to Jesus and the Church.  These Roman 
Catholic revivals were continued by the hierarchy, even after Forbin-Jansion moved along 
and reportedly led to the conversion of tens of thousands of people.58   
The new pietism included more public celebrations of feast days, more pilgrimage 
sites.  The liturgy became more elaborate as did the churches themselves.  People wore the 
signs of their devotion on their clothing and erected small, household shrines to their 
favourite saints.  The vestiges of this can still be seen in the proliferation of Marys-in-a-
bathtub that can be seen from the road in parts of Quebec and New Brunswick—family 
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shrines to the Virgin Mother, almost all of them still bright inside their annually white-
washed enclosure, tenderly surrounded with cheerful perennials and small offerings.   
The ultramontanist Church also cleaved to French Canadian nationalism, in deep 
resonance and accord with the Romanticism of the mid-19th century.  In the end, as 
Choquette writes, “…for more than a century Catholicism and nationalism would constitute 
the twin pillars that supported French Canada’s national identity.  They were two faces of 
the same French Canadian coin.”59 
 This is evidenced by another turning point for the Ultramontanist Church in Lower 
Canada that came with the Union of the two Canadas.  The intention of this Union was to 
Anglicize Lower Canada or Canada East, as it was then known.  It is at this point that the 
Ultramontane Church does something very interesting.  The ideology that insists on 
obedience to authority and preaches for independence from the State becomes itself a 
spokesperson for a French-Canadian nationalism and works against the government status 
quo.  Using a political strategy that posited responsible government as a device by which to 
defeat the Anglicizing purpose of the Union, ultramontane church people and clergy were 
allying with Reform politicians.60   This alliance, writes Moir “…became an operative force 
in Canadian life thereafter, thanks to the conjunctions of ultramontane and French-Canadian 
national ambitions.”61  In this way, then, a conservative, reactionary movement within the 
Church is utilized as a legitimate tool for liberal democratic processes.   
 In this sense, then, ultramontanism can be seen as a political ideology if political 
ideology is defined as a collective of integrated assertions, theories and aims regarding how 
people should be governed.  Although it was always a product of French Canadian 
Catholicism, Quebec Ultramontanism became ever more inextricably intertwined with 
French Canadian identity.62 Therefore, its political ideology—its aims, assertions and 
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theories—are shared, at points, with that identity.  Ultramontanism asserts the absolute 
independence of the Church from the state.  Not in the American sense of separation of 
Church and State—but, in a loose sense, in the American system of separation of powers.  
Ultramontanism sees the Church as a pivotal and vital arm of society that legitimately 
informs and instructs and has a voice at the Rawlsian table.  That independence also speaks 
to how people should be governed by viewing the state’s role as “…simply to provide 
funding and generally to support the church in its social endeavours.”63 
 In addition, as Choquette points out, in the ultramontane paradigm, the church is 
perfect and, therefore, infallible.  Thus, when the interests of the state—even if the state is a 
democracy—conflict with those of the Church, the Church will prevail.   
 As Clark points out, ultramontanism led to the view that the Catholic Church was a 
society “complete unto itself”.64 Ultramontanism did not set out to accomplish this end; it 
was very quickly thwarted from its original liberal principles to one of a reactionary anti-
modernism.  The ideal transformed into a vision of a universal Catholic communion, united 
under the authority of the Pope—not a remnant of the faithful as a religious and linguistic 
minority within a vast confederation.   
 That being said, the Church expanded the vision of Ultramontanism to incorporate 
the needs of the people at the time.  The subculture was nurtured by the structures that the 
church traditionally had maintained—education, hospitals, and orphanages.  Under the aegis 
of being an independent agent distinct from the State, the Church constructed a parallel 
culture that was “untainted” by English Protestantism.65  
The hold that ultramontanism took on the Canadian Catholic church was important 
for an understanding of Church-State relations in Canada for several reasons.  One of them 
was that it provided for the infrastructure that enabled the development of a distinct society 
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within Quebec.  As Perin points out, the minority status of the French in the civil 
government after Confederation placed the Church in the perfect position to become the 
keeper and definer of French language, customs and culture in Quebec.66  In the mid-20th 
century political-economic reasons—in part having to do with the financing of the church-
run social institutions—necessitated a shift that placed “…the provincial state (as) the 
instrument through which French-Canadian culture would develop.”67 Another aspect of it 
that is important is in what it tells us about the role people with religious worldviews believe 
that religious institutions should have in society.  To be sure, the more radical elements of 
the ultramontane movement envisioned a theocracy and a universal cleaving to Roman 
Catholic Christianity, and this remains on the very radical edges of both Catholicism and 
Protestantism.  But the moderate element shows that, like evangelical Protestantism, the 
belief in the separation of church and state has a fluid definition.  In the ultramontane point 
of view, such a separation empowers the Church to move in the public sphere 
unencumbered by any claim the state may have upon it—whether it be one of power or 
economics, or both.  
Protestants 
 Despite small English-speaking settlements in Atlantic Canada and Newfoundland, 
there was not a significant Protestant presence in Canada until the mid-18th century.68  In 
1749 and 1750, 5,000 Protestants from Britain, Germany and Switzerland arrived in Halifax 
and settled, for the most part in Lunenburg.  From 1760 the lure of free land and religious 
freedom brought settlers from New England and the British Isles to all parts of what is now 
Atlantic Canada and also to Newfoundland and Labrador. They were Anglicans and 
Protestant dissenters as well as Catholics (Catholics not being emancipated in Britain at the 
time).  By 1775, it is estimated that there was a population of 18,000 in the region.69  The 
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American War of Independence let loose a floodgate of Protestant migration to Canada.70  
According to Choquette, 7,000 of the Loyalists settled in Canada and 30,000 in what would 
become New Brunswick.  This immigration from the south continued until the War of 
1812.71  This is significant not only because it gave Protestantism a critical mass that had 
heretofore been missing, but also a tradition of democratic governance (inherited from the 
Loyalists that migrated from New England) that was distinct from the system they found in 
Lower Canada.72  It is also important to note that Anglophone merchants, soldiers and 
government officials had formed “pockets” in sections of Montreal, Quebec and Trois 
Rivières—this, combined with the later migration of the Loyalists from the United States led 
to the 1791 division of Quebec into Upper and Lower Canada.73 
By the mid-18th century, Protestantism—whether in the form of Anglicans, 
Methodists, Congregationalists or Presbyterians in Lower Canada or the more diverse 
denominational melange in Upper Canada74—began to loom larger in the Canadian religious 
landscape, crafting its own character and wielding political influence.  Terrence Murphy 
highlights that an important point to be considered when looking at the history of the 
relationship of churches with the State in Canadian history is the relative autonomy of the 
Protestant faithful in Canada in the 18th century.  As migration to British North America was 
not an organized colonization program—as it had been with New France and with New 
England—the institutional infrastructure of the churches did not migrate as a whole with a 
group of settlers.  This meant that the religious needs of the community had to be addressed 
by the community itself and arose out of community impulse and desire.  This lack of clergy 
and/or institutional leadership from the beginning meant that the responsibilities and 
leadership roles ordinarily ascribed and assigned to the professional clergy were often taken 
up (or assigned by the community) by lay persons with a certain degree of standing within 
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the community.  Murphy observes that such arrangements were, as a rule, temporary and 
that communities eventually recruited clergy persons to come minister to them.  The 
initiative shown by the communities, especially those communities for which a central 
authority appointing clergy was the practice, gave those elites within the communities a 
certain amount of ownership, a sense of establishing for themselves the social institutions 
that they thought necessary for a civilized society.75  It is significant, though, to note that 
even though infrastructure was put into place, overall practice before 1815 might not have 
been universally fervent, at least according to the standards of the missionaries and clergy 
reporting on their charges.76   The point must not be lost, also, that a community without a 
church would have been unthinkable at this point in western history.  The church still served 
as a social structure, just as much as one geared for the spiritual well-being of the faithful.  
Another pertinent component of this puzzle that is Protestantism in Canada is a 
general spirit of tolerance that developed.  I have already touched upon the religious 
tolerance showed by Murray and Carleton towards the French Catholics after the Conquest.  
This tolerance was firmly rooted in the rationalism of the Enlightenment and, especially after 
the rush of Protestant immigration, necessity.  The rational intellectualism of the 
Enlightenment affected the church in myriad ways.  One of these was to eschew any 
extremism or emotionalism that would be tinged by an excess of emotion.  As Murphy 
notes, “(r)eason fostered restraint and moderation, and there was a deep distrust of religious 
enthusiasm, which was associated with fanaticism and conflict.”77 A result of this was a 
Christian conversation that strove to strip the religion of extraneous doctrinal dissent in 
order to discern the commonalities.  What emerged was a few Christian tenets upon which 
everyone could agree: existence of God as Creator of the universe, the divinity of Christ, the 
providential ordering of history, the immortality of the soul and punishment for sin and 
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reward for virtue.78  As noted earlier regarding ultramontanism, morality was especially 
important and agreements over moral stances were also seen as essential.   Of course there 
was infighting and dissent but those were exceptions rather than the rule.79 
This spirit of mutuality was supported by what Murphy calls the “18th century social 
utility of religion”80 that worked in tandem with the basic morality it was felt that all 
Christians were called to embrace.  Christians had a duty to exhibit upright and moral 
behaviour, beginning with obedience to civil authority.81  In both the Roman Catholic and 
the Protestant paradigm, society mirrored the static face of a divinely mandated hierarchy.  
“The social order, like the natural creation, was thought to be arranged in an unchangeable 
pattern of higher and lower forms.”82  Thus the Church (Protestant and Catholic) embraced 
conservative social doctrines that maintained a societal status quo.  This was mutually 
beneficial for both Church and State, as seen in the eventual triumph of the Catholic Church 
in its bid to be the established Church of Quebec by virtue of its hierarchy’s vocal and active 
support of the British Crown in 1776 and in 1812.  Hence, even the denominations which 
had no hope of establishment in Canada (i.e. Protestant denominations other than the 
Church of England) were concerned with maintaining a social order that was also desired by 
the State.  Rebellion against legitimate civil authority came to be seen as akin to religious 
apostasy.83  The champion Protestant Church for maintaining the status quo was the Church 
of England. 
The Anglican Church in Upper Canada did not fare as well in terms of membership 
as did the Roman Catholic Church, although it was mighty in influence.84  It had been a 
looming presence since the 1763 Treaty of Paris and officially recognized as an established 
church by the Constitutional Act of 1791.85  This was controversial, as many felt that the 
Church of England should have been the established church.86  However, this policy has 
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been cited by many as an integral component in withstanding revolution, republicanism and 
representationalism.87  A consequence of this was, as O’Toole writes that, “despite legal, 
social and economic advantages, Anglicanism never evolved into the naturally acknowledged 
Church of Canada envisioned by a British elite in the wake of U.S. independence.”88  And 
indeed, such establishment was a faint hope at best.  By giving religious freedom to the 
Roman Catholic Church, if not always in statute then certainly in practice, the Crown and 
many of its agents (i.e. Murray and Carleton) through political expediency laid the 
groundwork for a multiplicity of religious establishments in British Canada.  As mentioned 
above, the Methodist movement in Upper Canada felt empowered to lobby against official 
special status for the Anglican Church.  The Church of England (so called in Canada until 
1955) did, in practice, retain a “certain social status and elite influence”89 but the 
disestablishment via the Clergy Reserves Act of 1854 made official what had already been 
tacitly acknowledged—the “denominational character of Canadian religious life” made a 
monolithic State church untenable.   
Official disestablishment by way of the abolition of the clergy reserves was official 
recognition of a practical reality in English Canada.  The removal of government support 
and recognition of special status was the end of an era.  But it was not the end of religious 
involvement in the public sphere. Evangelical Christians, riding the wave of the Second 
Great Awakening in the United States and in Britain had campaigned hard to remove the 
church from what they saw as the corrupting influence of the State.  They accused the 
established churches and traditional denominations of becoming enamoured of what we 
would now classify as modernity—individual human autonomy, a degree of rationality that 
removed all mystery from nature (glimpsing here a link with Romanticism) and that placed 
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God beyond human reach, need or comprehension (deism),  and a love of intellectualism 
that discouraged an experiential relationship with God. 
This rise of evangelical Protestantism and the parallel rise of ultramontane 
Catholicism were important components in the development of the Canadian religious 
landscape.  Although evangelical Protestants and ultramontane Catholics have profound 
doctrinal differences, they did share  
“…a strong faith in God, an understanding that Christian faith was primarily 
defined as assent to God as first truth (a more Catholic than Protestant phasing), a 
passion for God’s truth, a holistic understanding of Christianity, impatience with 
intellectualism, and a resolute determination to evangelize society through 
missionary outreach, confessional schools, temperance campaigns, and control of 
the public agenda.”90  
The relative religious tolerance (in terms of European traditions) in practice that had 
been extant in Canada since the time of the British Conquest did not satisfy the evangelical 
Protestant contingent.  Intent upon transforming the Dominion of Canada to the Dominion 
of the Lord, they set their sights on an English, Protestant Canada.  Myriad societies 
sprouted up—all with Protestant affiliations and conceived as components in a plan 
designed to form Canada into their ideal society.91 In addition, the zealousness with which 
the evangelical movement pursued their goals was often marked by aggressiveness and 
intolerance.  In the Canada of their conception, French Catholics there well may be, but 
French Catholics confined strictly to Quebec.  The two sides were frequently at odds, 
sometimes even violently.  Protestants attempted to thwart Catholics at every turn, especially 
when it came to establishing Catholic schools. 
As mentioned above, attempts were made to establish the Church of England as the 
state Church, but—with the exception of Atlantic Canada and in spite of the institution of 
the clergy reserves—this was not a successful venture.  As Choquette remarks, “(t)he policy 
of establishment ran aground on the shoals of political, ethnic, social, economic, and 
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religious diversity.”92  The diversity of Protestantism did not lend itself well to the 
establishment of a single State church.  This is not to say, however, that Protestants were 
disinclined to have churches influencing the State.  On the contrary, as will be shown below, 
the concept of the separation of Church and State was seen to be one that enabled churches 
to engage in the business of the State while maintaining their autonomy from it.  As well, 
they were opposed to an establishment church for the very practical reason that an 
established, S tate-sponsored church meant that the established church was supported 
monetarily by the State and, as such, had a distinct advantage when it came to evangelizing 
and providing infrastructure for church growth.  For those Protestants who had come up 
from the United States, the establishment of a state Church was offensive to democratic and 
egalitarian ideals.  There was also the issue of political power.  Unlike the Presbyterians, the 
Methodists and the Baptists (who were mostly concentrated in Atlantic Canada), 93 members 
of the Anglican Church were drawn from the ruling elite—although their base did widen 
until they were the largest denomination in Upper Canada by the mid-19th century.94   
 The various Protestant denominations in Canada were voluntarist.  They were self, as 
opposed to state, supported.  This is important to remember when looking at the triumphant 
spirit that is displayed by 19th century Canadian Protestants.  Many of them were convinced 
that they were on a holy mission from God and part of that proof lay in the fact that they 
survived and flourished despite the great odds that pitted them against a state-supported 
Anglican Church.95  The development of a more evangelical Protestantism in the 19th 
century speaks to this and influenced the ways in which Protestant denominations interacted 
with the State. 
 Evangelical Protestantism has its antecedents in 18th century Great Britain and the 
rise of rational supernaturalism that developed during the Enlightenment.  Part and parcel of 
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the dis-enchantment of Western Christianity, reasonable Christianity arose out of the notion 
that God could be understood rationally and scientifically without the trappings of 
supernaturalism and mysticism.  The concept of Deism comes to the fore in this period.96  
In response to this rationalism, movements like German pietism and British evangelicalism 
and the growth of Methodism developed and spoke to people’s emotions rather than to their 
intellects97  Murphy also observes that the Great Awakenings served as a deep contrast to 
natural religion and “glib moralism” in favour of asserting revelation via sola scriptura and 
justification by faith, not works.98 Movements were demonstrated in North America 
(concentrated at first in the United States) through what is known as the Great Awakening 
and the Second Great Awakening.  The Great Awakening was a movement concentrated at 
first in New England that eventually became widespread and arrived in Nova Scotia in 1775 
with Henry Alline who led a revival movement called the “New Light” movement.  Baptists 
and Methodists were attracted to the Great Awakening, and the evangelical fervour it 
sparked rose and fell throughout the 19th century.   
 In terms of Church and State, evangelicalism marks a shift in the social imaginary.  
The more established churches (especially the Church of England) denounced 
evangelicalism as radical and anti-intellectual and accused their religious “extremism” of 
spilling over into political extremism.  In Canada, at least, these accusations were false.  
Especially in the First Great Awakening, the leaders urged their followers to be mindful of 
spiritual things and to rise above politics.  William Black is quoted as saying “What have the 
ministers of Christ to do with the administration of civil government?  Christ’s kingdom is 
not of this world.  We are neither magistrates nor legislators.”99   
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 At least one very important ramification for church and State relations in Canada can 
be drawn from Murphy’s excellent discussion: there was an implicit challenge to the social 
order in the Great Awakening:   
“Elite conceptions of society rested on distinctions of rank, deference to 
authority, the power of coercive institutions, and the obligation to obey 
traditional norms.  Evangelical religion encouraged individual self-assertion, 
voluntary association, the definition of status in terms of virtue and 
achievement rather than birth and inheritance, and the maintenance of order 
through popular consent.  Revival movements offered not only an alternative 
view of the world but autonomous forms of corporate organization and 
bonds of social cohesion that were outside the control of the governing 
classes.  Their effect was not to destroy the fabric of society but to guarantee 
religious and cultural diversity.”100 
This diversity stands upon and intertwines with the earlier pragmatic tolerance of the early to 
mid 18th century and this speaks to, among other things, the growing impossibility of an 
established church.  The pragmatism of the State and its need to sway a diverse populace 
towards societal order under the Crown trumped any notion of one established religious 
institution.101  What is apparent here, also, is that the relationship between Church and State 
is shifting and that the underlying theology of some of the population is involved in that 
shift.  Heretofore the relationship had been one of establishment church deeply entwined 
with and supportive of the State and its established hierarchy undergirding a set social 
imaginary.   
During the Great Awakening, evangelical Protestantism, while inherently politically 
conservative, unwittingly planted the notion of a more egalitarian relationship between the 
polis and the people in power.  In some ways it could be seen as a wresting away of power 
from the elite Reformers who strove to do away with carnivals and such.  The revivals, as 
Murphy states, “were outside the control of the governing classes.”102  The order that had 
been sought by the Reformers in the 16th century and by governments from any century was 
54 
 
still extant, but it was being changed to fit a paradigm that was beginning to be moulded by 
the lower classes.    
The Second Great Awakening was an example of a rising up of the fervour planted 
during the Great Awakening.  It began in the early 19th century and again spread from New 
England up to Canada.  This wave of Evangelical Protestantism is important in the history 
of Church and State in Canada not because the majority of Protestants in Canada were or are 
evangelicals, but in the influence evangelicalism in general and the Second Great Awakening 
in particular had on Protestantism as a whole.  The Second Great Awakening saw the 
introduction of institutionalism in the evangelical community, a desire to codify the 
worldviews that emerged during the revivals and camp meetings.103  The hallmarks of 
evangelicalism in the Second Great Awakening were simple.  For the evangelical Protestant, 
redemption came at the moment of conversion and from then on one was empowered to 
lead this life of holiness by the presence of the Holy Spirit.  Evangelicals also stressed the 
importance of a personal relationship with Jesus Christ.  Protestants set great store by 
individual holiness and believed strongly in salvation by personal conversion—an acceptance 
of one’s broken, sinful nature and the acceptance of Jesus’ redemptive gift in atoning for 
one’s sins.  Integral as well was the belief in the sole authority of the Bible and in the Bible as 
the inspired Word of God.  Evangelicals also embraced a belief in a God that cared about 
individuals and who intervened in history and in human affairs.  They believed in the power 
of prayer and in miracles.  Mostly, they “believed in the transforming power of faith in 
Christ, thus standing apart from the Christian rationalists of their day…”104    
Inherent, too, in the Second Great Awakening was a shift in soteriology which saw 
human endeavour after acceptance of God’s redeeming act of grace in Jesus Christ as 
playing a small role in one’s ultimate salvation.105  As well, there was an understanding that 
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with redemption of the individual came the responsibility for redeeming society.  Piety, hard 
work, perseverance and frugality were values highly prized by the evangelicals and Murphy 
points out that this was highly conducive to an economy shifting from subsistence.  Ethical 
conduct and philanthropy and missionary work were seen as the fruits of the Spirit.106    
Evangelicals also led the Protestant missionary movements and were key players in the 
movements to abolish slavery, provide education to the poor, pass laws that protected 
women and children, to strictly keep the Sabbath as a day of rest, and to limit or prohibit the 
distribution and imbibing of alcohol.   
 Thus, this missionary streak, one that had not been at all strong in the Protestant 
tradition in Canada before the Great Awakenings, manifested itself in many ways, not the 
least of which was social reform.  Indeed, the seeds of the Social Gospel movements in both 
the United States and Canada had their beginnings in the Evangelical fervour of the Great 
Awakenings.  Eventually tempered by time and by adoption of the social reform principles 
by the more established denominations, evangelicalism informed the entire spectrum of 
Protestant Christianity in Canada.  The similarity in theology and soteriology held by 
Evangelicals did not result in the unity of all Protestants under that banner, however.  
Despite the tradition of agreeing most of the time and then agreeably agreeing to disagree 
that had been supported by the rationalism of the Enlightenment, doctrinal, ethnic, 
economic and social differences made for a fractiousness that was not conducive to absolute 
unity and Evangelicalism blossomed under the denominational banners of Methodists, 
Presbyterians, Baptists, Congregationalists, to name the larger groups.107  These groups were 
still united in one sense, though, in that they (like the French Catholics in Quebec and the 
Irish Catholics in Upper Canada) were opposed to the establishment of any church by the 
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State.  The rhetoric that they developed in their joint opposition enabled them to find ways 
to work across denominational lines on other issues as well. 
 However, the distinctions that set evangelicals apart from their more “rational” co-
religionists fomented dissent within denominational ranks and from without.  In the 1840’s 
and 50’s, the Protestants or “dissenters” took up the rhetoric of liberalism and religious 
voluntarism and used it to undermine the authority of the “established” churches.108  Part of 
the reason for this was demographic; the influx of immigrants from Great Britain after 1815 
expanded the population and put a strain on material and human resources.  Another reason 
was an attempt to find a place for less established Protestant traditions within a social milieu 
that was re-defining the place for religion in the public sphere. 
 Draper writes that this rhetoric opened up an “evangelical Protestant discourse that 
found a new legitimation for religious authority.”109  This discourse, he goes on to say, 
expresses itself in a creed that is “noncredal”.110 Instead, this creed provides a consensus of 
belief that does not require unanimity of doctrine.  In a very real way, this continues the 
earlier pact of the non-evangelical Protestants to find common denominators.  Murphy 
concurs, writing about the Second Great Awakening—which laid the foundations for the 
aforementioned precept—that it “resulted in a reconstitution of the movement, as bonds of 
fellowship resting on common spiritual experience were increasingly channelled into formal 
structures.”111 Thus, Protestants can work together across denominational lines and be in 
agreement.  The ideals of Biblicism, conversionism, crucicentrism, and social activism were 
hallmarks of this belief.112   Also included in this creed is the belief that true religion was 
internal, individual, between a person and their God.  This internal religion was shown to be 
true in the actions of the person.  Religion could not be regulated from the outside, nor 
could faith.113    
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 As the Evangelical and/or non-Anglican Protestants became more and more 
successful, they began to chafe under the restrictions placed upon them by the 
Constitutional Act of 1791 which gave privilege to the Church of England.  The issues of 
educational exclusivity, the right to perform marriages and to form parish corporations were 
all disputed but the largest issue came to be the clergy reserves.114  The egalitarianism and 
relative autonomy of congregations that was implicit in the non-Anglican Protestant 
denominations became a springboard of sorts for a heightened interest by the churches in 
temporal matters of the State particularly where they directly affected church affairs.  
“Methodists in particular,” writes Murphy, “became—at least temporarily—overtly political 
and increasingly indentified with the cause of constitutional as well as social reform.”115  And 
thus began an exceedingly important phase in the history of the Canadian Churches’ 
relationship with the State.  The battles were at once internal to the churches and external 
with the State.116 
 The internal battles could be divided roughly into two camps—on the one hand, 
those of the ruling elite and those of High Church Anglican persuasion (personified by Jacob 
Mountain and John Strachan) who were convinced that maintaining even vestiges of Church 
establishment were crucial to the continuance of social order and morality and the 
maintenance of imperial ties.117  On the other side were political reformers who wished to 
depose the “rule of the local oligarchy” and those voluntarists who wished to see a clean 
separation between Church and State.118  These last formed what Murphy calls a “broad 
alliance” between the politically and the religiously motivated against the established 
Anglican Church.  The battle escalated from 1815 onwards, with the Anglican establishment 
gradually losing ground until, in 1840, a deal was struck to divide the proceeds of the clergy 
reserves (albeit unequally).  Although they had, by and large, disparaged State support in 
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favour of a purely voluntary system, all major Protestant denominations, save the Baptists, 
accepted the revenue.119  The clergy reserve issue was not truly settled until 1854, but this 
compromise shifted Church-State relations.  More importantly, as Murphy observes, “(i)t 
revealed a trend in British North America towards the division of state support, as opposed 
to an American-style ‘wall of separation’ permitting no state support for religious bodies or 
institutions.”120  This trend is important to note because it points to one of the arguments of 
this study in general that, at least in Canada, church and state are not seen as being at odds 
per se.  That is, that the conflicts that arose had less to do with the free exercise of religion 
than with the State’s giving preference and monetary support to one church at the expense 
of the other.121  While some still pressed for a United States-like strict separation of Church 
and State, the reality developed into a tradition that acknowledged religious institutions as 
integral to the well-being and political stability of society and the preference by the State of 
one over the other as the true danger to stability.  This point of view is well-illustrated by the 
introduction of common schools. 
 The schools issue loomed large in the delicate balance between Church and State.  
After 1840, the effort to establish common, non-denominational schools erupted into 
sectarian battles.  The Protestants lobbied hard for the teaching of basic, shared principles of 
Christianity without pausing to consider the myriad Christian perspectives on what was 
“common”.  The Roman Catholics in Quebec were against the use of anything but the 
Vulgate and against students reading independently from the scriptures.  The Ultramontane 
Church was soon involved in the matter, exercising its belief that the State had no place in 
the education of its children.122 Separate school boards were then set up, with the non-
denominational schools set aside for the Protestants and the Catholic board for the 
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Catholics.  However, as Murphy points out, the “non-denominational” education provided 
was Anglo-centric and heavily imbued with the tenets of evangelical Protestantism.123 
With the repeal of the Clergy Reserves in 1854 (and in Atlantic Canada in 1850) the 
way for an evangelical Protestant consensus was opened.124  Without the State-established 
church, a vision for Canada could be formulated and propagated without fear of censure or 
reprisals.  This vision took shape as one that was exclusively Protestant and Anglo-centric.  
Clarke again points to the rhetoric of the time as positing Britain as “…a new Israel, chosen 
to spread true Christianity over the globe, and through the imperial connection Canadians 
would participate in the great work of the empire to free humanity from ignorance and 
sin.”125  To be sure, there was sectarianism and sectarian violence and anti-Catholicism ran 
high, especially amongst the Irish Protestants against the Irish Catholic.  However, the 
overall social imaginary (outside of Quebec) that was professed remained as the over-arching 
general Protestant ideal. 
 The power dynamic experienced by the evangelical Protestants in Canada at this 
period was not like the one experienced by the Catholic Church.  To be sure, Protestant 
denominations were not accorded any real political voice, but then their situations were 
vastly different from those of Catholics in Quebec.  They saw their mission as one of 
evangelizing the world, not as defending a people from the tyranny of a government that 
they experienced as completely legitimate.  Like the Ultramontane movement, though, 
evangelical Protestants had little time or patience for those who would thwart their plans.126  
Unlike the Ultramontanists who saw their church as perfect and the Pope as infallible and 
therefore the final arbiters of what was right and just in society, evangelical Protestants saw 
the creation of a Christian society as one that would come about through a reformation of 
60 
 
life and habits.  They aimed to change each individual citizen and in that conversion, convert 
society at large.  
 It is in that context of anti-establishmentarianism and an evangelical Protestant sense 
of unity and destiny that the idea of God’s Dominion arose.  God’s Dominion is a political 
ideal in that it has aims, theories and assertions of how people should be governed.  In this 
period, it is based upon a liberal democratic understanding of society as composed of 
individual liberty and responsibility.  As noted above, the aims of God’s dominion were to 
reform the lives and habits of individuals within society—echoing the impetus of the 16th 
and 17th century desire to bring order out of chaos.  Those reformations included preserving 
the Sabbath, the control of alcoholic beverages, education of the poor, the reclamation of 
prisoners and ‘fallen’ women.  They formed voluntary organizations (YMCA, Sunday 
School, WCTU, Bible societies) in order to further their ideology.  They also lobbied hard in 
Upper Canada against the Catholic efforts to establish confessional schools.  This effort at 
quashing separate schools was repeated systematically in New Brunswick, Manitoba and the 
Northwest Territories.127  
 The evangelical Protestants of this era in Canada wanted to bring about a Protestant 
society.  A society that was the epitome of Victorian religious scruples and morality.128  They 
believed strongly in the need for personal conversion and that individuals, once converted, 
would form a society that would shine like the Kingdom of God.  In that sense they were 
not unlike their ultramontanist brethren in Quebec.  Ultramontanism emphasized a moral 
life, a temperate life, a life in obedience to God.  It had a vision of a society that would act in 
perfect obedience to its religious leaders, and thus be a society that would also be 
reminiscent of the City of God. 
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In terms of social welfare, Protestants looked upon it as a means to an evangelical 
end.  If people needed help, it was because they were sinful and only Jesus could truly lift 
them out of their poverty.  A strong Calvinist streak of predestination ran through some 
efforts at social outreach, a belief that one was poor because of one’s moral fibre.129  The 
organized, systematic infrastructure needed to provide a holistic social welfare program like 
the one proffered by the Ultramontane Catholics in Quebec was not yet on the horizon for 
the Protestant contingent in Canada and wouldn’t appear until the Social Gospel movement 
and a shifting of theology around the issue of poverty as a societal rather than a personal 
failing. 
 For the ultramontane and the evangelical Protestant in both the 19th century and in 
the present, religion has an integral spot in the public sphere.  Separation of church and state 
only exacerbates that influence—when the Church is free of political influence, it has the 
legitimacy and moral authority to hold the government accountable to its most noble 
purposes. 
Most importantly for the purposes of this study is this:  that the church sought 
independence from the state.  It is a vital distinction.  The battle was NOT to separate the 
state from the church.  The damage, in this paradigm, was being done TO the church BY 
the state and the consequences to society were grave.  Far from being interested in becoming 
disentangled with the affairs of the state, the church and its membership sought autonomy in 
order to be more effectively entangled.  This  ideological end is key.  From their perspective, 
the intertwining of church and state not only put the church in danger of falling under the 
thrall of modernity but also restricted the church’s prophetic voice.  The intention of the 
evangelicals was never to separate the churches from the public sphere, disestablishment was 
a way of (hopefully) reclaiming the authoritative voice of God so as to become the 
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government’s real, authoritative conscience.  What the evangelicals in English Canada really 
wanted was what the ultramontane Catholics in Quebec had—power to sway the 
government.    Not only did the Catholic Church enjoy support of the people in terms of 
numbers, but it also wielded the power of the transcendent—the power to excommunicate, 
the power to impart to the people what the Pope, God’s Vicar on Earth, would prefer them 
to do.  Evangelical Protestants did not see the church as leaving the public sphere.  Nor did 
the more traditional, moderate denominations envision this.  Their vision was one of total 
influence over society in order that the fulfillment of God’s purposes on Earth be achieved.  
The separation was not conceived as a separation from influence or relevance (although that 
did happen) but as a disentangling of priorities, that the transcendent and hence everlasting 
voice be heard amid the cacophony of temporal assertions and manipulations of power.   
Meanwhile, at the end of the 19th century, while Protestants and Roman Catholics 
were trying to sort themselves out, modernity marched onward bringing more and more 
change in its wake.  The churches continued to be the centre of community life in many 
cases and also provided education and a semblance of a social safety net.  Church 
membership that seems to actually reflect real involvement and commitment grew.130  
Murphy observes that the churches “…had increased not only their institutional strength but 
also their formative influence on people’s lives…(n)ow they could concentrate on working 
from within to transform community life and shape a social environment that would reflect 
fundamental Christian values.”131  One way in which this transformation was attempted and 
embraced was through the Social Gospel. 
The idea of the Social Gospel began to take hold in earnest as the idea that souls 
could only be won when the temporal person was fed, clothed, housed, sober and 
rudimentarily educated.  The Social Gospel is pertinent for the study for a couple of reasons.  
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First, it is an important development in Canadian Church history in and of itself.  Secondly, 
it ultimately provided a template for social justice that future politicians and political groups 
used to formulate public policy—thereby providing an example of the ways in which church 
and State intertwine in Canadian history.  Thirdly, it is an historical measurement whereby 
one can begin to demarcate where and when the traditional institutional churches ceased to 
be integral voices in the public sphere with collective influence.  In other words, what 
constitutes secularism in Canada, and when did it start?  
Part of the debate around secularism in Canada (as indicated above) has arisen from 
the shift in the institutional focus from personal salvation to the social gospel.  The dates of 
this shift and whether or not this shift was indicative of the beginning of Canadian 
secularism is contested, with one side arguing for a date inclusive of the WWII years132 and 
another arguing for the beginning of the Social Gospel movement as the start of the descent 
into secularism: “By abandoning the transcendent of the immanent in a highly social gospel,” 
Ramsay Cook avers, “the mainstream churches of Canada ‘set off down the path to the 
secular city’.”133    
The writings of Albrecht Ritschl and Walter Rauschenbusch were foundational to 
the Social Gospel movement in both the United States and in Canada.  They articulated the 
theology of the movement, evangelical fervour of the age and a shift in anthropological 
sensibilities that began to emphasize the perfectibility rather than the hopeless depravity of 
the human creature—if only social structures could be put in place to facilitate that process.  
The movement evinced disenchantment with laissez-faire liberalism and a belief in the new 
social sciences as a way to analyze and solve society’s problems.  It also served as another 
point of cohesion for the Protestant denominations, laying part of the groundwork for the 
eventual development of the United Church of Canada.134  
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 The Canadian Social Gospel movement has its antecedents in Christian Socialist 
movements of Great Britain and Europe as well as in the United States.  These two 
traditions converged in Canada to be transformed into the Canadian Social Gospel.  The 
Social Gospel was a complex movement of Christian theology and social reform which first 
arose in the late 19th century.  It was a particularly Protestant movement that came about in 
response to a variety of economic, social and intellectual phenomena.   
 The Social Gospel arose out of a background of individualism that had its roots in 
the 17th century.  Both liberal and conservative Christians held an individualistic view of the 
cosmos—individual salvation and responsibility lay at the heart of society.  To reform 
society, you must first reform the individual.  By the end of the 19th century, that 
individualism was being re-thought.  The growing economic disparity, the depression of the 
1890’s and the deplorable conditions that existed for the poor in the slums of the industrial 
centres of Britain and North America were proof to some people that laissez-faire liberalism 
was not working.  The ideas of collectivism arose and with it a belief that God could be 
found both in and through society.  As touched on before, the understanding among 
Protestants began to be that individual salvation could only come if an individual’s material 
needs were first met.  This last is important to understand, as the Social Gospel movement is 
often criticized for not paying heed to individual salvation.  While it is arguably true that the 
later Social Gospel movements became more about enacting one’s faith in the world than 
about drawing people into that faith, at its roots the Social Gospel was concerned about 
individual salvation.  But, again, the understanding began to shift from onus on the person in 
misery to the structures that had originally facilitated that misery.  In that sense, as 




 Richard Allen, the first chronicler of the Social Gospel movement in Canada 
“…defines the “social gospel” in terms of intellectual changes within Protestantism itself.”136 
He also calls it a religious movement that was not “based primarily upon economic or social 
factors.”137 Christie and Gauvreau object to the constraints of this definition and insist that 
the movement cannot be defined apart from “…the wider transatlantic context of the 
reinterpretation of liberalism in the early twentieth century.”138 Christie and Gauvreau’s 
point is important in that it adds a heretofore ignored dimension to the understanding of the 
Social Gospel.  The Social Gospel movement was instrumental, they argue, in establishing 
social work and sociology in Canadian universities.  In addition, Protestant clergy were 
instrumental in applying sociological methodology to social problems and to resulting 
legislation, “…helping transform the scope and responsibilities of the modern state.”139 The 
Social Gospel movement, millennial and evangelical in tone and revivalist in orientation, 
worked hand in hand with the proponents of a “new liberalism” which emphasis on service 
rather than avarice provided a great appeal to Protestant ministers.140  
This “new liberalism” was a reaction to traditional laissez-faire liberalism which was 
proving unable to rise to the challenges of the social problems brought about by the 
industrial revolution (among other forces).  This new liberalism, as stated above, advocated 
service as the dominant principle underlying social relationships and as such emphasized the 
mutual dependence of individual and society.141 It is important to note the rejection by these 
proponents of the new liberalism of Hegelian general will, “…as it negated individual 
freedom, and they preferred to discern in the progressive movement of society towards 
cooperation the greatest realization of individual moral action.”142 Collective action was 
stressed, but as a “…harmonious convergence of the goals of individuals and their 
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society.”143 Thus, the Social Gospel movement embraced a new economic understanding 
which was expressed in the reform programs of the Protestant churches.144  
It is important, however, when looking at the components of the practical—
economic applications, social scientific reforms—to also highlight the intellectual and 
religious background of the Social Gospel in Canada.  The religious background of the Social 
Gospel can be seen to be firmly grounded in the aftermath of the Great Awakenings that 
occurred in the late 18th to mid 19th centuries.  Revival meetings were still sweeping across 
the continent and, according to Allen, laying the groundwork for the social gospel 
movement.145 
According to Allen, the revivals did three things that lay this groundwork:  First, they 
fostered the idea that change was possible.  This spoke directly to a theology of 
predestination, assuring the faithful that if they but took the initiative to approach God, 
salvation was not only possible but assured.  Of course, Calvinism was not the only 
theological understanding held by the droves that came to listen to the revivalists, but it was 
a strong Protestant tradition.  For those not holding predestinarian views, the revivalist 
message served to reinforce the notion of salvation by grace and God’s innate power to 
transform.  In this groundwork lay the seeds for transforming an understanding of individual 
hope for change into one of societal hope for change. 
The second notion put forth by the revivalist was that God was a tangible presence 
in the temporal, mundane world.  This again, was not new, but the revivalist reiterated it to 
the crowds, engendering a collective awareness.  God was not only present but available, 
“…an immanent being available to man and working in the process of reformation.”146 If 
God was working to transform the individual, it was not a big leap to speculate that God 
could work to transform the collective.  It is not untoward to speculate that the ideas being 
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generated by the new liberalism and the ideas being perpetuated by the evangelists would 
converge to create a new movement within Christianity that embraced the ideal of the 
collective above the individual.  This would become a point of contention between the 
Social Gospellers and the evangelicals in Canada.   
Third, the revivalist was a “crucial mediator”.147  This role of mediator, of arousing 
God’s grace and human repentance was easily transmitted into a pattern for social activism 
that “evoked the impulses of social reform, reorganization and reconstruction.”148  
The intellectual impetus of the Social Gospel movement is also key to understanding 
its precepts.  I have already noted above the contribution of social sciences and economics 
to the movement.  Reformers like Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Marshall were having an 
effect, as were J.A. Hobson and Sidney and Beatrice Webb.149  It is in this milieu that the 
radical concept of an individual as a product of his/her environment began to arise.  
The concepts of Darwin, also, heavily affected the early Social Gospel movement.  
Not the social Darwinism formulated by Herbert Spencer and critiqued by Lester Ward but 
the observations of Henry Drummond and Kropotkin that species survived as a collective 
not so much by competition as by cooperation.150  The last was very important because it 
lent scientific credibility to the notion that society was progressing towards its logical end, 
cooperative society, envisioned by the Social Gospellers as the Kingdom of God.151 This last 
also was undergirded by, and in turn supported, the evangelical millennialism that was 
prevalent in the Protestant movements both in Canada and in the United States.  
In addition, Allen points to the science of Biblical criticism as foundational to the 
Social Gospel movement.  In a sense, it was also to eventually alienate some of the more 
fervent evangelicals—e pecially in the US where the idea that the Bible could be studied as if 
it were just another historical text contributed to the backlash fundamentalist movement.  
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Biblical criticism was used in the Social Gospel movement, not as a way to discredit the 
scriptures, but as a way of giving primacy to the prophetic tradition found in the Hebrew 
Bible.152  The reading given to the prophetic tradition in this paradigm stripped away the 
conception of the prophets as announcements for the messiah and instead located them as 
leaders within the Hebrew community.  The prophets were put forth as biblical proof that 
the faithful have a duty to be involved in public affairs, to be the voice of justice in society, 
to render the Word of God in such a way as to bring about societal, not personal, 
conversion. 
The above, in concert with Hegelian notions of societal progression and with an 
anthropology that saw humanity as essentially good and sin as not brokenness, but 
selfishness, informed and inspired the early proponents of the Social Gospel tradition in 
Canada.   
The men and women who were the earliest proponents of the Social Gospel 
movements were not limited to theologians and scholars.  However, the movement was, in 
its beginnings, staunchly middle-class and urban.  To be sure, the movement caught on in 
the rural areas, and the voluntary organizations that rose up in response to the call of the 
Social Gospellers for reform of society were not limited to the urban areas.  But the focus of 
much of the work was trained on the cities where the need was seen by many to be greatest.   
Social welfare institutions sprang up funded by the churches and by various missionary 
societies.   
As these institutions arose, concern began to be voiced as to how best to allocate 
resources and how best to help those in need.  The need for trained social workers became 
apparent and departments of sociology and social work began to be planned and 
implemented.   
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At the same time, organizations like the Women’s Christian Temperance Union 
(WCTU) lobbied hard to bring about national prohibition.  The Lord’s Day Alliance worked 
hard to make Sunday a required day of rest.153  These movements, allied with the Social 
Gospel movement, worked steadily towards the end of creating the Kingdom of God (in a 
Christian Protestant sense) in their respective countries.   
Another area of import for the Social Gospel movement was that of immigration.  
Immigrants were seen in both countries as being in need of “civilizing” and “evangelizing”.  
The churches soon found that they alienated immigrants when they tried to convert them 
away from their own beliefs.  As such, the churches eventually found that the most success 
they had with immigrants was in “Canadianizing” them, explaining the franchise and giving 
classes in civics.   
 The Canadian Social Gospel movement was unique and informed Canada in ways 
that some scholars posit have to do with Canadian exposure to Enlightenment thought.  In 
this view, the Christian humanism and Christian socialism that are imbedded in the Social 
Gospel movements are less humanist and socialist and more Christian in Canada than they 
were in the United States.  There could certainly be some veracity in this assessment.  The 
Canadian Social Gospellers worked hard to ensure that “…the institution of the church 
would not only insinuate itself into the reform network…but also that it would directly fund, 
manage and define the agenda of the national and provincial platforms for social 
amelioration.”154 
 An interesting observation in regards to the development of the Social Gospel in the 
United States and in Canada is that the influence of corporate interests served to keep the 
United States government from whole-heartedly embracing the ideal of a welfare state as 
proposed by the Social Gospel movement in Canada.  Canadian politics were not devoid of 
70 
 
such influences, but were more amenable to partnering with the Churches in this regard, 
most assuredly because of the tradition of Church and State working hand in hand in Canada.  
As has been seen, the tradition of State-sponsored, Church-run social institutions was 
already deeply entrenched in Quebec.  The Social Gospel movement in Canada continued to 
influence public opinion and policy until the 1960’s.155  
Christie and Gavreau argue that the institutional influence of the churches does not 
end until after World War II in English Canada and not until the 1960’s in Quebec when the 
nature of influence changed with Vatican II and the Quiet Revolution.156  It is also important 
to note that the influence of traditional religious institutions loomed large with tragic 
consequences in the First Nations communities.  The formal agreement between the 
government of Canada and the Anglican, Roman Catholic and United Churches in regards 
to the residential schools did not end until 1969.  It is safe to say that while secularization in 
the guise of attempting to annihilate aboriginal religious traditions was certainly foisted upon 
these children, to claim that their experience of government intervention was devoid of 
religious influence or context would be ludicrous.  It can be shown, then, that the influence 
of religious institutions on the public sphere (certain aspects of it, at least) continued longer 
in some spheres than in others, at least in terms of official public policy.   
 In English Protestant Canada, the overt influence of the churches ended when the 
State took over the institutions and precepts of the social gospel. Since this was, in large part, 
the way in which the Protestant church had defined itself in the context of modernity and 
the modern state there was again a necessity to review and renew its status in general and its 
status in relation to the state.  This process is ongoing and it is obviously affected by and 
affects the socio-political-economic context of society at large.  As will be shown in a later 
discussion, religious worldviews as such still play an important role in the individual lives of 
71 
 
many Canadians.  However, the overt role of church as shadow establishment has been 
replaced by the more amorphous role of the individual as representative of the institution 
within the work of the state.  That is, although the churches as institutions do take stands on 
issues of morality and justice (often through lobbying groups, if not as entire ecclesiastical 
bodies), these stands are not received by the State with the same gravitas that they were 
when the institution had status as a shadow establishment.  Where the churches as 
institutions still have sway and direct impact on the state are when they are represented by 
the individuals who embrace the tenets of a religious worldview and bring that worldview 
(unavoidably) to the legislative or policy table. 
 The beginnings of this can be seen in the development of some of the political 
parties in Canada in the early 20th century.  Individuals took their religious worldviews into 
the organized space of party politics, in part, to promote their vision of what a Christian 
country should look like.  What follows is a brief exploration of the role Christianity played 
in the development of these parties as one example of how the relationship of church and 
state shifted during the decline of the shadow establishments. 
Christianity and Political Party Formation in the Twentieth-Century 
CCF 
The Canadian Commonwealth Federation was a left wing political party that was 
started in 1932 by a conglomerate of progressive, socialist and labour leaders.  It is too facile 
to say that Christianity played a role in the development of the CCF simply because the 
founding members were almost universally Christians.  It is fair, though, to say that 
Christianity can be held to have been influential by looking at the stated ideology of the 
organization in question and asking:   1.  If there are elements within that ideology that are 
uniquely Christian or 2.  If not, are there elements within that ideology that resonate with a 
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Christian worldview, but are couched in non-religious terms? Of secondary relevance is the 
background and confession of the framers of that ideology.  The confessed beliefs of the 
ordinary members of the organization who ratify and agree to abide by the ideology are 
relevant but not deterministic, that is, their religious worldview was foundational to their 
activism but not completely definitive of the organizations with which they chose to affiliate.  
Thus, it is quite likely that a member of the United Farmers of Alberta did not much care 
that JS Woodsworth was a Social Gospeller who had turned to socialism.  What might 
matter to the farmer is that the CCF was a big enough entity to put forward his practical 
needs in Parliament and have those needs heard and met.  This is not to say, for example, 
that the Regina Manifesto (the founding document of the CCF) would have been irrelevant 
to the common membership.  Rather, it is to say that the Manifesto was not directly 
reflective of the common membership, but of the ideals expressed by the framers—ideals 
that the framers believed would reflect the views of the general membership—but the framers’ 
ideals, nonetheless.  Therefore, in order to explore the place of Christianity within the party 
politics of the State, I will examine the stated ideology of each political party and briefly 
touch upon a sample of the framers of these ideologies in order to determine whether or not 
Christianity influenced the formation of these parties.   
 A quick read of the Regina Manifesto shows a glaring absence of any mention of 
faith or of God.  It reads, in short, like a political manifesto of its time and place.  In order to 
determine whether or not there is a Christian influence in the Regina Manifesto, it is 
important to look at the kinds of Christianity one might expect to find therein.  The CCF 
was a group of like-minded organizations bent on governmental reform through the auspices 
of the collectivist spirit of socialism and/or new liberalism.  The Christians who would be 
attracted to such an organization would more likely than not hail from the Social Gospel 
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tradition of Protestantism or the social welfare tradition within Catholicism.  A tenet of 
Fundamentalist or Ultramontane Christianity is one of conservatism, obedience towards 
authority and an absolute adherence to the absolute sovereignty of God.  The CCF was not 
organized around the principles that would be conducive to attracting a more conservative 
kind of Christian into its fold.  That being said, it is not out of the range of possibility that 
such conservatives did populate the CCF, but if they did so they would have done so in 
adherence with a professed ideology that was antithetical to their own theology.   
 That being said, there are no statements within the Regina Manifesto that are 
uniquely Christian.  However, there are statements within the document that resonate with a 
Christian worldview, if that Christian worldview is that put forward by the Social Gospel 
movement.  Article 13 on Social Justice is especially telling even as it insists on social work 
professionals to administer this component.  Professional social workers were an 
increasingly important component to the Social Gospel tradition when J.S. Woodsworth was 
involved with the movement.  Article 10 regarding world peace is more a personal tenet of 
Woodsworth, a well-known pacifist, but a component of a collectivist Christian spirit, as 
well.  In fact, the entire manifesto, couched as it is in socialist terms is reflective of 
Christianity as expressed by the Social Gospel movement.  In that sense, then, the CCF can 
be seen to have been influenced by Christianity in its foundational ideology. 
NDP 
 The New Democratic Party was formed in 1961 and is a union of the CCF and the 
Canadian Labour Congress.  The NDP adopted the Winnipeg Manifesto of 1956 as its 
foundational ideology.  The Winnipeg Manifesto is less socialist and more social democratic 
than was the Regina Manifesto.  It affirms the centrality of democracy and freedom of the 
individual—as has been discussed, these are values that were implicit in the impetus of the 
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non-Anglican Protestant denominations to oppose and defeat Anglican establishment.  
Written in such a way as to assuage the hostility to socialism occasioned by the Cold War, 
the Winnipeg Manifesto affirms the need for a planned society but accedes to the need for 
both public and private corporations.  In short, this Manifesto reiterates much of the values 
of the CCF while acknowledging the primacy the Canadian public puts on the democratic 
process and individual freedoms. 
 Again, there is nothing uniquely Christian within the Manifesto.  Interestingly 
enough, though the Manifesto (or Declaration) asserts the “…belief that society must have a 
moral purpose”157 this is a tenet that is held by both conservative and liberal Christian alike.  
In fact, this is an example of the Enlightenment virtue of finding common denominators 
within the tradition at large with which everyone can agree.  This is not to say that the 
Christian philosophy that can be read between the lines of the Winnipeg document is in line 
with a conservative Christian stance. It is not.  Human potential is still at the apex of the 
ideology outlined here and, as such, the Christianity that can be seen within its pages is again 
reflective of the Social Gospel movement. 
 The above cursory analysis does not prove beyond argument that Christianity played 
any sort of role in the formation of these parties.  Given the tone of the professed ideology, 
however, and the belief systems of several of the framers (Woodsworth, Douglas, Ivens) it 
would be difficult to assert that the foundations of the parties were without religious scruples 
or ideals. The political parties that arose from this period were not just political 
manifestations of the Social Gospel tradition, however.  There was a conservative, populist 






 The Social Credit Party was founded in 1935 by the evangelist William Aberhardt.  It 
was based on an obscure and somewhat convoluted economic theory developed by a British 
engineer, Major CH Douglas.158  Aberhardt seized on Douglas’ idea as a way of alleviating 
the devastation of the Depression and urged his substantial radio audience to adopt it as a 
tenet of faith.  Aberhardt was elected Premier of Alberta on the “SoCred” ticket and lasted 
in that office until he died in 1943 and his protégé; Ernest Manning took over both his 
ministry and his political office.  Manning held that office until 1971.  Under Manning, 
however, the “SoCreds” reverted from the social credit doctrines of their founders and 
operated under an ideology of social and financial conservatism.  
 Social Credit was a populist party the foundations of which were laid in a peculiar,  
but not far from socialist, economic theory and in fundamentalist, evangelical Christianity.  
While producing no manifesto, the Social Credit party under Aberhardt and Manning was 
socially conservative, in keeping with their theological convictions.  And those convictions 
reflected the classic themes of Canadian Protestantism and the ideology of God’s Dominion, 
temperance (no alcohol was allowed to be served on airlines flying over Alberta), and 
Sabbath laws.  The language/culture barriers of English Protestantism and Catholic 
Quebeckers also played a role in the national party, with Ernest Manning stating categorically 
that he would never accept a Francophone Catholic as national leader.  So the ideology that 
is reflected in the operations of the Social Credit Party is one of a staunch, conservative, 
God’s Dominion Protestantism untouched by the teachings of the Social Gospel and 
entrenched in the doctrine of individualism, Anglo-centrism, and transformation of the souls 





 Preston Manning is the son of Ernest Manning, evangelist and former premier of 
Alberta.  He is the author and founder of the former Reform Party of Canada, which joined 
with the Canadian Alliance and the former Progressive Conservative Parties to create the 
Conservative Party of Canada.  The Conservative Party came into a minority government in 
February, 2006.   
Like the Social Credit Party of his father, Preston Manning’s Reform Party was a 
populist movement sparked by a number of political issues raised by the Mulroney Tory 
government.  These issues (Meech Lake, the Charlottetown accords, the GST, NAFTA, etc. 
and, of course, the National Energy Program earlier under Trudeau) contributed to a feeling 
of Western alienation, a feeling that Manning had been planning for and leapt to exploit 
when he saw the time was ripe.  The party was hugely successful in splitting the conservative 
vote and in providing Westerners with a voice that they felt had been lacking.  
 It is difficult to assess just how much Christianity may have influenced the building 
of the Reform Party’s professed ideology.  Preston Manning and his people crafted a very 
careful, very circumspect platform for the 1993 election and Mr. Manning is very close-
mouthed about the religious convictions that might have come to play, had the merger not 
taken place and the populist Reform Party been able to form a government at the federal 
level.  Books about the conservative movement that entwines Reform, Alliance and PC are 
carefully neutral on the subject of Christianity or any fundamentalist influences that may be 
exerted from within the party faithful.  Mr. Manning insists that the Reform party was purely 
populist and all moral issues were to be decided democratically.  This is, indeed, a big move 
from the Social Credit party which reflected classic Canadian conservative Protestant values 
in its unabashed move to legislate morality for the good of the Dominion.  Manning, Sr. was 
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a well-known pre-millennial dispensationalist whose religious convictions were never 
separate from his political endeavours.  
 This is not to say that there is any hidden agenda within the Reform or Conservative 
ideology, merely that the lack of a platform plank suggesting a moral or ethical stance is 
unusual, even in a populist movement and especially in one founded by a confessed 
evangelical Christian and led by a professed evangelical Christian.  It could, of course, mean 
that there is no religious influence whatsoever in the party’s ideology, but that belies the very 
nature and definition of evangelical and begs the question as to just what kind of relationship 
we are now going to see between Church and State in Canada.  Traditionally, we have been a 
country with overtly religious motivations.  The careful crafting, packaging and marketing of 
the past Reform and current Conservative governments signifies a shift in that transparency.  
Stephen Harper, the current leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of Canada 
under the minority government, is notoriously tight-lipped in general and even more so 
when it comes to the place religious worldviews have in the party.  Whether it is simply in 
self-defence—not wanting to get painted with the tarry brush of the American Religious 
Right—or a true statement of a conviction that Church and State are separate, remains to be 
seen.   
Conclusion  
 The history of the relationship between church and state in Canada lies somewhere 
between that of Great Britain and the United States.160   Although both the Catholic Church 
in French-speaking Canada and the Anglican Church in the Maritimes were established (de 
facto and legally, respectively), the more persistent ethos in English speaking Canada is of an 
informal religious establishment that embraced a type of Protestant pluralism.161  In French 
speaking Canada, as well, until the 20th century, the Catholic Church was the keeper of 
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culture and of society, running the educational, medical and charitable organizations.  The 
state in this instance worked hand in glove with the Church to maintain this status quo, in 
essence taking a subordinate position within society as mandated by an ultramontane world 
view. 
 Two major underlying tenets of Church-State relations in Canada are, then, tolerance  
of doctrinal difference for the sake of political or societal order, and a working relationship 
where neither party feels particularly threatened by the power of the other as long as an 
egalitarian spirit prevails, whereby no one religious institution or doctrine is seen to be 
actively promoted by the State.  In short, Canada has a history of recognizing religion as an 
important component of society and of viewing it pragmatically as a tool for social order or 
for orderly social change, and not for out-and-out rebellion.  Even when religious 
worldviews challenged the status quo with the progressive notions of the Social Gospel, the 
State itself was not being challenged, but rather the duty of the State towards the polis.  The 
perception of this duty has, of course changed over the course of the twentieth century and 
the next chapter explores an aspect of that change.  
 A discussion of secularization theories is the next step in understanding the history 
of Church and State in Canada and how religion fits into the twenty-first century State. In 
light of Canada’s strong history of recognizing religion as integral to culture (whatever that 
culture may be), the discussion of secularization theories assists in unpacking the complex 
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Chapter Two: Secularization 
Introduction 
The underlying assertions being challenged in this study are that the Canadian 
political landscape is secular and that religious worldviews are in some way detrimental to the 
legislative process.  Just what is meant by “secular” will be explored in this chapter.  As well, 
this chapter will explore theories of secularization, including the history of the theories, and 
make some assertions regarding the applicability of secularization theory to the Canadian 
political landscape.  The beginning of the chapter will concern itself with some definitions 
and move into a discussion of what is meant by secularization.  The discussion will then turn 
to a brief exploration of modern secularization theories, discussing several core branches of 
the current scholarly discussion.  The final portion of the chapter will explore secularization 
theory in the context of the Canadian political landscape and, to some extent, the contexts of 
the public and private spheres of Canadian society.  
Secularization Theories 
From the outset it must be stated that this study begins with the premise that 
religious worldviews are extant in Canada at myriad levels of society and that these 
worldviews manifest themselves in both the private and the public spheres—either explicitly 
or implicitly. In other words, the fact that Canadians hold religious worldviews is not being 
questioned and is considered as a fact.  The extent to which Canadians are religious, or 
whether or not religious institutions are declining or expanding, is tangential to the larger 
discussion.  Therefore this chapter will not examine data pertaining to the decline and/or fall 
of the religious worldviews of Canadians as individuals or of religious institutions.    What 
this chapter (and the study overall) is concerned with is how religious worldviews are 
manifest in the Canadian political landscape and whether or not this manifestation has been, 
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or has the potential to be, detrimental to the legislative process.  Secularization theories 
belong in this discussion because their very essence is the investigation of the interaction of 
religion with and in the public and private spaces of western, liberal democracies.   
At its essence, classical secularization theory argues that “as a society becomes 
increasingly modern (usually as knowledge expands through the processes of scientific 
rationality), religion becomes less and less important to that society.”1  Secularization theory 
rose as a sub-category of the social sciences—driven by the desire to explain and analyze 
modernity.  Building on the earlier ideas of Voltaire and David Hume, two distinct schools 
of thought intertwine as a double helix to form the skeleton of its DNA.  One strand is the 
functional camp, after Emile Durkheim.2  This strand posits that as society progresses, 
religious traditions as institutions have less and less control over societal institutions.  
Education is one example, and a powerful one in the history of Canada.  Religious 
institutions once functioned as the prescribed dispensers of education for the young, and 
religious teachings were considered as indispensible to the educative process as learning 
one’s letters and numbers.  Gradually, the State took over the function of the churches, 
establishing State-funded institutions that were increasingly divorced from specific doctrinal 
viewpoints and then, in some cases, from any religious affiliation or teachings whatsoever.3  
Religion was something one practiced outside of school—it was extracurricular.  Thus, the 
function of religion becomes minimal; it is personalized and privatized, i.e. kept out of the 
arena of public discourse.     
The second strand is the Weberian strand (after Max Weber), theorizing that in a 
disenchanted universe—i.e. in part, a universe where answers that rely on the supernatural 
are no longer needed to supply knowledge or meaning—the scientific and the rational will 
render a general societal belief in the supernatural “impossible”.4  If the above are the 
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genetic codes of secularization theory, then the contention that the intertwining of religion 
and State are antithetical to a modern, liberal democracy is the philosophical big bang of 
their conception. 5 
 Secularization theory is controversial on a variety of levels and these controversies 
stem from myriad reasons. Some scholars argue that secularization theory is not globally 
applicable and therefore not useful as a tool for analysis and comparison.  This argument 
points to American or European exceptionalism (the idea that because Americans appear to 
be more religious than ever and thus undermine secularization theory or that Europeans 
seem to be less religious than ever while much of the rest of the world is experiencing a 
religious upsurge, thus undermining the theory) to underscore the argument.6  Others argue 
that the theory is not tenable because it is false.7   
 As in many things, much of the conflict in secularization theory rests in definitions.  
A major tension currently centres on whether secularization is to be defined as the decline of 
religion or as the transformation of religion. David Yamane, a self-proclaimed “neo-
secularization” scholar at Wake Forrest in the United States, referencing Olivier Tschannen’s 
work on the history of secularization perspective argues, that defining secularization theory 
as simply the decline of religion is unnecessarily reductionist.8  R. Stephen Warner, Jeffery 
Hadden and Rodney Stark—among others—contend that secularization theory does define 
secularization as the decline of religion and that scholarship should move towards a new 
paradigm of “postsecularization”.  Steve Bruce argues the same definition as Hadden and 
Stark but contends that religion is, in fact, on the decline in the developing world.  Bruce’s 
contention, that religion has been and continues to be declining, is particularly important for 
the purposes of this study for it articulates the position that not only is religion declining, but 
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modern liberal democracies precipitate that decline and, in part, rely upon it to continue to 
flourish. 
Secularization as Fact: Religion is Declining in Modern Societies 
Steve Bruce states that:   
The secularization paradigm combines two things:  an assertion about changes in the 
presence and nature of religion, and a collection of related explanations of those 
changes…It is not a universally applicable scientific law, but a description and 
explanation of the past of European societies and their settler offspring…It is not a 
simple evolutionary model and does not imply a single uniform future—but it does 
suppose that there are “socio-logics” to societal changes.9 
 
Bruce’s core argument is that there has been a long-term decline in the power, popularity 
and prestige of religious beliefs and rituals.10  A root cause of that decline, he writes, is that 
the plausibility of a belief system is proportionate to social consensus—the more consensus 
there is, the more plausible the belief.11  Thus, the individualism, diversity and egalitarianism 
found in the context of liberal democracy lead to the marginalization of religion in modern 
societies.12  The need of modern societies to encompass diversity, to remain religiously 
neutral is based on the premise that diversity of faith cannot be tolerated in a society where 
the government allows one belief system to have legitimacy above all others.  The result of 
such a situation, he writes, is high levels of social conflict.13  Therefore, the modern state 
cannot but step back and allow religion to become privatized to the extent that, at a societal 
level at least, it declines until it is received with “benign indifference.”14  Bruce will be 
explored in greater depth when I turn to the discussion of Charles Taylor. 
 Like the postsecularists and the neo-secularists that are examined below, Bruce has a 
desire to move beyond the contention of whether or not religion is in decline and look at 
what secularization means as a sociological phenomenon.  The point of contention for him, 
though, continues to be that many other scholars argue that what Bruce interprets as decline 
is in truth transformation.15  
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Postsecularization 
In the early 1990’s R. Stephen Warner called for a re-framing of secularization 
conversation by suggesting not that the definition be reframed, but that a “new paradigm” of 
“postsecularization” be explored.  Postsecularization theorists define secularization as the 
decline of religion and then refute the theory with arguments that religion is not actually in 
decline.  Warner’s argument embraced Stark and Bainbridge’s conception of rational choice 
theory.  Rational choice theory (as applied to religion) asserts that religion serves as a 
function to fulfill the human need to know that life has meaning beyond mechanistic 
existence.  Rational choice theory manifests as a supply and demand construct, with 
humanity demanding the meaning that religion supplies.  It also posits a religious economy 
whereby religious institutions of various stripes benefit from the same principles that guide 
free-market capitalism: deregulation, competition, specialization.16  This perspective takes 
American exceptionalism as the rule.17  In addition, this perspective looks at institutions and 
at individuals but does not particularly take heed of differentiation of religion from other 
societal institutions.  Yamane, Tschannen and Chaves each in their own way argue that 
classical secularization theorists were most interested in the macrosocial significance of 
religion.18  Kevin Schultz agrees, noting that failure to consider aspects of secularization such 
as “institutional secularization (as in the marginalization of religious institutions from a 
reality-defining role), cultural secularization (the transformation of mythic and symbolic 
markers), or social secularization (faith as a source of social solidarity and division)” 
complicates the debate by presenting secularization as less multi-faceted than it actually is.19 
Neosecularization 
Others argued that the above paradigm of secularization theory still missed the point, 
which was that secularization itself was defined improperly by the postsecularization 
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proponents and hence the real issue—how religion transformed in modern society on a 
societal, as well as on an institutional or individual level—was being completely obfuscated.20  
To define secularization as the decline of religion was reductionist.  Mark Chavez—at the 
forefront of the neosecularization camp—notes also that, “…currently fashionable claims 
suggesting that secularization theory has been decisively falsified throw the baby out with the 
bathwater;” implying, of course, that secularization as a theory should not be discounted on 
the premise of a faulty definition.21 Neosecularization defines secularization as a 
transformation of religion in response to modernity, not necessarily as a free-fall decline.  
Another important issue gets raised by the scholars in this section: not only are there 
differences in definitions of secularity, but in function of religion.  In this part of the 
discussion, it is just as important to define what secularization theory is/was meant to do as it 
is to define what secularization is.   
Robert Bellah began criticizing a reductive definition of secularization theory forty 
years ago, calling it an “Enlightenment myth of secularization” which essentially posits the 
development of science as a direct cause of the decline of religion.22  Yamane, Tschannen, 
David Martin (in his later work) and Bryan Wilson, to name but a few, join with Bellah in 
stressing that secularization theory posits a transformation of religion in the modern world:  
“…over time the place of religion in the social order, the structure of religious organizations, 
and the orientation of individuals to religion all change.”23  Wilson asserts that religious 
institutions, actions and consciousness diminish in their social significance, not in their 
existence altogether.24    
Neosecularization, as put forth by Yamane as a counter to post-secularization, roots itself in 
an early understanding of the word “secular” which referred to the removal of territory or 
property from ecclesiastical authorities.  Yamane, using Chavez, extrapolates his definition of 
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secularization to mean the disengagement of institutional authority over the spheres of 
public life.25  Secularization, then, becomes more about the differentiation (i.e. “the process 
by which functions which are originally carried out together crystallize out and fall into 
separate spheres, with their own norms, rules and institutions.”)26 of institutions and what 
does or does not have authority in public life, than it does about whether or not religion is 
on the rise or on the decline.  Yamane argues further that there is a double movement of 
secularization: “the broad movement in the history of the West toward a decline in the scope 
of religious authority vis-à-vis secular authorities and the persistence or reemergence of 
religious organizations under the secularized conditions established in the first movement.”27  
Thus, in this paradigm, secularization theory explores the transformation of religious 
institutions in response to the secularizing effects (i.e. loss of authority over institutions and 
persons in the public sphere) of modernity.   
 José Casanova and Mark Chavez can be placed firmly in this secularization paradigm 
proposed by Yamane—Chavez himself suggests a shift from arguing over demographics 
data to examining a decline in religious authority and Casanova has written that, “…the 
theory of secularization is nothing more than a subtheory of general theories of 
differentiation.”28  Casanova argues that using delineated categories (which will be discussed 
below) to facilitate cross-cultural discussions would enable discussions to move beyond the 
issue of veracity into that of substantive comparative analysis.29  For Casanova, this is 
necessary as the secularization debate is often “fruitless” and the analysis he suggests could 
“…account for different patterns of secularization…across societies and civilizations.”30  
David Martin, as well, sides with Casanova in this aspect—both of them posing the 
suggestion that a more constructive discussion could be had by reconsidering what is meant 
 91
by secularization and “…whether we aren’t better off thinking in terms of “multiple 
modernities,” where no single rule holds true for every society.”31 
  These are some of the current conversations.  Secularization, so far, has been 
shown to be defined as many things, including:  the movement into a public sphere that is 
set firmly in profane time; the decline of religious belief, practice and relevance in modern 
society; the decline of religion as authoritative institution in modern society; and the 
transformation of religion as a consequence of its interaction with modernity.  A thicker 
understanding of the current discussions can be had by making a brief foray into the past 
and looking at the history of secularization theory. 
The Historical Development of Secularization Theory 
 Although the concept has its roots in the Enlightenment, the word “secularization” 
comes from the Latin “secular” which originally meant something akin to “era”.  By the fifth 
century, the meaning of the term had broadened and become somewhat more ambiguous—
meaning at the same time a sense of time without end; a differentiation between types of 
clergy (those cloistered as opposed to those secular or “in the world”) and the differentiation 
between a priestly life (close to God) and a “secular” life (in the mundane, profane world 
outside of the monastery and professional clergy).  Without further dalliance in etymology, 
suffice it to say that the term, like most words adopted into the English language, went 
through a series of definitions—differentiation between civil and ecclesiastical laws and 
lands, for example—before presenting itself to the modern age in its current forms.32 
 A good deal of the literature places the current meanings of the term at the feet of 
G.J. Holyoake, a nineteenth century British freethinker and founder of the Secular Society—
a body formed in order to promote a social order that did not look to religion for authority.  
Holyoake himself, though, did not argue against religion.  He wrote,  
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(secularism) does not say there is no light or guidance elsewhere, but 
maintains that there is light and guidance in secular truth, whose 
conditions and sanctions exist independently, and act forever.  Secular 
knowledge is manifestly that kind of knowledge which is founded in this 
life, which relates to the conduct of this life, conduces to the welfare of 
this life, and is capable of being tested by the experience of this life.33   
 
Holyoake encapsulates the spirit of many in the Enlightenment who did not see the rise of 
science and rational thought as fundamentally opposing religion, but rather as superseding 
certain aspects of it.  As the The Hedgehog Review points out, it was only people like Marx who 
“dared to predict that the world of the future would be a world without religion.”34 Most 
were, the argument goes on, like Thomas Jefferson, more likely to think that human 
enlightenment would result in, among other things, a rational form of religious knowledge 
and experience.35 Secularism as a concept has never been clear-cut and has become more 
nuanced as it slowly developed from Enlightenment thought to, among other things, 
twentieth-century secularization theory.   
The definition of secularization as it is encapsulated in classical secularization theory 
was proffered by others, including Ernst Troelsch, but is most often attributed to Weber, 
although the term appears quite infrequently in his writings.36  “Secularization” was the term 
Weber gave to the process and the result of the process of rationalization and Entzauberung, 
commonly translated as “disenchantment” but more accurately referenced as de-myster-
ization or de-magi-fication.37   Weber’s analysis was that as human beings become more able 
at providing this-worldly answers for their questions and problems (a shift in epistemology), 
religion will cease to have special authority in society and in people’s private lives (a shift in 
the locus of authority).  Hence a society in which political decisions are made and have 
authority according to human reason and needs, not out of fealty to precepts proscribed by a 
deity or a religious institution purporting to speak for that deity—anthropocentric as 
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opposed to theocentric.  Durkheim and others with a functional theory of religion also 
espouse this vision of modernization—that it is a step in humanity’s collective progression.   
Charles Taylor refers to both Weber’s and Durkheim’s view of this process as 
“acultural” or “culture-neutral”—a state in which it can be shown that “…under certain 
conditions, human beings will just come to see that scientific thinking is valid, that 
instrumental rationality pays off, that religious beliefs involve unwarranted leaps, that facts 
and values are separate.”38 In this paradigm, culture does not affect the development of 
human ideology and social theory as acutely as does a general propensity of all human beings 
to move towards the paradigm of modernity.39 
 Secularization theory in essence restates Weber’s assumptions of modernity.  
Modernity is a process of rationalization and this process will decrease the need for and the 
significance of religion both at the macro (societal and institutional) and micro (individual) 
levels.40  From this assumption arose the conceptions of differentiation (described above) 
and privatization 
Privatization—the idea that that which used to be seen as a primarily communal 
activity (worship, for example)—means that religion is now seen as primarily a private matter 
with communal aspects; i.e. as an individual, I continue to believe in God— occasionally I 
may choose to express that belief with others in the context of public worship.  Privatized 
religion has been regulated to “the private sphere”—the sphere where religion can remain 
significant in personal and private matters.  The individual embraces or chooses not to 
embrace what used to be a communal and hence societal norm. Differentiation and 
privatization were encapsulated in secularization theory as key components of the process of 
modernization.  There is more to unravel here, but before engaging in further discussion 
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regarding differentiation and privatization, some exploration of the ways in which aspects of 
the theory began to be debated within the academy is necessary. 
Early Debates and Detractors 
 In the mid-twentieth century, even as secularization theory began to gain momentum 
as a way to explain the ways in which religion and society were interacting in the modern age, 
the theory had its detractors.  David Martin41 and Larry Shiner42, in particular, were strong 
voices for this point of view. Shiner was concerned about a lack of cohesiveness and clarity.  
The question of analysis versus value judgement begins to arise here.  There was a concern 
that the theory had become dogma and, as such, was not reflecting and analyzing reality but 
was too focused on its own perpetuation to be useful.  In addition, the lack of universality 
and the fluidity of definitions, it was argued, made secularization theory an unwieldy tool for 
analysis. 
 In addition to the above, there is also the very real split between European and 
American social scientists in regards to secularization theory.  The earliest proponents of the 
theory were Europeans or British, Bryan Wilson, Peter Berger (an émigré to the US), 
Thomas Luckmann and Karel Dobbelaere.  As Europeans brought up in a milieu of church 
establishment, secularization theory seemed logical.  The process of modernity described by 
Weber was certainly happening in Europe.  Disestablishment, differentiation and 
privatization all had more resonance with societies that have experienced the entrenchment 
of religious institutions for centuries.   
 In the United States, the scene was somewhat different.  Americans took the 
separation of Church and State as a foregone conclusion and the idea of establishment was 
completely foreign.  Therefore, they saw no decline in the influence of established religion or 
signs of additional differentiation.  In America, traditional religions and non-religious 
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spheres of society came already disassembled—no differentiation required.  As there also did 
not seem to be any decline in the patterns of practice and belief in the US—such 
components actually increasing and not decreasing—a cadre of American scholars began to 
view secularization theory as false.  Of course, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.  
American practice and belief has diminished in a sense and to a degree, at least in terms of 
the mainline churches and what is traditionally understood as religion.43  But whether or not 
that can be attributed to secularization as it is formulated in the traditional theories is 
another matter altogether.44   
 In the face of these and other perceived flaws in secularization theory as an analytical 
tool, several solutions have been suggested.  The most vigorous of detractors insist that the 
concept should be dropped altogether (Jeffery K. Hadden, Rodney Stark and Roger Fink 
[with their supply-side model of religion as marketplace], William Bainbridge, and David 
Martin to some extent).  
A core argument for laying the theory to rest was laid out cogently by Hadden in his 
1986 presidential address to the Southern Sociological Society45 in four distinct points:46 
(1) Secularization theory is internally weak in its logical structure — "a hodgepodge 
of loosely employed ideas" — first so revealed, indeed, by Shiner in 1967; (2) such 
secularization theory as does exist is unsupported by data after more than twenty 
years of research, a point also made by Glasner (1977) in his critique of 
secularization theory as a "myth" a decade earlier;(3) New Religious Movements 
(NRMs) have appeared and persisted in the most supposedly secularized societies 
— indeed, Stark and Bainbridge (1985) have shown that the lower the level of 
practice or saturation on the part of traditional religion in modern societies, the 
higher the likelihood of NRM activity; and finally, (4) religion has emerged as a 
vital force in the world political order (cf., Hadden and Shupe 1989).47 
 
           This call to remove secularization theory from the scholar’s lexicon inspired a bevy 
of responses and led, in part, to the three different approaches that are outlined above.      
           Furthermore, to take Hadden point by point: Hadden’s first point, regarding 
secularization theory as a “hodgepodge” has resulted in a vigorous re-working of 
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secularization theory by several scholars, David Martin and José Casanova, to name but 
two, in order to find a systematic or at least comprehensive way of studying the 
phenomenon.  Hadden’s second point is vigorously debated by Steve Bruce, for one, who 
argues (as has been shown) that the data does show a steady decline in religious relevance, 
practice and belief most notably in the UK, but in other parts of the developed world, as 
well.48  Hadden’s third point is somewhat contentious—Steve Bruce has vigorously 
refuted Stark and Bainbridge’s NRMs theory.49  In a more nuanced approach, Reginald 
Bibby and Harold Weaver acknowledged its importance while arguing that Stark and 
Bainbridge’s assumptions do not necessarily support a case against secularization as 
NRMs appear not to be filling a vacuum made by the ebbing of traditional religious 
worldviews but pulling their relatively meagre membership from a pool of the non-
religious.50  Bryan Wilson takes a completely different tack and contends that NRMs are 
themselves proof of secularization.51  Hadden’ fourth point has been addressed by David 
Martin and Martin Marty, to name but two scholars interested in the rise of religious 
fundamentalism in the latter half of the twentieth century.52  Thus, although Hadden was 
inspired to call for a removal of the theory from the field of discourse, his critiques have 
served (as have the critiques of others) to refine and retool secularization theory.  
Casanova has already been mentioned and his theories will be expanded below.   Before 
that, however, the work of Charles Taylor will be examined in order to better explore the 
claims of both the orthodox secularization theorists (Steve Bruce) and the 
neosecularizationists.  Understanding the division is important first, because this is an 
integral component to the field of secularization theory at the present time; and because 
understanding the distinctions and the reasons for the distinctions between the theorists 
helps when establishing a theoretical framework for this study in order to better grasp the 
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reality of the position of the Canadian political landscape in terms of secularization.  
Taylor and Bruce make good foils for one another for their perspectives regarding the 
place of religion in modern society are quite different. 
Charles Taylor on Secularization Theory 
             Taylor likens the secularization discussion to a three-storey dwelling in which the 
ground floor is a place of convergence between the detractors and the proponents—it 
“represents the factual claim that religious belief and practice have declined and that the 
‘scope and influence of religious institutions’ is now less than in the past.53  Claims about 
how to explain these changes live in the basement and speculation and debate about the 
place of religion today is housed in the upper storey.54   The divergence in both sides, 
according to Taylor, becomes most apparent when the two camps (those who embrace 
secularization theory as a valid way to understand religion and those who see 
secularization theory as obfuscating, at best and wrong at worst)  attempt to explain 
(from what Taylor calls “the historically explanatory basement”) the inhabitant of the 
ground floor (the claim that religious belief and practice have declined and that religious 
institutions wield less influence than in the past) or when the same groups move to the 
top floor and engage in vigorous discussions about what dwells there (i.e. speculation and 
debate about the place of religion in society today).  What becomes apparent in those 
discussions are deep definitional divides.  The most basic, outlined by Taylor but also 
reinforced by Steve Bruce,55 is that the mainline theorists must believe that features of 
modernity (urbanization, development of class societies, industrialization, the rise of 
science/technology) “…of themselves undermine belief, or make it harder.”56     
             Those who would revise or do away with secularization theory, writes Taylor, see 
that “…the new structures indeed, undermine old forms, but leave open the possibility of 
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new forms which can flourish.”57  In this sense, Taylor reinforces the insights of the neo-
secularizationists.    
           The divide becomes even more apparent when Taylor points out that Steve Bruce 
and Roy Wallis explain exceptions to the theory by stating, in essence, that in a modern 
paradigm religion has no independent motivation or reason but functions only as a 
support to something else.58  This draws upon Weber, Troelsch and Durkheim by 
revealing a functional vision of the relationship between religion and society rather than 
what Taylor calls the “transformative perspective” of religion which “takes (human 
beings) beyond or outside of whatever is normally understood as human flourishing, even 
in a context of reasonable mutuality (that is, where we work for each other’s 
flourishing).”59  In other words, a distinction between the two positions of secularization 
theory that are being considered (the one asserting that secularization means the decline 
of religion in modern society, and that this decline is clearly supported by sociological 
evidence, and the other, the neosecularizationist point of view) is that the first sees 
religion as essentially mechanistic, a tool that developed in human societies to meet 
particular, functional needs—i.e. as a way to maintain order or as a way of explaining how 
and why the universe works as it does.  The other asserts that religion is not so much a 
utility as it is a portal through which human beings posit a model of human flourishing 
that goes beyond what is to imagine what may be.  This “transformative perspective” is 
missing, according to Taylor, in secularization accounts that rely on a functional 
definition of religion.  He argues that to miss that component of what religion has 
historically meant to Western society is to miss an important facet of modern society.   
                Taylor extrapolates two assumptions that he asserts underlie secularization 
theorists such as Steve Bruce:  
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The first (assumption) says that the independent motivation to religious belief and 
action…tends to disappear in conditions of modernity.  The second says that in 
conditions of modernity (if not always), religious belief and action can only be 
epiphenomenal, that is functional to some distinct goals or purposes. 60 
 
In what Taylor calls the “orthodox” camp61, the view is that modernity has an adverse 
affect on religion—that modern society reduces or represses religion.62  Bruce’s work 
bears this statement out.  Bruce refers to secularization theory as a paradigm which 
“…combines two things: an assertion about changes in the presence and nature of 
religion, and a collection of related explanations of those changes.”63  The changes the 
orthodox side sees are those of secularization as a consequence of modernity brought 
about by egalitarianism, individualism and diversity—hallmarks of differentiation.  His 
argument is that all three create a paradigm in which there is no longer a preponderance 
of consensual belief but a diversity of opinion.64  This diversity of opinion can only 
thrive, according to Bruce, in a religiously neutral State.65  This neutrality leads to a 
society in which “…all faiths are in some sense equally valid, (the result of which is that) 
parents lack an incentive to indoctrinate their children, and the environment proves stony 
ground for such seeds of faith as are planted.”66  Therefore, he argues, although we 
continue to see religion as an apparent component of society, it is steadily diminishing: 
Perhaps a suitable metaphor is that of the progress of any point on the 
circumference of a wheel on a vehicle running down a gentle slope. As the wheel 
turns the point rises and falls but after each turn, it is lower than it was before.67 
He points to census data and sociological analysis that indicate the decline of persons 
practicing or affiliating with traditional religious institutions.68  What is important, he 
argues, is the decline of the importance to the public sphere of the religious institution as 
social structure and as medium of a collective moral conscience.  Recognizing this decline 
is one step we take as a collective to understanding human cultures in another light and 
on a different level.  But in the orthodox paradigm, this knowledge can only come to the 
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fore when we accept the data for what Bruce and his cohorts believe it is—the 
secularization of western culture. 
         As noted above, Bruce relies upon the familiar church, sect, and cult typologies of 
Weber and Troelsch to underscore his contention that religion as social scientists 
understand and study it is a functional, social phenomenon in decline in the West.  There 
is no doubt, according to Bruce, that this aspect of the religious is rapidly disappearing 
from the public sphere.  He and Roy Wallis dismiss the standard countermeasure of 
American exceptionalism69 as an example of continuing sectarianism that will eventually 
lead, not to the demise of religion but to its acute privatization and irrelevancy.  However, 
other scholars from the post and neo-secularization schools conclude that what is meant 
by religious and the ways in which the religious intersects with the public sphere are 
merely in flux, not necessarily in strict decline.70  
            What is shown here, then, by utilizing the assumptions extrapolated by Taylor and 
described above, are the contemporary deep divides between the proponents of orthodox 
secularization theory and those who would revise or abandon it.  Again, the differences 
are not only in terms of the definition of what is religion.  They also have to do with the 
meaning of religion in a societal context.  As Taylor has shown, with certain caveats, it is 
possible for that divide to be crossed by at least some on either side.   
           As well, and this is to my mind the most fundamental of the divisions, is the issue 
of the second storey of Taylor’s hypothetical house—the place of religion in modern 
societies.  To discover this, the field will need to consider a more global approach than is 
used by Bruce, who concentrates on Western liberal democracies while it is becoming 
increasingly apparent to some that modernity occurs differently in different cultural 
contexts.  José Casanova has done extensive work in this area partially with the hope that 
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the distinctions between orthodox secularization theorists and neo-secularization 
theorists can be overcome.   
Privatization, Differentiation, Modernity and Secularization 
Casanova attempts to “insert conceptual clarity and empirical accuracy”71 into the 
debate by separating the theoretical threads into what he calls three “connotations”:  The 
first, and most recent, usage is “the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern 
societies, often postulated as a universal, human developmental process.”72  The second is 
“the privatization of religion, often understood both as a general modern historical trend and 
as a normative condition, indeed as a precondition for modern liberal democratic politics.73  
The third is the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually 
understood as “emancipation” from religious institutions and norms.74    
 Casanova makes a very insightful point when he remarks that two of the sub-theses 
of secularization theory, decline and privatization, have been examined minutely and have 
undergone “numerous critiques and revisions”; but that the sub-theses of “functional 
differentiation” has not.75  Hence a rather ethnocentric understanding of what constitutes 
modernity has been allowed to underpin secularization theory, even as modernity itself by 
virtue of globalization has defied “a single teleological process of modern functional 
differentiation”. 76   
Secularization theory has, for the most part, been predicated on a Western European 
understanding of what constitutes modernity and a substantial portion of what constitutes 
modernity is thought to have been the differentiation of society and religion.  A 
characteristic of this conception of modernity is the construction of neat categories with 
impermeable borders.  These categories are constructed with the idea that they make more 
possible the process of analysis by which a variety of subjects can be best understood.  The 
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social categories created by the process of modernity once were subsumed in the great web 
woven by church and state.  During the process of modernity the economical, political, 
personal and the religious become dis-united and differentiated.  Non-religious spheres 
become increasingly emancipated by virtue of their reliance on reason and human freedom 
rather than on religious authority.  Religion becomes more and more relegated to the 
margins of society as people become empowered by their newfound freedom in rationality 
and self-governance.  This collision of cultures—Enlightened, disenchanted, democratic 
modernity versus Unenlightened, mystical, enchanted, institutional authoritarianism— 
increased alienation and strengthened the boundaries between categories or spheres.   
This understanding of differentiation, however, changes when confronted with the 
reality in the United States which, as I have already states, emerged from the foreheads of its 
theoretical framers much like Athena emerging from the brow of Zeus—fully formed and 
fully separate.  Church and State were never entwined and indeed, worked together to ensure 
that religion was not interfered with by the State.  It is often forgotten in our times as many 
religious groups in the US clamour for the State to impose particular religious points of view 
in portions of public space, that their forebears crafted a government that was expressly 
devoid of the power to impose such particularities.  Therefore, as Casanova and Martin have 
argued—there are multiplicities of differentiation—collision as in Europe and collusion as in 
the US being only two.77 
Another problem of differentiation, besides being Western-centric, is that human 
beings—even modern ones—are not easily and neatly relegated to one sphere and then to 
another and so on; the boundaries of the spheres that people inhabit are not self-contained 
and exclusive.  The categories constructed by modernity are just that—constructions.  
Human beings are not categorized or generalized easily—to make a generalization.  To draw 
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an analogy: every parent knows that the impermeability of categories is false.  One does not 
depart from the private sphere of family (the home) just drop off the children at their 
respective public spheres(daycare/school) and forget about the domestic private sphere as 
one goes about one’s day in the public sphere (job/volunteer).  In the back of the mind and 
underlying conversations is always the subtext of obligations unrelated to one’s job in the 
public sphere: dependents must be collected, meals must be produced and distributed, 
homework supervised, dogs emptied and filled, offspring and relationships nurtured, 
appointments made and kept, the feelings of guilt and/or inadequacy suppressed until it is 
appropriate to wallow.  This is multitasking.  But it is also a blatant example of the folly of 
compartmentalization on a micro level.  And, since human institutions and societies are 
comprised of individuals, I would argue that it is folly on a macro level as well.  I am not 
arguing against categories.  But I am arguing against a mindset that sees those categories as 
impermeable because human beings don’t work that way.   
At the macro, or societal level, we see that on practical terms the boundaries of the 
spheres of modernity are much more permeable than theoretically predicated.  In terms of 
religion, Taylor writes, “…the fact that activity in a given sphere follows its own inherent 
rationality and doesn’t permit of the older kind of faith-based norming doesn’t mean that it 
cannot still be very much shaped by faith.”78  The spheres may be differentiated 
institutionally, even legally, but human beings do not leave their ethical and moral 
frameworks at the door of the public sphere as if they were one’s outdoor shoes left outside 
so as not to muddy the pristine interior. 
Differentiation is a theory—albeit one that should be seen as more diverse than it 
has been in the past—but it is not dogma and it can become untenable when the dynamism 
of the human condition is not factored into the calculation.  The proof of this contention is, 
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I believe, in the way that privatization—closely linked in some minds and paradigms to 
differentiation in secularization theory—has borne itself out.  Casanova reports and Taylor 
supports that “we are witnessing the ‘deprivatization’ of religion…Religious traditions 
throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories 
of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them.”79  For example, 
churches in the United States found themselves in a niche position during the civil rights 
movement as sort of being relegated to special interest group status.  A little more than a 
decade later, the religious right had organized itself as a central player in the American 
political scene as evidenced by the election of first Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan.   
What classic secularization theory does not take into account—despite the fact that it 
is keenly concerned with individualization—is the fact that institutions are comprised of 
human beings.  To be sure, these human beings now have the freedom to choose whether or 
not to affiliate.  But when they choose to do so, they can bring the influence of that sphere 
to bear on the other spheres in which they live and move and have their being.  To be clear, 
I am not arguing that they bring that influence in a way that is necessarily authoritative 
(although it can be), but that one’s worldview cannot help but be present with one in any 
sphere one inhabits and that this worldview informs one’s movement in that sphere—even if 
one acknowledges one’s biases, the worldview is still present as background noise, if nothing 
else.  In this way, the institutions as well as the individuals become in a sense “deprivatized”.  
The individuals that comprise these institutions are the representatives of these institutions, 
of all the institutions with which they voluntarily associate and they bring the norms and 
mores of those institutions with them as components of their very being, whether it be their 
ethical or moral code and/or their economic or political philosophies.  What is crucial in this 
observation, though, is the fact that any authority they may wield is not due to the religious 
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institution per se.  Thus, although a religious group or institution may have the intention of 
swaying the polis to their particular dogma, the group or institution has very little, if any 
authority save that which has been given to the individual or individuals espousing the 
institution’s assertions.  
Danièle Hervieu-Léger points out that modern religious worldviews are quite often 
personal conglomerations of religious beliefs and practices, even when the believer is 
affiliated with a traditional religious institution.80  Therefore, it is perhaps more accurate to 
say that the institution has a modicum of influence through the actions of the individual 
operating in both spheres.  Differentiation and privatization must be used carefully—taking 
the human propensity to be (partially) a product of their worldview/environment very 
seriously.81   
Moving back to Casanova’s discussion of differentiation and privatization: what is 
interesting and, I believe helpful, is the way in which the clear delineation of his 
connotations of secularization provide tools for analysis in another context.  For example, 
David Martin’s work on the comparative analysis of secularization in Canada with other 
societies underscores the ways in which differentiation, used judiciously, can be a useful tool 
for analysis of societies whose ancestry stems from Western Europe and which, unlike the 
United States, became gradually distanced, if not completely emancipated from, the mother 
countries.  Also, by looking at the concept of privatization, one can determine how and 
where religious institutions and/or individuals have repudiated the idea and what sort of 
effect (if any) this is having upon the political landscape of any particular society.    
However helpful or non-helpful secularization theory may be and whether or not it 
is true or false according to one’s definition, the fact remains that religion was and is a 
component of culture and to understand societies, religion must be a factor that is entered 
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into the equation.  Many scholars are urging their colleagues to look beyond secularization 
theory and explore avenues that might be more fruitful in the increasingly global milieu.  As 
has been shown, Casanova advocates for a shift in focus: “sociologists of religion should be 
less obsessed with the decline of religion and more attuned to the new forms that religion is 
assuming in all world religions at three different levels of analysis: the individual level, the 
group level, and the societal level.”82 The work of Hervieu-Léger, Heelas and Woodhead and 
Grace Davies all seem to agree with a variation on this theme in their own work.  
As a specific conclusion to this section, it can be stated that this study also contends 
that a neosecularization point of view—one that sees differentiation and privatization as key 
components for analysis and defines secularization in the two-tiered way that Yamane 
suggests, is most fruitful for understanding, at the very least, the ways in which religion and 
politics interrelate in Canada.  Before moving on, there is one more aspect of secularity in 
modern society discussed by Taylor that is relevant to the discussion: conditions of belief. 
Conditions of Belief 
Taylor, in the tradition of Casanova in a sense, examines yet another sense of 
secularity and how it can be determined as a factor in society.  In A Secular Age, Taylor 
explores “the conditions of belief” which in turn invites a conception of secular society as 
one that “…would be secular or not, in virtue of the conditions of experience of and search 
for the spiritual.”83  Although the concept is complex and would take more space than I 
have here to unpack, I take Taylor to mean, in part, that the secularity of a society can be 
examined in light of the number, ease and acceptability of worldviews a society is 
comfortable with an individual having to choose from without stigma or public reprisal.  In 
this paradigm, it must be clear that religious worldviews must be among those available, 
although certainly not privileged, just choices among many.84  In this, Taylor could be seen 
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as standing shoulder to shoulder with Bruce, but this is not the case.  Bruce hypothesizes 
that the diversity of choices will make people indifferent to religion.  In this, the reasons for 
the decline in membership of North American mainline churches might bear him out.  
Taylor is more convinced that human beings are searching for a transformative component 
in their plethora of choices and is speculating that this is more than an individual need, but a 
social one.85  Going back to the fundamental question of the place of religion in human 
society, then—both scholars see diversity of choice, but each sees a different ramification.  
As will be shown, the diversity in the field of secularization field are debates that are 
happening more internally than they are externally.  In other words, the fact that there is a 
debate about what is meant by secularization and whether or not religion is on the decline in 
the West—and in Canada in particular—is on the periphery of awareness for what is 
referred to as the elite in Canada.  This is important to understand in moving forward with 
the argument that religion is present in the political landscape of Canada.   
Secularization and Canadian Society 
This study posits the existence of an elite in Canada which is distinct from the larger 
polis and from grass-roots populism.  The development of this elite is complex and a full 
discussion requires more time and space than are available here.  What this section will offer 
is a simple definition and a cursory discussion of some religious and cultural elements that 
contributed to the establishment of an elite within Canadian society.    
The Elite 
 The literature on Canadian religion, Christianity in particular, is rife with references 
to “the elite”.  However, the definition of this term is not spelled out, but simply put forth as 
if the definition should be intuitively obvious.  Political theorists Michael Ornstein and H. 
Michael Stevenson note that:  “…there simply is no commonly shared definition of the 
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population of elites…” in other words, the category is subjective.86  A careful reading of 
Charles Taylor (more general, actually, than specifically Canadian), George Rawlyk, Nancy 
Christie, David Martin, Peter O’Toole, Marguerite Van Die and Michael Gauvreau, to name 
but a few of the scholars who use the term, leads to the construction of at least a working 
definition:  The Canadian elite, as used in this study indicates a particular class of individuals 
who operate in or have direct influence on the Canadian political landscape.  Their chief 
characteristic is that they have access to power—whether it is political, financial, through the 
academy or through the more established media outlets.  Another key component to the 
cohort is their commitment to the definition of secularism as first the absolute necessity for 
the privatization of religion in modern society.  Members of the elite appear, more often 
than not, to fall in line with an orthodox construction of secularization in the tradition of 
Steve Bruce.  This point will be expanded below.  In addition, this cohort tends to be 
educated in a classical Western Liberal Arts tradition—even if they are not formally educated 
beyond secondary school (and most are), they tend to be autodidacts who have educated 
themselves in that tradition—this component is important for it is where the academy have 
had greatest influence for it is in the classrooms of universities that secularization theory is 
studied and has undergirded the pedagogy.  If members of the elite are connected to 
religious institutions, it tends to be as a family tradition and not as an article of faith and they 
hold fast to the premise that religion in Canada belongs squarely in the private sphere.  Any 
affiliation is likely to be Anglican, United Church or Roman Catholic.87   
The Development of an Elite 
“Secularization has not necessarily destroyed Canadian Christianity,” writes George 
Rawlyk, “rather, it has helped to de-Christianize the elite but not necessarily the rank and 
file.”88  The existence and composition of an elite in Canada can be traced back to the 17th 
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and 18th centuries.  In his 1995 article, “Religion in Canada: An Historical Overview,” 
Rawlyk wrote that the seventeenth century French authorities in regards to New France 
“hoped and expected order and stability would be ensured by carefully and precisely defining 
the roles each person was to play within the colonial society.  Three key institutions—the 
colonial government, the seigneurial system, and the Roman Catholic Church—were to be 
the means whereby stability and social discipline would be imposed on the colony.”89  The 
attempt was unsuccessful, as the colonists showed a distressing (to the authorities) tendency 
towards ‘a spirit of independence’.90  In the mid 18th century, Rawlyk notes a “considerable 
chasm between the Roman Catholicism of the priestly elite and that practiced by the rank 
and file.”91  Rawlyk records the worldview on the elite side as being one of a “strong sense 
of providential mission, an obsession with deferential religious and often political order, 
priestly control and moral and cultural hegemony.”92  The rank and file evinced, for the most 
part, a “deep ambivalence toward elite Catholicism, an almost peasantlike suspicion of those 
in authority, and an eagerness to control one’s own responses to the unfolding cosmic 
drama.”93  This chasm is important for, as will be seen, it is one that continues to the present 
time, not only in French-speaking Roman Catholic Canada but also amongst English 
Protestants.94   
In British Canada, before the War of 1812, Rawlyk argues, with Nancy Christie, the 
dominant religious tone of the Maritimes and Upper Canada was one of “a unique form of 
Radical Evangelicalism, which placed inordinate emphasis on the centrality of the traumatic 
New Birth experience” as taught in varying ways through the more evangelical of the 
Christian denominations: Baptists, Methodists and Presbyterians.95  This Radical 
Evangelicalism became significantly less prevalent following the War of 1812 and the influx 
of “hundreds of thousands” of British immigrants.96  This influx strengthened a pro-British 
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bias and Anti-American fears some Canadians had about the “evils of American 
republicanism and extreme religious enthusiasm.”97 Thus, a pro-British leadership and a 
“growing middle class preoccupied with British order and British respectability, and a 
growing suspicion of democratic Evangelical and American-styled enthusiasm,” pushed 
Radical Evangelicalism to the periphery.98  In its place was an evangelicalism that put more 
stress on religion of the head and less on the religion of the heart.99  This last is important 
because it shows a trend of accommodation within the Evangelical movement that moves it 
more into the centre of society and allows it to influence political power, albeit more from 
the grassroots perspective than from a perspective of initial power. 100  This accommodation 
is key to understanding the ways in which Canadian Evangelicals work to have a voice within 
the elite spheres of Canadian power, as it is the shadow establishment Churches—Roman 
Catholic, Anglican (most particularly) and, to some extent in the twentieth century, the 
United Church of Canada—that spawn the elite who are the focus of this section.101 
The elite in Canada fall in the tradition of the strong British and French authoritative 
systems that equate social order and respectability with the state of being civilized. Like their 
Enlightenment brethren before them—Modern Canadian elites incorporated the perspective 
of orthodox secularism as another component of what it means to be modern, Western and 
democratic.102   
Having been educated in an academy that stresses differentiation and privatization as 
key components to modernity, religious worldviews remain a mystery and a prejudice of 
portions of the intellectual elite in Canada.103  Patrick Deneen summarizes the thoughts of 
Christopher Lascher on the subject of the persistence of religious belief among most 
ordinary citizens:  
This persistence offends the cultural, intellectual, and economic elite, and 
even fosters anxiety among them, because it flies in the face of the 
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Enlightenment creed that religious faith would be overcome with the 
advent of scientific progress, economic development, and political 
liberalization. Seen by elites as superstitious and unwarranted, religious 
belief is derided as intellectual pabulum and false emotional security, while 
public policies that arise from religious traditionalism …are viewed as 
irrational, inegalitarian, illiberal, arbitrary, and oppressive.104 
 
 Lascher is speaking about Americans, but his point is well—taken in a Canadian 
context as well.  John Fraser wrote in the National Post that 
Religion, as a source of excellent stories of all sorts, is one of two great 
no-go areas in the contemporary media…as a general rule over the past 
few decades; stories on religion will break into the media only if they are 
  (a)sensational, (b)bizarre, (c) goofy, (d) gee-whiz, or (e) contemptuous.”105 
 
Both authors support the contention that there is a belief amongst the elite in Canada that 
religion is not only irrelevant but that it undermines democracy and/or modernity itself.  In 
short, the orthodox view of secularization in entrenched in the minds of the elite in Canada.  
The rest of this chapter will explore why this might be so and why it might be detrimental to 
Canadian democracy and society. 
There are several premises of secularization theory that seem to loom large in the 
mindsets of a great deal of the intellectual elite in Canada.  I laid out the more salient aspects 
of the current debate above.  At this juncture I will unpack these premises that underlie the 
challenges I am making in this study before making a cursory exploration of the theory as it 
pertains to the Canadian context as well as its relevant history.   
Challenges 
 As I noted earlier, I am posing two challenges.  The first challenge is to the notion 
that the Canadian political landscape is secular.  The second is that religious worldviews are 
detrimental to the legislative process.  I will deal with the first challenge in this section and 
leave the discussion of the second challenge for Chapter Five.  The analysis of the challenge 
to the assertion that the Canadian political landscape is secular intertwines with 
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secularization theory.  As stated above, the notion of a secular political landscape is 
embraced in a large part by certain factions of the academy and by the Canadian mainstream 
media.106  The acceptance of a traditional sense of secularization by this population is 
supported by two clear premises and by what Taylor referencing a Foucaldian term refers to 
as “unthoughts”.107   
The first premise is that religion no longer plays the same role in Canadian society as 
it once did.  As was discussed above, there is no longer a shadow establishment of Church 
looming silently over government.  As well, the churches no longer play the role of primary 
social safety net, the State having assumed the role which the Social Gospel had originally 
claimed for institutions searching for relevance in the public sphere and a new reason for 
institutional continuity.108  
However true this premise may be in literal fact, it is far from cut and dry when it is 
considered more closely.  The shadow establishment of the institutional church may no 
longer have the influence it once did—but the influence of religion in the guise of 
individuals who espouse religious worldviews has not necessarily diminished.109  As 
Casanova and others have pointed out, religious worldviews are asserting themselves in 
myriad places and ways—refusing to stay in the privatized and marginal positions 
secularization theories placed them.110  There seems to be increasing awareness that the 
irrelevancy Bruce predicted will come to pass if the religious institutions do not incorporate 
the transformative component of which Taylor speaks otherwise, what differentiates the 
church from Amnesty International or the Synagogue from World Vision or the Mosque 
from the soup kitchen?  Religious institutions are attempting to re-figure their position in 
modern Canada in both the public and the private spheres.111 
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It is clear that religious worldviews are not gone nor are without influence.  What 
seems to be shifting slightly in Canada, at least, is the ways in which those worldviews are 
expressed and practiced.  Peter Beyer made this point when arguing against both a 
postsecularization and an orthodox secularization in the Canadian context when he points 
out that neither theory accounts for what happened in Canada where the “possible 
maintenance of religious influence under conditions of structural secularization.112  Reginald 
Bibby has shown, for example, that Canadians are far more likely to affiliate and/or identify 
with the religious traditions of their families than they are to switch affiliation.113  What 
Bibby’s research shows is that people holding religious worldviews are more likely to pick 
and choose what they will believe from the presented doctrine rather than embracing it 
whole cloth (if, indeed, that ever really did happen) and have a sense that the institution with 
which they may choose to affiliate with should be flexible and willing to evolve with and for 
society.  Bibby’s research shows that religious institutions in the private sphere do not seem 
to be as doomed as early reports would suggest.  Religious institutions may not be a societal 
given any more in Canada, but religious worldviews perpetuated within a traditional 
institution are not so much of a minority as to be discounted as players in the public 
sphere.114   
Hence, I would argue, that this first premise (that religious institutions no longer 
wield the power they once held in the public sphere) is true to the extent that the established 
church—both legal and de facto (Canada hasn’t had an officially established church since 
1857, but that did not remove the fact of shadow establishments affecting government both 
in English Canada and in Quebec)—has shifted in its structure and meaning within Canadian 
society.115 
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On the other hand, this premise can be argued against on the grounds that 
individuals affiliated with religious institutions do bring some of the teachings and ethical 
models of those institutions into the public sphere with them as they go about their daily 
business.  It would be more accurate to state that the institutions have less sway as 
monolithic constructions but that they do have sway inasmuch as they are personified in the 
individuals who themselves wield power in the political world.  Institutions are, after all, 
comprised of people who act out of corporate as well as individual needs and beliefs. 
The second premise used to support the secularization thesis is that religious practice 
and belief is in continuing decline—the orthodox paradigm.  This was discussed above. It is 
reasonable to assert, in this context at least, that the second premise undergirding 
secularization is tenuous in the face of recent evidence, but that it is defensible.  That is to 
say, that it is true in a traditional sense of what it means to be religious, but not necessarily 
tenable when one looks at current surveys on Canadian religious stances.  As I discussed 
above, traditional practice is certainly changing but whether or not it is in decline in a 
meaningful sense in Canada is debatable.  In fact, Bibby shows otherwise.  
The third category by which secularization theory is supported by a cadre of the elite 
is that of the “unthought”.  Unthought goes deeper than ideology.  Taylor and Bruce both 
assert that the term “ideology” has a charge of blatant bias and partisanship that is 
unwarranted.  Unthought is more specific to the point here—it is not a conscious 
motivation, but an underlying framework that creates the parameters of what is important 
and what can be known.  In the context of secularization theory, Casanova lists unthought as 
a categorization of “secularisms”: 
 …the kind of secular world-views (or “Weltanschauungen”) which may be 
either consciously held and explicitly elaborated into historico-philosophical 
and normative-ideological state projects, projects of modernity and cultural 
programs or as an epistemic knowledge regime that may be unreflexively held 
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and phenomenologically assumed as the taken for granted normal structure 
of modern reality.116   
 
What unthought connotes in this context is, to quote Taylor; “…the subtle way that 
one’s own framework, beliefs and values can constrict one’s theoretical imagination.”117  
Connolly, in unpacking the idea of unthought, quotes Foucault’s assertion that knowledge 
has finite forms and goes on to observe that “…every articulation of thought presupposes 
the unthought from which it draws nourishment and, conversely, that which nourishes 
thought must always escape full articulation.”118  In this context of the elite, secularization 
theory is the thought and the underlying unthought is the paradigm of modernity that 
requires secularization in its orthodox conception to be a fact and religion to be detrimental 
to a modern democracy.119 
The unthoughts that underlie the secularization debate among academics and the 
mainstream media in Canada are slightly different from the premises listed above—which 
are more quantifiable—and have to do with the perceived veracity (or lack thereof) of a 
religious worldview in the context of modernity.  In this conception of modernity, the 
scientific worldview holds that religion has been proven false and/or irrelevant in the face of 
scientific discovery and individual autonomy.  In addition to this general belief (articulated 
through the first two premises I put forward), the unthought in Canada is nuanced and 
solidified by the official policy of multiculturalism which is itself seen as emerging from a 
pluralism made possible, in part, by the emancipation of the public sphere from religion. 
I am not arguing against mulitculturalism.  The intentionality with which Canada has 
approached multiculturalism is one of its greatest strengths.  That being said, however, 
multiculturalism is often seen as going hand in glove with pluralism and pluralism, in 
secularization theory, emerges from a differentiated, privatized, secular society.  So not only 
does the unthought extant in the elite comprise an unshakeable belief in the primacy of 
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scientific rationality, the falsity or irrelevancy (for not all of the elite are atheist) of religious 
worldviews and the inalienability of individual autonomy—but it holds all of these truths to 
be self-evident and necessary components of a pluralist and hence, a multicultural society.  
Religion, in this unthought, is not only false, but dangerous.120  A society comprised of 
religious worldviews—all of them (in traditional thought) mutually exclusive and 
triumphalist (again, in traditional western thought)—a society comprised of these cannot 
sustain a modern democracy as their religious worldviews will be constantly trying to assert 
themselves.121   
There is a kind of stratification of social imaginary that allows for many academics 
and intellectuals to embrace secularization as a given and the ensuing theory as necessary for 
understanding the current position of religion in modern society.  The unthought seems to 
be the most powerful level, as it bedrocks the two premises in such a way as to assert their 
undeniable veracity.122 
 This seems strange in some ways though— in the face of evidence that, while the 
mainstream media and parts of the academy may view the political landscape of Canada as 
secular, the general population may not.  Even after the postwar waves of immigration that 
created a much more culturally diverse country, as recently as 1985, religious affiliation was 
still the major indicator of political party choice.123 In addition, as Lyon points out, religious 
affiliation played a major role in the fate of the 1995 referendum in Quebec with 60% of 
Catholics who attended mass weekly (13% of the francophone population) voted “no”.124  
And Lyon remarks that “in Canada, believers who belong to religious organizations are still 
more politically influential than those who do not.”125    
As to why this unthought is important in the larger scheme of things: what the elite 
think and how that is disseminated through the mainstream media has an influence on public 
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perception.126  For example, it is quite telling that many people are still surprised to find that 
religious affiliation is such a strong indicator of political preference.127  This is a small 
indicator, I believe that those outside the elite while not encumbered with the same 
unthought are nevertheless swayed on a surface level into thinking that secularization is a 
fact.  It is not until surveys asking individuals what their opinions are have been conducted 
and analyzed that the picture of a more religious (albeit a less traditionally religious) society 
begins to emerge. 
Having outlined the premises underlying secularization theory among a particularly 
potent population in Canada, I turn now to a more focused discussion of secularization 
theory.  The main argument is that the stratified foundations upon which the intellectual elite 
of Canada have built their assumption of secularization in Canada are made of sand too 
shifty upon which to build a solid societal structure. 
This section began by outlining three premises upon which it could be posited that 
secularization theory was based and which underlay the insistence of the Canadian elite on 
secularization (as is conceived of in the orthodox model) as a pillar of Canadian society: 1.  
Religion no longer plays the same role in Canadian society; 2.  Religious practice and belief in 
Canada is in decline; and 3. the unthought that an Enlightened, scientific worldview holds 
that religion has been proven false and/or irrelevant and that it has no place in the public 
sphere of a modern democracy.  These premises, it was asserted, provided a stratified 
foundation for secularization theory.  In addition, another layer can be added to that 
foundation: the assumption that secularization is a universal, normative condition of 
modernity that, along with emancipation from religious institutions and norms, is a 
precondition to liberal democracy.128     
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 Much work has been done in trying to re-think secularism in a Canadian context.  
As was noted earlier, though, at least in terms of informing popular opinion—the 
mainstream media and many members of the intellectual elite who are not part of the social 
sciences academy have embraced this notion of Canada as a modern multicultural State 
whose very modernity rests, in part, on its secular nature.  The argument is that a 
multicultural State cannot exist without the clear separation of our religious spheres from the 
spheres of law and democratic governance.  It is possible that cohort has come very close to 
doing what Hadden accused the academy of doing in 1987—“sacrelizing” secularization—
making a theory into a dogma that should be accepted on faith, in spite of rational evidence 
to the contrary.   
This sacrelization of Canadian secularism is, in my opinion, keeping a very important 
conversation from happening.  There are myriad consequences to this but I will mention but 
two.  First, this discourages public discourse about the role personal ethical systems that are 
formed by religious worldviews play in the context of an individual’s role in the public 
sphere.  Second, by maintaining an extreme and untenable position in regards to 
secularization theory the elite in Canada is providing a way for people with extreme religious 
convictions to slip into positions of power without their religious worldviews being taken 
into serious account—whether they be elected or appointed positions.   
The above consequences are important to explore.  It is important to remember that 
the rise of the religious right in America in the late 1970’s was made possible, in part, 
because the liberal left considered that the days of religion as a viable voice of general 
influence in the public sphere had been annihilated after the Scopes trial in the early 20th 
century.129  A viable voice of general influence is denoted in order to differentiate from the 
particular voice that rose from the religious establishment during the civil rights movement 
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in the 1960’s.  While religious institutions did not see themselves as special interest groups in 
this case, they were perceived by the political establishment as being just that.  And, while 
the Canadian political process and landscape is somewhat different than that of the United 
States it is not untoward to be watchful so as not to fall into the same trap of polarizing 
ideological battles that have been so detrimental to American public discourse.  To 
acknowledge that Canadian secularism is a myth is to begin to foster a dialogue and an 
openness across power lines that will in the end make for a more stable and civil society. 
An example of a case where a public conversation could be important concerns the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)  Canada’s current Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, 
appointed the former president of Focus on the Family Canada, Darrel Reid, as first the 
policy director of the PMO and then, in March of 2009, as chief of staff.  The news, while 
reported, was not picked up on as being significant.  There are no doubt myriad reasons why 
this it so.  It is interesting to posit that one such reason is the motivating unthought that 
supports a dogma of secularization in the Canadian public sphere.  Mr. Reid brings an overt, 
clearly stated religious worldview and agenda to the realm of public discourse.  He has been 
quoted as saying, among other things, that Christians are under an obligation to change 
Canadian law to conform to biblical values.130   Mr. Reid’s brand of evangelicalism has very 
strong, clear goals regarding the place of religion in society.  There is nothing wrong, of 
course, with holding strong views and this study is not advocating for a witch hunt.  What 
needs to be stressed is how important it is for the elite in Canada to understand that the 
premises of secularism and modernity and democracy are silencing an engagement with the 
religious—a subject that for many people is a key motivator in their public lives.  People 
who agree to work in the public sphere should expect that they will be questioned by the 
polis as to how they will balance their personal convictions with the plurality that they 
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represent.  Especially if the convictions that they hold do not allow for a plurality of valid 
worldviews.  Bruce and Taylor agree that such a plurality is a necessity in a democracy.  But 
what the adherence to an orthodox vision of secularization engenders is not the value-
neutral plurality that Bruce predicts, but the kind of public landscape that has developed in 
Canada where religion is not taken as an equally valid voice and only marked when it can be 
used for purposes of hyperbole, fear mongering or ridicule.   
To that end, this study is not suggesting that individuals who represent religious 
institutions who hold narrow worldviews should not be elected or appointed.  The model to 
follow, however, is put succinctly by David Novak:  
…there is nothing irrational about a member of a traditional religious 
community affirming a public policy because this is what his or her 
tradition teaches; as long as he or she can also give the reason his or her 
tradition advocates that public policy. Inevitably, that reason has to be 
because this policy is for the good of any human society and not just for 
the members of his or her traditional community.131 
 
The point is that since we cannot compartmentalize ourselves completely,  there is an 
obligation to engage in discourse in the public sphere in such a way as to allow that not only 
to religious worldviews exist but that they have weight and import in and for the public 
sphere.  An orthodox version of the secularization paradigm seems to be preventing that, as 
the unthought supporting it does not allow for the malleability that has become if not in 
actuality at least a harbinger of post-modernity. 
One reason to consider the place of the secularization paradigm and the various 
points of view therein is in order to understand the trajectory they have taken and the 
theories built upon them.  Once understood, there is the potential for dismantling the layers 
of the foundation with rationality and statistics and more cogent analytical tools and 
definitions that make sense to the moderates from all stakeholders, including those in power 
who genuinely have an interest in the common good and democratic governance as opposed 
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to those who would grasp power tightly and keep it close in order that a particular and 
perhaps personal agenda be implemented.  In short, to acknowledge that Canadian 
secularism is a myth is to begin to foster a dialogue and an openness across the lines of 
power that will in the end make for a more stable and civil society. 
 The next section will explore secularization theory in the Canadian context, touching 
upon history, definitions and some comparative notes.  I will conclude with a further 
discussion on the ramifications of its continuing to inform the Canadian elite. 
It is difficult to demarcate where and when the traditional institutional churches 
ceased to be integral voices in the public sphere with collective influence.  In other words, 
what constitutes secularism in Canada and when did it start? Part of the debate around 
secularism in Canada (as indicated above) has arisen from the shift in the institutional focus 
from personal salvation to the social gospel.  The dates of this shift and whether or not this 
shift was indicative of the beginning of Canadian secularism was discussed earlier. In this 
paradigm, the traditional definition of secularization—outlined above by Casanova and 
expanded below certainly reveals itself as underpinning both sides of the debate.  Secularism 
in one instance is assumed to be the shift of institutional focus on “a highly social gospel.” 
On the other, it is assumed to occur only after the raison d’être of the Social Gospel had 
been taken over by the State.   
This study finds congruence with Christie and Gauvreau, agreeing that the 
institutional influence does not end until well after World War II in English Canada and not 
until the 1960’s in Quebec when the nature of influence changed with Vatican II and the 
Quiet Revolution.   
It is also important to note that the influence of traditional religious institutions 
loomed large with tragic consequences in the First Nations communities in the form of 
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residential schools, most particularly.  The formal agreement between the government of 
Canada and the Anglican, Roman Catholic and United Churches regarding the schools did 
not end until 1969.  It is safe to say that while secularization in the guise of attempting to 
annihilate aboriginal religious traditions was certainly foisted upon these children, to claim 
that their experience of government intervention was devoid of religious influence or 
context would be ludicrous.132   
It can be shown that the influence of religious institutions on the public sphere 
(certain aspects of it, at least) continued longer in some spheres than in others—at least in 
terms of official public policy.  Of course, this is to be expected.  History is not easily nor 
neatly arranged and the edges of eras are often unevenly cut. This is a central reason as to 
why this study concludes that secularization theory in the orthodox construction is too 
heavy-handed a tool to enable one to make an adequately complete analysis of the actual 
place of religion within the centres of power in Canada.  However, it is possible that it can 
be used in the neosecularization paradigm as a general framework to get the big picture of a 
nuanced process. 
Casanova and others have pointed out that secularization as it traditionally stands 
makes the most sense as “an analytical conceptualization of a historical process” when 
applied to Western European Christianity from the Middle Ages to the present.”133  If this is 
so, then certainly there should be some aspect of secularization theory that works in a 
Canadian context.  David Martin, in his comparative analysis of Canadian secularization 
places Canada mostly closer to European (and Australian and New Zealand) sensibilities 
than to the United States.  This is important to know because it helps to analyze the past, as 
long as one remembers that immigration will, at some point, make that tool of analysis less 
helpful. 
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Canada is becoming increasingly more diverse and the population is expanding with 
immigrants for whom secularization theory does not offer a reasonable rubric for 
understanding.  Even the intellectual elite from these cultures will bring with them a 
different sort of unthought—although it is certainly possible that this unthought will also 
support a notion of secularization.  So, while I will concentrate on secularism as much as it 
can be applied cogently to a derivative of Western European Christian culture, I also offer 
the above caveat as part of my reasons for reiterating that secularization theory is, at its best 
obsolete, and at its worst obfuscating.  
In the 1990’s, schools of thought arose that challenged the notion that “religion has 
become a matter of purely private concern.”134  “Private concern” in this case points both to 
a perception of the individualization of religious belief and praxis and to the demise of the 
shadow establishment.  A key point of this argument states that religion (specifically, 
Christianity) moved “decisively out of the centres of power represented by government and 
economics, and into civil society”.135  “Civil society” in this paradigm being defined 
somewhat in congruence with “public space”—that is, the circles of society in which citizens 
engage in discourse regarding the commonweal.  It is distinct from the centres of power in 
that the discourse is informative but not binding.  Whereas in the past, religious worldviews 
(and this really should read Christian worldviews) formed a shadow establishment that held 
real authoritative sway—both in a moral sense and in the sense that practical power could be 
brought to bay for or against the political powers that be.  This shift, argues Van Die and 
others, has placed religious institutions and voices to the voluntary sector of public life 
where they remain an enriching entity in our democracy.         
This assertion is true in the sense that the churches no longer hold official or 
sweeping power or sway as “shadow establishments”.  However, I argue that neither have 
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they been relegated quite so neatly into the voluntary sector as they still have sway via the 
presence of individuals whose worldviews are intertwined with those same institutions. In 
fact, and this is a subject that should be explored in another study, the churches essentially 
have to learn how to sway the political sector in the same way that the synagogue had been 
doing for years.  When you have never been a part of the shadow establishment, but still 
hold moral authority within your community and wish to make the stance of that community 
well known and decisive for certain issues, you learn to act through key individuals and 
leverage your power rather than loom ominously in the background, as collective force of 
sway.  Again, the loss of the shadow establishment led not so much to the demise of a 
religious voice within Parliament, as to the theoretical levelling of a playing field—
reconstructing power bases, not necessarily dismantling them.  
The old categories still hold as helpful when analyzing past trends.  In this sense the 
orthodox understanding works.  Van Die relies on the traditional understanding of 
secularization in her observations about religion being removed as a shadow establishment 
in Canada—the emancipation of society from religious institutions and the expectations the 
institutions put upon members of society as a whole.  In this connotation, religion is seen as 
an institution, as a shadow establishment, as a maker and keeper of societal norms and 
mores.  Most importantly, this connotation requires an understanding of Church as the 
central conveyer of correct soteriology, theology and anthropology.  This particular vision of 
religious institution is deeply rooted in the history of countries with monolithic 
establishment churches where the institution was seen (sometimes only by its own self) not 
only as the provider of a badly needed social safety net (schools, hospitals, alms for the poor) 
but as the conscience of society as a whole.  This is the definition that Western Europeans 
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tend towards and one that does fit well with the Canadian position.  This is congruent with 
observations made by David Martin.136 
Casanova reports that European sociologists look as well to the more recent 
connotation of secularization—the theory that secularization in the guise of a decline in 
religious beliefs and practises is a “universal, human developmental process”137; this last, 
rather condescending component, are viewed by the European academy “as structurally 
related components of general processes of modernization.”138   In this point, Canada does 
follow Europe to some extent as practice and adherence to established religious institutions 
has dropped significantly in the latter part of the 20th century.  However, as Bibby’s more 
recent polls have indicated, Canadians are far more engaged with myriad religious 
worldviews than this particular connotation of secularization theory would indicate.   In this 
case, Canadians stand more in the middle, between Europe and the United States.   
In light of this, Taylor’s notion of conditions of belief is quite interesting.  Taylor 
allows for the reality that secularity is not a universal, and yet it is a technique that could be 
helpful in understanding the different types and levels of religiosity that are normative in a 
given culture.  In the Canadian case it is particularly helpful because Canada is a multicultural 
society which welcomes immigrants from a variety of cultures that consider themselves quite 
modern but not particularly secular in the classic sense.  
Building upon the previous section, this study proceeds with the assertion that the 
most useful tack for rethinking secularism in Canada is to look at the contextual shifts and 
restructuring, to take Lyon seriously when he writes that “…a good starting point for 
rethinking secularization is to look at ways in which the religious is restructured and 
relocated, instead of seeking indices of general decline, or moments of doctrinal transition.”  
Martin concurs with this point of view, writing that “…secularization has everything to do 
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with the altering relations between church and state in modern times.” Further to this point 
is Hervieu-Léger who sees secularization as “the process of permanently reorganizing the 
work of religion in a society structurally powerless to fulfill the expectations that it has had 
to create in order to exist as a modern society.”139 In this, Hervieu-Léger can be used to 
highlight the social gospel trajectory in Canadian Church-State relationships.  Lyon observes 
that both Hervieu-Léger and Martin “…deal not only with the fate of religious institutions, 
or of religious functionaries but also with how religiosity is manifest in high modern 
times.”140  By moving beyond the orthodox paradigm the questions regarding the 
fundamental religiosity of humanity or lack thereof that Bruce and Wallis raise can more 
effectively be answered. 
Leaving for another time the discussion of whether or not we live in high modern or 
post-modern times, Taylor and Hervieu-Léger have interesting points that are not dissimilar.  
Hervieu-Léger speaks of “desemboitement de la croyance, de l’aparenance et de la reference 
identitaire”141 while Taylor, commenting on what he refers to as the “retreat of 
Christendom” predicts that “…it will be less and less common for people to be drawn into 
or kept within a faith by some strong political or group identity, or by the sense that they are 
sustaining a socially essential ethic.  This should give pause, though.  Because Canadian 
studies have shown that there is a correlation between party affiliation and religious 
institution affiliation.  In fact, it is the strongest corollary.   However, party affiliation has 
declined markedly and there are generational differences that make an impact here as well.  I 
would suspect that if it were broken down along generational lines, there would be fewer 
people under 50 affiliating with either party OR traditional religious institution and that 
those who did espouse a religious worldview, if pressed, would admit to be influenced in 
their party affiliation less by their religious institution than by the congruence of the party 
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platform with their religious and ethical ideologies.  Family tradition and loyalties should not 
be discounted either.  The religious institution, I contend, is not the predictor, more the 
community within the institution that a person chooses to affiliate with.  This is consistent 
with the observation that people bring the portions of the institutions they resonate with 
along with them to the public sphere but also cognizant of the fact that the institution as an 
entity no longer infiltrates the public sphere as a monolithic authority. 
The most important thing to note in terms of this study is that in trying to get a 
grasp of the ways in which the relationship between a religious worldview and non-religious 
worldview—and here I am also incorporating the categories of modern individualism and 
religious individualism used by Hervieu-Léger in her work— shift and realign we are trying 
to grasp what it is to acknowledge the complexities of ourselves in addition to 
acknowledging the complexities of the Other.  The shifting of what is the “public structure 
of belief and a sense of collective religious obligation”142 has resulted in the necessity of a 
multicultural society such as Canada to submit to acknowledging a level playing field, of 
sorts, of political access of which it was hitherto unaccustomed.  This is not to say that there 
is practical equality in terms of access to the circles of real power, but merely to point out 
that Christian religious institutions are no longer an overt avenue for such access.  This is 
part of the readjustment brought on by what is usually referred to as secularization.  Lyon 
writes, “Spiritual experience as a means and expression of the power which an individual can 
exercise over self and the world, without any involvement in a particular church: that 
precisely is an essential aspect of the reordering of religious individualism which its 
absorption into modernity infers.”143 
As well, what Grace Davies has coined the “believers without belonging” play an 
important role in the political life of Canada.  Grenville reminds us that “…contemporary 
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religiosity in Canada (as elsewhere) is a ‘complicated reality’…(a)mong other things, this 
means that church and denomination are at least ‘less salient’ than they once were to 
understanding the religious sphere…religious involvement in body politics challenges 
simplistic analyses.”144  In other words, just because mainstream religious institutions are in 
flux—religion cannot be shelved neatly with the label “extinct and obsolete” pasted upon its 
dust jacket.   
 But what of the premises that underlie secularization theory?  As was shown, the 
premises are certainly not without some merit in the Canadian context, but neither are they 
all encompassing.  What is really important is the unthought that (loosely put) assumes 
because Canada is a liberal Western democracy that it must also de facto be a secular state—
that is devoid of the influence of religious institutions or religious worldviews.  This last is vital, 
for it is integral to the unthought.  In fact, I would argue that the distinction is not made in 
the unthought; religious worldview and religious institution are interchangeable and 
inseparable.  Therefore because shadow establishments no longer exist, the influence of 
religion, even as it is manifested in people holding power, must be null.  Of course, this is 
not true in reality.  Institutions are comprised of people and those people are shaped even as 
they shape the institution and they bring those institutional values with which they resonate 
with them into the discourse of the public sphere.  Taylor writes that: 
We don’t just decide once and for all when we enter sociology class to leave our “values” at the 
door.  They don’t just enter as conscious premises which we can discount.  They continue to 
shape our thought at a much deeper level, and it is only a continuing open exchange with those 
of different standpoints which will help us to correct some of the distortions they engender. 145 
 
For the purposes of argument, the above is essential.  Novak is clear when he calls for 
people with religious worldviews to use their traditions as support for their argument only 
insofar as those worldviews can be shown to have another, rational (or, I would use the term 
“empirical”) reason for being put forth.  Premeditated murder, for instance, is not only 
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forbidden by Torah, but can be shown empirically to be bad for society—if only because 
one loses so much sleep keeping one eye open lest a neighbour sneak up upon one with a 
blunt instrument.  Novak argues in so many words that one must be aware of your 
worldviews and of the values that are attendant, but do not expect the rest of society to be 
swayed by your worldview without undergirding it with arguments from the common, 
agreed upon mores and norms upon which the polis has agreed.   
 This speaks strongly to those holding the unthought that is integral to the foundation 
of secularization theory.  Be aware that the unthought is there and engage the very thing you 
believe to be irrelevant if non-existent.  Secularization theory has had the effect of dissuading 
the elite of the fact of religion in Canadian politics and this has the potential not only to 
alienate a good portion of the polis to the extent that democracy could erode irrevocably but 
also to allow those holding worldviews that are far from centrist to operate without the 
checks and balances good governance requires. 
 In the end, at least in a Canadian context, secularization theory fails to engage the 
nuances that need to be highlighted.  It can posit a general trend and provide traction against 
which to push for other solutions and explanations and that is helpful to an extent.  But it 
cannot allow us to construct models that incorporate religious worldviews as integral 
components in a post-modern democracy and that is what is really needed at this point in 
our history.  Taylor makes a very important observation in A Secular Age that believers and 
unbelievers truly seem to constitute separate cultures.  This is important because it highlights 
the extent to which a religious worldview can be entrenched in an individual.  Canada’s overt 
policies regarding multiculturalism could be a unique avenue for both believers and 
unbelievers to traverse on their way to trying to understand the place of religious worldviews 




 While secularization—whether theory or paradigm—is not necessarily helpful in and 
of itself as a tool for analysis or discussion, it has served as a catalyst for important debates 
about religion and modernity.  The orthodox point of view has been shown to be too 
narrow, as it does not allow for flexibility of definition and hence for the human element 
that must eventually be present when theory is applied to practice.  This being said, the 
orthodox interpretation does provide insight, mainly when it converges with the point of 
view of the more revisionist scholars in the field.  
 What is vital for the purposes of this project is the understanding of the unthought 
that underlies the premises of secularization theory held and embraced by Canada’s elite.  
This unthought drives the perspective of the elite and in turn the perspective of how religion 
manifests in the public sphere.  Whether the unthought is a positive, a negative or merely 
neutral phenomenon is up for debate, but understanding that it is present only enhances a 
comprehensive vision of the place of religion in Canada’s public sphere. 
 The next chapter traces a different component of this study—environmental history.  
This analysis also traces, in part, the pre-modern history of religion both in Europe and in 
the Indigenous communities of the portion of North America which became Canada.  What 
will become apparent are the complex ways in which humanity’s conception of itself in 
regards to its environment intertwine with the development of modern conceptions of 
Church, State and political landscape. 
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Chapter Three:  Resources and Making Home: A Brief History of Cultural and 
Religious Attitudes Towards the Natural World From First Contact to 
Confederation. 
Introduction: 
Religion and the environment have been always been intertwined.  Religion offers 
avenues for exploration of the unanswerable questions of life and the natural world, in part, 
gives rise to those questions.  In their forward to the Harvard Religion and Ecology series, 
Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim write that: 
...religions help to shape our attitudes toward nature in both conscious and 
unconscious ways.  Religions provide basic interpretive stories of who we 
are, what nature is, where we have come from, and where we are going.  This 
comprises a worldview of a society.  Religions also suggest how we should 
treat other humans and how we should relate to nature.  These values make 
up the ethical orientation of a society.1 
In the 20th century, especially, religion—specifically Western religions—were 
castigated by the nascent environmental movement for precipitating the societal values (or 
lack thereof) that enabled environmental degradation.  Indeed, the relationship between 
humanity and the natural world has, at least in the West, been complex and complicated by 
myriad factors—some of which have been discussed and some of which will be presented in 
this and subsequent chapters.  The Forum on Religion and Ecology founded by Tucker and 
Grim strives to show where religion values intersect and inform environmental values and 
how that intersection can be used to further the cause of precluding global environmental 
disaster.  This study relies loosely on the mandate of the Forum for its impetus.  Since, as 
Tucker and Grim assert, religion and nature are integral to the human experience, one 
cannot explore the influence religion has on modern society without taking into account the 
impact that influence had and does have on the environment.  This chapter proposes to 
utilize Tucker and Grim’s methodological aims of identification of distinctive ecological 
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attitudes, analysis of commonalities, and explorations of desirable modes of human presence 
with the earth in its exploration of environmental history.  This will lead, eventually, to a 
discussion of how religion, environment, and political landscape are intertwined in Canada.  
In addition to adding to the story of how religion and the political landscape is 
intertwined in Canada, this chapter provides a context for the development of environmental 
policy in Aboriginal communities and in the communities formed by the Europeans on this 
continent after first contact and after Confederation.  I will discuss the specifically Canadian 
story of human beings and their physical environment and the ideals and worldviews that 
were moulded and shaped, in part, by the landscape in which they found themselves.  First 
and foremost, this is a chronology of environmental policy from the three aforementioned 
perspectives.  In order to render this chronology meaningful, I have constructed a 
framework that is informed, in part, by environmental history and bioregionalism.  This 
framework allows for a narrative that provides context for policies and demonstrates the 
inextricable intertwining of tangible human context (in this case, the physical geography, 
flora and fauna of place) and ideology when applied to public policy.  This is vital for my 
ultimate argument that religion has, does and will play a part in such human endeavours.   
This premise rejects a mediational epistemology2 whereby embededness is irrelevant 
for acquisition of thick knowledge.3  Instead, I am demonstrating a dialogical approach that 
does not allow for alterity of the environment but rather sees it, as Yi-Fu Tuan notes, as an 
integral component of the development of human culture.  For, according to Tuan, culture 
and space create place. 4   
Culture consists of cumulative deposits of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, 
attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of 
the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people in the 
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course of generations through individual and group striving.  These aspects of particular 
human societies combine with particular profane space (Eliade)5 to bring about place, which 
I will define using Kathryn Allen Rabuzzi’s definition of home as belonging or dwelling in 
one’s proper habitat (italics mine). Therefore, particular human societies develop in concert with 
particular geographical environments to create a whole in which humanity and physical 
environment are intertwined.    
This last is vital for comprehending the ways and kinds of environmental policies 
that societies craft and embrace. Physical environment must shape, although they do not 
determine, the people who dwell within it and context is, as I argued above, certainly 
formative.  It is a symbiotic relationship; human beings are on the one hand at the mercy of 
environmental components we cannot change—weather, for instance (global warming and 
climate change aside).  On the other hand, our physical environment is at the same time 
somewhat malleable, we can and do change it by expressing and carrying out our needs, 
wants and wishes within and upon it.  Our physical environment changes with us and 
because of us just as certainly as we are marked and changed by it.   This understanding is 
crucial because it is not just our ways of basic survival that are affected by the environment, 
but also our worldviews.  Our philosophies and our religious ideologies are profoundly 
affected by our environment, just as surely as the ideologies we hold affect our environment.   
When I refer to “environment” in this chapter, I mean something very specific.  
“Environment” is an amorphous term, meaning different things in different disciplines.  In 
this context, “environment” is used in the ecological sense.  It can be defined here as a 
complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors (as climate, soil, and living things) that act 
in concert with an organism or an ecological community…”6  (italics mine) Part of a dialogical 
approach necessitates, in part, rejecting the supposed dichotomy between culture and nature 
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in favour of an acknowledgement of embededness and mutuality.  In part, embededness in 
this context represents the actuality of the statement above: that an organism or an 
ecological community acts in concert with their respective environment.  Additionally, it also 
represents the integral intertwining of organism, community and environment.  One does 
not live, move, or have their being without the other.   
Embededness can be effectively examined in this milieu by utilizing the concept of 
bioregionalism.  Bioregionalism is the idea that “a place (is) defined by its life forms, its 
topography and its biota, rather than human dictates; a region governed by nature not by 
legislature.”7   Dan Flores has presented a more specific understanding of bioregionalism as 
a tool to understand human history.  Flores argues that seeing bioregionalism as “not merely 
(a) focus on ecology and geography, but (an) emphasis on the close linkage between 
ecological locale and human culture…(the) implications (are) that in a variety of ways 
humans not only alter environments but also adapt to them”. 8 His argument, as Neil S. 
Forkey points out, gives the opportunity to underscore natural place and the human 
community. 9   For the purposes of this study, bioregionalism also gives license to see history 
outside the context of political boundaries.  This is especially important for the purposes of 
understanding aboriginal histories as First Nations people lived their lives in accordance with 
bioregions rather than with artificial, legislated territorial borders.  That is to say that there 
were recognized territories but that the boundaries were organic rather than artificially 
imposed by a governing body.  That is to say that Aboriginal governance did not have a 
tradition of distributing territory along the lines of human-made boundaries, but rather relied 
upon the bioregion itself to determine logical boundaries. 
A good deal of the above has already been incorporated into the historiographies by 
scholars of Canada’s First Nations.10  What I hope to contribute here is some insight into 
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how their environmental policies were reflective of their notions of place—before and after 
First Contact.  The other two-thirds of the chapter will explore the British, French and post-
Confederation Canadian contexts in much the same manner.  While the actual history of 
environmental legislation will be addressed in greater detail in the next chapter, this chapter 
will lay the contextual framework to facilitate greater comprehension and analysis.  In this 
chapter, the discussion will be focussed on the sociological, theological and economical 
ideologies that formed the precursors to legislation from which modern environmental 
policies and legislations emerged. 
Pre History: 
 North American Aboriginal peoples posit that human beings have lived on Turtle 
Island, what we now call North America, for as long as there have been people.11  The 
Western scientific community is not as clear as to when human beings arrived, but they posit 
that it was an actual arrival and that human life did not begin in North America.  The popular 
assumption had been that they arrived from Asia, moving across Beringia—the land that 
emerged in the area now covered by the Bering Sea as a result of the lowering of sea levels 
during an Ice Age 14-12,000 years ago.12  The hypothesis is that hunter gatherers pursued 
their prey across Beringia onto what would eventually become a separate continent.  
Although the evidence shows that the vegetation was not capable of sustaining “large or 
diverse ungulate population(s)”, the radio-carbon dating of mammalian skeletons found in 
the region show that large mammals did roam that region well before 12,000BCE. 13  Wynn 
states that the archaeological evidence for their presence comes from central Alaska and 
indicates that humans entered the area in a warm-climate interlude…between 12,000 and 
11,000 years ago.14  The hypothesis has been that these people—later known as Paleo-
Indians to scholars of the Americas—gradually migrated southward.  These people were 
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then the rootstock from which an increasingly large, diverse and culturally complex 
population of indigenous people…descended.15 This hypothesis is based heavily on the 
existence of a particular kind of projectile point technology (the Clovis Complex) that is 
common to Paleo-Indian cultures in North America and to the indigenous peoples of 
Siberia.  The above story is disputed, both in the scientific community and in the indigenous 
communities.  The latter of whose stories of origin indicate the presence of their people in 
this continent from time immemorial and who find mythologies that state otherwise highly 
offensive.  The disputation of the former has to do with some recently discovered evidence 
that has led to a diversity of interpretation. 
 The crux of this has been that many scientists now date human occupation of North 
American to 30,000-43,000 years ago.16 As Wynn points out, this dating is much closer to 
“time immemorial”, which is more in keeping with the oral histories and traditions of North 
American Aboriginals.  This is not to adopt the oral histories and traditions at the expense of 
a scientific interpretation of the data.  Rather, it is to reinforce what many scientists who 
work with aboriginal elders have discovered—that the traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK) held within the collective mythology of aboriginal peoples often (but not always) has 
a theoretical foundation that gibes with that of western science.17  I will expand upon this 
below. 
Regardless of which theories or combination of theories are correct regarding the 
peopling of the North American continent, one fact seems clear—that human populations 
migrated northward as the ice sheets receded and a plethora of cultures developed.  Wynn 
writes, “diffusion and local innovation replaced migration as the major impetus to cultural 
change, and technologies were both elaborated and increasingly precisely adapted to local 
environments.”18   
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 The rate of environmental change decelerated between 4000BCE and 1000BCE.  
Temperatures declined and sea levels stabilized to approximately what we are familiar with 
today.  As a result, in part, of this relative stability, the archaeological record is quite rich and 
reveals a wide diversity of cultures.  Most cultures appear to have been either relatively 
sedentary or predictably peripatetic—occupying the same seasonal 
hunting/fishing/gathering grounds year after year or travelling established routes in concord 
with the seasons.   
 Some cultures, however, were sedentary.  There is evidence of a large urban 
settlement where the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers join, close to the Ohio River.  From 
one thousand to six hundred years ago, an estimated 25,000 people inhabited this city known 
as Cahokia.19  As Paper notes, nothing but temple platforms survive in our time—but at the 
time it was a “mercantile metropolis”, the hub of a large trading network that was 
operational during the heyday of a macro culture that archaeologists call Hopewell.20  We 
have evidence, as well, of a busy sea trade on both coasts.   
 The archaeological evidence shows that by 1000CE, most of present-day Canada had 
been occupied for thousands of years by a variety of peoples.  We know little of these people 
and our ability to collect information about them is limited.  What we do know is that most 
of them were hunter-gatherers and that the animals hunted included fish.  Agriculture was 
not widespread, notwithstanding the cultivation of corn, squash, sunflowers, beans and 
tobacco introduced into southern Ontario after about 500CE.  We also see that these 
populations are embedded in their ecology, living and moving with the rhythm of the 
seasons: 
Most people lived in small mobile groups and all depended upon the close and 
detailed knowledge of their environments acquired over the centuries by 
ancestors who had occupied their territories for generations before them.  
Typically, each band developed a seasonal round of activity within an 
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approximately defined territory.  Within this area, particular species of animals 
would be hunted at certain times and places, perhaps determined by their 
migration routes, plans would be gathered at appropriate times of the year, and 
fish and other resources would likewise be exploited according to the seasons.  
Trade linked groups of people and different geological and ecological regions.21 
  
More than this, the indigenous cultures of present-day Canada had lived and thrived in 
particular bioregions for hundreds of generations.  As Wynn cautions, it is not wise to 
assume that these cultures were static and unchanging. 22  As embedded components of a 
complex ecosystem, these people were “…products of skilful adaptation, over millennia, to 
changing environmental circumstances and the opportunities presented by cultural contact 
and the diffusion of ideas and technologies.” 23 
 These cultures were composed of individuals who knew their physical environment 
and its ecology with the same intimacy that Sherlock Holmes was reputed to know the city 
of London.  Such an intimacy was vital for sustaining oneself and one’s community.  In 
order to exploit the technologies made available for the greatest good of the community (or 
what Wynn refers to as the satisfaction of their needs), one needed to understand the 
materials one was working with, as well as the environment in which they were to be used—
i.e. the use of fire to clear land for agricultural purposes.  This is a practice that is 
controversial now, but long ago seems to have been carried out in ways that were 
sustainable.  Even more apt than the comparison to a great detective might be that of a 
modern day artisan, attuned acutely to the tools and materials of her trade. 
At this juncture it would be wise to stop and briefly discuss traditional ecological 
knowledge (TEK) and its more generalized cousin, Indigenous Knowledge (IK).  The 
interlocking components of environmental policy and religious understanding are integral to 
TEK which is a way of knowing that informs the assertions I am making here in regards to 
what is known about aboriginal environmental policies in Canada.  In her book Working with 
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Indigenous Knowledge: A Guide for Researchers, Louise Grenier defines Indigenous Knowledge as 
“…the unique, traditional local knowledge existing within and developed around the specific 
conditions of women and men indigenous to a particular geographic area.”24 These systems 
are dynamic, innovating from within but also adapting external knowledge to suit a local 
situation.  In addition, IK covers all aspects of life and is cumulative.  Grenier notes as well 
that they are the result of “…generations of experiences, careful observations and trial–and-
error experiments.25 TEK is a component of IK referring more specifically to the knowledge 
of the natural environment.  Traditional ecological knowledge is not flummoxed by the 
dynamic and non-linear processes of cycles and fluctuations.26  TEK relies upon “intuitive 
wisdom” that is “characteristic of traditional, non-literate cultures…in which life was 
organized around a highly refined awareness of environment.”27 In aboriginal cultures, TEK 
is the way in which continuity and changes in resource management are tracked.  As Berkes 
writes, “…the practice of indigenous knowledge is, above all, the story of how 
social/cultural systems adapt to specific ecosystems.”28  In short, TEK is the cumulative 
knowledge a traditional culture has about the cycles, habits and fluctuations of its natural 
environment.  TEK is not static, but neither is it fickle.  It relies on the observations and 
teachings of generations before but is open to the observations and experiences in the 
present.  It has developed systems by which any new knowledge can be tested and integrated 
into the body of the TEK of that particular culture. 
Berkes lays out a framework for analysis of TEK known as a knowledge-practice-
belief complex. 29  In this complex (as Berkes composes it), there are four concentric circles: 
Local knowledge of land, animals; Land and Resource management systems—this uses local 
environmental knowledge and includes a variety of practices, tools and techniques; Social 
Institutions: rules-in-use, codes of social relationships that facilitate social restraints and rule 
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enforcement; the fourth level is the worldview “…which shapes environmental perception 
and gives meaning to observations of the environment…(this) level includes religion, 
ethics…and rounds out the knowledge-practice-belief complex that describes traditional 
knowledge.”30   
 The aboriginal cultures that the Europeans encountered in what became Canada 
were complex societies deeply embedded in their ecology with sophisticated political 
structures and intricate religious systems. 31 The acknowledgement of this complexity is 
important in the context of establishing that there were cogent, comprehensive 
environmental policies that were developed within a different social imaginary than those of 
Europeans, but were nonetheless, extant and sophisticated.  For example, in the worldview 
of the Cree, the animal (or fish or bird) controls the hunt.  The creature being hunted has 
agency and, as such, must be treated with respect.  One uses what one catches and does not 
“play” (i.e. catch and release) with the game.32 This worldview has currency within a social 
imaginary vastly different from a western European one.  However, the environmental 
policies that arose with it were (and are) sound: rotation of the fishing areas—fishing one 
lake for a season and then letting it lie fallow for several seasons after.  Also important was 
the strict attention paid to “biophysical events in the landscape such as the spring ice break-
up in the river and change of color of the vegetations in September.” 33 these signs gave 
evidence that it was time for hunting.  Even more specifically, for a particular Cree 
community, the Chisasibi Cree of St. James Bay was the choice of where and when to set 
their nets and the size of the nets to be set.  The nets that were set farthest from the village 
were aimed at larger, slower growing fish while the ones closest to the village were designed 
to catch a smaller, more quickly maturing fish which was able to withstand a higher fishing 
pressure.  Fikret Berkes, in his own studies with the Chisasibi Cree of St. James Bay, 
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concluded that the above strategies constituted a productive, sustainable managed system 
using recognizable management strategies.34  The example is, of course, contemporary, but 
the practices and strategies were extant way before the time of First Contact. 
 It is important to note that mere accumulation and possession of knowledge does 
not guarantee wise resource management.  There are instances where indigenous peoples 
have not managed their resources well.35  However, there is evidence that societies 
possessing such knowledge and a strong capacity to learn are likely to have sustainable 
practices. 36  Berkes references Slobodkin and Gadgil in arguing that humans as a predatory 
species can be characterized as being adapted to maintaining a population “close to the 
ecological carrying capacity”; and, as such, are also characterized by forming societies that 
use a variety of social regulations to ensure prudent resource usage.37  By and large, the 
environmental models of the aboriginal peoples of Canada—when taken into context—
seem to have been sustainable. 
 The models used by the varied aboriginal peoples of Canada differed from band to 
band, depending upon location, needs and custom.  However, there was/is a certain 
uniformity in the ways in which the bounty of the natural world was viewed.  The aboriginal 
understanding of the physical world is fluid and non-hierarchical. The transcendent is 
tangible and interactive. Therefore the concepts of stewardship (which implies kind of 
mandate to steward resources bestowed upon one as a kind of property) and of dominion 
(which speaks for itself), are imprecise at best.  The social imaginary in an aboriginal context 
is one of complete integration with the tangible, the spiritual and the intellectual.  Each 
component of creation has a presence in the tangible world of the here and now and in the 
intangible world that lies beyond mortal space and time.  Each component has its place in 
creation and each component has value in and of itself and as a critical piece of the whole of 
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creation.38  Therefore, one piece of creation cannot be said to own another piece of creation 
in the way Europeans would have understood land and property ownership and the rights of 
usage thereof.39   
 As a case in point, the Mi’kmaq people have a term, Netukulimk.  Somewhat akin to 
the understanding of resource management, it is much more layered and nuanced.  It is 
defined in Mi`kmaq Fisheries (1993) as “the Mi`kmaq way of harvesting resources without 
jeopardizing the integrity, diversity or productivity of our environment…it embodies the 
sharing of the natural bounty of the Creator for self-support and the well-being of the 
individual and the community at large.” 40 This doctrine of Netukulimk is seen as an 
inheritance, passed down from generation to generation.  One of the manifestations of that 
doctrine is the belief that the land itself is sacred and to be held in trust by the current 
generation for subsequent generations.  The principle allows for the survival of the current 
generation while they are enjoined to be mindful of the needs of the seventh generation for 
the basic necessities of life.  In short, the present generation is seen to be holding the fate of 
the next seven generation in its hands.   
Aboriginal cultures are, first and foremost, oral cultures.41  Traditional knowledge is 
handed down from elder to youngster via songs and stories that instruct and inscribe the 
history and traditions of each peoples in the memories of each generation.  As such, 
inflection and tone are as much a part of the stories as the words themselves.  This renders it 
difficult to adequately represent the memories of aboriginal peoples on the page.42  That 
being said, it is also integral to an adequate understanding of aboriginal social imaginaries to 
at least have a flavour of the myriad mythologies that undergird the cultural understandings 
of the relationships between humanity and the natural world.  To understand the social 
imaginary more completely, it is instructive to look at the creation myths or myths of origins 
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of some of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.  The myths of origins of the indigenous 
peoples of North America are varied. Canada’s First Nations have eight unique creation 
myths that can be loosely divided into two categories: diving person and world parent.   
 In the Iroquois version of the diving person the story is told of the Sky People; there 
was no earth beneath.  The chief’s daughter became ill and a wise elder was consulted.  He 
told them to dig up a tree and lay the girl beside the hole.  As the people were digging the 
hole, the tree fell through it and took the chief’s daughter with it.  The falling girl saw only 
water below her.  Two swans observed her fall and decided that she was too beautiful to 
drown so they swam to her and caught her.  They placed her on the back of the Great Turtle 
and all the animals of the earth gathered to see her.  The Great Turtle counsels that the Sky 
Woman is a symbol of good fortune.  He bids the animals to find where the tree landed in 
the ocean and to bring it to him.  The swans lead the animals to the place where they caught 
the girl.  The otter, muskrat and beaver dive down in succession and die upon surfacing, 
exhausted and empty-pawed.  The last to try is an elder woman toad who also perishes with 
the effort but not without first managing to spit a mouthful of earth onto the back of the 
Great Turtle.  The earth is magical and grows and grows until it becomes the Earth Island.  
The animals, also at the behest of the Great Turtle, gather lightening from the sky to create 
the sun and the moon while the burrowing animals dig holes for the sun and moon to 
descend into and rise up from.  The woman gives birth to twins, one good and one evil, and 
corn, beans and squash grow from her breast.43 
 In the Igluik version of World Parent a catastrophe causes the world’s supporting 
pillars to collapse and destroy the earth.  Two men emerge full-grown from the chaos.  They 
marry and one becomes pregnant.  The other man sings a song which causes the pregnant 
man to become a woman who then gives birth to a girl child.  The two giants care for the 
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child who is also large and who has a huge appetite for meat.  One night they awake to find 
her biting them.  Horrified, they take her far out to sea and push her into the water.  When 
she clings to the boat, they cut off her fingers.  The fingers become whales, seals, and shoals 
of fish.  The giant parents are afraid of their child and row away into the night.  The giant 
girl becomes the demon girl Sedna, Great Mother of all sea creatures.  She causes storms and 
governs the migrations of her sea creature children.44 
There are, of course more variations on these themes, as each culture is unique.  The 
Siouian story includes a man arising out of the earth, warmed and hardened by the sunshine.  
The Haida mythology incorporates the trickster tradition embodied in Raven who releases 
humanity into the world and gives them fire.  The Tsimshian have a resurrection 
component, the Mi’kmaq a variation on the story of a great Flood.  Despite the variances, 
there are some commonalities that can be extrapolated.  All posit human beings as part of a 
worldview that is inclusive, that is, a worldview in which balance is the causation of harmony 
and visa versa.45  Another key component of these worldviews is that of the common good.  
Heroic and laudable actions are almost always linked to ends that benefit the community as a 
whole.  Thus, the animals that lose their lives diving for the tree at the bottom of the ocean 
in order that land may be started and the first nation’s woman saved are heroic in part 
because the turtle tells them that the woman is good luck and therefore her preservation will 
help the extant community.  Lessons learned from the trickster stories are those which 
benefit the community as a whole.  This is one way that the creation myths show how deeply 
the needs of the common good are rooted within aboriginal culture.  This is not to say that 
individual gifts and needs are not acknowledged, but there is a strong sense that the 
individual profits excessively at the peril of the community.  Like many religious systems, the 
worldview perpetuated is at its heart deeply practical.  Keeping balance means that food will 
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be plentiful, people will not starve and society will not unravel.  The societies that the 
indigenous peoples of Canada developed (subsistence economies, hunter-gatherers) 
depended on their being able to work together and to get along in order to survive.  
Attributes such as selfishness or thievery undermined the cohesiveness of the community 
and put the whole people in peril.  Let me be clear, I am not advocating for an entirely 
functional view of religion.  This discounts, rather condescendingly I believe, the reality of 
the metaphysical dimension that religious communities attribute to their beliefs.  The fact 
remains though, that the messages inherent in the mythologies do reflect ethical codes that 
foster cohesive community and support a morality that puts the common good ahead of 
individual.  This speaks directly to the ways in which the natural world was regarded and 
used by Canadian aboriginals: although the aboriginal nations that were extant in Canada at 
the time of first contact were making use of the natural resources for the very practical 
purpose of survival, their underlying philosophy towards the resources that they were 
utilizing was one of mutuality and balance rather than one of entitlement and dominion.46 
 To understand the above principle is not to embrace the concept of the Noble 
Savage.  It is important to acknowledge that avarice and deviancy were and are extant in 
aboriginal society—the trickster stories, especially, make reference to that reality.  However, 
the above principles enable one to begin to grasp how aboriginal societies in Canada worked 
in concert with one another and with their physical environment.  The social imaginary was 
one of mutual use and benefit rather than of individual ownership.  Therefore the policies 
that developed in regards to what we refer to as resource management were, in Western 
terms more along the lines of stewardship than domination and exploitation.  To be sure, 
there were agreements between different peoples who inhabited adjoining territories as to 
who would use what hunting grounds when, and what the parameters of those hunting 
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grounds were.  However, as can be seen in the case of the Mi’qmak and the concept of 
Netukulimk –ownership was foreign to these understandings so one band may use a 
particular territory as its summer hunting grounds while another would use the same 
territory in the winter.   This amorphous (to the western mind) understanding of what 
constitutes ownership and subsequent user rights are part of the root of the conflict between 
aboriginal and western Europeans that underlies the complex issue of treaty negotiations and 
land claims. 47   As I will discuss further down, the social imaginary of the Europeans at the 
time of First Contact had shifted from those of a society with lands held in common to that 
of a society where individual ownership was integral to the economic system.  In addition, 
the cosmology that supported both social imaginaries added yet another layer of complexity.  
In part because of the willingness to draw from their own history of place, aboriginals were 
able to respond swiftly and efficiently to natural ebbs and flows of the population of game 
and to let farming grounds lay fallow for a certain number of seasons—a prime example of 
ecological adaptation of human groups to their environment. 48 
 As Paper points out,  “...what we can learn from European sources on the nature of 
Native religious traditions around the time of contact is partial at best…(w)e can learn much 
more from the Native peoples themselves who have extensive oral traditions about their 
past.”49   What TEK tells us is that the aboriginal cultures of Canada in general had 
environmental policies whose ends were directed towards conservation and a subsistence 
economy.50  These policies were informed by a cosmology that saw all of creation as 
interwoven and non-hierarchical.  This is a cosmology centred in a world that is still 
enchanted, with the boundaries between temporal and spiritual permeable and real.51  In this 
paradigm it is impossible to speak of environmental policy or ecological practices as being 
separate from religious scruples—talk of this would be a false dichotomy.52  Therefore, the 
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practical is always checked by the spiritual.  In the case of the Cree, where the animal 
controls the hunt and the human being is a passive partner in the hunt,53 the lack of game in 
a particular area was not necessarily an indication that other hunting spots should be sought 
for a prescribed period of time so that the population had time to recover, but a sign that a 
hunter had been disrespectful to the animal he was hunting and that animal was refusing to 
cooperate in the face of disrespect.  Berkes relates the story of a young man who 
inadvertently showed disrespect to the Otter he was trapping.  He had taken too long to 
check his traps and the fur had begun to spoil.  The young man was despondent as he 
expected the Otter to retaliate by not allowing itself to be caught for perhaps three years.54  
More observation would be needed over a longer period of time to determine if the 
resources were making themselves scarce in general (a sign of mass displeasure—indicating 
that the land should perhaps lay fallow for a period of time).  Or, it could be possible that 
the “land is unfamiliar” with the hunter—he is new to the territory and the land and animals 
do not know him, have not yet measured his mettle.  As the land gets to know him, he will 
gain in success—that being gauged not by quantity but by his ability to “get what he/she 
needs.”55   
 The environmental policies and practices of the various aboriginal peoples of Canada 
at the time of First Contact were developed within a social imaginary and worldview that 
necessitated maintaining harmony and balance in both a practical and a metaphysical sense.  
IK and TEK show that the systems that developed, did so over time and that, like any 
process, encountered errors in judgement and practices that were not, in the end, practical or 
good for the land.  That being said, it is also clear that by the time of First Contact, the 
policies and practices that were extant had been so for generations—honed and perfected 
over the years; making note of subtle changes in environment, dynamic, but, generally 
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speaking, not reckless.  These were cultures that had developed their environmental policies 
over a long period of time.  Patience and acumen had enabled them to maintain rich, viable 
societies in North America.  The coming of the Europeans introduced a vastly different 
social imaginary to North America and with that social imaginary came environmental 
policies that were, at times, in direct opposition to those practiced by the aboriginals.  The 
next section exams the development of that social imaginary and worldview and explores the 
environmental practices that accompanied it. 
After First Contact: European Environmental Policy 
 Robert B. Anderson and Robert M. Bone divide the change in the nature of natural 
resource use into three periods: Prior to first contact, European colonization and state 
building, and that of the present day.  The first period, according to Anderson and Bone, 
was of usage that “…was as a part of a complex and reciprocal relationship inseparable from 
culture, values and spirituality.”56   
  It is the deeply rooted notion of reciprocity which indicates an awareness of being 
embedded in a particular landscape—a notion of reciprocity that is not shared in the same 
way with the Europeans.  Even the settlers who came to see the Canadian landscape as 
something fine and possessed of a kind of spirit did not demonstrate the same collectivity of 
reciprocity, the kinds of non-hierarchical relationships with nature as did the aboriginal 
peoples.57 Nor, understandably, did they interpret their history with the land in the same 
fashion.   
 It is interesting to note, however, that the settlers who did develop a sense of the 
Canadian landscape as imbued with a spirit of its own or as a transcendent natural force 
were reflecting a theology that was not at all popular but that had been quietly and 
continually expressed and nurtured from its 12th century beginnings.  That this is so is of 
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relevance, lest this population be labelled simply the “Romantics” and be left to languish in 
that taxonomical box.  Franciscan theology and the natural world will be expanded upon 
below. 
 In Anderson and Bone’s conception—the second period—the phrase “resources 
management” arose and with it “…the notion that something can be good for people and 
bad for the environment, which makes that benefit an entirely relative one.”58  It should be 
noted that the concept of resources management is not unlike the aboriginal understanding 
of “continued use”—both adhere to the principles of renewability and animal cycles.  
Therefore, although Anderson and Bone are sceptical of what the term reflects 
philosophically, the use of the term by some ecologists is, in general, neutral. 
 The current period, according to Anderson and Bone, incorporates two forces—the 
emergence of an environmental movement and interest in sustainable development and the 
fact that Aboriginal persons are regaining control over their lands.  These two forces 
coalesce with a “growing acknowledgement of the traditional Aboriginal world view, and 
attempts to incorporate “traditional environmental knowledge” (TEK)…”59  The emerging 
environmental movement incorporates a point of view that rejects seeing the natural world 
in terms of resource management and instead incorporates a term coined by Aldo 
Leopold—“imagine a mountain”.  This term refers to a shift in perspective allowing for 
human beings to see themselves as one component of, rather than the ruler/shaper/decider 
of, the natural world; just another biological organism within the biosphere, as it were. 
 I have explored the first of Anderson and Bone’s periods and now come to the 
second—European colonization and state-building.  A comprehensive historical treatment is 
beyond the scope of this work.  However, it is important to establish the religious 
framework in which the European colonizers of Canada were operating, as this also provides 
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illumination for the greater cultural, political and economic impetuses for colonization of 
this portion of North America.   
Sixteenth Century Europe (by way of the Medieval World) 
 In his book A Secular Age, Charles Taylor outlines three features that, in sixteenth 
century Europe,  made it  impossible not to believe in God:  the order, design and “great 
events in (the) natural order” of the natural world; the deeply embedded belief that society 
and the various associations therein were “grounded in something higher than mere human 
action in secular time”; and, opposed to Weber’s expression of “disenchantment”, the world 
in which they lived moved and had their being was enchanted. 60  As Taylor points out, to 
say that this world was enchanted is to claim that, for them “…beyond all the inevitable 
ambivalences, the Christian God was the ultimate guarantee that good would triumph or at 
least hold the plentiful forces of darkness at bay.”61  The spiritual world was a tangible place 
and evil was real.  The cosmos was filled with “super-agents like Satan himself…down to 
minor demons…the enchanted world, in contrast to our universe of buffered selves and 
“minds”, shows a perplexing absence of certain boundaries which seem to us essential.”62  
This section explores, in part, the idea that in terms of the natural world, the buffered self 
was in some limited sense already extant in the pre-modern period.   
 This last is important because it shows that past and current environmental policy 
stem from a social imaginary that is deeply entrenched in an understanding of the 
environment as “Other”.  The notion of the buffered self as used by Taylor is a concept that 
lends itself well to the explanation of the pre-modern western European’s relationship with 
the natural world.  Taylor’s explanation of the enchanted self is one who is porous, who is 
vulnerable to forces beyond the tangible—psychic forces, spiritual forces which have agency 
and power to infiltrate one’s very being,   The porous self is without the boundaries that 
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modern people have—among them the strict sense of individual autonomy and integrity that 
renders the self incapable of being co-opted by transcendent forces. In discussing the 
difference between enchanted and buffered, Taylor writes: 
We make a sharp distinction between inner and outer, what is in the “mind” and 
what is out there in the world. Whatever has to do with thought, purpose, 
human meanings, has to be in the mind, rather than in the world. Some chemical 
can cause hormonal change, and thus alter the psyche. There can be an 
aphrodisiac, but not a love potion, that is, a chemical that determines the 
human/moral meaning of the experience it enables. A phial of liquid can cure a 
specific disease, but there can’t be something like the phials brought back from 
pilgrimage at Canterbury, which contained a miniscule drop of the blood of 
Thomas à Beckett, and which could cure anything, and even make us better 
people; that is, the liquid was not the locus of certain specific chemical 
properties, but of a generalized beneficence.63   
 
An enchanted worldview is by definition a worldview in which human beings are embedded 
in their complete surroundings and those surroundings have the potential for a causal 
relationship—for good or evil—directly with an individual.  The buffered self has 
boundaries.  She is, in a sense, one degree (at least) of removal away from whatever it is that 
is affecting her.  This is taking liberties with Taylor’s idea of the buffered self, but the 
comparison is helpful in terms of the distinction of removal versus embededness.   
The person living in an enchanted universe is embedded holistically and 
experientially in the physical, mental and spiritual.  As Taylor points out, the 16th century 
person was embedded in an enchanted universe in which the existence of God and the 
intangible world of spirits, demons and demiurges simply was.  The mindset can be likened 
unto one of those around-the-campfire ghost stories:  two travellers are venturing forth on a 
deserted road in the middle of a moonless night.  They come to a crossroads and do not 
know which way to turn.  A third traveller appears on the road and exhorts them to take the 
road that he is himself taking.  They travel along together until they reach a pub whereupon 
the first two travellers turn to the third and offer to buy him a drink in repayment for his 
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helpfulness and find that he has vanished.  Later, when they relate their tale to the landlord 
they are told about the Ghost of Whatever-it-may-be Road who was hanged at those 
crossroads and either helps hapless travellers or leads them down the wrong road to their 
doom.  To the person of an enchanted age, the ghost is as real and as tangible as the first 
two travellers supposed their new companion to be.  The spirits, God, demons directly 
interact and affect those who are alive and mortal.   
 A person who is not part of an enchanted universe is able to remove herself from 
the environment by compartmentalizing and rationalizing.  Therefore, the ghost was not 
real, but merely a manifestation of the fears the two travellers had about travelling along a 
strange road late at night with no map and no GPS to guide them.  Like Alice in Wonderland 
they puzzle and rationalize until the governess wakes them up and they realize that of course 
it had all been a dream—a dream composed of the rational components of the tangible 
world upon which her mind had been dwelling when she drifted off to sleep.  The same 
analogy can be drawn to the film version of the Wizard of Oz.  Improbable things, feelings 
and experiences have rational, scientific explanations and these rational, scientific 
explanations allow the modern person to remove or distance herself from the feeling in a 
way that a pre-modern person couldn’t.  “Things don’t really have this meaning; it just feels 
this way, which is the result of a causal action utterly unrelated to the meanings of things.  
This step of disengagement depends on our modern mind/body distinction, and the 
relegation of the physical to being ‘just’ a contingent cause of the psychic”64  Without taking 
exception to Taylor’s observations regarding the buffered modern and the unbuffered pre-
modern person, I would argue that the pre-modern person was already buffered or distanced 
from the natural world.  
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  This must be argued carefully, for it is so that for all intents and purposes the pre-
modern person was living in an enchanted world.  But the shift from enchanted to dis-
enchanted took place slowly and in stages.  One did not wake up in an enchanted imaginary 
one day only to step through the looking glass into the rationalism of modernity the next.  
Indeed, the type of buffered self that I am positing was not dis-enchanted per se.  But the 
person was buffered in the sense that he or she saw themselves as removed from and not 
embedded in the natural world.  To use a rather worn Christian cliché, they were in the 
world but not of it.  They were buffered in the sense that the natural world was other—
whether as tool to be used by the spiritual world for or against them, or as resource to be 
used as one saw fit.  In a sense, they were one step removed from their natural environment.  
This use of the concept of the buffered self is congruent with Taylor’s exploration of 
the relationship humanity has to the natural environment in this period.  He argues that the 
philosophical concepts of nature held by the pre-moderns were foundational in lay attempts 
to reform which, in turn, were fundamental to the development of humanism.65  Taylor 
refers to it as an interest in nature “for its own sake” as opposed to nature as only in 
reference to God.66  To understand this proffered construction of a pre-modern Western 
understanding of humanity’s relationship with the natural world, a short exploration of the 
work and thought of Lynn White, Jr. may be in order.  White wrote an essay in 1967 for the 
journal Science which is regarded as a seminal work, not the least for the vigorous 
conversation that it generated.  White believes that to “adequately understand the 
environmental crisis, we must first exhume and critically evaluate the ideas of nature, human 
nature, and the proper relationship between people and nature embedded in our inherited 
world view.”67 This is a fundamental component of White’s philosophy; that “what people 
do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things 
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around them.”68  For White, since the West was deeply influenced by Latin Christianity, the 
history of its interpretation of the natural world was the place to look for key ways to shift 
societal perceptions of the relationship human beings have with their natural environment.  
His essay in Science laid out his understanding of this history and a proposal for how a shift in 
perceptions might be made to come about.69  
In “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”, White70 makes an observation 
regarding a shift in perception of the relationship between humanity and the natural world 
by drawing, among other things, upon a shift in Western illustrated calendars around 830CE.  
He observes that the older calendars were “passive personifications” but that the newer 
calendars “…show men coercing the world around them…man and nature are two things, 
and man is master.”71  White makes this observation in the context of building an argument 
that Christianity underlay the shift in consciousness that moved people in the West from 
seeing themselves as embedded in the natural world to seeing themselves as removed from 
it.    His argument, in part, is that when Christianity “triumphed” over paganism and its 
concomitant animism, human beings found themselves able to exploit the natural world 
“…in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects.”72  White contends that this 
mindset is rooted in a particular interpretation of the Genesis story73 embraced by the Latin 
West.  White asserts that in the early church “…nature was conceived primarily as a 
symbolic system through which God speaks to men...(a) view of nature that was essentially 
artistic rather than scientific.”74  According to White, by the 13th century, the Latin West had 
shifted in its focus of natural theology from one of divine communication via “physical 
symbols” to one of human discernment of the divine mind via the deconstruction of 
creation.75  The foundational cosmology in the former paradigm is that of humanity firmly 
embedded in creation.  That being so, the original understanding of the natural world by the 
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early church posited that God was communicating with human beings (creatures) via their 
intrinsic medium (creation).76 The “symbolic system” is indicative of an implied 
embededness.  Human beings use symbols to represent and communicate complex realities 
and those symbols must make sense, be relevant to the intended recipient.  If God was seen 
as using nature as a symbolic system to communicate with humanity, then there had to be an 
inborn connectedness, an empathy with the natural world in order for God to expect human 
beings to decipher the codes of meaning within.  There is an assumption, before the 12th and 
13th centuries, in this paradigm that nature and humanity are concomitant—they belong to 
the same métier and milieu.   According to White, this shifts by the early 13th century, and 
nature becomes not symbol but mechanism.  Taylor also notes something similar to this with 
reference to Aquinas and the “autonomization of nature” where each part of creation had its 
own nature, peculiar to itself.  God is still present in the whole, but the whole is a 
background of harmonious order comprised of autonomous parts.77 
White believes that the cause of the shift lies in the ways in which the Latin West 
interprets the Biblical creation stories.  This misinterpretation, according to White, has its 
roots in the writings of the early Church Fathers, particularly Tertullian and Irenaeus.  These 
last, writes White, planted the seeds to the notion that “…man shares, in great measure, 
God’s transcendence of nature.”78  White sees the false dichotomy between human beings 
and the natural world coming to the fore in the 13th century—a development concurrent 
with the rise of a nascent scientific community.79 Contending that Christianity has 
historically been perceived as radically anthropomorphic, White traces the consequences of 
this anthropomorphism to an unprecedented bent for technology and a shift in imaginary 
that manifested itself in a mechanistic conception of creation as composed of pieces that can 
be taken apart and shown to be reflective of the mind of the Master.80  Like no longer 
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communicates with like, but apprentice learns to be Master by reconstructing (after 
deconstructing into components) and eventually gains the knowledge/mind of the Master 
him or herself.  Humanity is no longer embedded in or consubstantial with creation, but 
rather above and outside of nature.  God is the Master of the craft and humanity God’s 
apprentice, made in the Master’s image and therefore given license to deconstruct the 
Master’s work in order to determine the workings of Master’s mind.  Creation is seen as a 
tool used by God and humanity endowed with the mandate and the ability to learn to 
dominate and deconstruct creation in order to master the materials themselves.  This is not 
to say that humanity would become God—at least in the context of the High Middle Ages 
this would be seen as heretical—merely that humanity is expected by God to gain greater 
understanding of God and God’s creation by using scientific principles.  According to 
White, the anthropomorphism of Christianity, magnified by a misinterpretation of the 
Genesis stories of creation, gave impetus to this eventual evolution of perception.  Thus 
White attempts to show the scientific audience that he is addressing the ways in which he 
believes Christianity was misinterpreted in the West and used to further the work of science 
and technology to the eventual detriment of the natural environment.  While his exegesis is 
somewhat questionable81 at points, and undoubtedly the causation of ecological devastation 
is much more complex that this one essay asserts, the shift in the Western understanding 
from embededness in nature to detachment or buffering from nature is well-drawn.   
To be clear, I am not endorsing an interpretation of White that asserts his entire 
argument to be that Christianity was the major culprit in global environmental degradation, 
but using his argument to support my contention that pre-modern humanity in the West was 
buffered in a Taylorian sense to the extent that they saw themselves removed rather than 
embedded in the natural world.   
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After drawing a particular picture of Latin Christian interpretation, White introduces 
a component of Western Christianity in his essay that he argues is more in keeping with the 
earliest of Christian understandings of the relationship between humanity and the natural 
world and which he believes should be embraced by the West so that the ecological crisis 
could be averted.  He argues for the rejection of “…the Christian axiom that nature has no 
reason for existence save to serve man.”82  St. Francis of Assisi, claims White, “…proposed 
what he thought was an alternative Christian view of nature and man’s relation to it:  he tried 
to substitute the idea of the equality of all creatures, including man, for the idea of man’s 
limitless rule of creation.”83  But even in Francis, there is still the sense of humanity as 
distinct from, and not embedded in, nature. 
Francis’ theology was both broader and more nuanced than White portrays.  Taylor 
refers to the Franciscan aspect of a “new vision of nature” in the 13th century as “…the life 
of God in the animate and inanimate things which surround us…”84  Taylor argues, in part, 
that Francis’ focus on this vision was at the forefront of a new spirituality that focused on 
the humanity of Christ among people, as opposed to the Christ of judgement that had 
heretofore been put forth by the Church.85 Granted, Taylor and White are using Francis to 
prove two different theses.  But each point out that Francis was part of a movement that 
involved the new vision of nature.  White sees this vision as wholly radical in its 
egalitarianism.  Taylor points to a movement that was trying to take Christianity back to the 
masses.  In this context, Francis’ ecstatic poetry is more old-fashioned than radical.  Francis’ 
point is to see the life of God in every living thing.  He fights against hubris and extols 
humility but not to the extent that the faithful are extolled to see themselves as co-equals 
embedded in the natural world.  Francis’ awareness of the value of all of creation has 
important ramifications for the current environmental movement, but his theology, as 
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Taylor points out, was also instrumental in the emerging process of recognizing the ordinary 
person in their individuality.  This particularity, according to Taylor, eventually contributes to 
the individualism of modernity.   
White and Taylor each present a different facet of Franciscan theology for 
consideration.  Another point at which they both differ is that of the social imaginary of the 
world that Francis inhabited.  White portrays a world wrested from enchantment at the 
hands of conquering Christianity.  Taylor’s history is more nuanced.  Even though there are 
signs of dis-enchantment, Taylor asserts that the process was much slower than White 
indicates.  This next section explores the two theological points of view put forth by White 
as well as the social imaginary described by Taylor.   
The view of nature that 16th century Europeans inherited from their medieval 
forbearers was complex and several strands of thought come to the fore when the 
complexities are examined.  One strand, exemplified and amplified by St. Francis of Assisi in 
the 12th century was that of the ancient Christian ascetics.  Incorporating statements such as 
Antony’s from the 4th century—“God’s words can be read in nature,”86 but also introducing 
the ideas of familial relations with other creature in the whole of creation and the extension 
of chivalric conceptions to interactions with creatures—St. Francis’ writings and teachings 
supported a vision of creation that has been interpreted by some contemporary ecologists 
(White included) and theologians as one that posits humanity embedded in creation in a 
non-hierarchical relational way, very much like Aboriginal thought. 87  However, as Roger 
Sorrell very rightly points out, much of this interpretation is anachronistic; Francis was a 
man of the 13th century and his foundations were not egalitarian but hierarchical.  Creation 
was God’s handiwork and was hierarchical. 88  Each facet of creation had its fixed place and 
purpose.89  Human beings may need to show respect to God’s creation and have a 
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responsibility for stewardship but this respect and responsibility stem from the knowledge 
that it is God’s work that commands humanity’s respect and duty.  Creation is the work of 
God, that is the universal commonality.  God is pleased best when God’s works are treated 
with respect and reverence—not because they have intrinsic value in and of themselves, but 
because they are the works of the Creator.  The Creator is great and good, thereby the 
Creation is great and good.90   
The above is the thread of commonality that united all the strands of thought 
towards nature in the 16th century—that nature (or creation) is something that humanity is 
part of but not something with which humanity interacts on an egalitarian footing.  Nature is 
Other, a part of the created order crafted and presented by God for humanity.  In Francis’ 
paradigm this position means that humanity has responsibility towards the rest of creation 
and joins with the rest of creation in praising God, but is not embedded in the natural world 
in an egalitarian sense.  Thus Francis shows “affection and reverence” to creation in his 
Canticle to the Sun but the language he espouses with the Sun and the Water “…do not 
imply any pantheistic of pan-psychic view of creatures, since Francis’ conceptions of them 
were rooted soundly in Christian doctrine.  They are rather a way of showing in a poetic and 
emotional way Francis’ affection for and affinity with creatures.”91  It is not confraternity 
that Francis sees, but beauty in the other aspects of God’s creation.  Humanity is part of the 
created order but as the “highest” creature in that hierarchy.  From this perspective, it can be 
seen that Francis has a deep understanding of the Othering between humanity and the rest 
of creation. 
That Francis understood this can be seen in the way he speaks of creation: sister 
Moon, brother Fire, etc.  Francis is not romanticizing or anthropomorphizing, Sorrell argues, 
but is personifying—trying to build bridges of empathy.92   Such efforts would not be 
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necessary with a population that saw itself as embedded in nature; Francis’ nomenclature 
would not be seen to be radical in the least.  But his “enfraternization of all creation” belies a 
popular conception of nature as Other.  His attempts to persuade offer a telling glimpse into 
the mind of his contemporaries and their view of nature.   
Again, it can be shown that in the Latin West, people and nature were perceived as 
being distinct from one another.  Sorrell’s arguments undergird Taylor’s observations 
regarding the type of spiritual direction in which Francis was heading—that of bringing 
Christ to the masses, especially to those on the margins of society.  As mentioned before, 
Taylor argues that this focus on the person of Christ also brings focus on the uniqueness of 
the individual.  The implications of that for this study is that with a humanity buffered from 
nature, the increased pull to know God through the person of Christ and not through the 
vehicle of creation becomes stronger.  The natural world becomes more and more Other—
incidental, almost, to humanity’s understanding of itself.  Francis’ exhortations are not that 
humanity knows God through creation, but that humanity recognizes the wonder of God in 
creation.    
This refutes, in a large sense, the portrait of Francis’ cosmology that is put forth by 
White.  Francis did not attempt to “depose man from his monarchy over creation and set up 
a democracy of all God’s creatures.”93  However, when White remarks on Francis’ “spiritual 
autonomy of all parts of nature”94  he is closer to the mark, for that reflects the particularity 
brought about by the trend reflected in Francis’ overall theology.  Seeing White’s arguments 
in this light is important, for the discussions that White generated encouraged a reading of 
Francis as a heretical environmentalist that may be of use for contemporary 
environmentalists, but is somewhat unhelpful when trying to decipher the attitudes of pre-
moderns towards the natural world.  This worldview was one of a humanity with a religious 
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worldview buffered—removed and not embedded—from the natural world.  In that part, 
White’s point is valid—religion is integral to understanding the history in the Latin West of 
humanity’s relationship to nature.  As Taylor writes, “the new interest in nature was not a 
step outside of a religious outlook, even partially; it was a mutation within this outlook.”95  
In the next section I will explore varieties of religious outlooks in the 16th century that had 
their antecedents in the 12th and 13th, and whose people set forth into the New World armed 
with worldviews and social imaginary that would differ profoundly from new cultures that 
they would encounter. 
Sixteenth Century Western Europe  
The theology that undergirds the social imaginary and hence the view of humanity’s 
relationship with the natural world in the 16th century is inextricable from the culture of the 
time and place.  And it is inextricable in the sense that a religious worldview was not merely 
a component of society—it simply was, among other factors, what made society whole; what 
made reality real.  Taylor describes the buffered self as “…essentially the same self which is 
aware of the possibility of disengagement.”96  If this is the case, then the non-buffered self—
the pre-modern person—could be described in most instances as not being aware of the 
possibilities of disengagement.  White argues that, in terms of the relationship between 
humanity and the natural world, these possibilities appear to be present in the 13th century.  
Taylor is clear that the buffered self is not fully so until the modern period.  He observes 
three components of this 16th century world:  1. The natural world the people lived 
in…testified divine purpose and action; 2.  A kingdom could only be conceived as grounded 
in something higher than mere human action in secular time.  3.  The world was 
enchanted—a world filled with spirits, demons and moral forces…97  So the premodern 
person of the 16th century was only buffered in a very limited sense.98  This partially buffered 
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person exists in a world that is not particularly conducive to the “possibilities of 
disengagement.” Thus the premodern person cannot distance him or herself from the 
influence of demons or evil spirits—in an enchanted world, their existence is tangible and 
inarguable.   Therefore, even though the partially buffered person no longer sees humanity 
as embedded in the natural world, the natural world is still full of all the components that 
make it enchanted and, as such, has a powerful place in the social imaginary.   
So it is fair to observe that leading up from the long 13th century and at the beginning 
of the 16th, the theology of the natural world (to distinguish from natural theology) 
engendered a view of nature as something to be feared or regarded with awe but not 
something of which humanity was necessarily a part.  They were dependent upon nature, but 
nature itself had no agency apart from how the supernatural chose to use it.  The 
supernatural was Other to nature as well—as it was temporal and not eternal.  The natural 
world is object, never subject.  Aside from Francis’ cosmology, nature was a force to be 
overcome and subsumed.  In certain interpretations of the scripture, God had sanctioned 
that domination.  The Fall had shown nature to be untrustworthy as it could be used by evil 
to tempt human beings.  Although Francis does speak against this particular view, there is no 
doubt that it was deeply entrenched in the cosmology of the time and place.  On the positive 
side, God also could use it to bless human beings with fertile soil and good weather.  The 
natural world was often an auger of God’s current disposition towards God’s people.  The 
natural world was one vehicle through which God communicated the Divine will.  
According to scripture, the natural world outside the safety of the Garden of Eden was also 
a place of exile after the Fall.  In terms of humanity’s place in all of this, as a special part of 
the natural world endowed with souls, human beings had a unique relationship with God.  
All of this makes for a fairly complex theoretical attitude towards the physical environment. 
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 The belief was that human beings were at the top of the created order and, as such, 
had dominion over nature; even, it should be recalled, in the paradigm presented by St. 
Francis.  For, as discussed, although Francis’ teachings did not vary in some respects from 
those of his contemporaries, his view of nature is best understood as a view of creation that 
was organized according to a divine plan, was hierarchical in nature and in which each 
component had its own set place.  The responsibility for stewardship can be justly 
extrapolated but to do so at this period is somewhat anachronistic.  In either case, God had 
provided the basic necessities for living—fertile soil for planting, materials for creating 
shelter and clothing, animals and birds for hunting and fish for the catching.  In this way, 
human beings were beholden to creation for their survival and, since God was the author of 
creation, they were ultimately beholden to God.  In St. Francis of Assisi’s paradigm, this 
meant that God should be seen to be present in all of creation and that should engender a 
kind of humility in our encounter with all of creation—almost as if being part of creation 
was practice for the humble wonder that one would display when one eventually found 
oneself in God’s presence after death. 
 But as alluded to above, there were other paradigms as well that viewed nature not as 
God’s gift nor humanity’s benevolent sibling, but as a dark and broken prison, a “vale of 
tears” that was corrupt and through which God chose to manifest God’s pleasure or 
displeasure through floods and droughts and years of good harvests and fine weather.  In 
this sense nature becomes a tool of God, through which humanity benefits or falls ill.99  It is 
an effective tool because humanity is trapped in this world (not embedded, for humanity is 
in a real sense seen as above and beyond).  In this paradigm humanity’s true home is the City 
of God.  In this worldview, being part of the created order is a trial of one’s mettle, a place 
for the soul to be refined and honed.  A place so corrupt and corrupting that it was merely 
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to be endured and, in the end escaped not for Paradise but for Purgatory, as the corrupting 
influence of this world was too great for all but the most pure of souls. 
 Since the worldview that I am exploring will eventually come into contact with the 
North American aboriginal worldviews, it would be fruitful to do a short compare and 
contrast at this juncture.  The western European worldview just described stands in deep 
contrast to the one held by the aboriginal peoples of what came to be known as Canada.  In 
their paradigm, humanity does not stand outside of the natural world but is literally “of” the 
natural world.  To be sure, the forces of the natural world and the resources could also be 
communicated with, but the actions taken were seen as a consequence of the relational. If 
the game were scarce or the weather intemperate it was because relationships were out of 
balance and needed to be put right.  It was incumbent upon all parties to strive to regain that 
delicate balance that allowed for all life to proceed.  There are contrasts and parallels here, of 
course.  In the Christian paradigm a balance of relationships was also important but the 
fundamental beliefs about those relationships were inherently different.  For the Christian, 
the relationship between humanity and the divine had been put out of balance with the Fall 
and no amount of human effort would bring that relationship right.  Through Christ there 
could be reconciliation but the scales could not be so easily reset, as the corruption of the 
corporeal world was irredeemable until the end of time.  In addition, in the European 
context, human beings were not contending with spirits in nature, but spiritual forces using 
nature for their own ends.   
 In this sense, then, the desire is not so much for a balance of all relationships but for 
an overpowering of the forces that are complicit in perpetuating brokenness.  In the 
European paradigm, the broken relationship (in the form of the Fall) was foundational to the 
way the world now worked.  Christ’s coming may have brought spiritual redemption but, 
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unless something changed at the final reckoning, the relationship between human beings and 
the natural world was broken.  Hence, the enchanted world of the European is hierarchical 
and adversarial—all the more so if God is seen as judge or tempestuous father.  Human 
beings are embedded in the natural world but they are not of the natural world and therefore 
do not need to seek for right relationship with the components of that world but with the 
creator of that world.  The Aboriginal worldview (in the most general sense) is that of 
humanity embedded in the natural world with the need for maintaining right relationships 
within that natural world.  Although many Aboriginal mythologies do portray a creator 
figure (or figures), the stories all convey the sense that these figures expect their creation to 
be in harmony with itself and not to look to the creator as the automatic arbiter.  Human 
beings have the capacity and the responsibility to maintain proper relationship and balance 
with the natural world. 
 All of this is not to make a value judgement regarding which paradigm is the most 
“correct” or beneficial for humanity as a whole.  History is complex and the theories that I 
am bringing forth are merely attempts to try and understand portions of what eventually 
evolved from the clashing of these worldviews. Religious worldviews are fluid and emerge 
and evolve as the needs of their respective societies change.  This does not mean that 
worldviews always change fundamentally, but that their modes of being expressed and even 
of being used change as they are adopted by and adapted for each generation.   
 The European paradigms—St. Francis or the “vale of tears”—necessitate an 
understanding by humanity of their dis-embededness in the natural world.  In the sixteenth 
century, the latter view was more prevalent than was the view ascribed to St. Francis.  
Entwined in this perception, of creation as God’s tool, was the understanding that earth was 
not humanity’s true home—the Augustinian idea of the City of God and the City of Man.  
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In this paradigm the physical world is incidental to human happiness and it is the soul’s true 
desire to leave the created world to join with God in God’s perfect city.   
 In this fundamental worldview was a cosmology that could not help but inform 
environmental practices.  Nature was a tool used by the supernatural in a variety of ways for 
a variety of reasons.  Because of the Fall, humanity was destined to dwell as broken creatures 
in a created world that was not their true home, but a lost Paradise filled with danger and 
hardships.  This worldview is evidenced by the widely held belief that salvation was only for 
the few and that eternal damnation was the eventual lot of most; the increased sense of God 
as harsh judge rather than forgiving father; the idea mentioned above that the world was in 
Satan’s hands; and that flesh was equivalent to corruption and damnation.”100 
 This highlights a very important difference between the worldviews seen in North 
American Aboriginal cultures and the enchanted world of 16th century Europeans.  The 
theological understanding that human beings were in the world but not of the world—that 
is, embedded in the natural world but not really a part of it because their souls belonged with 
God in their true home—that understanding combined with the worldview that saw nature 
as God’s tool, served to support a cognitive dissonance that leads to alterity.  That is, by 
seeing the natural world as a tool and human beings as not ontologically embedded in this 
world, the natural world can be seen by human beings as Other, as an entity separable from 
humans.  The difference in theology underlying the worldviews leads to social imaginaries of 
very different types.  
 I want to be very careful here to state that I am not arguing against Taylor’s notion 
of the pre-modern person as porous and the modern person as buffered.  Although nature 
was Other in the enchanted paradigm, it still operated on the principle that boundaries 
between things were porous—and it is here that there is some congruity between the 
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European and the Aboriginal.  Humanity could not buffer itself from the reality of nature as 
actor.  When crops failed it was not just that the farmer was a victim of the weather but that 
there were evil spirits making themselves manifest in the lack of rain or in the clouds of 
locusts.  Or, that God was displeased and showing God’s wrath.  The idea of in the world 
but not of it does not preclude the reality of one’s being affected by the world or the 
otherworldly.  I am arguing merely that nature (in the form of the physical environment) was 
a tool through which spiritual forces were known to work and, as such, this laid partial 
groundwork for an eventual shift to disenchantment that saw nature as predominantly a tool. 
 This notion of nature as tool is integral to the understanding of the environment that 
European explorers in the sixteenth century brought with them as they searched for new 
trade routes and for geographical expansion.  At this stage in the common European 
worldview (and Taylor does make a very important distinction between the intellectuals of 
the time and the general population—more on that below), God is in charge and uses 
nature, in part, to keep humanity mindful of what power God has.  This relieves human 
beings of a certain amount of responsibility towards the natural world.  To be sure, it is 
God’s creation and tool and, as such, commands respect.  However, God has also 
commanded humanity to “have dominion” over the earth and to use the resources therein to 
sustain themselves.   
 This creates a kind of fragmentation in the enchanted worldview of the 16th century 
European:  First, nature is God’s tool for reminding humanity of God’s power; secondly, 
nature is populated with spiritual forces both good and evil that constantly vie for 
dominance over human existence; third, nature is God’s gift to humanity in their 
brokenness—having been expelled from paradise, they are nonetheless presented with the 
means necessary for eking out a subsistence living from the created world outside of Eden.  
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And lastly something new, the Reformation brings about one more fragment—the sense that 
the natural world is something to be conquered or overcome.  Just as an undisciplined body 
can bring the soul’s downfall, so is the natural world repugnant and unruly.  Just as the flesh 
needed to be brought into discipline and controlled, so too did the natural world.101  The 
first fragment reflects the judgemental father God mentioned earlier.  This gives the natural 
world a menacing tinge, a flavour of retributive justice if you will.   The second reflects a 
humanity with some measure of power in the spiritual realm as the relics of the saints are 
available to them for the requesting of God’s power and the magical use of warding off evil.  
The third fragment views nature as a reflection of God’s largess and mercy.  The fourth is a 
variation on the second with its dawning belief that humanity can have some measure of 
control over the physical world—though of course this control is seen as illusionary at this 
stage as all control ultimately belongs to God. The mechanistic point of view can be seen 
here as well—with God-through-nature shifting from the great communicator to the great 
mind which must be disassembled for the watchmaker’s edification.  The difference between 
two and four is mainly in the decreased belief in the magic of relics or other material objects 
and the increased belief in the power of good works and of science.   
 These four fragments are reflective of different theological positions that will all play 
out in environmental policy as disenchantment begins to take hold in the European 
worldview.  The first two, especially, form part of the foundation for an exploitationist 
vision for what will be called natural resources that the Europeans brought with them to the 
New World. 
 This is not to say that aboriginals did not exploit their environment.  However, their 
understanding of their societies first had a longer, remembered and respected breadth.  They 
also had a worldview that not only acknowledged human embededness in nature but saw 
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this as integral and non-hierarchical.  There was also a perception that there was a direct, 
causal relationship between the respect shown to nature and the ways in which nature 
reacted.  Humanity had a measure of control that went with the responsibility.  Exploitation 
could only go so far, or the subsistence economy would collapse because, according to the 
worldview, respect for the natural world was not being displayed.  The worldview of 16th 
century Western Europe was somewhat different. 
 Worldviews do not develop in a vacuum.  All the components that comprise society 
interact with one another and influence one another to varying degrees.  The social and 
theological changes being wrought in the period of 1300-1600 were accompanied by 
economical and political changes as well.  All were to have a deep impact on the global 
environment. 
 In A Secular Age, Taylor traces the shift in social imaginary in Western Europe from 
an enchanted universe where God is an indisputable fact and the ways in which moderns 
delineate boundaries—between self and others, temporal and spiritual—are porous to one 
where autonomy is beginning to take hold and disenchantment to reign supreme at the 
advent of the Reformation.  The pre-modern person that I have posited above, partially—
buffered and disembeded from the natural world, is also deeply entrenched in a social 
imaginary that is shifting.  The shift, in broad terms, can be described as going from symbol 
to mechanism.102  The art and sciences of the Renaissance build in part, upon the theological 
antecedents which posit human agency and autonomy along with the absolute sovereignty of 
God.  Taylor, making his argument for the development of humanism in this period, notes 
that in this period, the concept of human agency as “active, constructive, shaping…”103 gives 
rise to contemplative ways in which to grasp the world—science and art—as well as taking a 
greater place in ethics.   
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 This last is especially important because it contributes to the social imaginary that 
arises in Western Europe during the Reformation which, in turn, deeply affects the ways in 
which humanity sees their relation to the natural world.  A humanity with agency has 
responsibility to render human society to be what God expects it to be, and that includes 
managing nature in such a way as to maximize human flourishing.  Reformers saw this 
agency being kept in check by strict discipline and order. 
 Taylor’s observations regarding the history of a “disciplinary society” paint the 
picture of a complex and increasingly regulated culture where discipline and order were 
reflective of, among other things, proper religious conformity.104 He notes that in the 16th 
century, elites who heretofore would have been satisfied with the gains their own class had 
made in terms of knowledge and refinement (becoming “civilized”, in other words), began 
attempts to make over the lower orders of society:  “They are precisely not left as they are, 
but badgered, bullied, pushed, preached at, drilled and organized to abandon their lax and 
disordered folkways and conform to one or another feature of civil behaviour.”105  This 
understanding of lower orders as a population that needs to conform to the ideal of the elite 
has far reaching consequences for both cultures after First Contact.   But what is also 
important is what is seen as the divine mandate for the “Godly minority” to keep the masses 
in check.   
The particularity of human natures that was a harbinger of autonomous 
individualism also dovetailed with the Protestant insistence that there was no hierarchy of 
vocations.  Since everyone was called by God to live up to their calling in the fullest way 
possible, it would be irresponsible of the elite to leave the masses as they were.106  It is not a 
particularly difficult stretch to argue that this passion for creating order out of chaos and felt 
responsibility for enabling God’s creatures to rise to as high a level of perfection as possible 
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informed attitudes towards the natural world.  There was already the idea that humanity had 
the capacity to discern the mechanics of nature and, as such, the capacity to use it as a tool in 
the same manner as God.107  This view goes beyond disembededness of humanity from 
nature to entwine with the theological stance of domination.  The notion of stewardship or 
of empathy with fellow creatures is still extant, but is peripheral in the great wave of 
theological, social and economic changes being wrought in the 16th century. 
As the European worldview moves towards disenchantment, it is easy to make the 
statement that the sense of the environment as Other, and subsequently also as tool for the 
betterment of human pursuits by humans, led to greater and more unsustainable 
exploitation.  However, as with any type of human history, things are much less facile and 
far messier in their explanation.  Neither environment nor religion are deterministic in and 
of themselves.  However, the two are integral to an understanding of the social imaginary of 
the 16th century. 
 As mentioned above, it is impossible to speak of European society in the sixteenth 
century in any kind of secular terms.  The worldview and social imaginary were enchanted 
and God was inextricably entwined.  This being the case, it is inconceivable that any kind of 
vision of the natural world was formulated or implemented devoid of theological influence 
in the sense of what Taylor refers to as a “naïve understanding”, or “the construal we just 
live in, without ever being aware of it as a construal, or—for most of us—without ever even 
formulating it.”108  That is, the theology (or, to be more accurate, the theologies) imbedded 
in the social imaginary of the time would have been part of the make-up of any person.  
Again, I am not arguing in the least that such a theological component was deterministic, 




 Leading up to the 16th century, there were profound shifts taking place socially, 
economically and theologically.  Some of these changes led directly to the development of an 
economic system that would depend upon geographic expansionism for its growth and 
prosperity.  This expansionism was supported theologically by a growing mechanistic 
understanding of the world—exploration brought knowledge and knowledge furthered the 
quest to understand the mind and ways of God—and by the mandate to proselytize.   
  As well, there is little doubt that shifts in the natural environment were deeply tied to 
some of those changes.  The outbreaks of the Black Death from 1347-1400 and what is 
often referred to as the Little Ice Age are just two examples.  In the case of the Black Death, 
for example, one ramification was a reduction in the available labour force and a command 
of higher wages for those few who were left to work the land.  During this period, it had also 
become possible for peasants to have small surpluses which they were then able to trade or 
sell in the urban markets.  In some cases, peasants were themselves able to purchase land.  
Although this relative largess was not always a predictable constant, one consequence was 
that the class distinctions necessary for maintaining feudalism began to erode and with this, 
the dependence on a subsistence economy.109   
 The rise of the city-state and the degradation of arable land due to unsustainable 
farming practices (i.e. an imbalance between livestock which were necessary for providing 
fertilizer; pastures; poor crop rotation; and land that had been parcelled into too many lots) 
and the process of enclosure of common lands110 also contributed to social unrest and 
peasant uprisings in the countryside and in the urban areas.111  As Perry Anderson observes, 
“the penetration of the countryside by commodity exchange had weakened customary 
relationships, and the advent of royal taxation now often overlaid traditional noble exactions 
in the villages; both tended to centralize popular reactions to seigniorial extortion or repression, into major 
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collective movements” (1974a: 202, emphasis added). 112Thus, land use (or misuse), in part, led to 
some colonization into Eastern Europe and to a noticeable dip in the relative prosperity of 
the peasant class.  Those who had been managing to have a small surplus to sell or barter for 
themselves found themselves struggling at a subsistence level once again.  As Moore notes, 
“those areas most prone to revolt were neither fully commercialized (prior to capitalism no 
area could be) nor entirely subsistence-oriented, but rather those areas that lay somewhere in 
between.”113  In other words, those peasants who had been rising above a subsistence level 
were reluctant to return to their former economic positions—no matter how much pressure 
was put to bear upon them by the seigneurs or the princes. 
 Moore’s discussion is focused on the development of capitalism in the West, but his 
insight into the environmental issues that played a part in that development from 1300-1600 
are also important for this study.  The changes in the ecology of the feudal lands, the 
droughts and famine brought about by inadequate land use, the ensuing Black Death 
possibly exacerbated by the weakened resistance to disease through malnutrition114 
supported a theology of despair—only slightly ameliorated by the dim hope of purgatory and 
the Church’s offering of indulgences—while also providing partial grounds for a profound 
shift in the balance of power between social classes.115   
 To elaborate, I will turn again to Taylor’s examination of the time period of 1450-
1650 and the rage for order.  He outlines three kinds of change that were integral to the shift 
from enchanted to disenchanted and which were supported by the Reformation: 
…first, autonomous changes in popular piety, which may be encouraged from on high, but are 
not mainly powered from above, like the devotion to the crucified Christ, and the practices of 
solidarity before death and Purgatory.  There are, second, the rise and development of new 
elites, with a different outlook, or different social base, as with the educated laity who more and 
more mark the religious picture of Latin Christendom through this period.  And then there is the 
third, the deliberate attempts by elites, whether old or new, to make over the whole society, to 
change the lives of the mass of people, and make the(m) conform better to certain models which 




Taylor’s observations here mark, as do Moore’s, the shift in the power balance between the 
different factions of western European societies.  As Feudalism crumbles and a new social 
and economic reality begins to emerge—so, too, does a new religious reality begin to 
develop.  Taylor calls part of this a “rage for order” and a “…dissatisfaction…with the 
hierarchical equilibrium between religious leaders and people, hierarchy and laity…”117  
According to Taylor, this dissatisfaction can be seen, in part, through the banning of festivals 
that make fun of the hierarchy—such as Carnival, when societal roles are reversed and 
peasants play at being kings while the clergy play at being peasants.  As the “rage for order” 
becomes more entrenched in the wake of the Reformation, such hierarchical equilibrium 
becomes intolerable, as do its collective expressions. 
 To Taylor’s explanation of the drive for order, I would also add that the comparative 
economic disarray that was caused by the slow dismantling of feudalism and the 
development of the early stages of capitalism also contributed to the circumstances that 
made Reform so fertile.  Internal societal structures were being shifted, making it necessary, 
in part, for external structures to be put into place so that the theological impetus for order 
and discipline was justified by the social and economic situation.  The additional 
environmental realities—i.e. lack of available arable land for cereal crops, climate change—
also added to the shift. 
 There are many threads to weave together to present as coherent a picture as 
possible of a Western European concept of the environment at the time of, first Cartier 
(1497) and then Cabot (1534).  The centuries leading up to this point had produced people 
who lived in an enchanted universe, where the concept of Godlessness was inconceivable.  
The natural world was, if not filled with the spirits of nature that a much earlier culture had 
worshipped, ripe for use by a wide variety of supernatural forces, including God.  Although 
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pre-modern, these people were partially buffered in the sense that they did not see 
themselves as being embedded in their natural environment.  Mind-body dualism served as a 
foundation upon which a cosmology of nature as Other was set.  Nature is conceived of as a 
tool.  It can be used, as stated above, by supernatural forces for the help or to the detriment 
of humanity.  Conversely, nature was also a tool used by humanity for its own needs.  
However, the sense of nature as unpredictable, as a tool for judgment in the hands of the 
supernatural was also palpable.  Even as farmers planted crops and made shrewd predictions 
about the weather, there was the sense that all would be for naught if evil spirits were to feel 
capricious or if God were to be angered and pass judgment in the form of drought or flood 
or early frost.  Still, the predominate understanding at the time was of nature as tool to be 
used to further one’s ends, be they human flourishing or spiritual caprice. 
 It is apparent, also, that although the view of nature articulated by Francis in the high 
Middle Ages is not defunct, it is certainly not at the fore.  With the emergence of a 
mechanistic view of the universe and the development of a nascent scientific method along 
with the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy comes a point of view that sees 
nature not as God’s great communication device, but as the blueprint of God’s brain.  Taylor 
asserts that the beginnings of humanism are partially here, and I agree.  I would also add that 
the beginnings of a further tendency to Other nature are also here—nature is no longer 
complicit in the great struggle to communicate with God; nature is object that must be 
deconstructed to understand God.  This furthers an understanding of the natural 
environment as tool for humanity’s use.  There is a kind of empowerment here as well.  If 
the workings of nature will help one to understand the mind of God, will not this 
understanding enable a mastery of nature that will take it out of the hands of malevolent 
spirits?   
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 Therefore, at the foundation of the picture I am trying to portray here is a Western 
European embeded in an enchanted universe but partially buffered in the sense that he does 
not see himself as embedded in the natural world.  And this is one point at which the 
worldviews of the Western European and the North American Aboriginal diverge—both 
worldviews are enchanted, but the former is disembeded while the latter is not.  For the 
Western European as well, the natural world is a tool for use by the temporal and the 
supernatural but the social imaginary in which he is embeded is slowly moving towards a dis-
enchanted universe.  For the Aboriginal, the natural world has agency and works in concert 
with the other agents within creation to achieve a balanced, sustainable existence.   
 In Western Europe, nature had no agency and the theology of the time sustained a 
humanity-has-dominion perspective towards the natural landscape.  Therefore, the 
degradation of arable soil and the depletion of forests were seen as fulfilling a divine 
mandate and the ensuing ramifications not viewed at all as a sign that nature itself was 
displeased.  If anything, God would be beseeched to make the land fertile and hold off the 
forces of evil. 
 Thus, when the opportunity arose to expand European interests to the New World, 
the opportunity itself was seen as a sign from God and the economic and consequent social 
good that would presumably come from such ventures as evidence of God’s good will 
towards the endeavors. The mastery of open ocean navigation and the resources to make 
such voyages a reality was confirmation of the divine mandate to acquire the knowledge 
necessary for further mastery of vast mechanistic universe. 
 Layered upon this was the belief of the Reformers that creating order out of chaos 
was also a divine mandate, that cultivation and civilization were also signs of the Divine 
presence and pleasure.  This drive to tame and subdue that which was hitherto wild and 
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unpredictable had a deep influence on later settlers to the New World, who would claim that 
the Aboriginals could not possibly lay claim to land that they had not permanently 
cultivated.118   
 Lastly, there was the missionary aspect of Christianity, both Roman Catholic and 
Protestant conceived of themselves as fulfilling the divine mandate of Mathew 25 by going 
off to make believers of all peoples.  Thus it was that not only did the Western Europeans 
strive to have dominion over the non-human flora and fauna of the New World, but to also 
dominate and “tame” the Aboriginals they encountered.  This missionary activity, however, 
did not manifest itself until the late 16th/early 17th century 
First Contact: Western European 
 As Wynn remarks, the intersection of cultures new to one another is a “complicated 
and intricate set of processes.”119  He references Urs Bitterli and his rubric for classifying the 
engagement between Europeans and non-Europeans:  contact, collisions and relationships.  
Although Bitterli’s rubric has some problems in what it does not encompass,120 it does 
provide a methodology of sorts (or, as Wynn calls it, a “grid”) for viewing the process of the 
consequences of contact. 
 According to Bitterli, “contact” was short lived, first meetings that incorporated 
ceremonial qualities.  Sometimes the parties were aware of the other before contact and 
sometimes not.  Bitterli cites these contacts as usually being peaceful.  “Collision” happens 
when there is a shift from peace to war fomented by a power imbalance and/or the 
perception of the other as treacherous.121  Wynn points to disease, also, as a form of 
collision, an idea that will be expanded upon below.  “Relationships”, according to Bitterli, 
involve “…a prolonged series of reciprocal contacts on the basis of political equilibrium or 
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stalemate” and rely on commerce and religion;122 in the case of the Canadian Aboriginals and 
Europeans the instruments of those relationships were traders and missionaries.123   
 The relationship aspect, as Wynn notes, was peaceful “so long as the exchanges at 
their core remained of interest to both parties.”124  This was more readily workable at an 
economic level.  The evidence shows the Aboriginals to be shrew and careful traders, largely, 
savvy about what their good were worth in exchange for the offerings of the Europeans.  
Where the relationships were most volatile was when worldviews were misinterpreted and 
misunderstood and when the relationship with one group created animosity with another—
this last includes the process of enculturation which was, in general, experienced more 
keenly by the Aboriginals than by the Europeans.125   
 Therefore, commerce was a commonality.  Certainly the socio-economic structures 
of Europeans differed from those of the Aboriginals.  But Aboriginal cultures were well 
acquainted with the notion of trade and cognizant of the material benefits, as were the 
Europeans.  Trade in the form of goods and services (information, making guides available 
for the explorers, etc.), although it may have been unbalanced at times (with either side 
occasionally gaining the better part of the bargain), the fundamental rules of trade seem to 
have been understood on a basic level by both groups of people.  In terms of land use and 
religion, the gulf was vast and the consequences grave for both sides. 
In the case of land use and ownership there were obvious divergent views.  A 
cosmology that sees nature as a tool without agency is bound to clash with a cosmology that 
sees nature as having agency and therefore as being more than tool.  In addition, we have 
seen that, historically, the clashes between Aboriginal and European have centred on land 
use and property ownership.  This intertwines with the religious component of a relationship 
as well.  While both sides were inhabiting enchanted universes, the understanding of the 
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supernatural in those universes was disparate.  As I have tried to show, however, the 
theological underpinnings of the Europeans were every bit as entrenched and intractable as 
were the Aboriginal’s.  The Europeans eventually come to see their relationship with the 
Aboriginals on a religious level—assuming that the Aboriginals have no religion and that it is 
the European’s mandate to give them a religion.  The Aboriginals enter into the relationship 
with the Europeans well aware of their own worldviews and without the notion of 
proselytizing—to them, the presence of the sacred is intuitively obvious in the way that the 
world works, one does not attempt to convert another to a worldview that is just as apparent 
and necessary as breathing.  It is quite likely that the Aboriginals who first encountered 
Europeans assumed that the Europeans held the same worldviews as they did.  Even after 
the differences become more and more apparent, it was the Europeans who had to struggle 
to create a “need” for the religious wares they had to peddle.  As Bitterli drily observes, 
eternal life as presented in the Christian worldview was “seldom really in demand”.126  Thus, 
the egalitarian, non-supercessionist worldview of the Aboriginals intersected with the 
hierarchical, supercessionist worldview of the European at contact, into collision, pell-mell 
into relationship, thence to a state of first colonization, and then into the morass that 
remains post-colonialism.  Religion and the natural environment both play key and 
intrinsically integrated roles within this square dance of cultures.  The first set begins (for our 
purposes) in the 16th century. 
 “First contact” is somewhat of a misnomer for the 16th century.  Archaeological 
evidence shows that contact between the aboriginal populations of Canada and Europeans 
go much further back than the 16th century-actually around 1000CE with the Norse from 
Greenland making contact with Newfoundland, Labrador and possibly Baffin Island.127 
 The Norse settlements, in part because of the Little Ice Age (1200-1600), were 
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abandoned in 1400 (western and northern) and were completely bereft by 1500 (eastern).  
This study touches briefly on the late 15th century (John Cabot, 1497) and then moves to the 
16th century and Jacques Cartier (1534).  The scope of this study is not vast enough to 
encompass a thorough examination of the consequences of First Contact on all indigenous 
peoples and the physical environment of Canada.128  What I will do here is make some 
general observations. 
 As stated above, European expansionism was driven by myriad reasons, some 
religious, some social, some economic.  What the explorers also brought with them was a 
social imaginary fueled, in part, by a religious worldview that posited the natural world as a 
tool over which humanity was destined, even mandated, to have mastery and dominion.  The 
New World (as they deemed it) was abundantly stocked with natural goods for which there 
was a good market back home.   
 Within ten years of John Cabot’s voyage to Newfoundland, British, French, Spanish 
and Portuguese fishing vessels were populous along the coast.129  Fisheries were established 
and their growth eventually had devastating effects for the Beothuk, the indigenous people 
of Newfoundland.  Wynn writes of the Beothuk world that “It’s very foundations had been 
undermined by the growing number of newcomers who failed to understand, and remained 
largely indifferent to, the fate of those whose delicately balanced traditional way of life was 
dislocated and disrupted by European occupation of this island territory.”130  I want to be 
careful here not to romanticize the Beothuk but to use this as an example to highlight the 
manifestation of a particular theological mindset.  16th century Europeans were partially 
buffered—nature was tool, not system in which they were embedded.  Although they may 
have solicited information from the Beothuk and trade may have occurred,131 any 
information they received would have been heard by ears tuned to a social imaginary that 
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perceived the natural world as tool or mechanism to be used or manipulated.  What they 
would have heard was the “how” of existing in that environment.  Even if they had been 
told the “whys” of the Beothuk’s ways, it is not clear that those whys would have made 
sense—the two worldviews being so vastly different.132  The “delicate balance” described by 
Wynn likely would not have been seen as such.  The conception of such a balance would 
have meant re-thinking the fundamental relationship between human being and natural 
world. 
 The 16th century European explorers were driven, for the most part, by economic 
reasons.  Cabot, Cartier and da Verrazzano were all given mandates by their monarchs to sail 
forth and find new riches and new passages to the east and its abundance of silks and spices.  
What they found were new lands and new fisheries rich in fish and timber and furs.  In 
addition, of course, people.  
By the time of Cartier’s landing in 1534, precedence had already been established in 
terms of being able to claim the land although it was already occupied.  This precedence 
stems from the 13th century church’s attempt to define the rights of “heathens” and 
“infidels” in light of the church.  Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254) affirmed and relativized the 
heathen’s “natural rights to possess property and to exercise political power”133  by 
subordinating those rights to the right of the church to evangelize and make disciples of all 
nations.134  As Choquette points out, this concern with the rights of the church, resulting 
from its mission to evangelize remained a framework of the discussion of ‘heathens’ until the 
16th century.135  Under this framework, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella were able to 
obtain exclusive rights to evangelize the native population of Hispanolia in 1492, 
circumventing the laws that would otherwise have denied their claims of sovereignty because 
the land was inhabited.  Pope Alexander VI (1431-1503) issued the papal bull Inter Coetera in 
187 
 
1493 and delegated his power and duty to evangelize to the Spanish Crown.  The bull also 
granted authority to adopt whatever measures might be necessary to achieve that 
objective.136  The essential effect of this was to grant Spain “exclusive ownership and 
dominion over all of the lands in question.”137 
 In 1537, another papal bull was issued, this by Pope Paul III, that addressed the 
vicious treatment the native peoples in Spanish colonies had endured and concern over the 
difficulty such treatment might make for evangelizing.  Sublimus Deus affirms that the 
Aboriginal persons are people and that “the said Amerindians and all other people who may 
later be discovered by Christians are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the 
possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that 
they may and should freely and legitimately enjoy their liberty and the possession of their 
property…”138  Choquette reminds the reader that political realities made this bull difficult to 
enforce in the Spanish colonies.139  However, it laid down a framework that differs from the 
first one above in that it recognizes the aboriginals as men and does not put the rights of the 
church above the rights of the aboriginal populations.  This distinction did not keep the 
French and the English from seeing themselves as more civilized than the Aboriginals nor 
did it prevent atrocities.140  However, since the Church and the ideas and proscriptions 
thereof were deeply entrenched in the ideology of the time, it is conceivable that this 
ideology became part of the mindset of the later French explorers and missionaries.  The 
import for the purposes of this study is this, that it is possible to speculate that by 
acknowledging the humanity (although not necessarily the equality) of the Aboriginals, the 
Church tacitly grants the European nations the capacity to apply their own understanding of 
laws and property to their relationships with the Aboriginals.  Before this, we know, that the 
Europeans seemed to have no compunction at occupying lands that they desired.  A century 
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afterwards, there is at least the recognition that the Aboriginals conceived and laid claim to 
land as property (although certainly not in the same sense as the Europeans understood the 
term). 
 The lack of compunction can be evidenced, in part, by the encounter that Cartier 
had with the Iroquoian chief Donnacona in 1534 just three years before the Sublimus Deus 
when Cartier raised a cross on lands being used by the Iroquoi at the Gaspé.  Cartier wrote 
that the chief “made us a long harangue, making the sign of the cross with two of the fingers
 …he pointed to the land all around about, as if he wished to say that all of this 
region belonged to him, and that we ought not to have set up this cross without his 
permission.”141  Cartier’s dismissal of Donnnacona’s perceived claim is solidified by the fact 
that on Cartier’s voyage of 1541 the stated purpose was to take control of the territories “by 
friendly means or by force of arms.”142  Sublimus Deus had been issued 4 years before that 
date, but I assert that this was not enough time for the meaning of the bull to have 
entrenched itself in the consciousness of Cartier or the French monarchy.   
 There is little doubt that the Europeans saw Canada as being full of natural resources 
that were theirs for the taking.  In the 16th century, fishing was the major focus and trade 
with Aboriginals a secondary one.  The British concentrated their efforts on the Grand 
Banks and the French in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.  Cartier had been determined to establish 
settlements but weather and disease, and the strained, eventually hostile, relations with the 
Aboriginals caused him to withdraw.  Settlement attempts by France were abandoned until 
the 17th century.   
 Contact, collision and relationship in the 15th and 16th centuries between Europeans 
and Canadian Aboriginals were marked by a growing awareness of each other’s similarities 
and differences.  Initial contact was profitable on both sides, Europeans acquiring 
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information and furs and Aboriginals acquiring metals and other European goods.  This is 
not to say there was no hostility or that everything went smoothly.  Collision occurred in 
several ways: mishandling of natural resources by the Europeans leading to sometimes 
devastating consequences for the Aboriginals (i.e. the Beothuk), the assumption by either 
side that the other was operating out of the same cosmology and social imaginary as 
themselves, the forming of alliances that favoured one Aboriginal group but made the 
Europeans the automatic enemy of a group hostile to the group with which an alliance had 
been made, and disease.  Relationships, I would argue, wove in and out, not linearly 
progressing, but forming and unraveling and being re-formed.   
Land Use and Population 
 To understand the natural world that Cabot and Cartier found in the 15th and 16th 
centuries is vital to how current understandings of the natural world are formed.  North 
America was not a sparsely populated, pristine wilderness upon which the Noble North 
American trod softly and noiselessly on lissome toe.  By the mid 18th century, it may have 
been seen to be so, but this was only after millennia of use (15,000 years), contact and 
collision had changed the landscape yet again.   
 William Denevan has estimated the Aboriginal population in North America in 1492 
to be around 3.8 million.  He estimates a drop in population to about 1 million (74 percent) 
by 1800.143  This is significant for our purposes in two ways.  First, it shows, in part, the 
devastating biological impact of European and African diseases on the North American 
Aboriginals.  Second, it somewhat belies the argument that the natural world of the 
Americas was uncultivated by the Aboriginals.  It is true that the cultivation and care 
developed by the indigenous population was not familiar to the Europeans, but it was 
certainly manipulation and cultivation in its own context.  Denevan observes that “by 1492 
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Indian activity throughout the Americas had modified forest extent and composition, 
created and expanded grasslands, and rearranged microrelief via artificial earthworks.  
Agricultural fields were common as were roads and trails.  All of these had local impacts on 
soil, microclimate, hydrology, and wildlife.”144  One important ramification of this 
information for this study is that it shows that Aboriginal cosmologies did not preclude the 
alteration of the natural environment.145  Embededness within the natural environment did 
not mean that one was passive.  What it did mean was that one considered the utility of 
one’s actions against the consequences and tried to make choices that would not result in an 
imbalance of the cosmos.146  This was the environmental ethic (or policy, for our terms) in 
general that was extant in the 15th/16th centuries.   
 The Europeans, mainly the French at this point in the Canada narrative, came with 
rigid and hierarchical understandings of society147 and of the natural world.  The policies that 
they brought with them were not those of sustaining what was there, but of finding better 
ways in which to utilize it.  That was the dominion mindset, the mandate from God—to use 
the natural world for the betterment of human flourishing.  Betterment, in their cosmology, 
meant to take their own ways of doing things and impose them on the new lands, which they 
felt were theirs by divine right.  Hence, the exploitation of the resources they found in New 
France had theological as well as economic impetus.  They saw land that was not being 
utilized as they believed it could be and set out to claim that land on the basis that they knew 
what to do with it.  The decimation of Aboriginal numbers, mainly through disease, in the 
15th and 16th centuries worked to further their cause and helped even more as they moved 
into the 17th century and further into the interior.   
 As well, as Denevan points out, “the landscape of 1750 was more “pristine” (less 
humanized) than that of 1492.”148  The demise in Aboriginal numbers and the subsequent 
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lessening of human impact on the environment strengthened the myth that the Aboriginals 
were neither impacting nor utilizing the land productively.   
 But, this is not a noble savage vs rapacious capitalist narrative.  The reality was more 
nuanced than this.  The Europeans brought with them ideas and policies regarding the 
natural world that were deeply entwined with their theologies.  Land use, ownership and 
exploitation of resources was constructed and prescripted by the view that God had ordered 
the universe in such a way as to put humanity in charge and to mandate their use of the 
world for human flourishing, both economically and spiritually.   
European Environmental Policy 
 The theological themes of dominion and of stewardship both arrived with the 
settlers in New France and with the British.  Dominion underlies the dominant themes 
towards the natural environment, even as the notions of stewardship continue to play a 
countertheme even after the entrenchment of modernity, through the growth and 
development of Romanticism. 
It is difficult to discern any blanket European environmental policies at this stage 
without making this portion of the larger study completely unwieldy.  There were regional 
policies for agricultural lands and forest usage as well as regulations regarding hunting and 
fishing.  In general these policies were reflective of a dominion theology borne of a 
conviction of entitlement by divine right and a belief in hierarchy that placed noble above 
peasant above nature, just as God was above humanity.  The seigniorial system in France 
(initiated in New France in 1623 and abolished in 1854) and the declining feudal system in 
Britain were reflective of this hierarchy-by-divine-right.  As well, there was the impetus, 
mentioned above, to create order out of chaos.  This becomes codified in various ways, one 
of which is the Lockean notion that labour (the work required to subdue and coerce the 
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land) gives one ownership rights to the land.  This impetus is manifested also in the policies 
of the government in 19th century, as in during the War of the Demoiselles, where the 
government attempted to restore its conception of order and “civilization” through 
ecological policies of re-forestation.149 Choquette remarks that this predilection is not 
surprising, given the precariousness of European society (black death, war, Reformation, 
Counter-Reformation, demise of the feudal system); such a desire was not untoward.  There 
was, however, a latent theological course that wended its way quietly under the roar and 
tumult of the dominant theological flood. 
 The Franciscan notion of God reflected in every aspect of nature had never been 
completely subsumed.  As was discussed above, St. Francis described a view of creation the 
logical outcome of which, although firmly entrenched in a hierarchical social imaginary, was 
conservation or stewardship.  Francis championed the idea that humanity had responsibility 
towards the natural world.  This idea expanded over the centuries to become an 
understanding that God’s mandate for dominion was actually a mandate of care and not of 
domination.  
 A case in point that shows the existence and occasional clashes of these two 
worldviews can be seen in an examination of the ramifications of enclosures of common 
lands in England during the 16th century in Kett’s Rebellion (1549).150  It is not necessarily 
the rebellion itself, but the demands set before the King that highlights the differences in 
worldviews.  The argument is made, in this petition, for a return to and respect of the 
tradition of the lands held in common.  In essence, Kett petitions Edward VI for, among 
many other things, recognition of the just use and distribution of the land and maritime 
resources.  The petition upholds the hierarchical component of the society that is a given of 
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the time, but is also reflective of a Franciscan sensibility, pleading for the equitable treatment 
of God’s creatures by those who by God’s mandate are set above them. 
 The fisheries, the fur trade, the settlement of French and then the English all bear 
the stamp of dominion.  The natural resources are viewed as not only there for the taking, 
but as never-ending. Dominion theology—the worldview that sees humanity as mandated by 
God to cull the natural world for its own flourishing—also has within it the strong sense that 
God will continuously provide, a sense that could be supported by referring to the New 
Testament, in particular.151  Couple this with the growing sense that economic prosperity and 
plenty was indicative of God’s favour, and the surety that European resource management 
strategies and land use customs were superior to those of the Aboriginals, and the result was 
human-induced environmental change on a scale much larger than the continent had 
hitherto witnessed. These changes were not only geographical, but affected indigenous 
animals and sea life as well.  Wynn records, and others have noted in various studies, the 
sharply decreasing numbers of indigenous species from East Coast to West.  The heavy 
demands of European and Russian fishers, hunters and trappers on the fisheries, whales, sea 
otter, fur seal, seal lion, beaver, bison, etc. were extraordinary and devastating.  There were 
attempts at moratoriums and quotas, but many of these measures proved to be “too little, 
too late.”  It is also interesting to note that the attempts at quotas happen in the 19th century, 
at the end-point, rather than at the beginning of dis-enchantment of the Western 
worldviews.   
Intertwining of Theologies with Ideologies of the Time 
 It is important to note also that from 15th century contact on, the idea of the 
environment as Other, as tool rather than integral component with agency, does not 
permeate the Aboriginal cosmology in a complete way, but it does begin to permeate 
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practice.  The traditional Aboriginal ways were changing and shifting due to external factors 
directly related to the European fur trade and settlements.  However, the traditional 
understanding of the way the cosmos works does not disappear from the Aboriginal 
cultures, even as those societies are slowly being splintered by the importuning of 
missionaries, of needs and demands of the fur trades and reduced decimation by disease.  
Trade for European goods at the point of contact becomes collision when traditional 
Aboriginal societies are asked to change their economies more swiftly than their cosmologies 
and social imaginaries can adapt.  This has import for this study in that it intimates that 
extant cosmologies and subsequent environmental policies can be easily subsumed by a new 
dominant group, as was the case in Canada.  The presence of the Europeans as in the fur 
trade, and as settlers and as communicators of disease established a new dominant religious 
and environmental worldview that subsumed the one held and implemented by Canada’s 
Aboriginal population.  That being said, the Aboriginal groups in Canada were not passive in 
this process, the Aboriginal understanding of the way the land and its inhabitants should be 
treated continue as a third stream in the story that is Canadian environmental policy.  It is 
clearly distinct from the dominion theology.  The differences with the Franciscan/Romantic 
sensibilities seems less apparent, until the fundamental cosmologies are compared.  Then 
differences become clear.  For example, an Aboriginal worldview supports an ethic and 
system of sustainable use-—a dynamism that in many ways precludes a pure conservationist 
outlook.  The Franciscan and Romantic worldviews on the other hand can (and often do) 
support a conservationist stance that could be seen as static rather than dynamic.   As I will 
show in another chapter, the Aboriginal cosmology is heard and codified in numerous 
treaties and negotiations.152 
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 The dominion theology brought by the Europeans allowed them to use, harvest, cull, 
manipulate and subjugate the natural world as they saw fit.   This theology was, of course, 
overlaid by the scientific and philosophical thinking of the time—personified by Bacon and 
then later by John Locke and his concepts of labour as justification of ownership.153   
 Neil Evernden encapsulates the Baconian mindset neatly when he discusses Bacon’s 
way of looking at knowledge (and at nature).  “Bacon’s science helps command nature in 
action, and its method is therefore to catch nature at work, as Jonas says-—to ask questions 
that illuminate the “how” rather than the “why”.154  Laid over the dominion theology of the 
time, this supported a worldview that concentrated on how the natural world could be 
utilized and tamed to facilitate human flourishing.  That does not mean, of course, that there 
was a lack of awareness that the resources of the natural world could be over-used, but the 
flora and the fauna of Canada must have seemed so abundant and so vast was the continent 




If dominion theology was intertwined in the Baconian and Lockean ideologies of the 
17th and 18th centuries and transported to Canada, the ideals of stewardship and empathy 
towards the natural world were sustained and nurtured in many ways by the Romantics of 
the late 18th and 19th centuries.  Kevin Hutchings writes that “in its responses to 
Enlightenment science, technological development, and ecological despoliation, 
Romanticism155 was the first Western discourse to address environmentalist concerns in a 
comprehensive and sustained manner.”156  Where it becomes important in the scope of this 
study is where and when it upholds a medieval Franciscan theology expressed by writers and 
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observers of Enlightenment cultures.  As Harrison points out referencing William Cronon 
and Paul Fry, “Romantic representations of nature reflect not so much actual places and 
encounters as virtual landscapes and experiences that mirror their writers’ projected desires 
and culturally mediated values”157  One need look no further than Susanna Moodie’s 
Roughing it in the Bush or even to Catharine Parr Traill (less a romantic, but still reflecting a 
Franciscan ideology of stewardship and empathy) to understand what Cronon and Fry mean.  
The key to this understanding and to the import of the Romantics for our purposes is their 
insistence on experience as being true and relevant which flies in the face of the Baconian 
and dominion worldview of questioning nature in order to control it.158  The Franciscan 
worldview harkens back to Aquinas who, as Evernden reminds us, “…assumed that practical 
knowledge should derive from experience, and that theory should inform the practitioner of 
the wisdom of choosing one form of action over another.”159 Moodie and Parr Traill both 
observe in order to understand and empathy continues to grow with that observation.  A 
Franciscan theology of stewardship and empathy lies at the foundation of this Romantic 
sensibility, with its affirmation of a hierarchical relationship with nature that nonetheless is 
called into a kind of empathetic relationship with a world that is foreign to humanity and yet 
is still home, although temporarily.   
 From the 17th century until Confederation, the dominant environmental policies of 
first New France, then British North America, then Upper and Lower Canada, then finally 
Canada were those undergirded by a dominion theology, supported by a worldview that saw 
creating order out of chaos as not only virtue but necessity, by an increasingly modern sense 
of scientific competence and European superiority.  The policies were to expand holdings, 





                                                
Although there were three theologically environmental worldviews extant in this period, only 
one was successfully asserted.   
 These three worldviews: Aboriginal, Franciscan, Dominion cannot be said to actually 
intertwine as Canada moves towards Confederation, but they do persist and assert 
themselves.  Dominion and Aboriginal worldviews find themselves the most overtly at odds 
until the late 19th century when strains of Franciscan theology rise up in the voices of the 
early environmentalists.  These voices were explored more completely in Chapter One and 
will be examined in a different light in Chapter Four in aa review of Canadian environmental 
policy from Confederation to the 21st Century. 
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history of environmentalism is inarguable, I have chosen not to dwell on her theories-as tempting as that is-for 
the sake of brevity. 
155 The use of Romanticism as a tool for understanding environmental history is sometimes controversial and 
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fully grasping the nuances of the arguments.  For more discussion on this, see Hutchings. 
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Chapter Four:  Canadian Environmental Law: Background, Theory, Trends 
Introduction 
Environmental law is seen as a modern phenomenon.  The earliest cases cited can be 
found in 19th century tort law.1  I contend, however, that the antecedents of environmental 
legislation lie in property law, as these earliest of laws focus directly on human relationships 
with one another and the land.2  In addition, it is not possible to fully discuss environmental 
policy and legislation in Canada without first exploring the treaties made between Europeans 
and Canada’s Aboriginal Nations.  The spirit in which many of the treaties were negotiated 
and the worldviews of the negotiators are vital to understanding the trajectory of a social 
imaginary that has direct bearing upon modern environmental law.   
Eventually in this segment of the study, environmental and church histories coalesce in an 
exploration of Canadian environmental policy and law in the late 19th through the early 21st 
centuries.  The section starts with an answer to the very basic question, “what is 
environmental law?” Having established that, I will discuss the origins and philosophical 
background of contemporary environmental law.  This will necessitate a brief foray into the 
antecedents of Western legal systems in general, with a side trip through the labyrinth of 
Natural Law before coming back to a more focussed exploration of environmental law in 
particular.  The discussion will then turn to previous chapters, drawing points of relation and 
clarification in order to begin to pull together the threads of a very broad argument.  The 
chapter will conclude with a more detailed history of environmental law in Canada that will 
segue into Chapter 5 and the detailed discussion/analysis of the Species at Risk Act and two 




Environmental Law:  Definitions 
Aristotle wrote that law is the application of reason for the common good.  If this is 
so, then it can be said that environmental law, specifically, is the application of myriad 
compromise positions—all considered “reasonable”—by one group or another and designed 
to balance a plethora of definitions of the common good.  Plainly stated “(e)nvironmental 
law is the body of legislated statutes and judge-made common law that can be used to 
protect and improve environmental conditions.”3  More comprehensively, Canadian 
environmental law is a complex system of federal and provincial common law, legislation, 
statutes, regulations, treaties, orders-incouncil, and international agreements that have been 
put into place in a variety of jurisdictions to provide a system whereby human agency in the 
context of its impact on the natural world is monitored and/or regulated.  The amalgamation 
is crafted to provide parameters of use, allocation, and regulations to prevent abuse 
(however that may be defined) or to provide avenues for redress in cases of breach or abuse.  
Environmental law is extremely broad, aspects of it being incorporated in criminal, civil and 
international legislations.  
Canadian Environmental Laws: 
The Fisheries Act (1868) is the oldest example of Canada’s specific environmental 
legislation.  As mentioned above, international agreements, treaties and conventions are also 
aspects of the environmental law landscape.4  In the modern period, there are several 
components that comprise the whole of federal Canadian environmental law.  These include:  
 Environmental regulatory laws (i.e. laws that regulate harmful substances that 
affect water and the atmosphere).  These laws utilize licensing, prohibitions 
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and regulatory offences to obtain their objectives and are usually overseen by 
tribunals;5   
 The Environmental Assessment Act. The federal act is triggered when a 
project is proposed for federal lands or requires federal permits.6  Major 
physical undertakings that involve a public authority or public funding 
require environmental assessments to determine whether or not the 
undertaking will have deleterious effects on the environment in which the 
undertaking is proposed to take place.  If it is determined that the effects may 
be deleterious, usually the project will not progress until hearings have been 
conducted.7 An important consequence of this Act is that it provides 
interested parties with advance notice of proposed projects.8   
 Protection legislation is also another core component of Canadian 
environmental law—The Canadian Environmental Protection Act and The 
Species at Risk Act, for example.  Essentially, protection legislation covers 
species, natural land areas, forestry, energy and economic sectors and oceans 
and inland waters.  
In addition, there are laws that confer environmental rights on citizens, i.e. the right to 
information, participation in regulatory decisions, and the ability to demand that standards 







Environmental law is also concerned with the mechanism of regulatory oversight.  In 
Canada, there is disagreement regarding how regulation and redress are handled, with one 
side wishing to have immediate recourse to the judiciary when there is a dispute and another 
advocating for disputes to be adjudicated by boards or tribunals.  The distinction may seem 
smallespecially since there can be recourse by way of judicial review—but it is significant, as 
it reflects deeper philosophical differences in regards to the purpose of government and the 
places of the voices of corporations, the general public, and the courts in the public sphere.   
Administrative Boards and tribunals are components of administrative law, which is 
one of the three basic areas of public law (in addition to constitutional and criminal) in 
Canada dealing with the relationship between a government and its citizens.9  Administrative 
law is the body of law dealing with the relations between private individuals and the 
government, and with the structure and operation of the government itself10 and is “…based 
on the principle that government action…must (strictly speaking) be legal, and that citizens 
who are affected by unlawful acts of government officials must have effective remedies if the 
Canadian system of public administration is to be accepted and maintained.”11   When a 
government drafts a piece of legislation, part of the process is to determine whether the 
legislation will be regulated by an administrative board.  If there is no indication, then 
aggrieved parties can seek recompense from the courts.  If a piece of legislation is going to 
be governed by administrative law, the legislation will state this and will outline the 
provisions for creation of a board or give jurisdiction to an existing board.  The jurisdiction 
and  make-up of the board will also be spelled out.  Some legislation is more specific than 
others.  Although, as stated above, judicial review may be available as recourse, courts are 
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loath to interfere with the decisions of administrative bodies unless there is a clear and 
palpable error of law and/or fact.  Reviews can be initiated if the administrative board has 
violated constitutional, statutory of common law principles.12   In most cases, the judiciary 
will only exercise control where the board has exceeded its jurisdiction, issued a patently 
unreasonable decision, or followed improper or unfair procedures.13  Administrative action 
is initiated by an aggrieved party who has legal standing.  Who may consider themselves 
aggrieved is typically spelled out in the legislation but if there is a question of legal standing, 
the courts may be asked to render judgement on that one point before addressing any case 
on its factual merits.  Proponents of embedding administrative recourse (that of an 
administrative board instead of direct access to the courts) in environmental legislation argue 
that it is more cost-effective than going to court, both for the government and for the 
aggrieved party.  They also argue that the composition of an administrative board can consist 
of experts in a field who are more qualified than the court to consider and deliver a fair and 
informed decision.  Timeliness is another factor often raised—administrative boards are 
usually required to render a decision within a very short period of time.   
Those who argue for environmental legislation that is more in line with American 
environmental legislation where courts interpret legislation and guide implementation argue 
that the administrative process is actually not expedient in the least, as it allows the 
government time and leeway to prolong the process if they find the decision of the board 
unpalatable.  It is also pointed out that there is more flexibility with rules of evidence and 
with the scope of persons that a board can choose to hear.  Proponents of administrative 
recourse argue that the rules of evidence are stringent in a courtroom and that judges are 
bound by strict and complex rules of evidence, interpretation and precedence that often 
preclude what some persons may deem to be simple common sense solutions. 
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Administrative boards can allow for creative solutions that might not be available to a 
court.14   
Proponents of environmental legislation that allow for immediate access to the 
courts, rather than involving an administrative board, look to the Americanstyle litigation 
paradigm.  Opponents claim that litigation is needlessly adversarial, exacerbates animosities, 
is costly, may not effectively address all points due to the rules of court, can disallow 
standing for peripherally aggrieved persons, and precludes win-win solutions.  Proponents 
counter that the courts are the last resort of public voices which are often subsumed by 
corporate interests and governmental indifference in an often frustrating attempt to engage 
in dialogue with all interested parties.  It could also be argued that recourse to the courts is a 
necessity because government often neglects (in some cases refuses) to enforce 
environmental legislation and that recourse to the courts is the only way for people outside 
of government to ensure that science, not politics, will receive proper consideration in what 
comprises sound, sustainable environmental policies and practices.  Another argument for 
immediate access to the judiciary as opposed to boards is that the government crafting the 
legislation finds ways to subvert or control the regulatory or tribunal process to its own ends.  
The perception in this case is that the government’s own ends are often not in accord with 
the best interests of the environment, but are more geared towards the interests of corporate 
power and economic expediency.   As well, although there is the possibility for practical 
solutions that a judge may not have recourse to, an administrative board also does not have 
the power to impose severe penalties.  Opponents argue that the inability to impose such 
penalties can hamper a board’s efficacy, making environmental legislation a paper tiger.  In 
addition, although the courts are open to anyone with standing who wishes to file suit, 
administrative boards can refuse to entertain the submission of a person or group if that 
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person or group are not demarcated in the guiding legislation.  The flip side of that is, 
however, that administrative boards may choose to hear parties that are not so demarcated.  
It is also true, however, that although anyone can file a suit,  courts have the discretion— 
actually the mandate—to only hear cases brought forward by persons or groups that are 
determined to have legal standing in regards to the issue or issues before them. 
Philosophical Underpinnings: First Observations 
The on-going crafting of these systems of environmental laws (for each jurisdiction 
has such a system, from municipal to international) reflect on one hand the development of 
a growing consciousness of human causality in regards to environmental degradation and, on 
the other the need to control and/or protect economic interests.  These competing (but not 
always conflicting) interests together gave the impetus for what we know as environmental 
law. 
The diversity of opinion in regards to the legal oversight put into place by individual 
pieces of environmental legislation indicates a diversity of motivation behind the crafting of 
legislation.  The Species at Risk Act, for example, was in response to the international 
convention on biodiversity that Canada signed in the early 1990’s which required the 
Canadian government, as signers of the convention, to protect and monitor its own 
biodiversity.   In contrast, The Fisheries Treaty of 1818 was negotiated in order to regulate 
the access of American fishers to Canadian (or at that point, British North American) 
fisheries.15  The diversity of opinion and motivation are also reflective of the history of the 
development of environmental law where the fundamental issues of modernity in regards to 
the overlapping of different spheres (i.e. public, private, social) are constantly being revisited.  
The Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), for instance, arose in response to a variety 
of issues regarding the control of toxins that accumulate in the environment and the inability 
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(some would say refusal) of industry to recognize any residual danger from the application of 
human-made chemicals on the natural environment (such as DDT and other harmful 
chemicals) and to regulate itself.16  The controversies surrounding the adoption of the Act 
remain: federal vs. provincial jurisdiction, the rights of the public v the rights of private 
enterprise.  In addition to these are intertwined discussions regarding the actual objectivity of 
science and agreement (or lack thereof) on just what constitutes education and real 
knowledge.  For example: 
In 18th and 19th century France, the elite ruling class and educated foresters became 
convinced that the Alpine regions needed to be re-forested and that poor use of the land by 
peasants had led to the degradation of the Alpine environment and landscape.  Thus 
implementation of a policy of reforestation was attempted.  The peasants, annoyed at not 
being consulted and alarmed at the prospect of losing their livelihoods were less than 
amenable to the policies and responded in a variety of creative and effective ways.  However, 
the knowledge of the peasants in regards to their own environment was dismissed as 
unscientific and uneducated.  In fact, the archaeological records have shown that the areas 
had not been deforested in any meaningful way, and that the peasants for the most part had 
adapted to the locale just as much as they had adapted the locale to accommodate their 
needs.17  The recognition of the value of the perspectives of different stakeholders has 
gradually come to be acknowledged, albeit grudgingly at times, and the principle, at least, is 
reflected in the process that accompanied the CEPA in modern Canada. 
Scope and Jurisdiction 
This same diversity of opinion and motivation behind environmental law ensure that 
it is exceedingly broad in scope and that its boundaries are not clearly demarcated.  As 
mentioned above, not only can criminal law be a component,18 but property law and tort law 
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are also (and more consistently) used to advance environmental objectives.19  As well, the 
field also draws upon a “vast range of traditions, legal concepts and subjects…some (with) 
counterparts in other regulatory areas.”20   
The above being so, the issue of jurisdiction looms large in environmental law.  In 
Canada, the power to legislate for the environment is split between the federal and provincial 
governments with Aboriginal issues and rights also coming into play. The Constitution Act of 
1867 gives no express allocation of environmental management powers and this state of 
affairs remained in place after the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982.  It is apparent in the 
1867 Act, though, that issues involving natural resources were seen as integral to the social 
and economic well-being of society.  Section 91 of the Constitution Act gives the federal 
government the power of taxation and the power to make laws governing trade and 
commerce, navigation, seacoast and fisheries, Aboriginal interests, and criminal law.  In 
addition the federal government has the mandate to make laws for “peace, order and good 
government” of Canada.21  The federal government also has treaty-making power although it 
cannot implement international agreements without constitutional authority or provincial 
agreement.22  Aboriginal governments have authority by virtue of constitutionally protected 
rights and powers established in section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, which includes 
treaties.23  
The Provinces under Sections 92 and 109 can: make laws for the management and 
sale of public lands, municipal institutions, property and civil rights, and matters of local or 
private nature.  The 1982 natural resources amendment delineates changes in powers to 
manage and to capture revenues from non-renewable and forestry resources and the 
generation of electrical energy.24  In addition, proprietary interests are granted in Section 109 
wherein public lands and minerals are vested with the Provincial government unless they are 
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federally owned or under federal authority.25  Essentially, the federal government has 
jurisdiction over a breadth of resources—fisheries, interprovincial and international, while 
the provinces control local natural resources, have primary jurisdiction over forestry, 
agriculture, mining and hydroelectric development.  Provinces are also responsible for 
regulating the forestry industry in regards to the pollution of local streams and rivers, 
notwithstanding the federal mandate for regulating fish habitat. 
 The delicate balance of powers that exists in Canada is continually being played out 
in environmental policy and legislation.  The natural world is easily divided on paper, but not 
so sanguinely managed in reality.  Therefore, a solution posed for the preservation of one 
species may not be effective for the preservation of another.  Since law is, by necessity, 
usually crafted with general principles in mind rather than particulars, the inability to provide 
blanket solutions for environmental issues can be seen as a challenge to the legislative 
process.  More than most other fields of law, it must account not only for the human 
element which contains in itself a broad diversity of belief systems; but for the dynamism 
that is inherent in ecosystems—which are not entities that are easily defined, confined or 
generalized.  The jurisdictional challenges can be seen in myriad cases.  One example is from 
the Species at Risk Act where the federal government only has legislated responsibility for 
species that are on federal lands.  Critics of the legislation demanded to know just how the 
governments were going to convey to the species in question where it was safe to reside and 
where it was not, as the flora and fauna of a landscape more often than not tend to be 
oblivious of artificial political boundaries.   
Of course, political entities by their very nature demand that boundaries must be set 
and parameters recognized.  Historically, when there are environmental issues to be 
addressed, provincial and federal governments in Canada have attempted to work together 
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to design legislation that is complementary rather than adversarial.26  When there are 
significant disputes, judicial decisions interpret the jurisdiction.  In 1997, the Supreme Court 
of Canada issued a landmark decision in the case of R. v. Hydro Quebec, upholding the 
argument that the Canadian Environmental Protection Act  constituted criminal law and was, as 
such, valid legislation. To make the matter more complex, the courts have also decided that 
pollution deleterious to fish and marine pollution fall under federal jurisdiction.  Two other 
points must also be understood.  First, attempts to give the federal government umbrella 
jurisdiction over environmental issues have been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
which views environmental protection as an aggregate matter.27  For this reason, arguments 
for complete federal jurisdiction cannot be made on the basis that it is of “national concern” 
or under the residual “peace, order and good government” power and; second, that if there 
is conflict over whether federal or provincial law should prevail in a particular instance the 
“doctrine of Paramountcy” decrees that federal law trumps provincial law.28   This creates a 
hierarchy with the Constitution at the apex and government policy being developed in the 
form of environmental statutes.  These statutes provide a legislative framework for the 
official policy.  They specify objectives and purposes and the general scheme by which those 
objectives will be accomplished and specify or create the officials and/or agencies 
responsible for administration and enforcement.  They also enable the making of regulations 
and rules by cabinet ministers, municipal governments and some environmental boards.29  
Jurisdiction is only one component of what makes environmental law the rich and 
complex field that it is.  Since it does, as mentioned above, intertwine with a variety of other 
legal fields, it is useful to have a cursory understanding of the development of general legal 
theory and practice in the west—specifically the development of natural law theory and the 
issues of legitimation.   
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Some Points of Interest in the Development of Western Legal Theory:   
Legitimation and Natural Law 
It is impossible, and tangential to the main study, to give a complete account of the 
development of Western legal systems in this chapter.  However, it is important to 
understand the development of the concept of our modern legal system in light of the 
emergence of the modern world.  Not, as I have shown, because the pre-modern world saw 
human beings in Western Europe embracing an idyllic wholistic existence with human 
beings and nature acknowledged to be interdependent and mutually embedded, but because 
many of the philosophical tensions that arise with the Reformation and then with modernity 
are still reflected in the discussions and debates over legislation in our time—one of the 
most salient being should or does law reflect a morality that is inherent to the human 
condition as such?  To paraphrase the singer/activist Billy Bragg—does society envision 
courts of justice or courts of law?30 
The earliest codified laws were largely property laws.  These developed chiefly from 
the ancient community customs and religious laws of particular societies which were 
themselves codes for human behaviour within a given society.  They established rules that 
enabled people to live together peaceably in groups. In ancient times these laws were seen as 
being mandates by the local deity or deities.  They made good sense, for the most part.  
Obviously it is easier to live in community with someone if both of you have agreed that 
your deity frowns upon the practice of stealing livestock.  The earliest understandings of 
how laws were justified (seen by society as legitimate), and how legal reasoning and judicial 
decisions should be made, were formed in the context of communities imbued with a 
religious worldview. 
For example, the practice of English common law developed along much the same 
lines as did (does) religious law.  For example, the Talmud is legal commentary on the Torah.  
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It contains a plethora of legal questions put to rabbis or by rabbis and decided in council.  
The decisions of the rabbis, both majority and minority, are recorded in the Talmud and 
serve as precedence for subsequent legal decisions.  Common law developed in much the 
same way.  Common law consists of judicial decisions and commentary on important cases 
to which a lawyer can point to establish the strength of his or her case.  From common law 
come statutes, which are essentially the rules that society agrees to obey.  Statutes maintain 
the status quo and are designed to facilitate the workings of an ordered society.   
One major difference between common law and religious law is that the one is seen 
to be positivist (human-constructed) law whose antecedents are justified partially on the 
basis of natural law rather than stemming completely from laws proscribed directly to the 
community by a deity.31  In either paradigm, the heart of what is being discussed is the 
justification by which laws are binding on individuals and societies.  Religious law says, at its 
most base and essential, “Because God (or Gods) says so!”  Natural law theory as it has 
developed in the modern age says “Because humanity reasons that it must be so!”  In fact, 
Michael Stolleis points out that this legitimation was in the process of shifting in the period 
of the High Middle Ages to the Early Modern Era:  
from determined truth (veritas)  to …secularized will (voluntas), and, with that, from 
eternal law to a continuously adapted positive law.  In the mindset of the early modern 
age, this law approximated natural law because it appeared to be a timeless ratio 
scripta.  What is more, being ‘imperial law’, it bore a sacred aura.32 
The distinctions made here between natural law and religious law are crucial for the 
eventual development of an anthropocentric rather than a theocentric moral order, because 
natural law theory can be seen to posit a particular anthropology that is conducive to the 
belief that the capacity for self-rule is inherent.  Faith in this political capacity eventually 
intertwines with other humanisms of the Renaissance to emerge as the modern Western 
State.  This emergence is important to understand in the context of this study, as it speaks 
216 
 
directly to the idea that environmental legislation, and the ways in which it is conceived and 
executed, is reflective of a current social imaginary that itself derives from concepts of how 
we should be governed and the philosophical underpinnings of that imaginary.  A pivotal 
(but not determining) development that leads to the modern concepts with which this study 
is concerned is that of Deism. 
Deism and Shifts of Theological Legitimization 
 The removal of theological legitimization of natural law has to do, in part, with the 
conception in the West that the temporal and the tangible were real (the “natural” world), 
and that the transcendent was not concerned with the temporal.  Stolleis describes three key 
changes in Europe that brought about that conception: “fundamental transformations of the 
geocentric world view and the theoretical revolution in the natural sciences, the religious 
crisis in Europe that triggered a relativization of the theological monopoly on truth, the 
political rise of absolutism and the emergence of the nation state at the cost of feudal rule 
and the power of the estates and cities.”33 In other words, the discovery of the “New World” 
by Western Europeans and the rise of inductive reasoning (i.e. the Baconian “scientific 
method) as opposed to syllogistic logic; the Reformation and the Wars of Religions which 
contributed, in part, to a distaste for the confessional aspects of theology both in the 
academy (in a general way) and, specific to my purposes, within the legal faculties of the 
academy.  The third factor—the rise of the nation state and the demise of feudalism—as I 
have shown in a previous chapter, took place slowly over a long period of time and was as 
influenced by the two factors mentioned above as it was influential in and of itself. 
The mechanistic world was not, as Taylor points out, the only foundation for a 
“reconstructed” social imaginary that came out of the Renaissance.34  The idea of human 
cooperation with divine perfection is seated deeply in Aquinas’ thought and establishes itself 
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quite comfortably in the philosophical outlooks of Michelangelo and Leonardo.  The echoes 
of it can be heard much later on in the writings of John Wesley as he “strives toward 
perfection”.  But the mechanistic view did supersede the non-mechanistic worldviews that 
arose.  And the discovery of immutable natural laws allowed, eventually, for natural law to be 
seen as an organic outcropping of social norms that were natural because of humanity’s 
creatureliness. Logical, consequential conclusions could be made and drawn about inanimate 
as well as animate objects because both were regulated by natural laws.  The rise of Deism is 
particularly important here.  Deism is the idea that reason can determine that there was a 
divine architect of the universe who conceived of and put into place the laws that govern all 
of creation.  The God of Deism is a remote being, a designer but not a meddler, for once the 
universe was put into motion, the Creator withdrew and does not interfere either through 
miracles or revelations.  “God made the integers,” wrote Leopold Kronecker, “and all else is 
the work of man.”35 God becomes the maker but not the nurturer, the Mastercrafter content 
to establish rules and natural order and then to step back to watch the scene that has been 
put into play.  Natural laws no longer derive their authority solely from the fact that they are 
the laws which God wishes us to follow, but because they are the laws which bring inherent 
order and point us towards happiness or flourishing, with or without God’s presence to 
manipulate them.  Taylor writes, 
What is striking about Deist views is that the human good in terms of which God’s 
benevolence is defined is so self-contained.  It is not that the reference to God is 
wholly absent, but it seems to be subordinate to a conception of happiness which is 
defined purely in creaturely terms.  Happiness is the attaining of the things we by 
nature desire, or pleasure and the absence of pain.  The rewards of the next life seem 
to be considered just as more intense and longer-lasting versions of the pleasures and 
pains of this…” 36 
Taylor cautions against drawing a straight line from the Enlightenment to Deism to 
humanism.37  This caution is well-placed, as it reminds one that the course of human 
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thought and history is never neatly linear.  The entire elite of the Western world did not 
embrace Deism en masse or all at once.  However, Deism did become a favoured intellectual 
position of many elite members of Western society and that theological conception 
interacted with the scientific worldview championed by Bacon, among others, to eventually 
enable a political and legal system that conceived of itself as separate from divine or eternal 
law even as they were also conceiving of a physical world that must, in the face of reason, be 
devoid of any random, inexplicable or magical influence or intercession in the form of a 
suspension of the laws of nature.38  Deism was one way in which the elite, who had already 
internalized a new moral order characterized by discipline and rationality, incorporated belief 
in God with this new order.39   
This rise of Deism is important to consider when one looks at the development of 
the nation state under the rule of law as we know it.  The understanding of humanity’s 
position in the cosmos changed with the Renaissance.  Higher anthropologies (conceptions 
of human beings as not depraved or irredeemable but as rational, capable creatures, 
endowed by God with that rationality and capacity for reason) developed and with that a 
changed willingness to accept (over time, of course) human-generated laws as authoritative 
in and of themselves.  Reason was still a necessary component, but reason was seen as God 
given and then, eventually and only be some, a virtue possessed of human beings which 
separated them from other animals.  The value of human discernment and judgement based 
on reason and influenced by Baconian scientific method slowly allowed for the notion that 
laws might be counted as authoritative without needing the force of God to legitimize 
them.40  I am suggesting that just as common law drew authority from a perceived sagacity 
of age and use so does natural law eventually become to be perceived as authoritative by 
virtue of human sanction.  As in Deism, God is not unimportant in this perception, but 
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neither is God contemporaneously central as God may have been in earlier eras.  Rather, the 
human capacity for comprehension and invention is seen as limitless.  The introduction of 
inductive reasoning allowed for scientists to study the particular and make generalities in the 
form of natural laws (i.e. how the world works).  This way of reasoning allowed, in part, for 
thinkers to posit that all that can be known about the natural world could be observed, 
reasoned and categorized.  There were physical laws that operated outside of God’s 
jurisdiction (the voluntarist point of view embedded in Deism).41   If this was the case, it was 
reasonable to assume that there were natural laws governing human society that could be 
objectively discovered and which would be authoritative in and of themselves, just as were 
the laws of the natural world.42  In a sense, I am arguing that a shift to the literal scientific 
interpretation of nature (as opposed to the allegorical), through what James J. Bono calls the 
study of the natural particulars, led as well to an interpretation of natural law being literally 
derived from the temporal reality of human nature and society.43  This last connects with the 
assertion that a higher anthropology has been developed and with it a measure of trust in 
human ability that was not (directly, at least) illuminated by divine inspiration but by 
observation and inductive reasoning.  If the paradigm begins to exist that one can trust one’s 
own perception of the composition and mechanisms of the natural world, then surely one 
would begin to trust in one’s perception of what was good for temporal human society  and 
happiness.  To be clear, there is no hubris being exhibited here, merely a shift in the 
perception of the limits of human finitude.44  
And so with the rise of Deism and the shift in social imaginary that moved God and 
a common community focused on “practice, prayer and hope”45 to the periphery of what 
constituted human good there is also a shift in perception of what constitutes natural law.  
God is no longer essential.  To be sure, God can be reasoned out of the particulars, but the 
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particulars themselves, the natural laws that Aquinas subsumes to the eternal laws, live and 
move and have their being outside of divine interference and authority.  Of course, this shift 
takes quite some time. 
Categorization and Private Property 
One more aspect of early modernity that is relevant to the development of inductive 
reasoning is that of categorization.  Inductive reasoning, as mentioned above, involves 
creating generalizations or universals from particulars.  To do this in a comprehensive way 
requires a great deal of categorization and taxonomy.  To draw universal conclusions about 
non-deciduous trees, for instance, one studies a plethora of non-deciduous trees and creates 
a category for them: conifers.  Conifers are studied more closely and then more narrowly 
defined, and so on.  This need to categorize in order to comprehend is useful, of course, and 
in many ways, efficient.  However, I would argue (and it is certainly not an original 
observation) that it leads to a particular mentality that increasingly sees the need to create not 
only categories, but distinct boundaries around subjects in order that they might be studied 
more closely.46  It is possible that the zeal with which this form of scientific method was 
embraced reinforced the centuries-old perception of humanity’s disembeddedment with the 
natural world and had the effect of (in part) perpetuating the point of view that humanity 
was removed/above/set apart from the natural world.  This point of view, being reinforced 
by theology on one side and by the increasingly Deist elite on the other, served, in part, to 
allow the myth of human disembeddedness to continue even when an objectively scientific 
point of view might have pointed the way to the contrary.  In the present, this continued 
perception allows environmental legislation—and, tangentially, treaty negotiations—early on 
to be crafted in such a way that the natural world was and is viewed as a series of neat 
compartments rather than an overlapping dynamic whole.  The effect has been to trust such 
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categorization as foundational to an objective method of comparison and discernment which 
can have the consequence of giving weight to that which is perceived to wreak less economic 
havoc, than being moved to examine the effects as an organic whole.47  But, of course, the 
pathway to this predicament is far from straightforward.  A significant branch of this 
pathway for environmental law is the role that natural law plays in the developing of the 
Lockean notion of private property, a way of compartmentalization that led to profound 
communication difficulties between Western Europeans and North American Aboriginals.   
Natural law, even without a theistic component, eventually became to be seen by 
many as the moral facet of the law itself—a necessary component of the legal systems 
gradually adopted by and adapted to the nascent nation state.  Therefore, what constituted 
natural law was (and is) as important as what authorizes it.  In the third century, Ulpian cited 
marriage and procreation as integral components of natural law.48  Isidore of Seville adds 
“one liberty of all human beings” and “the acquisition of property taken from the heavens, 
earth, and sea” in his Etymologies, written in the 7th century.49  The twelfth century Canon 
jurist Gratian connects the Jewish and Christian injunction that “…each person is 
commanded to do to others what he wants done to himself.” in the Decretum.  In recognizing 
this, Pennington comments that, “(b)y defining natural law as the duty to treat other human 
beings with care and dignity, Gratian stimulated jurists to reflect upon a central value of 
natural law:  the rendering of justice and the administering of equity in the legal system.”50  A 
century later, Aquinas asserts the teleological tenet that the goal of natural law is to direct 
human beings toward the good and that good could be discerned with the proper application 
of reason.  As stated above, natural law theory became common usage in the West after 
Aquinas and Pennington elucidates the creativity of 12th and 13th century jurists in expanding 
what was fundamental to natural law:  property rights were deduced and protected by natural 
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law because when God forbade stealing, private property was sanctioned.  Since natural law 
protected private property, even emperors could not deprive a person of their property 
without just and necessary reasons.  Contractual rights were also deemed natural law and 
hence, even royalty was bound by them.  The fourteenth century found judicial procedure 
being included.  The support, education and inheritance of children were also included and 
in the 15th century Gregorio Lopez de Tovar argued that a child’s right to inheritance was 
indelible and could not be taken away.  Finally, in the 16th century, Francisco de Votira 
argued that the right of the majority of people to render their consent in political matters 
was also a norm of natural law.51   Ingredients comprising natural law were added over the 
centuries, in particulars, if not in essence.  
A careful reading shows that the fundamentals of natural law (at least up until the 
point of this discussion) are about maintaining right relationships—what Grotius refers to as 
the “sociable” aspect of his definition of natural law.52  Of course, it could be argued that 
right relationship is what all law is about, but there is a subtly here worth pointing out.  
Natural law can be seen as different in the sense that it is seen to be derived to enhance the 
positive attributes of human society—that is, it posits the best and the most virtuous 
standards of human behaviour.  It is teleological; it works towards the human good.  
Common law, as positivist, is derived from the practical in human relationships.  It reflects 
what has happened—usually deviance from a societal standard and the steps taken to 
ameliorate that deviance.  It does not aim towards aiding human flourishing per se but for 
assisting in establishing and maintaining a social order in which human flourishing can 
happen.  Natural law says what should be happening.  People should be married and they 
should procreate.  Here is how those relationships should work.  This is not to say that 
natural law does not prescribe consequences, it does.  But the consequences are aimed at 
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maintaining an establishment of right relationship that is in itself good.  The moral teleos of 
goodness and harmonious relationships, in this paradigm, is what is seen to be driving and 
sustaining the law.  Natural law is reflective of a universal, moral order against which 
positivist (including common) law can be evaluated.53 This moral order is derived from an 
understanding of humans as rational, sociable beings.  
It does not matter if, as Grotius writes, the natural law stands as authoritative on 
reason alone or, as Locke asserts, that it is from divine mandate.  What is important, writes 
Taylor, is the rationality aspect:  “God made man rational, and he made him sociable, and 
with an instinct to his own conservation.  It is plain from this what norms he held binding 
on his creatures.  Plainly they must respect each other’s life, liberty and estate.”54  What 
should also be noted is that the right relationships by and large have to do with human 
relationships—eschewing any mention of equity or embeddedness with or in the rest of the 
natural world.  This disembeddedness is also reflective of a shift in the moral order which 
embraces not only the older understanding of human disembeddedness with the natural 
world, but also disembeddedness with the old, pre-modern prescriptive, hierarchical social 
and economic systems (at least, at first, among the elite).55   
This spirit of natural law (even with, or perhaps because of, the divestment of the 
concept along purely theistic lines) is part of what Taylor calls the Modern Moral Order,  
…disembedded individuals who come to associate together.  The design 
underlying the association is that each, in pursuing his or her own purposes in 
life, act to benefit others mutually.  It calls for a society structured for mutual 
benefit, in which each respects the rights of others, and offers them mutual help 
of certain kinds.56   
The conception of human goodness and right relationships reasoned in the natural law 
paradigm has shifted from theocentric imposition to anthropocentric derivation—but the 
understanding that human beings are moving on a path undergirded by universal truths 
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regarding the human condition remains strong.  These universals are, as discussed above, 
seen to be codified in natural law. 
The natural law or natural right component that is most salient for the current 
purposes is that of private property.  Property laws are among the earliest of codified laws 
and, as I have shown above, are integrated by jurists into the realm of natural law.  John 
Locke’s theories on private property are particularly pertinent when exploring environmental 
law because of his theories equating the acquisition of private property by virtue of one’s 
labour, and for his argument that the purpose of government is for the “regulating and 
preserving of property” (II, ∫3). 
Given the premise of this study, I would be remiss in observing that Locke’s 
religious upbringing no doubt played an integral part in his later worldview and philosophies.  
His theory of labour is redolent with that particular theology that equates industry and 
proper application of energy to a material success which brings honour to God who has 
endowed the individual with the resources necessary for success.57  In addition, for Locke, 
property was more than material, it “…could include one’s bodily activities or one’s liberty 
as well as one’s physical possessions.  The way in which a person exploits these resources 
reveals his qualities as a rational agent.  Private property—the exclusive individual right of 
exploitation—is necessary to individuality.”58  Peter Laslett argues that the word “property” 
as used by Locke in most of the Second Treatise is to be read as not material possessions 
“…nor in units of the conveniences or necessities of life but much more generally as ‘Lives, 
Liberties and Estates.”59  “Property” is symbolic, then, of that which an individual can be 
said to own—whether it be material or a natural right or the Protestant religion.60 
The concept of private property for Locke, then, began with the person.  This 
ownership of one’s personhood was inalienable and central to natural law.  Like Grotius and 
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Pufendorf before him, Locke argued that humanity had been given the created world in 
common.  However, Locke deviates from the other two jurists by insisting that property 
could only be private.  Grotius and Pufendorf argue that “universal consent was required 
for…collective ownership to be divided into private portions.”61  Locke asserts that one’s 
person and one’s capacity for labour are inherent private properties and by their application 
a “secondary type” of physical property is attained.62   
Thus the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut; and the Ore I 
have digg’d in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others; 
become my Property, without the assignation or consent of any body.  The 
labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, 
hath fixed my Property in them.63 
Geraint Parry points out that Locke takes the criterion of “occupancy” that was held 
in both Roman and natural law and creates a test for what occupancy consists in.  Locke 
contends that property becomes such when an individual “hath mixed his Labour” with 
whatever he removes from the “common natural condition”.64  This is an encounter of 
embeddedness of an entirely different kind.  Parry points out that the physical object that 
has become property “takes on an element of the person.”65  In this sense, the natural, 
physical world becomes embedded in the person—not vice versa.  This is vital for 
understanding the ways in which treaties were negotiated and later environmental legislation 
enacted because this understanding of humanity’s relationship with property and the natural 
world becomes a key component in Western legal thought.  Unlike Grotious and Pufendorf, 
Locke argues that no consent to disperse commonly held property is needed because there is 
no “property” as such until an individual applies his or her labour and that portion of the 
natural world cleaves to them by virtue of that application.66  To be sure, this is but one 
small component of the vast shift in social imaginary that came about in the wake of the 
writings of Locke and others in the 17th and 18th century.  I am only aiming to scratch at the 
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surface of complexity here by teasing out one aspect of a possible connection between the 
eventual pervasiveness of Lockean thought and the ways in which ownership and 
stewardship come to be perceived in the west. 
As pointed out above, Locke’s definition of property is, by necessity, quite broad.  
Thomas Jefferson paraphrased it in the Declaration of Independence as those inalienable 
rights endowed by the Creator: “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”  Locke himself 
defines it as “lives, liberties and estates”.  As David C. Snyder (among others) points out, 
Locke needs this definition of property to explain why political authority is legitimate, why 
human beings consent to be governed, and what the limits of that governance should be.67  
For the purposes of this study, it is enough to know that Locke has articulated a theory of 
property and governance that is self-consciously composed of individuals coming together in 
“…such a way that their reciprocal action redounds to their mutual benefit.”68  Individuals 
acting for their own self-interest will according to Locke, by their very natures, act for the 
benefit of others, because such actions are obviously what will lead to the betterment of 
society.   
The natural law tradition out of which Locke partially draws his theories of 
governance and economics (and out of which Grotius draws his theories of international 
law) was a way of structuring a new societal order that not only, as Taylor asserts, spans 
across confessional divides69 but also provides a stabilizing bridge across the chasm between 
premodernity and modernity.  Natural law is a concept that has traction in the ancient world, 
the Middle Ages, and the modern world.  It provides stability, even as it is malleable enough 
to be embraced by different eras with their different needs.  “The aim of Natural Law theory 
was to provide a rational terrain d’entente, replacing not only the ex parte theories of 
extremist religious partisans, but later on, in its Lockean variant, also setting aside other, 
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dangerously flawed reactions to the religious strife, such as theories of sovereignty unbound 
by any law.”70  The underpinnings were malleable, even as the philosophical tenet of 
objective morality was not.  Knowing that how and why natural law theory developed and 
continued into the modern period is important, as mentioned above, because it remains, 
again, as one of several strands of arguments regarding what exactly legitimizes and 
motivates Western legal systems. 
The Purpose of Private Property 
Grotius, and later Locke, posit a rational moral order from the blueprint they see in 
natural law.  Grotius’ sociable beings are incorporated into Locke’s vision of individual life 
and liberty sustained in community by one another’s respect for that life and liberty.71  The 
Lockean ideal then has human beings using their drive for self preservation as motivation for 
working to exploit the natural world and, as a consequence, acquiring private property and 
spurring economic growth.72  This rational (and for Locke, God-given) way of living 
emerges as a norm; “…a stable order of industrious men in the settled courses of their 
callings, dedicating themselves to growth and prosperity, rather than war and plunder, and 
accepting a morality of mutual respect and an ethic of self-improvement.”73  It is the 
“dedication to growth and prosperity” and the “morality of mutual respect” that are most 
pertinent at this juncture of the study.   
The dedication to growth and prosperity was seen as a process, an unfolding of a 
teleological moral order.  The morality of mutual respect informed and solidified this order, 
it was the component of noblesse oblige that had been developed under the premodern 
hierarchy and which  Locke re-fashions into an implicit social contract—no longer between 
master and servant, but between individuals in society.  I am being quite careful here in not 
glorifying Locke’s philosophy as radically egalitarian—doing away with class and elitism by 
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turning over the tables in the public square.  But the assertion of the idea that the true divine 
order was one in which all men were seen as having equal access to the acquisition of wealth 
and the right to hold onto private property gave all men (and I am being deliberate in my 
choice of gender here) vested interest in laws that maintained this new status quo.74  In this 
sense, the morality of mutual respect incorporates the assumption that each man has the 
duty to assure that the laws government makes do not interfere with his or his neighbour’s 
fundamental, God-ordained right to the accumulation of private property.   
Locke’s social order and the social contract that is implied by it also reflects a new 
social imaginary that incorporates a world view that did not see time as cyclical but sees 
human history as progressive and dynamic—“(s)ympathy,” writes Taylor, “and a community 
of interests should have been enough to establish a non—conflictual order of things…the 
fully formed reformed society was close to hand…requiring only one more package of 
reforms:  political…economic…social”75  This is pertinent because a progressive view of 
history and of human endeavours reflects a philosophy regarding a social contract whose 
basic tenets incorporate the notion that members of society who are entrusted with the 
political directing of the state have the best interests of the individuals of that society in their 
hands and that this best interest is something that is already mutually agreed upon.  If the 
underlying understanding is that the moral order is teleological and progressive—always 
moving towards perfection (in this case, human flourishing, I am not referring to 
soteriology), then the implied understanding of the governed is that the laws that are being 
made are ones that will facilitate what it good.  Of course, the problem in that case ends up 
being who defines the good, and is there mutual agreement upon the steps one takes to 
arrive at this good?  Aside from the very real class differences that are brought to bear on a 
progressive view of human history, this question can also be addressed (and will be) in light 
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of treaty negotiations between nations who have completely different ideologies and social 
imaginaries.  The sensibilities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the ensuing 
philosophies of historical progression, human capacity for transformation and economic 
theories loom large in this story and play an integral part in the way environmental law is 
envisioned and shaped. 
In the eighteenth century, there is an understanding of natural law theory that is 
accompanied by Lockean economic theories regarding property ownership.  Muldoon 
comments in his brief discussion of the evolution of Western legal tradition and 
environmental legislation that the economic idea that it is acceptable for people to be self—
interested profit seekers intertwined with the equally compelling idea, discussed above, that 
nature can be broken down into parts, understood, and manipulated for human benefit to 
produce an ethos asserting that societies and individuals should pursue economic and 
scientific progress built on increasingly efficient innovative exploitation of nature’s 
resources. This understanding of property ownership in the Lockean terms of acquisition by 
virtue of labour and the understanding of the purpose of science and the purpose of 
government in relation to human flourishing are other components that comprise the 
foundation for comprehension of the development of Western legal systems in general and 
in environmental law in particular.76  All intertwine with the growing and shifting social 
imaginary that redefines human flourishing in terms of the individual in society rather than 
the society composed of individuals with set positions in a rigid hierarchy.  This is significant 
for the purposes of this study because it can be argued that the shift to individualism 
combines with other factors already discussed (i.e. private property rights, scientific 
discovery, Deism, anthropomorphism, inductive reasoning) to allow for the emergence of a 
society that values (to the point of ascribing divine sanction to) the acquisition of wealth, 
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individual achievement and the ability to flourish with a certain amount of autonomy from 
God, government or, to some extent, from one another.  Intertwined with this shift is also 
the reflection of the Protestant Reformation where the emphasis becomes less about the 
salvific nature of the Christian community embodied by the Church (whereby salvation of 
the individual is mediated by a hierarchy acting on behalf of the corporate faithful) than 
about an individual’s responsibility for their own salvation.  A spiritual safety net versus a 
pull yourself up by your own bootstraps approach to soteriology, as it were.   
This theological and sociological shift (if, indeed it is possible to actually make such a 
division) has profound ramifications for the crafting and implementation of law.  Laws, of 
course, always have to respond to and account for the dynamism of human society.77  Taylor 
points out that early modernity is a period in which human society (at least in Western 
Europe) was striving for ordered, comprehensible societies that would, the elites were 
convinced, best aid human flourishing. The modern moral order works quite nicely with a 
Lockean understanding of private property—government exists to protect that private 
property which, as shown above, is broadly defined not just as material, but as symbolic of 
the ideals of liberty and so on.  Legislation regarding use of the natural world and this 
conception of individualism and private property shifts also in order to reflect these modern 
ideas.   
 
 
An Ideological Shift and a Precursor to Environmental Legislation 
As mentioned above, Western Europeans saw themselves as disembedded from the 
natural world.  Nature was God’s tool and humanity roamed creation, dependent upon it 
and with the mandate to use it, if not subdue and dominate it.  Even the Franciscan 
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paradigm  reflected a rigid hierarchy that was extant in both Church and in lay government.  
Early modernity continues the model of disembeddedness in part by strengthening an 
anthropocentric worldview.  Science allows human beings at first to comprehend God in 
nature by disseminating God’s mind from observation.  This observation (and I am 
intentionally glossing over complexities here) leads to the discovery of what are believed to 
be firm and immutable laws of nature which allow for the observer to draw the conclusions 
that to know these laws is to know God, not just from observation but from inductive 
reasoning and experimentation.  The belief in the immutability of nature’s laws and the 
ability of human beings to discover those laws facilitate the rise and embracing of humanism 
and also, in part, necessitate the rise of Deism (if nature’s laws are immutable and God is the 
creator of those laws and the author of their immutability, it is unreasonable to posit that 
God would interfere with the workings of those laws by performing miracles and the like.).  
Lockean notions of private property add a different layer to the disembeddedness and 
conception of human relations with the natural world, even as they remain staunchly theistic 
in their intent and composition.78 
The Lockean ideal of ownership supported this disembeddedness by placing an ontic 
as well as temporal value on the relationship between labour, nature’s resources and the 
individual.  A different kind of embeddedness arises from this—the individual is embedded 
in nature to the extent that his or her relationship with the value of their property holds 
meaning and identity to and for them.  By positing the almost mystical fusion between the 
labourer and his or her acquisition, Locke introduces a meaning to ownership that borders 
on the transcendent.  Economics has always been integrally intertwined in human 
endeavours, but this particular vision of ownership by the individual as one that is not only 
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divinely sanctioned but is also a fulfillment of human purpose is reflective of a particular 
shift in the social imaginary. 
A shift in the social imaginary that, in part, values the individual over the corporate 
can be demonstrated in myriad ways, but the one most relevant to this study is via legislation 
having to do with the natural world—the plausible precursors to modern—day 
environmental legislation—specifically, laws regarding property ownership and land use.   
The Statute of Merton (1235) is the first of the Statues of the Realm in England and 
one of the bases for English common law.  The overall purpose of Merton was, as was the 
Magna Carta’s twenty years before, designed to limit the rights of the King.  The particular 
portion pertinent to this purpose is the component regarding enclosures.  Merton allowed 
lords of the manor to enclose common land, providing that sufficient pasture remained for 
the tenants.  The Statute sets out the manner and in which cases lords may approve part of 
the wastes, woods, and pasture belonging to their manors, against the tenants.  Wastes, in 
this case, refer to land which is not being used.  To enclose land means to “…extinguish 
common rights over it, thus putting an end to all common grazing.  To effect this, it was 
usual for the enclose to hedge or fence the land...(a)ll enclosers…deprived the community of 
common rights.”79 
The history of enclose (or “inclosure”) in England is complex and too vast to engage 
with in any sort of depth in this study.  What makes it interesting and relevant for the 
purposes at hand is the many ways in which enclosure is viewed at different points in 
England’s history.  As John Locke refers to enclosure as one way in which it may be proved 
that land is owned and as his contentions reflect attitudes that were brought to bear in the 
development of treaties between the Western Europeans and the North American 
Aboriginals, it is worth the while to explore the topic briefly. 
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The Statute of Merton states: “ 
Also because many great men of England…have complained that they cannot 
make their profit of the residue of their manors as of wastes, woods, and 
pastures, whereas the same feoffees have sufficient pasture, as much as 
belongeth to their tenements….if it be certified by assize that the plaintiffs (the 
commoners) have sufficient pasture, with ingress and regress let the other (the 
lords) make their profit of the residue, and go quit that assize.80 
 
This is significant for it codifies at least a sample of High Middle Age thinking in regards to 
private property and the responsibility of the owner towards the tenant.  The right to 
ownership of the land is not disputed and the right to profit is seen as a given, but not at the 
expense of the commoner.  The landowner has the mandate to assure that enough common 
land remains for the use of the commoner.  The point of Merton seems to be more a 
codification and recognition of the rights of the landowners as acknowledged by the Crown 
than it is a precept that the landowners needed in order to persuade the commoners to 
acquiesce to enclosure.  As Thirsk remarks, “Much enclosure had already taken place 
without trial or tribulation in the early Middle Ages.  Enclosure from the waste had been as 
commonplace a part of the farming round as ploughing.”81  Indeed, it seems to have been so 
commonplace, this negotiation between landowner and commoner, that once agreed to by 
the King, the Statute gradually falls into disuse.  It was revived again during the brief reign of 
Edward VI by the Duke of Northumberland (the doomed Lady Jane Grey’s father) to 
legitimate the enclosures by landowners during the Tudor era.  Such enclosures were 
frequently vehemently opposed (in some parts of England much more vociferously than 
others—the disparity being the consequence, in part, of population density and the quantity 
of available land for common usage).119 
 Even at the time of Merton, profit from the land was being sought.  But the statute 
reflected a social imaginary that incorporated an ethos of communality in general and in 
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particular to farming practices—profit was allowable, even desirable, but land held in 
common was deemed to be a necessary component of the community economy.  By the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this seems to have shifted—for a variety of reasons, 
some of which I have already discussed (population variations, environmental 
degredation)—to a time in which two disparate views of farming were extant: the 
individualist and the communal.82  The individualist allowed the farmer himself greater 
latitude in farming practices and often led the encloser to convert the land from arable to 
pasture—thus ensuring that he would need to hire fewer labourers.  This did little to endear 
the encloser to his neighbours.  The communal, and more ancient, allowed for enclosure but 
assumed that a semblance of balance would be kept: if one piece of land was enclosed, then 
another would be offered in compensation for common usage; the enclosed land remained 
arable and thus was a source of employment for others; the community itself worked to 
make the land arable and then agreed together to partition some land off for private use and 
some for common—but the decision was communal.83 
 These two farming ideologies are, of course, reflective of the larger tensions of a 
society where individualism is taking hold as a social, political and religious force.  In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (from 1750—1850) the Enclosure Movement, whereby 
enclosure happened rapidly by individual Acts of Parliament, seems to support a contention 
that the individualist point of view was prevalent and presumed to be the more legitimate 
construction of the social good—at least by those who had the power to make the laws.84  
Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, Mr. Wingrove Cooke is reported in the Report 
from the Select Committee on Master and Servant to have said, “If the lord leaves sufficient 
common to satisfy the rights of the commoners, he can inclose(sic) the remainder; but as 
there is scarcely a common now where that can be done, practically speaking the right of 
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approvement is a dead letter.”85  In that same quote Mr. Cooke opines that the Statute is all 
but “obsolete”.   
 All of this is relevant to the discussion at hand not only because, in a very small way, 
it reflects the rise of individualism, and a shift in the social imaginary, but because it traces a 
shift in how private property and, in part, how humanity’s relationship to the natural world 
as revealed by legislation, can be marked.  Disembeddedness is already marked in Merton. 
The feudal system of land tenure (i.e. the system whereby land is held by a vassal on 
perpetual tenure from a superior)86 is taken as given.  This reflects a social imaginary 
(perpetuated by Henry III, disputed to an extent by the barons) that placed the King as 
God’s envoy, ruling by divine right and, as a consequence, holding the divine right to do 
with the land what the King saw fit.  Just as nature was God’s tool, so was it, by proxy, the 
King’s.  The King has given the land to the barons’ use and the barons, in turn, see the land 
as a tool for sustenance and profit.  The relationship with the land itself—an understanding 
that sees nature as having agency—is subsumed by the relationship with what the land can 
provide.   
In addition, at its inception, Merton reflects a communal social imaginary.  Being a 
baron was expensive.  Among one’s expenses were taxes owed to the King for the use of 
His land.  In order to pay those taxes and cover one’s other expenses, the land had to be 
used in a way that was most profitable.  Enclosing the land was one way in which the 
property could be made profitable, either by converting the land to pasture or by 
consolidating farmland.  This was all well and good for the barons, but the peasantry also 
needed reassurance that their traditional access to common lands would not be 
compromised.  Merton establishes that the tenants—the common holders—have a right to 
expect that such common land will be made available—the assurance is codified.87  There is 
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an understanding that the individual is responsible for the well-being of the community and 
cannot profit individually at the complete expense of the whole.88 
Through the centuries, the communal need is devalued in favour of an ideal that 
seeks to have no lands in common but that every person traditionally using common lands 
will have their own, private piece of property for them to cultivate or otherwise use as they 
wished.  That this was so is again evidenced by the remark from the parliamentary gentleman 
above in 1865 that all land had been enclosed.  And indeed, this is what happened in the 18th 
and 19th centuries through Acts of Parliament—that small strip farms and traditional 
common lands were amalgamated and/or enclosed.  In compensation, farmers were offered 
private strips of land (often inferior) in the stead of the commons.  In this sense a different 
kind of disembeddedness can be seen as some tenants had farmed particular parcels of land 
and accessed in common particular areas for generations.  The relationship one might have 
built up with the geography was not measured as important in light of the necessity to use 
the land for maximum profit.  Indigenous knowledge and direct labour in the service of a 
specific piece of land were considered ephemeral at worst and as easily transferrable at best.   
 It must be pointed out, though, that the enclosures were not the same in all parts of 
England and that some were negotiated amicably. 89  However, the social imaginary that is 
reflected by the practice of enclosures in the 18th and 19th centuries is vastly different from 
that in the 13th, and supports a contention that religious perspectives are intertwined in the 
social imaginaries that produce legislation in any given era.  At a cursory glance, the Pre-
Reformation Catholicism of the 13th century is present in the assumption of a hierarchy that 
presumably mirrors that of heaven, and of the view of the natural world as tool over which 
the ruler has absolute dominion and over which lesser creatures have more limited access.90   
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 The legislated enclosures of later centuries reflect the passion for moral order that 
Taylor writes about as being integral to the Reformation.  To enclose the land is a way of 
taming it and the people who use it.  It is still tool, even tool to be given by a hierarchy to 
the lowlier—but here the tool is for the individual’s own good—not to ensure the common 
good per se by making resources available for common use, but to ensure the good of each 
individual and as a consequence, of the collective of which those individuals are a part.   
Another interesting point to ponder lies in the thought of Grotius and Locke and 
their respective positions regarding common lands and the acquisition of private property.  
Grotius, it should be remembered, argued that land was originally held in common and that 
some sort of general consent was required before the land could be held by a private 
individual.  Locke, on the other hand, held that no such consent was necessary as nothing 
became property until it was mingled with one’s labour.  Both philosophies are reflective of 
the state of enclosure that was most prevalent during their lifetimes.  Wordlie argued that it 
could be shown that in the 17th century, 2% of land in England was enclosed, while in the 
18th the figure rose to 24%.  Now, Wordlie’s exact figures have been disputed, but the 
principle still holds, that the state of enclosures during the majority of Locke’s lifetime would 
have been high, whereas they would have been relatively low in Grotius’.  In addition, 
Grotius was historically much closer to the time of the Tudors in England where public 
outrage in some quarters of England was loud and vociferous against the perceived tyranny 
of the landed gentry over the hapless tenant and labourer.  In short, Grotius’ time and place 
was more in tune with the practice and ethos of land held in common, whilst Locke 
witnessed and lived in the era where enclosure seemed to be the most logical and productive 
way of asserting ownership—after all, to enclose the land was to make it more productive 
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and required a modicum of tangible labour that merely working the land might not have 
seemed to do.  
Again, I want to be clear that this discussion is a microcosm of social, religious and 
legal phenomenon.  Obviously there are complexities which are too massive to unravel at 
this point.  As mentioned above, the motivation (in this case, the social imaginary and the 
religious worldviews) behind legislation is as important a component in understanding its 
complexity as are the facts of the political and economic climates of the time.  This is 
certainly true when trying to understand the role that treaties have played in Canada’s 
development of environmental policy and legislation.   
Private Property and Treaties 
 At first glance, it may seem odd to include a section on treaties in a chapter on 
environmental law.  However, treaties between European nations and North American 
Aboriginal nations reflect shifts in the European social imaginary that are relevant to current 
environmental legislation:  treaties deal with property rights, land and resource use and as 
such also reflect particular views regarding humanity’s relationship with the natural world—
all of which are also relevant to current legislation and policy positions.  Futhermore, the 
eventual privileging of European worldviews over the worldviews of the indigenous peoples 
of Canada have ramifications that are vital to comprehending the variety of voices that sit at 
the table of modern legislative and policy negotiations.91  Lastly, the religious worldviews of 
all parties are evident in the treaties and in the treaty-making processes.  The Aboriginal 
understanding of embeddedness in the natural world and the European conception of 
disembeddedness and nature-as-tool, in part, undergird the treaties themselves.92 
 As intimated above, the history of enclosures in England reflect a shift in 
understanding in regards to private property that is integral to understanding treaty 
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negotiations between the English Crown (or the Crown’s proxies) and Canada’s Aboriginal 
Peoples.  Treaties are important for understanding environmental law because they deal, in 
part, with use and ownership of the natural world.  As well, they reflect a shifting social 
imaginary in the West, part of which is theological and part of which is economic.  Both 
these factors are brought to bear in modern environmental legislation when we examine 
which voices are at the negotiation table and which interests are considered during those 
negotiations. 
 Lockean views of private property acquisition have already been discussed and they 
are vital to understanding a portion of the mindset that Western Europeans (primarily the 
English and the French) brought to the treaty-making process.  However, the legal 
justification for land acquisition and precepts of international law and treaty-making are also 
important for this discussion.  Intertwined with all of that is the background of contact with 
North American Aboriginals that has been discussed at an early juncture in this work.  It has 
been shown that some of the earliest motivations for European exploration that eventually 
culminated in their landing in the Americas were economic (as a part of the rise of 
mercantilism) and religious.  As these voyages of discovery took place, bodies of laws were 
developed in order to prevent or at least to forestall chaos from erupting on a grand scale.  
There are laws regarding what constitutes discovery and ownership—first sighting (Spain, 
Portugal) or development (France, England).  There were laws regarding in whose name 
claims may be made (always a political or economic (i.e. Hudson’s Bay Co. or the Northwest 
Co.) body—never in the name of an individual).  And there were laws governing how 
indigenous populations were to be treated (in the early days of Spanish exploration, the Pope 
determined these prescripts).  Although there are a few 16th and 17th century jurists who 
made their mark on international law, Hugo Grotius makes a particularly easy starting point 
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from which to gain perspective on the motivations and philosophies behind some 
burgeoning international law that had effects on the ways in which treaties were negotiated 
with North American Aboriginal peoples.93  Grotius is perhaps best known for his work on 
international and maritime law.  A 17th century scholar, lawyer and diplomat, Grotius was a 
Protestant who spent a good deal of his life working to further the cause of tolerance and 
religious accommodation in an era of bitter and deadly sectarian strife.  The aspects of 
Grotius’ thought that are pertinent for this study appear first in De Jure Praedae Commentarius 
(Commentary on Prize and Booty)94 in a brief discussion of non—European rulers and the 
legitimacy of States using proxies and in The Freedom of the Seas in which he briefly discusses 
treaties.  
In Pradae, Grotius is making an argument justifying the seizure by the Dutch of a 
Portuguese ship.  The main gist of Grotius’ argument is that the Portuguese could not have 
sovereignty over the high seas or exclusive trade rights with the East Indies and that the 
Dutch had no other recourse than to respond by using force.95  The relevance for the 
argument in Pradae for the purposes of this study rest in one of the ways in which Grotius 
makes an argument for justification.  Grotius argues that the Dutch are justified in the 
seizure because they have allied themselves with the King of Johore, a non-European.  
Grotius writes that “alliances and treaties with infidels may in many cases be justly 
contracted for the purpose of defending one’s own rights.”96  Edward Keene observes that 
“What probably first catches the attention here is Grotius’ positive attitude towards the 
rights of this non-European ruler.  Not only did Grotius assert the validity of treaties with 
heathens, he went further to praise the rationality and sagacity of the ‘Indians of the Orient’, 
and warned about the way in which ‘shameless lust for property was wont to take cover 
under the excuse of introducing civilization into barbaric regions’.97  In fact, Grotius was 
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part of what Taylor refers to as the “neo-Stoics”98 and, as such, had an investment in “the 
ideal of civility (which) develops an active, transformatory agenda (which is) partly the result 
of the symbiosis and mutual inflection with the agenda of religious reform…99 Of course, 
Grotius is not discussing North American Aboriginals, but his point, that making treaties 
with “heathens” was justified in the case of one’s own self interest, and his willingness to 
recognize non-European sovereignty, shows some congruence with the earlier thinker, 
Francisco de Vitoria, who also asserted that non-Christians could have sovereignty and 
ownership of land.100  Secondly, he was making an oblique theological argument against co-
opting land on the basis of trying to convert the original inhabitants, something against 
which Vitoria had argued vociferously in defiance of the Pope and the Spanish and 
Portuguese governments a century earlier.101  In this, he is also echoing Alberico Gentili.102 
Of course, this is not at all to say that Grotius disagreed with the precept that land could be 
appropriated under certain conditions, merely that appropriating land in order to convert the 
inhabitants was not a legal exercise of this right.  This discussion is pertinent to 
environmental law and the specific topic of this study, again, because it indicates how 
religious motivations became intertwined and foundationally integral to the development of 
the Western legal systems, even as the motivations and overt sectarian views were being 
fought over and attempts made to subsume them in natural law, which Grotius and others 
were trying to re-frame as universally moral but safely irreligious, or transcending religion. 
Grotius’ desire to place the discussion in the realm of natural law rather than letting 
it be couched in religious terms is congruent with his desire to move beyond sectarian 
violence and into the realm of moral justification by reason which leads, of course, to natural 
law. In this, Grotius was not alone.   As Merete Falck Borch points out, rightly so, that 
“some of the most prominent writers on international law in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
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centuries gradually left the theologically based justifications for conquest of indigenous 
peoples behind and increasingly turned to a concept of natural law as governing relations 
between nations.”103  The concept of natural law in Grotius’ time certainly had theological 
antecedents and connotations, but the connotations were universal rather than sectarian.  In 
this, it can be seen, that legal arguments move from the sectarian realm (i.e. the Spanish 
asserting their sovereignty over the “heathen” indigenous American Indians with the Pope’s 
blessing) to that of the moral and reasonable realm (i.e. natural law) that is theoretically more 
neutral and therefore more likely to enable consensual agreements.  Grotius, in other words, 
uses a traditionally religious tool—natural law—to undergird his theories but couches the 
theological (God-designed and given natural law) as morality and reasonableness upon which 
Catholic and Protestant can agree.  This is not to say, of course, that Catholic and Protestant 
did agree with any consistency, despite Grotius’ efforts.  However, even if Grotius did not 
consciously intend to foster the move from theological argument to a theological proxy, i.e. 
natural law as a potential Gileadean balm, it is fair to say that this is what his efforts did.  The 
import of that is to see a theological worldview deeply embedded in a strain of Western law 
that remains viable in modern Western legal thought.  That worldview is not overt, most of 
the time, but it is inextricably intertwined in natural law theory.   
Another point that is important to the treaty process is the argument that Grotius 
makes in regards to sovereign governments having the right to delegate a proxy to negotiate 
(or, in the case mentioned above in Grotius’ work, to fight) in its name—in essence what 
Keene calls “divisible sovereignty”.104  True, this had been common practice in the course of 
human history, but Grotius, as a jurist, reiterated this right in his legal argument, giving 
gravitas to already accepted practice.105 
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These concepts—divisible sovereignty, the theological worldview wrapped in the 
perceived rationalism of natural law, the argument for the legitimacy of treaties made with 
non-Christians and the Lockean view of private property and land acquisition—provide 
components that add to the whole picture of the mindset brought to bear by the Europeans 
in treaty negotiations with the aboriginal people of North America, specifically the portion 
that became Canada.  And, of course, the ideas presented by Grotius and Locke morphed as 
they were adapted and applied and integrated into shifting social systems.   
It has been mentioned before that both Grotius and Locke were interested in 
moving beyond the sectarian violence that had wreaked such havoc on their respective 
countries.  Natural law proved the perfect levelling ground for it provided a moral 
framework that did not disavow God but neither did it depend upon a Protestant or 
Catholic point of view for its inherent reasonableness.  Inherent in natural law was the 
notion of private property that would come to loom so large in treaty negotiations and in 
later environmental law.  Both Locke and Grotius agree that private property can be 
acquired and that it can be inherited.  Both also agree that private property cannot be called 
such until or unless there is a recognizable (and by this I mean a government that a Western 
European would have found recognizable) government in place, for the purpose of forming 
a government is for the protection of private property.  Locke and Grotius differ, as 
discussed above, in that Locke believes the initial acquisition of property (that is, from land 
that was previously unowned or “waste”) can happen via labour.  Indeed, it must happen 
with labour, or the land is not owned.  Grotius argues that land is originally held in common 
by all and that one must have permission before one can acquire it as one’s own property.  
Both Locke and Grotius appear to have envisioned the Aboriginals of North America as 
living in a condition of natural simplicity (Grotius) without the structure of any recognizable 
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government.  Of course, we now know that to be untrue, but when Grotius and Locke were 
writing, their understanding was of vast tracts of lands in North America that were inhabited 
by, but not possessed of, the indigenous peoples.  The implications are now well known, 
because of the concept of property ownership viewed by both Locke and Grotius as logically 
following from natural law—the precepts of which were universal.  But this is where a shift 
comes from Grotius’ thought and this shift is important. 
Grotius does not appear to have an issue with the sovereignty of non-Christians.106  
As shown above, he has no compunction against signing treaties with “heathen” rulers.  He 
does not make a distinction, in his construction of international law, between Christian and 
non-Christian states.107  This is not surprising when one considers that natural law was seen 
by Grotius as universal and the precepts of international law that he described were 
painstakingly rooted in natural law.  However, as Keene notes, Grotius’ original scheme of 
the law of nations as applicable in the same form to both Europeans and non-Europeans 
underwent a shift in the 17th century.108   This shift parallels Taylor’s discussion of a shift in 
the moral order and social imaginary, a shift towards civilization as both a measure of one’s 
more enlightened nature and as a goal through which all humanity would find fulfillment.  
Keene asserts that this idea of civilization “comprehensively radicalized the application of 
(Grotius’) ideas about how sovereignty should be divided and how individuals’ private rights 
should be acquired and protected in the extra-European world.”109  In part, the Lockean 
notion of property acquisition via labour became the standard, as did the practice of imperial 
paramountcy by the Europeans.  Keene points out that this results in an imperialism and 
colonialism undergirded by a bifurcated understanding of the goal of international law.  This 
bifurcation held that, on the one hand, European nations were civilized already and 
international laws existed to “…promote the toleration of cultural and political differences 
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between civilized peoples so as to allow them to live together in peace.”  On the other hand, 
“other forms of international political organization and different legal rules were deemed 
appropriate, in keeping with the belief that here the central purpose of international order 
was to promote the civilization of decadent, backward, savage or barbaric peoples.”110 This 
fits in with the contention that an important shift in the social imaginary was a movement to 
a particular type of moral order that saw the elite as having a paternalistic role to play in the 
cultivation of the souls of others.111  This was a European nation to non-European nation 
mandate. 
Grotius writes that treaties negotiated between an “inferior” and a “superior” party 
will lead to the strong overpowering the weak—leading to a “diminution” of sovereign 
power—even though negotiations appear to have been between equals.112  The treaties of 
the 17th and 18th century show just that, as settlement becomes more important than trade 
and the relationship of mutual benefit declines between the Europeans and the Aboriginals. 
As J.R. Miller writes, “The evolution of treaty-making—from commercial pacts to modern 
agreements—reflects the underlying Native-newcomer relationship.  When that association 
was mutually beneficial…the treaties were respectful of both parties and benefited all 
participants...When the relationship deteriorated…the treaties that resulted were much less 
advantageous to Aboriginal peoples.”113  Although this study is not focused on Aboriginal 
land titles and treaty rights, the above is relevant for this study because it marks the ways in 
which European view of humanity’s relationship with the natural world came to be 
paramount in North America.  
It has been established that (in general) two wildly disparate worldviews came 
together when the Europeans began to explore North America:  the Aboriginal worldview of 
embeddedness which drove the ways in which the natural world was used and regarded, and 
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the European worldview of disembeddedness.  The Aboriginal worldview, especially was a 
worldview that was at once dynamic and established, dynamic in that it was not stagnant—
just as the natural world is not stagnant and established, in that the worldview worked for the 
time and place.  Enter the Europeans at a profoundly complicated time in Western history.  
Sectarian strife and the beginnings of new social, economic, scientific and religious phase 
were swirling about and they brought this maelstrom of chaos striving to be tamed with 
them into what they perceived to be a New World.   
Of course, it is facile to say that the Aboriginal nations which they first encountered 
weren’t also dealing with political intrigue and economic challenges of their own.  Human 
society is by definition political and the historical record is clear that the Aboriginals in 
North America had rich and complex societies.  That the Europeans recognized this, in part, 
is clear in the first treaties. 
Miller lists three types of treaties in his historical survey of Canada’s treaty traditions 
with the Aboriginal nations.114  The first, and earliest (17th century), were forged not with the 
Crown, but with private companies (fur traders, mostly) which were given quasi-
governmental status by virtue of their charters given by sponsoring sovereigns.115  Miller 
stresses this in order to assert that treaties made with Hudson’s Bay Company, for instance, 
should be read as treaties made with the sovereign himself, under international law as 
described by Grotius.  These treaties were commercial compacts focused on commerce.  
Given that both the Europeans and the Aboriginals they encountered were experienced 
traders with shrewd business people on both sides, and that both the Europeans and the 
Aboriginals had something to gain by these compacts, both sides seem to have benefitted.  
In other words, although the Europeans may have seen themselves as superior examples of 
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God’s handiwork in every conceivable way, yet it was prudent and profitable to at least give 
the appearance of accepted equality between Aboriginal and European.   
That this was so could be seen as well in the ways in which each group sized up and 
learned to appease and incorporate the customs of one another.  Wynn speculates that 
“(t)hrough the earliest years of contact, natives and newcomers probably exchanged more 
than they knew, and syncretism—the fusion or reconciliation of diverse beliefs and 
practices—was widespread.”116  That the Aboriginals saw the Europeans not only as valuable 
trading partners but also as military allies is well established. 
The second treaties developed alongside the first, in the last part of the 17th century, 
gaining more and more traction in the 18th century.  These were the peace and friendship 
treaties that outlined alliances and developed out of the commercial relationships between 
Europeans and Aboriginals.  These alliances were important for all sides, militarily as well as 
commercially.117 
There was a religious component that must be recognized, as well, for the 
conversion of the Aboriginal peoples of North America to Christianity was, to some 
Europeans, an important mission. In some places conversion occurred.  Wynn (among 
others) notes that traditional remedies for illnesses were often ineffective against the new 
diseases brought by the Europeans and “age-old practices to propitiate traditional deities” 
sometimes did not have the effect to pull the ecosystem back into balance (for instance, to 
repopulate the beaver habitats quickly) and this resulted, in part, in the elders and in the 
traditional worldviews losing some of their traditional authority.118    
However, religion was also used as a means to an end, for both sides recognized its’ 
import to the other.  Although the Europeans may not have seen Aboriginal religious 
traditions as legitimate worldviews, that they recognized them as a distinct metaphysics can 
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be seen in the writings of the representatives for the Hudson’s Bay Company who refer to 
Aboriginal religious beliefs.119 The Europeans, especially the delegates from private 
companies, became skilled at incorporating important Aboriginal customs into their business 
practices120 but the Aboriginals were adept at this as well,  
(c)ustomary practices were blended with beliefs promulgated by newcomers, and 
it was not always easy for Europeans to establish how firmly their attitudes and 
expectations permeated indigenous views…In religion, certainly, elements of 
Christian belief were incorporated into native practices to make them more 
acceptable to missionaries, and some professions of Christian belief may have 
obscured polite and subtle but nonetheless deliberate rejection of its basic 
principles.121 
During the commercial and peace and friendship treaties, which were certainly reflective of a 
more egalitarian mutual perception than were the third type of treaties, it was practical to at 
least maintain a veneer of respect and regard for one another.  Miller reminds his readers 
that North American Aboriginals had vast trade networks already in place in the 17th century 
and that the Europeans adapted to the mores that were extant.  Kin relationships were key in 
Aboriginal trade relations and extended kinship ceremonies were performed to incorporate 
the Europeans into the networks.122  That the worldviews regarding humanity’s relationship 
with the natural world were disparate was not a problem in these instances.  Where it 
becomes problematic is when, as stated above, settlement becomes more of a desire than 
does trade.  By the time settlement and expansion begins happening in earnest, the 
Aboriginal populations have been drastically reduced by disease and the Aboriginals find 
themselves at a distinct tactical disadvantage.  What might have begun as treaties between 
equals now are the unequal treaties expostulated by Grotius.  Thus, Aboriginal sovereignty— 
along with Aboriginal worldviews and environmental policies—is fractured. 
The third line of treaties started in 1760 and remained a force until the early 1920’s.  
They “emerged directly, almost inevitably, from the vicissitudes and pressures of Britain’s 
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alliance system in the latter half of the 18th century.  Territorial treaties were agreements 
governing non-Natives access to and use of First Nation’s lands.” 123 
The ideas of Locke and Grotius regarding private property and what constituted a 
government undergirded the mindset of the Europeans in regards to land ownership and 
natural resource use in the Americas.  Both saw the Aboriginals as still in a state of nature, 
meaning that the land on which they lived, moved and had their being was land still held in 
common (Grotius) or simply available for original acquisition (Locke).  Locke builds on 
Grotius—who bases land claims on whether or not the natural right to appropriation had 
been exercised124—and writes that the Aboriginals have no enclosures, a sure sign to him 
that all land in North America is “waste” and up for grabs.125  This highlights a crucial point 
for environmental law even today—what constitutes “right” relationship between humanity 
and the natural world.  The Europeans literally could not see that the natural world was 
being used in a way that they saw as productive or meaningful.  This was not only an 
economic waste but an offense against God who had given the earth as a tool for productive 
use and the “taming” and cultivation of which was outward sign of inward holiness.  That 
land must be left in common that is “as good” as that which is appropriated was highly 
subjective, as the later treaties showed.   
In addition to this, Grotius’ international law clearly supported colonization of 
foreign lands, even if those lands were sovereign.  The caveat that enabled such 
appropriation was based on Grotius’ interpretation of natural law and the idea that self-
preservation was a tenet whereby property could be acquired.  If one’s own nation lacked 
sufficient land to support its own population, it was permissible for the people of that nation 
to find other lands to populate.  However, that nation maintained its sovereignty over the 
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appropriated lands, assuming, of course, that the non-Christian sovereign continued to 
adhere to natural law.  If he or she did not, then the land was deemed to be common.126   
The Aboriginals, on the other hand, had a different worldview.  They knew and 
understood that they were making use of their habitats in the most productive way possible.  
They had established methods for sustaining themselves and maintaining balance with the 
rest of the natural world.  That they were healthy metaphysically speaking was reflected in 
the abundance of game, a good harvest, and surplus with which to trade.  In a general way, 
the lack of these things would indicate a lack of holiness, of balance.   
In addition, where the Aboriginals saw agency, Europeans saw commodities.  To be 
sure, the natural world, for the Aboriginals, was populated with creatures on whom they 
preyed, but as has been discussed, their prey had agency—that is, the animal chose to allow its 
own capture and that capture was made possible by the respect the trapper showed for the 
creature’s dignity and agency.  This is not necessarily a nobler worldview, it simply highlights 
the distinction between Aboriginal and European.  To the European, disembedded from the 
natural world and thus removed from the necessity of appeasing any animist spirits to 
maintain a balance that would ensure his continued survival in a particular environment, the 
beaver was a commodity to be exploited.   
The commercial treaties indicate a willingness by all parties to use the natural world 
in ways that were increasingly unsustainable.  The environmental practices that had been 
slowly developed over thousands of years were not compatible with an economic system 
that was predicated on ever-increasing demand.  In addition, the goods for which the 
Aboriginals traded made them increasingly dependent upon the trading posts and the non-
Aboriginals for what were becoming to be seen as essentials.  Wynn makes this observation 
regarding the Algonquian, Huron and the French: 
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…as both indigenous groups suffered significant population decline as a result 
of introduced epidemic diseases in the 1630’s, trading at (the level of 12,00—
16,000 beaver pelts per year) must have required each of them to invest a 
considerably greater proportion of available labour in support of the fur trade 
than they had in the 1620’s.  For the Algonquians this probably meant more 
time spent killing beaver and less on hunting and fishing.  To compensate for 
this shift, they likely depended more heavily on corn and beans from the Huron.  
This would have required more time and effort from Huron men from clearing 
more land and from women both in the fields and grinding meal.  Thus, the 
temptation to substitute imported goods for traditional tools and other items 
that were time—consuming to manufacture was likely enhanced.  But satisfying 
this temptation meant trading yet more furs.  All of which spelled escalating 
dependence on the fur trade.127 
The three categories of treaty, outlined and expanded upon by Miller, show the shift 
in sovereignty cautioned about by Grotius even as they reflect a growing awareness of the 
divergence of thought in regards to the natural world evinced by both peoples, non-
Aboriginal and Aboriginal. 
The aforementioned dependence and consequent shift in the way of life for many 
Aboriginal peoples had profound social, economic and religious ramifications.  As the 
Aboriginals become less populous and more dependent, their sovereignty is weakened.  
True, the companies still need the Aboriginal trappers, but the company leverage is increased 
by the Aboriginal dependence.  Thus, it can be seen that the practices and trade outlined in 
the commercial treaties had unfortunate consequences for the sovereignty of the Aboriginal 
nations with whom they were made.  The decline in sovereignty is directly related to the view 
of the natural world that became paramount in Canada over that of the Aboriginal.  Because 
the European worldview regarding the natural world did come to subsume that of the 
Aboriginal peoples, it also gained traction as the correct view—seeing as it was the point of 
view that can be said to have “won”.  This is significant, for it implies that the European 
view is not only correct but more powerful and that the Aboriginal view is somehow weaker, 
as its people were unable to champion their worldview successfully.  This, in turn, is seen as 
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a triumph of Christianity over Aboriginal religious worldviews.  This becomes more and 
more significant as modernity and the belief in the objectivity of a scientific worldview 
become entrenched in the Western social imaginary.128  
 It is also helpful to understand that the European/Aboriginal relationship was 
somewhat unbalanced in the beginning (17th century) in favour of the Aboriginals who 
needed the Europeans much less than the Europeans needed them.  The Europeans 
adjusted to Aboriginal ways and mechanisms even as Aboriginals refused to speak European 
languages and insisted on their own customs being followed.  In this way, Miller asserts, 
indigenous peoples dominated early commercial compacts.129  However, their relationship to 
the natural world was changing as a result of the commercial treaties, and I would argue that 
this is where Aboriginal sovereignty—and hence a loss of Aboriginal worldview primacy in 
Canada—becomes vulnerable.   
 The peace and friendship treaties relied on the acumen of  European “forest 
diplomats” to further the cause of both French and English in the lead up to the final battles 
over which European power would control North America.  In Atlantic Canada, the French 
had an additional ally in the Catholic Church, as Membertou and his extended family were 
baptised in the early 17th century (1610)—most probably because Membertou recognized the 
ritual as one integral to the kin—making process so vital for trade relations.130  This last 
underscores the reality that Aboriginal peoples were highly conscious of their own self-
interest when negotiating trade and peace.131  The commercial and peace and friendship 
treaties serve as reminders that there was more to the relationship between the Aboriginals 
and Europeans than disagreements over property rights.  In the periods where there was 
mutual self interest and cultural ties (i.e. through carefully crafted kin relationships), there 
was also mutual conformity to one another’s customs and religious rituals.  The syncretism 
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that arose from that time did create a cadre of Crown representatives who respected 
Aboriginals on their own merits. 
 In 1763 Britain issued The Royal Proclamation that, among other things, created a 
legal protocol for establishing ownership and acquiring Native lands.  As Miller shows, the 
Proclamation “embodied and extended policy developments that had been under way for 
some years.”132  Aboriginal controlled territory ‘reserved for them as their hunting grounds’ 
is recognized as such in the Proclamation, even though the entire domain is supposedly 
owned outright by the King.  This is in clear accordance with Grotian international law 
which allows for members of other nations (in this case, the Aboriginals) to hold land within 
the sovereignty of another country (in this case, British North America).  The Proclamation 
is clear in its recognition of Aboriginal claims to ownership of Crown land created under the 
magic waving of powers of a document issued half a world away.133 
 The Crown representatives mentioned above had been advocating for these policies 
for quite some time.  Such policies were key if the British were to maintain the trust of the 
Aboriginals who were experiencing strife with speculators and ‘land hungry interests’ that 
threatened smooth governance (the Proclamation asserted that only the Crown had the right 
to negotiate land claims with the Aboriginals). Three things then happened that are pertinent 
to the study: The War of 1812, a new wave of Indian Department personnel, and a shift in 
British policy to a “civilization program”. 
 The aftermath of the War brought an influx of land-hungry immigrants and settlers 
into what was supposed to be Aboriginal Lands.  The representatives of the Crown who 
now staffed the Indian Department were not military men who had known and forged 
kinship ties with the Aboriginals, but young civil servants—non-military men from a settler 
society “who had never learned to appreciate First Nations’ commercial, diplomatic, and 
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military skills, and who, consequently had less consideration for them then their bureaucratic 
forebears.”134 These men were enjoined by the Crown to apply the new assimilationist 
policies. 
 The above is relevant to the history of environmental legislation because it represents 
a shift, not only in the equality of ideology on the subject of two disparate worldviews 
regarding the relationship between humanity and the natural world (i.e. Aboriginal and 
European), but also a shift from diversity in terms of how the natural world should be used.  
Hunting and trapping, once paramount in the economy of both newcomer and Aboriginal 
no longer had the import that agriculture did.  Land that was not enclosed was not being 
used to its utmost.  Land that was wild and from which one had to seek one’s livelihood 
amongst the tangle and chaos of forest and river was not being utilized according to natural 
law, which bids each man to acquire privately what he can in order that a civil, ordered 
society might be formed.  Lockean notions of private property were intertwined with the 
Reform ideology of moral order which in turn was reflected in a view of the natural world as 
both a challenge to tame, cultivate and a tool with which to foster order.  In this worldview, 
the land must be used to civilize, cultivate the Aboriginal person.  Obviously hunting and 
gathering were of a lower order and so Aboriginals were encouraged (and perhaps this is too 
mild a word) to become as the Europeans and enclose, settle and farm their land.   
 Thus, treaties, especially the land allotment treaties of the late 18th and 19th centuries 
are reflective of a subjugation of one worldview to another and reveal a policy towards land 
use that is apparent in policy discussions regarding the environment in the 20th and 21st 
centuries:  the superiority of objective science versus the subjectivity of indigenous 
knowledge, the balance between private property rights and the rights of the collective, the 
right to economic prosperity versus the right be assured of sustainable practices that will 
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benefit future generations, human embeddedness in the natural world versus human 
dominion over a universe created by a deity for humanity’s private use versus a stewardship 
model that sees not so much embeddedness but responsibility.  The re-emerging question of 
modernity—how to balance the individual with the collective, the private with the public and 
the corporeal with the transcendent— are reflected again and again in environmental policy 
and legislation. 
The Conventional Wisdom: Environmental Law Begins Here 
 In Judaism, after the second century of the common era, Rabbinic Judaism 
developed.  In the course of this development arose the tradition of putting a fence around 
Torah.  The concept was that since the Temple was no longer available for worship and it 
was still necessary for reclamation of a state of ritual purity, something had to be done to 
assure that the precepts of Torah were kept inviolate by the Jewish people.  One author 
likens the concept to that of a beautiful garden that one does not wish to see trampled.  The 
garden is there for our pleasure and enjoyment, but the fence that surrounds it keeps it fresh 
and pristine for everyone and assures its safe flourishing.  And so the Oral law of Moses—
traditionally passed on by word of mouth— was written down in the Mishnah, commentated 
on in the Gemarah and put together in the Talmud by two different communities (one in 
Palestine, one in Babylon) in part so that the Jewish people would be able to keep the 
precepts of Torah by adhering to traditions (fences) that served as reminders of the central 
mitzvoth.  For instance, Kashrot, (or the dietary laws of Judaism) state that one must not boil 
a kid in its mother’s milk.  This is understood to be humane, as it is disrespectful to cook the 
offspring in the very substance that was designed by God to nourish it.  To protect this 
teaching, the rabbinic “fence” of this is that it is forbidden to mix meat with milk.  A further 
fence is developed when it is decided that the milk and meat should not mix in the digestive 
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tract and so a certain number of hours are prescribed between the ingestion of meat and the 
ingestion of dairy.  Yet another fence is constructed with the further admonition to keep 
separate sets of dishes so that meat and milk will never mix.  Thus, concentric circles of 
behavioural control are constructed to maintain the integrity of the moral order within the 
community. 
 The Western legal system as it developed during the processes of modernity is quite 
similar.  As Taylor and others point out, one of the themes of the modern moral order and 
the modern social imaginary is that of creating order out of chaos.  In the late Middle 
Ages/Early Modern period, laws such as the Magna Carta were about limiting the powers of 
the crown.  With the Reformation and the consequent reforming of society, public policies 
were implemented to improve the behaviour (and presumably the eternal lot) of the 
public—they were implemented by the elite for people’s own good.  Codified laws under an 
agreed-upon societal structure ensured that society would be in control and ordered, just as 
the law of physics ordained the order of the cosmos (at the behest of God).  Just as property 
must be privatized by enclosure, ensuring that no one will trample on the natural rights of 
another to possess and to flourish.  Environmental law is at the heart of this discussion 
because, at its most basic it is “(t)he process whereby the common resources of society—the 
air we breathe, the water we drink, the minerals in the ground, the trees on the land, and the 
lakes—are allocated to those public and private interests that use those resources to provide 
goods and services for the public at large.”135 
Muldoon asserts that formal environmental law can most likely be traced back to 
customary rules about human-environment relations formed by our first ancestors.136  I have 
touched upon that briefly above.  The more modern antecedents to environmental law as we 
know it are tort law and, of course, property law.  Tort (Latin for “wrong”) is an area of 
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private (as opposed to criminal) law having to do with compensating those who have been 
injured by the wrongdoing or negligence of another party.  Torts do not deal with contract 
law. The sub-categories of tort law that are pertinent for environmental law are nuisance and 
negligence.  These sub-categories govern the use of land and can address physical injury to 
neighbouring land or interference with the use and enjoyment of neighbouring land.137  One 
of the very first cases that addressed the substantial and unreasonable interference with 
personal property was established in the common law case of Rylands v Fletcher in the 19th 
century. 
 Rylands v. Fletcher was the progenitor of the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous conditions and activities.138   Essentially, this case dealt with the liability one party 
incurred when it engaged in activity on their property that had an adverse effect on the 
property of a neighbour.  The principle established in Rylands v Fletcher (after two appeals and 
a narrowing of the rule set forth in the first appeal) is that a person is responsible to his or 
her neighbour when, no matter how inadvertently, they have harmed or injured their 
neighbour and/or their neighbour’s property.  This ruling strongly contributed to 
establishing negligence principles that are most promising for environmental law.  Another 
sub-category of tort law developed through 19th century common law rulings was nuisance, 
which legal addresses issues such as noise, unsightly premises, strong odours, etc.  It addition 
to being a sub-category of tort law, nuisance can also be found in criminal law.  Public 
nuisance is also an offence in the Canadian Criminal Code and can be used as a component to 
environmental law.  These are laws by which private citizens can bring pollution problems 




 In 18th and 19th century Britain, public health advocates were engaged with 
environmental issues, as the move towards urbanization was accompanied by air and water 
pollution exacerbated by factories and overcrowded and close quarters leading to the quick 
spread of disease.  Sanitation and clean drinking water became issues that public health 
authorities found themselves advocating for.   
 In the late 18th century a discussion was also fomenting regarding natural and 
positivist law that would escalate well into the 19th century.  Not only is positivist law 
human-made, but the theory rests on the ideology of positivism (personified most popularly 
in David Hume) which essentially says that that nothing can be known beyond what is 
empirically observable or logically demonstrable. Mark Tebbit writes (discussing William of 
Ockham’s proverbial razor) that positivism states “(i)n all our investigations of the natural 
world, there must be a presumption against theories which postulate a complex of unseen 
entities when a more simple explanation is available.”140 The upshot of this for law is the 
argument that common law and precedence were too arbitrary a foundation upon which to 
build a plausible legal system.  The point of this for the purposes of this study is that legal 
positivists were refuting natural law proponents.  They argued that reason and morality were 
not the same thing, and that to posit that law was based on a morality rendered it too 
subjective to operate as the tool of logic that it must in a just society.  This is an inherent 
religious argument.  Recall that Grotius and Locke were both emerging from the horrors of 
sectarian violence.  They both couched their theories from religious standpoints but in ways 
that subsumed sectarianism into what they assumed was the theologically neutral language of 
natural law.  To be sure, natural law did go back to Aquinas, a Catholic.  However, the idea 
that there were moral absolutes and universals also resonated with Reformers of all stripes.  
It was assumed that morality, prescribed by God through the natural world and through 
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humanity’s ability to reason, was fundamental to all facets of society, particularly to those 
that regulated personal and corporate behaviour.  Legal positivism, in the name of scientific 
objectivity, removes this theological component (although some positivists were more Deist 
than Atheist) and transforms the legal system, especially in Britain, by encouraging lawyers 
and judges to eschew arguments based on what was increasingly seen as a capricious moral 
stance in favour of arguments based on logic and bald fact.141  This discussion of legal theory 
is important to bear in mind in discussions of environmental legislation for it reflects deep 
philosophical divides in early modernity extant in our policy and legislation today. 
 The earliest laws discussed—tort and property— reflect a sense that the government 
(at least the judicial branch of it) is perceived by the populace as having the responsibility for 
enacting and enforcing regulations that protect and encourage what is valued most in society.  
In those cases, security and the enjoyment of our private property.  There is morality 
entrenched, a sense of the natural law that informs the concept of a social contract 
supposing the concept of mutual beneficence.  In the public health laws, also, there is a 
pragmatism intertwined with what could be seen as a sense of responsibility towards one’s 
fellow human beings in regulating conditions under which disease and pestilence can spread. 
 Beyond tort and property law, until the 1970’s, Federal environmental law in Canada 
was sparse and depended mostly on the Federal Fisheries Act.   And even the Fisheries Act, in 
its original form in the 1860’s was limited “to blanket prohibitions against discharge of 
‘deleterious substances’ in ‘waters frequented by fish’.”142  Cited by some as the strongest 
piece of environmental law in Canada,143 the Act has undergone several permutations since 
its first inception in 1868.   
A Legislative Gap 
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 As has been mentioned, until the 1960’s and 70’s, the tools of an environmental 
lawyer were limited to the apparatus just discussed.  This means that from the late 19th 
century until the mid 20th century, there were no major federal pieces of legislation passed 
that were directed at the interrelationship between human beings and the natural world.  
This is not to say that there were no pieces of legislation passed that had to do with the 
management of natural resources, but to point out that management of the natural resources 
is not akin to the protection of one’s habitat—which is how environmental law is broadly 
viewed today.   
 The word that is of the most importance in the above paragraph is “protection” and 
the most important concept is that of government responsibility.  Tort law arises out of the 
realization that private citizens need recourse to the courts in order to seek justice that is not 
technically in the jurisdiction of the State (i.e. if it is the State’s responsibility to maintain 
order, it has been determined that the State’s powers to enforce law resides in the Criminal 
Code, leaving other matters to be decided between private individuals via the State supported 
system of the judiciary).  Thus, the State maintains security—by regulating criminal 
behaviour and order—by providing the mechanism whereby citizens may seek and find 
arbitration and resolution.  But security in these instances are related to persons and to 
personal enjoyment or fulfillment via their property.   
 The Fisheries Act, in part, protected Canadian sovereignty and gave the federal 
government the authority to mediate between two economic powerhouses in Canada, 
forestry and fishery.  Thus, the forestry industry could be held in check, lest the effluent 
from saw mills cause irreparable harm to fisheries down river or in the ocean.  Again, these 
are regulations put in place for the State to maintain security—it served no one’s interests to 
have these two important resources at constant odds with one another.  So the individual 
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was protected from his or her neighbours under civil law and via the criminal code and 
Canada’s sovereignty and industry were protected via the Fisheries Act.  It wouldn’t be until 
the 1970’s that the federal government would be pushed to consider protection of the 
natural world as a component of governmental responsibility towards its citizenry.144 
The Social Gospel and Government Responsibility 
 The question of the purpose of government for human society is broad and 
convoluted.  In addition, despite the American and French Revolutions, the argument over 
the proper role of government has not been definitively decided in the West.  The various 
permutations of public, private and other spheres are part of the puzzles of modernity and 
just where governmental authority fits in is part of the never ending labyrinth of human 
society.  So when one looks at reasons for a dearth of federal environmental legislation in the 
early decades of the 20th century, it is prudent to remember that environmental legislation is 
as much about how we govern ourselves as it is about how we treat the environment.145  
Environmental law is a response to grass roots efforts to prompt governmental action on 
the basis of protecting the natural world—at times at what seemed to be at the expense of 
economic and private property interests.  In addition (and most pertinent to this study), part 
of the  question of how we govern ourselves lies in the ways in which Christianity in Canada 
evolved in its relationship with the State. 
 The simple answer to the lack of federal environmental legislation is that such 
consideration of the needs of the environment, of the natural world, was off the political and 
the grass—roots radar.  To be sure, there was a vibrant conservationist movement in Canada 
and a strong romantic notion of Canada as free, unspoiled wilderness (especially from 
European and US tourists), but the sense that the natural world of human habitation was 
something to be protected under the auspices of the government (as opposed to having 
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natural resource interests protected) was yet to come.146  In one sense, it can be said that the 
thought of such legislation was a luxury.  This seems ludicrous in light of today`s urgency 
regarding climate change, but not so much when one considers the turmoil of the first four 
decades of the twentieth century.  To be sure, the natural world was complicit in some of the 
suffering one saw (drought, decline of fish stocks, erosion of topsoil, etc.) but it was the 
aftermath of those disasters—what to do with the human fall-out that raised concerns.  Not 
to mention the devastating effects of two major wars on the morale and the economy of the 
country.  So although we can look back in history to see that there were environmental red 
flags everywhere, as early as the mid-18th century (if not before), the lack of environmental 
legislation in the early to mid-20th century does not seem untoward.  There is, of course, a 
more complex explanation, of which religion plays a small part. 
 The history of the Church in Canada was discussed above and it is the history of the 
Social Gospel that I turn to now to explore the statements of the preceding paragraph.  The 
social and economic turmoil of the mid-19th and then the early 20th centuries shook Western 
democracies and led to much soul-searching and much wrangling over political ideology.  
The churches were caught up in this to an extent, with the social gospel movement 
occasionally conflated with socialism itself.147   The social gospel movement took much of its 
cue from the earlier Great Awakenings in the 18th and 19th centuries where evangelism and 
what is now referred to as social justice emerged as two sides of a theological coin.   
 The social gospellers were about bettering society, the Protestantism underlying it 
also gave them a strong sense of  confidence that they, as intellectual and spiritual elite, knew 
what it was that the downtrodden needed—although it must be emphasized that the 
inherent paternalism was not (at least not always) intentional.  Social gospellers embraced a 
different anthropology than their predecessors.  Children and women began to be seen as 
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people.  Poverty began to be seen as a social ill—human-made and thus having the potential 
to be human-controlled—rather than as an individual moral failing.  When an anthropology 
changes, the need for a different theology (or Christology) arises.  The Christ that arose out 
of the Social Gospellers was one that resonated with the Great Awakenings.  This Christ was 
one with a heart for the poor, and one who wanted Christians to become better people by 
being the hands of God in the world.  Instead of church as status quo, the social gospel 
posited a church for social change.  If society changed, then people would have their basic 
needs met and then they could work at being better people.  This, too, is somewhat 
simplified form the complexities of the movement, but the gist is there.  The social gospel 
movement carried out and on the abolitionist and prohibitionist crusades that were begun in 
the Great Awakenings.   
 The above is important because it shows one way in which religion was still relevant 
in the political scene in Canada.  It was because of its position as a shadow establishment 
that it could effectively lobby itself out of a societal purpose by insisting that the purpose of 
government included providing a social safety net for its citizens.  The churches engaged in 
these debates vociferously. 
 Thus it can be seen that religion, in the form of Christianity, was present in the 
political and public sphere (if, indeed, such spheres can be said to be separate) in a covert 
and in an overt way.  Covertly (albeit not by intrigue or stealth, merely by historical fact) in 
the form of natural law theory which still informed the legislative and judicial processes and 
by its overt presence as a shadow establishment.  It should be remembered, for future 
reference, that the shadow establishment in the guise of the church was itself composed of 
the elite, even as it purported to represent the voiceless and disenfranchised.  The 
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establishment elite would not have been swayed by a shadow that was not equal in social 
prestige, at least not at that point in history. 
 The desperate human needs are lifted up and championed by many holding a 
religious worldview.  The political discussions centre on human need and the balancing of 
this with human greed and the needs of a pre, concurrent, and post-war economy.  
Underlying these discussions are still the complex questions of the purpose of government 
and the place of religion in the public sphere.  The social gospel movement was successful in 
helping to lobby for a greater social safety net and, as a consequence, saw the role that 
churches played in Canadian society shift.  Their position as a shadow establishment 
remained, but the raison d’être of the institutional church had shifted.  If the government gains 
a social conscience—what is the duty of a church that has seen itself as an advocate for the 
downtrodden in modern society?  The churches had planted their feet firmly in the temporal 
world for the good of humanity’s souls, but with the wars over and the Depression over and 
post-war affluence beginning to emerge, what was the purpose of a religious public voice? 
 This has bearing on environmental legislation because one of the things (among 
many) that the churches who had been involved in the social gospel movement did was to 
eventually become involved in the environmental movement.  Before that, though, the 
churches, by virtue of their continued societal position as the shadow establishment were 
also partially responsible for the continuation of the voice of natural law theory (though the 
theory is by no means uncontested).  This voice insists that law has a mandate to put forth a 
moral vision as well as functioning as a tool for order and justice. 
Canadian Environmental Law 
 Muldoon asserts that “environmental law rests as much on ideas about democracy as 
on understandings about how to deal with the environment.”148  To understand the rise of 
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environmental law one has to understand that it is, at its essence, a grassroots phenomenon 
and hence reflects an idea of participatory, rather than purely representational, democracy.  
Muldoon highlights two especially important ideas of environmental law: the public welfare 
role of government and the importance of citizen participation in policy deliberations.149   
 Environmental law posits that governments in democracies have the responsibility to 
defend and advance public well-being and that regulation of the environment is integral to 
that well-being.   
In the 1960’s and 1970’s grass roots movements formed in response to the issues of 
air and water pollution and, when it became apparent that the existing legal tools—The 
Fisheries Act, nuisance and negligence laws—were inadequate to provide for comprehensive 
and systemic environmental protection, these groups began to lobby for legislation that 
would be effective.150 
 The importance of citizen participation is integral to environmental law—“virtually 
all progressive steps in environmental law have required public initiative, public ingenuity, 
and persistent public pressure.”151  The environmental movement of the 60’s has its roots in 
the anti—nuclear movements that developed in the aftermath of the Second World War and 
the Cold War.  Where once there had been an assumption and an excitement that 
technology would be humanity’s greatest achievement, the looming horror of nuclear 
warfare incited a movement to convince governments to divest themselves of the bomb.  
There were many offshoots of the anti-nuclear movement and the environmental, or 
ecological, movement was one of them and one of the most enduring.   
 Environmental laws were crafted in response to a rising recognition (heightened by 
awareness of the over-whelming destructiveness of the atomic bomb) that the natural world 
was also human habitat and, as such, needed to be cared for in a way that would not be 
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deleterious to human flourishing.  Muldoon refers to the Fisheries Act and the tools of 
property law, criminal law and torts as “Phase One” in the history of Canada’s 
environmental legislation.152  “Phase two” are waste control and cleanup laws. 
 These laws were mainly localized, provincial laws and statutes.  They defined the 
environment as air, water and land upon which human life depends.153  The objective was to 
control harmful substances being deposited on land or into the water.  The underlying 
assumption of this phase was that “the natural environment could be used to dispose of, 
dilute, and cleanse the waste produced by human activity, as long as sufficiently careful 
management prevented too much contamination at any one time and place.  Legislation was 
a matter of fairly allocating nature’s assimilative capacity.”154  It is in this phase that specific 
regulations regarding particular contaminates begin to appear, along with cleanup laws and 
regulation of human and industrial waste.  The late 60’s and early 70’s also saw the 
enactment of comprehensive environmental legislation in Ontario, Quebec, BC and Alberta. 
 In the late 1970’s and 80’s it became apparent that the waste control laws did not 
address the problem of accumulation of toxic chemicals in the environment and the toxics 
control laws that characterize “Phase Three” were enacted.  The hallmarks of this phase 
were recognition that environmental protection is a long term process and that toxic 
substances respect neither ecosystem nor political boundaries.  The approach was 
preventative and anticipatory and included protocols and processes for identification and 
effective control of contaminants.   These pieces of legislation were consistent with 
international laws and are thus outward looking in development, implementation and 
administration.155  Federal and provincial levels of government were held to have the 
authority to regulate toxic substances and in 1975 the Federal Environmental Contaminants Act 
(the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) was its successor) was passed.  In 1997, the 
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Supreme Court of Canada in its decision regarding R v Hydro Quebec declared that CEPA was 
constitutional and that the federal government had the power to regulate toxic substances 
under the auspices of criminal law.  The Pest Control Products Act, the Transportation of Dangerous 
Goods Act and the Canada Consumer Product Safety Act are all part of this phase of 
environmental law in Canada.156 
Phase Four is the phase with which the next chapter will be concerned: 
Comprehensive approaches involving environmental assessment and planning and 
management regimes.  The Species at Risk Act and the Environmental Assessment Act are but two 
pieces of legislation that emerge in this phase of Canadian environmental law.  This phase 
recognizes the importance of international concerns as well as reflecting at least a surface 
acknowledgement that humanity might be more embedded in the natural world than 
modernity has heretofore admitted.   
Conclusion 
Since 1970, the field of environmental law has established itself and supported itself 
with more and more comprehensive legislation at both the provincial and the federal levels.  
Most of this legislation has been initiated at the grassroots level (although it should be 
pointed out that the various Non Governmental Organizations and citizen’s groups are now 
as organized and sophisticated as the government agencies with which they negotiate) and so 
reflects a belief in the social imaginary that government cannot always be trusted to act in the 
best interests of the polis unless provoked to do so. 
 Environmental law walks a fine line between preservation and change.  It has to be a 
tool of government, the polis and industry if it is to be effective.  As Muldoon notes 
environmental law is “expected to protect resources and maintain biophysical and ecological 






and enhance efficiency in resource use.  It is dynamic/conservative; ambitious/careful; a 
broad societal contributor/an effective tool in its own realm.”157  In short, environmental 
legislation reflects the complexity of the Canadian political landscape in general.  What is 
also apparent is that there is a dichotomy of modernity that is encapsulated in the 
negotiation of environmental legislation in Canada—that of religious and non-religious 
worldviews.  The religious worldviews are apparent in the insistence by some environmental 
groups (mostly grassroots, mostly purporting to represent segments of society that are not 
perceived by the elite as having agency) that environmental legislation is inherently moral 
and embodies a worldview that sees humanity at the very least as stewards of the natural 
world and at the most as embedded in it.  Religious worldviews are also apparent in the 
stream of natural law theory that is one tributary of the philosophy of law underlying 
Canada’s legal system. 
 The non-religious worldview is apparent in the pragmatic and the positivist.  The 
Lockean principles of private property and relative autonomy from government regulation 
and interference are apparent most clearly in the laws that have been enacted.  There is a 
sense from this position that the right to economic prosperity trumps all else and that self-
regulation contributes best to the general welfare.  This last, of course, is most un-Lockean 
for both Grotius and Locke take it for granted that society will advance along the principles 
of mutual benefit.  Of course, there are massive grey areas here and the sides I am describing 
are more of a spectrum than along two poles.  The next chapter will provide a microcosm of 
the above, allowing for some further dissection of two complex and, at times, disparate 
points of view in relation to the development of the Species at Risk Act.  
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Chapter Five: The Species At Risk Act, Background and Case History 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a case study, a microcosm in which the important question of 
the relevance, import and existence of religious worldviews in the Canadian political 
landscape can be examined.  In her book Passing the Buck: Federalism and Canadian 
Environmental Policy, Kathryn Harrison makes an argument from the field of public policy 
analysis that “societal influences on governmental strategies of action and of inaction within 
the federal system” are vital, and that “…institutional analysis cannot proceed independently 
of social analysis.” 1  Dr. Harrison is making an argument in the context of a discussion on 
federalism as viewed through the lens of environmental policy.  However, her observation is 
congruent with my thesis—most particularly with the goals of this chapter.  It is my 
contention in this section that social analysis cannot be fully informed without consideration 
of the religious worldviews inherent in underlying legal, institutional and personal 
philosophies in the Canadian political landscape.  In short, a useful social analysis cannot 
make the assumption that religious worldviews are not present in myriad ways in discussions 
regarding public policy and legislation.  That being said, it should be noted from the outset 
that the first part of this chapter will be more (in fact, mostly) concerned with laying a 
foundation that concerns policy and legislation more than it does religion.  It is necessary to 
set this foundation so that the reader has an adequate grasp of the context in which religious 
worldviews and their impact on the relevant legislation and policy will be examined.  
The aims of this chapter are to show how religious worldviews are present (in a 
general way) in the environmental policies of a government, in this case, the federal Liberal 
governments between the years of 1993 and 2004—when the Species at Risk Act (SARA)was 
first conceived until its eventual Royal Assent into law.  This portion of the study will also 
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show how religious worldviews were reflected in the process of negotiation, the eventual 
composition of legislation (SARA, specifically) and in the aftermath—discussions, critiques 
and implementation challenges.  I will begin with a brief discussion regarding policy in 
general and the Liberal Party’s stated environmental policy in the election of 1992 along with 
some observations regarding the implementation of that policy in the form of internal audits 
and external critics.  The study will then explore the context in which SARA was first 
proposed—the United Nations Convention of Biological Diversity—and the ensuing story 
of how SARA came to be, this portion includes an in-depth exploration of the religious 
worldviews of two of the most prominent people associated with the process of SARA 
becoming law, The Honourable David Anderson, former Minister of the Environment 
under Jean Chrétien and Elizabeth May, past president of the Sierra Club Canada and 
current leader of the Green Party of Canada.  This portion will include an analysis of SARA 
in the context of discussion Mr. Anderson and Ms. May.  The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the ways in which SARA has or has not been implemented and the role (if any) 
that religious worldviews played in that part of the story.  It is hoped that by telling and 
analyzing the story of SARA and two of the characters at the heart of its plot it will be 
shown that religious worldviews are extant and, when acknowledged as overt components of 
the political whole, beneficial rather than detrimental to the Canadian political landscape. 
Methodology 
 There are many ways to approach the type of analysis undertaken in this study.  The 
study could have been done without any interviews, relying entirely on the texts of 
committee hearings and reports issued from outside sources, such as the Sierra Club of 
Canada’s annual Reports on Rio (which will be discussed below).  However, I was interested 
in underscoring the human element of the policy and legislative process in order to drive 
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home the point of religion not being detrimental to the legislative process in general and to 
this one, specifically.  For this, I decided, it was necessary to conduct interviews with persons 
involved in the process.  Since the interest in this component of the study was the human 
element—in the stories and backgrounds that people brought to this legislation—a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative approach was employed.   
The next decision to be made was whether to concentrate on breadth or on depth in 
terms of soliciting input from persons involved in the legislative process under scrutiny.  
Theoretical sampling was to be used.  As Janice M. Morse explains, “A theoretical sample is 
the deliberate seeking of participants who have particular knowledge or characteristics that 
will contribute data to categories with inadequate data, referred to as thin areas of analysis.”2  
The category that was thin was that of the personal approach a person with a religious 
worldview might bring to the policy and/or legislative table and how deeply that religious 
worldview might or might not become embedded in both process and policy or legislation.  
Theoretical sampling can provide both breadth and depth, especially as the interviews 
progress and categories begin to emerge, but in the interest of brevity, it was felt that only 
one or the other could be employed.  
Both breadth and depth have merit.  Breadth affords a comprehensive picture with 
myriad perspectives and certainly provides a larger sample size from which to draw 
conclusions.  There were a plethora of parties involved in the crafting of the SARA and the 
process concerning its crafting and proclamation was far enough in the past to have enabled 
me to gain access to more than a few of the players.  One of the drawbacks of breadth, 
however, is that it can preclude the ability of the researcher to draw and report on in-depth 
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conclusions regarding individuals—especially given the limited space for this component of 
this particular project.   
The disadvantages of depth were that it would necessitate smaller sample sizes and 
therefore would not have the numbers to allow me to extrapolate my findings in a broad, 
general way.  However, depth could serve as a model for further study and more broad 
analysis by suggesting categories for comparison and contrast.  As well, depth could be 
facilitated by unstructured interviews with a limited number of players who were willing to 
speak with me not only in regards to policy and legislation and political strategy, but on a 
more personal level in regards to their individual religious worldviews and histories. 
Obtaining the permission and trust required of subjects for unstructured interviews could be 
prohibitively difficult, given that some of the people integral to the development of the 
SARA were still participating in public life. 
In the end, three considerations were pondered before choosing depth over breadth: 
the breadth and scope of the study itself, the likely quality of interviews obtained from the 
perspective of either approach (breadth or depth) and, the amount of useable data that might 
be obtained.3  The SARA was a fairly narrow topic to be studying, although the intertwining 
of environmental law and religion was not.  However, since this component of the study was 
narrow, it was felt that a representative from two sides of the drama that was the composing, 
negotiating, and passing of the SARA would suffice to build the categories mentioned 
above.  In a study that revolved entirely around the SARA, more samples would have been 
chosen.   
The likely quality of the interviews was a difficult one to assess, but I was confident 
that I could obtain at least two quality interviews from players who were integral to the 
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process and who were, if not on opposite sides, at least came from two different 
perspectives regarding the SARA.  My confidence stemmed from the fact that from 1998 
until 2001, I was living in Ottawa and working at St. Bartholomew’s Anglican Church as 
their Christian Education Coordinator and Youth Director.  Mr. Anderson’s children were 
part of the Sunday School and the Youth Group and Ms. May was (and is) a dedicated 
Sunday School teacher.  Both were active, involved members of the parish.  I was new to 
Canada at the time and initially unaware of the prominent positions Mr. Anderson and Ms. 
May held in their public lives.  To me they were simply engaged parents and willing 
volunteers.  However, as I became more entrenched in the parish, I began to gain knowledge 
of the “outside” lives of the parishioners and of the parents of the youth with whom I 
worked.  From time to time, I had conversations regarding religion and the environment 
with both Mr. Anderson and Ms. May.  I was also dimly aware of the conflict and tension 
that arose out of the negotiations regarding the SARA—as politics and environmental issues 
have always been two of my passions—although I was diligent in my efforts to remain 
neutral, as was my professional duty.  Through my work at St. Bartholomew’s, I developed a 
good relationship and an easy rapport with both individuals.   
My professional relationship with Ms. May and Mr. Anderson was one reason that 
the SARA was chosen as the piece of legislation to analyze in this study.  My relative 
familiarity with the story of the SARA and with two of the players and their religious 
worldviews seemed a good fit.  In terms of choosing samples for interviews in the context of 
the story of the SARA, Mr. Anderson and Ms. May were ideal—they both had established 
religious worldviews, came from the same denomination but held disparate theological 
views, and were passionate about the environment while having very different 
anthropologies.  In addition, they were both experienced participants in the Canadian and 
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International political landscape.  That experience would afford, I felt, a wealth of 
information and insight in regards to how one integrated one’s personal worldviews with 
one’s job as a public steward.  This experience, both in the realm of personal religious 
worldviews and praxis and with political landscapes, addressed the third criteria—the 
amount of useable data for the study.  As was mentioned above, it is exceedingly difficult to 
get public figures to speak candidly in regards to personal views and values especially as they 
pertain to religion.  I was confident that my relationship with Ms. May and with Mr. 
Anderson was based on enough trust that I would be able to ask personal questions 
regarding their religious worldviews and their early religious histories and receive responses 
that were more nuanced and in-depth than those I would have received from subjects with 
whom I had no relationship.  This is not to say that qualitative analysis necessitates such a 
relationship, but to point out that persons in public life are quite often inured to probing 
questions and reluctant to speak about religion in any sort of meaningful way on a personal 
level. 
One difficulty with qualitative analysis is that it is hard to know when one has 
acquired an adequate amount of data for one’s purpose.  The working rule is that of 
saturation—when no new data appear and, as Morse writes, “the researcher has ‘heard it 
all’”4  I conducted two interviews with Ms. May and two with Mr. Anderson.  Interviews 
with Ms. May were in person and on the phone and interviews with Mr. Anderson were 
both via phone.  The first interview with Ms. May lasted approximately 2 hours and each of 
the other interviews were approximately an hour each.  Both subjects were asked to tell 
about their religious worldviews, describe their religious history and to talk about the 
development of the SARA.  Saturation occurred, in terms of the SARA, in these interviews 




At this juncture it might be prudent to mention the fine line that this study draws regarding 
the privatization of religion.  Although it is defined clearly and discussed elsewhere in this 
study, an important clarification bears repeating here:  it is part of the contention of this 
study that religious worldviews in the modern world of the 21st century cannot be 
categorized as privatized.  Religious worldviews are integral to the myriad other worldviews 
that live in any given individual (always supposing this particular individual has chosen to 
embrace a religious worldview) but those religious worldviews are present in the public 
sphere or in the political landscape whenever that individual chooses to participate in said 
venues.  Ms. May and Mr. Anderson may be quite careful to articulate their desire not to 
impose their personal religious beliefs on others but their religious worldviews underlie the 
work they do in and on behalf of the polis at large.  In this sense, their religious worldviews 
are not privatized, but extant and operating in the public sphere and political landscape.  Just 
how they are integrated will be discussed below after a brief definition of other terms used in 
this chapter. 
Policy 
Simply put, policy is a plan or course of action that is adopted by an individual or 
group.  In terms of electoral politics, policies are developed by various political parties in 
part, to show the electorate what they can expect should that party be elected to power.  
Parties also use policies to determine and guide courses of action once the elections are over 
and the business of governing has begun.  In a Parliamentary system, such as Canada’s, the 
opposition theoretically uses their policy platform as a guideline for determining when to 
support or oppose the policies of the party in power. 
Conservatives, The Green Plan, and Rio: A Paradigm Shift Triumvirate?  
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As mentioned in Chapter Four, Canada’s environmental policies have traditionally 
been intertwined with economic concerns.  Even the conservation movement that nurtured 
the science of ecology had a mandate that was more in line with preserving parts of the 
natural world for the purposes of tourism, fishing and hunting.  This changed somewhat in 
the 1960’s and 70’s when a variety of grassroots environmental advocacy movements began 
to lobby for clean air and water in the face of increasing environmental pollution and a 
perceived unwillingness by industry or government to be proactive.   
These grassroots movements were informed, for the most part, by the ecology 
movement—which viewed the world as a complex of systems, rather than as autonomous 
components of a finite whole.  In religious terms, those movements that incorporated 
people and ideals of faith, the worldview embraced was a model of stewardship as opposed 
to a dominion/domination model.  St. Francis of Assisi is often pointed to as the originator 
of the stewardship movement (although, as shown, this is not a completely accurate 
conception of Francis).  Environmental concerns had occupied a portion of the theological 
community for quite some time but with Lynn White’s essay on “The Historical Roots of 
Our Ecologic Crisis” in 1967, a fervent and rigorous academic discussion began that started 
to give firm historical and theological foundations to the environmental activism already 
extant in the Christian community.  These movements are important for myriad reasons but 
one most pertinent for policy is that the arguments the groups made for clean air and water  
and for regulation of industry to counter pollution were arguments based in morality and 
public health—not on the premise of maintaining the integrity of natural resources for 
purposes of sustainable exploitation.  As can be seen, this was a substantial shift in focus that 
highlighted a growing hostility between government and industry and environmentalists.  
Policy had traditionally been driven by a tacit agreement between natural resource industries 
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and government that unimpeded access to resources were necessary for the well-being of 
Canada as a viable, sovereign nation.  The grassroots movements that rose up to lobby for 
stronger laws against pollution did not disrupt this agreement, but in many ways served to 
solidify it, creating, in essence, two distinct and adversarial camps, with government and 
industry united against environmentalists—each group seeing the other as intractable and as 
embracing social imaginaries that were detrimental to human flourishing.   This shifted 
somewhat in the 1990’s. 
Another shift that is important to note is that of jurisdiction.  In 1985, the 
Conservative government was compelled by a number of factors to increase the federal role 
in environmental issues, despite a stated preference for federal-provincial cooperation.5  
Harrison notes that Tom McMillan, the environment minister at the time, “…clearly 
envisioned a federal role that included federal unilateralism, thus going beyond the strictly 
supplementary role assumed in the past.”6  The Conservatives asserted a strong federal role, 
even after the election in 1988 with the new environmental minister, Lucien Bouchard 
stating that: 
If there is a special role for the federal government, it is the development of 
national environmental protection standards and practices.  The very nature of 
environmental problems demands this.  Too often, the solutions adopted to 
control polluting emissions or hazardous waste, for instance, differ from 
province to province…Ottawa must play a key role in the harmonization of 
standards and methods.7 
 
Harrison’s thesis is that increased federal involvement in environmental issues is 
strengthened only when the polls reflect an electorate that is profoundly concerned with 
environmental issues—Bouchard’s statement certainly is reflective of such a government 
inhabiting such a reality.  The courts had asserted the federal government’s place in 
environmental regulation and at this point in time, Harrisons shows, the public was eager to 
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see federal involvement.  As the recession of the early 90’s began to take shape, however, the 
urgency of larger environmental concerns (acid rain, global warming, etc.) is taken on less 
and less by the rhetoric of the federal government and talk turns to what is being done 
internationally and what can be done in partnership with provinces and the private sector.  It 
should be noted that the private sector increasingly comes to refer to industry and is not 
consistently inclusive of grass roots environmentalist movements who also see their 
influence wax and wane with the polls.  
As mentioned above, a shift in Canada’s environmental policy occurred in the 1990’s 
when an attempt was made to first discuss environmental and economic issues 
comprehensively and also to move in a direction that was less reactive (i.e. environmental 
cleanup) and more proactive (i.e. a sustainable development model with regulation only a 
portion of the whole picture.  This was aided, in part, by the newly minted (1989) Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) Enforcement and Compliance Policy which, among other 
things, promised that compliance with CEPA would be mandatory thus ushering in a change 
in policy, a ‘radical shift in philosophy’ from the ‘gradual, negotiated compliance’ that 
previous federal legislation had encouraged.8   In 1990, the Conservative government under 
the leadership of Brian Mulroney introduced the Green Plan, a five-year initiative designed 
to deal comprehensively with environmental and economical issues. The formulation of The 
Green Plan was complex and controversial with several governmental departments and 
cabinet ministers concerned about a “power grab” by Environment Canada.9  Roundly 
criticized by environmentalists and praised by the Alberta business community and the 
provinces, The Green Plan continuously stressed the need for federal-provincial partnerships 
(to the annoyance of the environmentalist groups who felt that their hard-won powers to 
force the federal government to flex its constitutional muscles in terms of the environment 
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was being eroded).  The first plan to make a policy commitment to sustainable development, 
the Green Plan was a combination of environmental cleanup/protection and framework for 
sustainable development.  “Sustainable development” in this context means a way of 
maintaining economic growth and natural resource exploitation while taking care not to 
decimate the very resources one is attempting to exploit.  The Conservative effort attempted 
to steer away from unsustainability and a poor economy, calling the Green Plan an effort at 
‘planning for life.’10  In a sort of three-pronged approach, the plan allocated funds for 
cleaning up past mistakes, growing industrial technologies and practices to promote 
pollution cleanup and sustainable development, and to develop programs to address 
“normative principles that shape decision-making systems in government and society.”  
These societal and economic decision making systems (i.e. the systems whereby concern for 
and steps to ameliorate potential environmental degradation was sublimated in the face of 
perceived economic necessity) were identified in the earliest drafts of the plan (1989) as the 
root cause of environmental degradation.11  Toner notes and Hoberg and Harrison agree 
that once the Green Plan was reviewed and amended by the Cabinet Committee on the 
Environment, it looked “less like a novel sustainable development strategy and more like just 
another environmental protection program.”12  What the Committee had done was to put 
the cleanup programs to the fore and the suggestions for a paradigm shift in societal and 
economic agendas aft, thereby addressing stated concerns of the electorate and subsuming a 
potentially difficult political position.  Toner notes, however, that even thus reinvented, the 
Plan still marked a shift of sorts by moving away from an inordinate reliance on the 
heretofore favoured regulatory approach.  Harrison remarks that The Green Plan was 
essentially a spending program that was composed heavily of “programs that make friends” 
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(i.e. national parks, local benefits and research centres) and innocuous spending 
commitments that “don’t make enemies” (environmental monitoring and education).13 
The Green Plan introduced to Canadians in 1990 was the plan taken to the Earth 
Summit in Rio and the plan had been to use Rio as a launching pad for Green Plan II, but 
that ambition was never fulfilled.14  What did happen at Rio was a reflection, in part, of the 
further acknowledgement by government that myriad voices, not just those of government 
and industry, were entitled to, if not precisely a seat at the proverbial negotiating table, at 
least a full view of what was on the menu and some input into how it ought to be ordered.15  
All components of the Canadian contingent at Rio were invited to daily briefings by Jean 
Charest, then the Minister of the Environment.  Although Environment Canada’s 
enthusiasm for this  ‘increasing recognition of the need for transparency, accountability and 
inclusion in the way we make decisions relating to the environment,”16 was strong, other 
departments did not share this zeal and the promise of inclusivity and transparency was not 
continued once the delegates reached their natal shores.  However, the precedence had been 
set and it will be shown how environmental groups would harness this model of cooperation 
and negotiation and potential for productive cross-section dialogue in the long and often 
fractious path towards Royal Assent for SARA.17  
Both Toner and Harrison have postulated that the Conservatives had political will to 
implement the Green plan but not the staying power because the agreements made at Rio 
and environmental issues in general faded from the ‘top of mind’ public opinion surveys as 
the economic recession deepened.18 19  In short, the plan needed the impetus of the 
electorate because the government itself lacked a “strong ideological or emotional 
foundation” for implementation from within the party.20 
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Harrison refers to this period as “the second wave of environmentalism” in Canada, 
wherein the electorate once again evince a major interest in the environment, prompting a 
response at the federal level.21  This is significant, for it illuminates the background against 
which SARA was negotiated.  The environmental policies of the Conservative government 
in the late 1980’s were driven by heightened public interest in the environment (most 
particularly in terms of air and water pollution) and were hampered by issues of jurisdiction 
that were reflective of other politically fraught developments in the same period (i.e. The 
Meech Lake Accord).  Federal-provincial relations are key to environmental legislation in 
Canada and Harrison marks two important ways in which they changed after the first wave 
of federal legislation in the early 1970’s.  The first was that the provinces had “colonized 
their jurisdiction” and were resentful of federal interference.  Jealous of their autonomy and 
concerned that federal environmental regulations put into place by politicians in Ottawa who 
did not have to pay the political price for loss of jobs and lack of economic investment 
would have deleterious results for their provinces, provincial politicians were antagonistic 
towards a stronger federal presence in environmental affairs.22  Secondly, environmental 
groups had fought and won court cases that forced the federal government to acknowledge 
and enforce its position as major player in environmental affairs meaning that, among other 
things, “…federal and provincial governments no longer were able to resolve their disputes 
behind closed doors.”23  Thus, going into the 1990’s, four players stood at the ready to 
embark on discussions of environmental protection and regulation, and economic 
development: the federal government, the provinces, industry, and environmentalists.  





The Liberals “Create Opportunity” in Black and White and Red All Over 
 The Conservative government were defeated in October 1993 and the Liberals 
moved into government with the policy book, Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada 
(aka “The Red Book”) clearly outlining the policy agenda for the foreseeable future.  In 
opposition, the Liberals had criticized The Green Plan for not going far enough to effect a 
“fundamental shift in values and public policy”.24   The environmental policy that the Red 
Book advocated was, in essence, one that adopted converging economic and environmental 
agendas.25  It took off from Rio and from The Green Plan and was intended, in part to 
institutionalizing sustainable development in government, society and industry.  The stated 
policy attempts to veer away from regulation in favour of “preventive care” and also 
advocates for the above stated “fundamental shift” by creating a social imaginary in which 
the economic and environmental agendas were focussed on prosperity without 
environmental degradation or loss.  In fact, the policy consistently insists upon sustainable 
development as a ‘win-win’ proposition.  Another interesting aspect of the policy is the 
consistent promise to reform the structures and functioning of the federal government in 
order to facilitate the ensuing agenda 
 The Liberal environmental policy outlined in the Red Book of 1993 had four 
components:  
1. “Keeping Canada’s Promises” puts into place two arm’s length governmental bodies 
(the Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development under the 
aegis of the Auditor General’s office, and the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency) and promises an audit of policies and funding so that there is incentive for 
research and development that is pro industry and pro environmental sustainability.   
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2. “The Greening of Industry” addresses pollution prevention and energy conservation, 
the environmental industry—which it does little to define other than to make the 
statement that Canada is a “world leader in understanding the impact of industry on 
the environment”— and, renewable resources.26 
3. “Building on Public Awareness” is the component most directed to the individual 
voter.  It outlines a project that emerged from the National Round Table on the 
Environment and the Economy and was a proposal to create a national marketing 
campaign—which was likened to Participaction—“…to communicate the individual 
and collective actions needed for sustainable development.”  As well, it promises 
intervener funding and greater individual access to the courts, proposing to give 
individual citizens and environmental group’s access to regulatory procedures.  This 
section also addresses the phasing out of toxins and a commitment of sorts to 
cooperate with the Provinces and municipalities on carbon dioxide emissions while 
still maintaining a competitive economic base.27  The policies outlined in this section 
also promise to complete the National Parks System by 2000 and to “protect in its 
natural state a representative sample of each of the country’s natural regions, 
amounting to at least 12 percent of Canada.”28 
4. “International Leadership” is the final section on sustainable development and it 
deals mostly with the promise that, “…environmental security through sustainable 
development will be a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy.”29   
The Red Book reflected both a pragmatic and a mythological approach to the 
environment.  Using phrases such as “wise public investment”30 and “integration with 
economic and environmental goals”,31 the policies described were intended to convey a 
message of fiscal responsibility and a keen sense of the importance of natural resource 
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industries to Canada’s economic well-being.  This is especially strong in the section on 
natural resources (as opposed to the section dedicated to the environment and sustainable 
development) where policies for “simpler environmental and regulatory policies, and 
attractive taxation regimes” are emphasized along with the assertion that government has the 
responsibility to be “more supportive” and “collaborative” with industry and “must help in 
the environmental sphere by dealing with the problem of overlapping jurisdiction over 
environmental standards, regulations, and assessments”.32  The settlement of Aboriginal land 
claims and a streamlined system of assessment, regulation and land access are earmarked as 
important environmental components of the Liberal natural resources policies.  It is 
interesting to note that the language used in the section on Natural Resources is clear, 
concise and business-like.  Discussion of the conservation of fish stock, for example 
mentions “effective conservation measures” for the purposes of sustaining the fisheries 
industry.33   This contrasts with the language present in the section on environment and 
sustainable development. 
 An exegesis of Chapter Four of The Red Book of 1993 is akin to untangling the 
myriad voices and sources of the Pentateuch.  There is the brisk, rational, business-like 
persuasion of the source that promises to “establish a framework in which environmental 
and economic policy signals point the same way;”34 and which observes that, 
“(e)nvironmental liability concerns have begun to affect the functioning of Canadian capital 
markets.  A solution must be sought that does not burden parties who exercise due diligence 
with undue liability…”35  This is the same voice found in the section on Natural Resources, 
the source I shall refer to as “P” for pragmatic, practical and prudent. 
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 There is a second voice that is particularly apparent in Chapter Four and it is a voice 
that goes beyond election hyperbole—although it certainly does indulge in that from time to 
time.  This voice uses the words “vision” and “moral” and reflects a stewardship approach 
to sustainable development and the environment that, it is believed, is meant to resonate 
with that portion of the electorate for whom the environment is not merely resource, but 
something over which humanity has an obligation that goes beyond economic need.  Thus, 
the “E” source (ecological, environmentalist) in the Red Book makes statements like “(t)he 
vision a Liberal government will follow incorporates the qualities of thrift, collaboration, and 
a special physical and spiritual tie to the land that are important to the Canadian identity.”36   
 The two voices represented in Chapter Four of the Red Book are interesting for the 
purposes of this study in part because they indicate a tacit acknowledgement or at least a 
perception of the environmentalist component of the electorate to whom the policy 
purports to speak.  The stated policy walks a delicate line between a dichotomy of 
interests—industry/government and environmentalists and, while it purports to be 
advancing an intertwining of needs and goals, it also by its very language facilitates the 
dichotomy.  The pattern of the document is such that a grand vision statement is put forth 
by E (with some snippets, in red, by P) to be followed, as the document narrows to details 
by statements that are often almost wheedling in tone aimed at industry and those more 
inclined to a “P” sort of vision: “Managing economic development and human growth 
without destroying the life-support systems of our planet demands of Canadians a 
fundamental shift in values and public policy.  We must aspire to be less wasteful of our 
natural and human resources, to place greater worth on the welfare of future generations, 
and to take pride in maintaining a healthy, productive earth37   followed in the next 
paragraph by more assertive use of “P”: “…a vision of a society that protects the long-term 
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health and diversity of all species on the planet, promotes energy efficiency and clean 
technologies as the basis of a competitive industry, and wisely manages and conserves its 
renewable resources.”38 
 Now, of course it is imperative when crafting a policy document for the entire 
electorate that the document be as all encompassing of a plethora of interests as possible 
without seeming to be obsequious in the extreme.  However, the tone of the rest of the Red 
Book is that of “P”.  “E” is only adamantly extant in the section on sustainable 
development.  This is so, in part, because the public’s interest in and approval of 
environmentalist groups was particularly high when the book was crafted.39  Thus, it was 
necessary to capture both the interest and trust of industry and environmentalists with the 
same document.  The Red Book acknowledges the agreements made at Rio while also 
attempting to convince industry that their interests would also be served by this societal 
shift.  But what is interesting here is that the “E” source uses language that is often 
associated with religious worldviews: “vision”, “spiritual”, “moral”, “wisdom”.  The more 
concrete language is saved for the “P” source: “sustainable management”, “converging 
agendas”, “promotion of efficiency” “competitiveness”.   
 The type of language that is associated with “E” in the Red Book is significant, for it 
betrays an assumption that environmentalists are more apt than not to hold a worldview that 
is, if not specifically religious, at least open to that way of framing reality.  There is nothing 
inherently wrong in that assumption, it is true that religious voices were up front and present 
at the Earth Summit in Rio and that voices advocating for environmental stewardship had 
become steadily stronger and more numerous throughout the 70’s and the 80’s.  This subtle 
equation of environmentalists with religious worldviews becomes significant when it is 
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realized that, as the economic recession of the early 90’s became more pronounced and 
public awareness of and urgency for environmental issues eroded, environmentalists as 
individuals and as groups had to fight not only for a place at the table but for the 
acknowledgement by government that their presence and their input was legitimate.  The 
dichotomy that is personified in the Red Book becomes more pronounced in practice.  In 
addition, it could be argued that one reason that the environmentalists were perceived as 
being outside the political norm in terms of helping to formulate legislation and critiquing 
policy was that they were perceived by the ruling elite as having a predilection for religious 
worldview, something that, as has been seen, is considered to be outside the pale for 
Canadian politics.  Of course, it is ludicrous to suggest that all environmentalists and 
environmentalist groups have religious worldviews or, even if they do, that those worldviews 
are at the fore when policy is being determined.  But it is clear in the language of the policy 
handbook that such worldviews were seen by the elite as integral to the thought processes of 
these groups.  And it has also been demonstrated that the elite in Canada’s political 
landscape are wary of religion in the public sphere.  This being said, it is not untoward to 
postulate that the voices of environmentalists were viewed with suspicion bordering on 
hostility not only because of a perceived agenda that was seen to be at odds with short-term 
economic prosperity (the Liberal government itself having argued that long-term prosperity 
lay in sound environmental policy) but also because environmentalists were perceived as 
opening the dialogue in the public sphere up to voices (i.e. religious worldviews) that the 
elite believed were detrimental to the smooth operation of government and society.   
The overall tone of the policy is one of enthusiasm for the potentially lucrative 
economic rewards that may emerge from a shift in focus from an economy based on natural 
resources exports to one based on “the research, development, and implementation of clean 
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and energy-efficient technologies, renewable energy use....a host of new investment 
opportunities.”40  It must be acknowledged, however, that the projected awareness of 
responsible environmental stewardship does not ring hollow.  The policy as written conveys 
a positive sense that sustainable development is not only prudent and potentially lucrative, 
but responsible as well, “Sustainable development—integrating economic with 
environmental goals—fits in the Liberal tradition of social investment as sound economic 
policy.  Preventive environmental care is the foundation of the liberal approach to 
sustainable development; it is a wise public investment like preventive social policies and 
preventive health care.”41  
Couching environmental stewardship in the terms of prudence and investment in 
addition to harkening to the very popular national healthcare system placed the Liberal 
policies in a position calculated to gain agreement from all sides.  To reiterate the policy 
position, the Liberals released a vision document called “A Guide to Green Government” in 
June 1995.42  This document was signed by the Prime Minister and by cabinet and state that, 
“achieving sustainable development requires an approach to public policy that is 
comprehensive, integrated, open and accountable.  It should also embody a commitment to 
continuous improvement.”43 This document is important because it provided a framework 
to guide the preparation of the now-legally mandated sustainable development strategies 
(SDS) that each governmental department was to design and implement.  The Office of the 
Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development was created at this time to 
monitor the SDS’s and to report on them to Parliament.   
The Liberal environmental policy of the early 1990’s was more cautious than the 
Conservative policies in the mid to late 1980’s.  This correlates with the salience of the 
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environment in the minds of the polis at the time.44  Stated policies leaned heavily on the 
desire to balance the concerns of the four stakeholders named above.  What is very 
interesting is that, in addition to the Red Book being a self-proclaimed collaborative process, 
it also builds heavily on the more popular aspects of Rio, using language from the 
agreements to reach out to the public, cementing the perception that Canada was a world 
leader in issues of the environment.  They revised and proclaimed the Environmental 
Assessment Act which was popular with the electorate and built upon the court cases fought 
by environmental groups forcing the federal government’s hand in intervening with 
provincially sanctioned projects.45  As Harrison points out, the establishment of the Act and 
the agency was also a means by which the federal government could re-gain control of their 
discretion to intervene with the provinces on environmental issues46—control that had been 
substantially weakened by court decisions in cases brought forth by environmental groups. 
They promised to invest in “environmental industry” citing new methods of manufacturing, 
research and development, capitalizing on Canadian experience in cleaning up environmental 
waste and alternative energy sources as ways in which the economy and the environment 
could be served this was a nod to the provinces and reassurance that federal funds would be 
available to mitigate other aspects of environmental policy that could prove to be 
detrimental.  This component also linked in with foreign policies, as trade and environment 
became more and more closely linked.47  The promise to pour money into a public relations 
campaign gave a nod to the promises made by countries at Rio and also was meant to 
reassure environmentalists that the Liberal government was sincere in its stated policies.  
Assertion of Canada’s intention to be present at the international level and the government’s 
awareness that security was, in part, an environmental issue re-framed the traditional role of 
environmental awareness at the federal level—which was seeing the protection and 
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conservation of the natural world as a component of maintaining sovereignty.  In addition, 
the international component also has a trade aspect to it.  The 1994 foreign policy review 
argued that “domestic policies on environment, trade, and development assistance have an 
effect on international security by influencing international developments.  Building shared 
security…involves creating a long-term international trade and investment agenda that 
focuses the World Trade Organization’s attention on issues such as agricultural export 
subsidies, labour standards, anti-dumping actions, and other domestic practices that harm 
the environment.”48   
Grand statements and attempts at diplomacy aside, the environment was not the 
primary focus of the federal Liberal government from 1993 to 1997 when Jean Chretien 
called a second election.  Balancing the budget and paying down the national debt were the 
focus, with the 1995 referendum in Quebec also taking some care and attention.  Also, as 
mentioned, interest in environmental issues were waning in the perception of the public as 
the recession and federal government cutbacks took hold, and Quebec separatism loomed 
large in the national conversation.  By the time an election was called in 1997, however, the 
budget was well on its way to being balanced (indeed, in 1998 there was a surplus) and 
Chretien and Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, were quite popular.  The 1997 Red Book was 
titled, Securing Our Future Together.  The section on the Environment is titled “Environmental 
Stewardship” and the language and policies are vastly different from those outlined in the 
first Red Book in 1993.  Gone is the dual source.  In its place is the “P” voice, steady, 
reassuring and solid.  Gone also is the language of spirituality and morality.  In its place are 
the terms “heritage”, “shared history”, “true and worthy stewards”, “conservation”, “proud” 
and most forcefully—“Canadians”.  It is a document and a section calculated to address a 
country recently on the brink of dissolution.  It also reflects a government well aware of the 
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fact that the environment was not at that point high on the public’s list of important national 
issues, but unemployment, the economy, health care and national unity were.49  In the 1997 
Red Book, the policy spelled out is one of careful diplomacy.  Emphasis is placed on 
traditional areas of federal involvement: National Parks, species and marine conservation, air 
and water pollution, public awareness campaigns.50  The areas covered are expanded in the 
1997 Red Book.  They are: 
1.  “Custodians of Wilderness and Wildlife”:  As mentioned above, a traditional 
area of federal jurisdiction, this section concentrates on conserving the National 
Parks and makes mention of the proposed Species at Risk Act. 
2. “Shifting to Sustainable Development”:  In the previous Red Book, sustainable 
development was the cornerstone of Liberal environmental policy.  In this 
edition, many of the same goals are articulated, but the ambitions are somewhat 
diluted and emphasis is on changes that the federal government can make within. 
3. “Science and Technology for Sustainable Development”:  The Liberal policy 
again is to provide research and development monies at home and abroad to 
facilitate the growth of environmental industry. 
4. “Strengthening Environmental and Health Science”:  This component of policy 
is new to the Red Book and is most likely designed to speak to that portion of 
the polis for who healthcare was a looming concern.  This component of the 
policy speaks to research into toxic substances and supporting the training and 
employment of scientists interested in environment and health. 
5. “Pollution Prevention”:  This component builds on earlier policy by proposing 
amendments to the CEPA and asserting that prevention is cheaper in the long 
run than is cleanup.  Again, the emphasis here is on what the federal government 
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can do to improve itself.  There is a careful delineation between what is federal 
and what is not. 
6. “International Leadership”:  In 1992, this section discussed security and the 
exporting of Canadian industrial knowledge, this section in the 1997 Red Book 
has a different emphasis.  In the 1997 version discusses the fact that “many 
environmental problems cross borders and so must be dealt with on an 
international level.”51  This is the first mention of crossborder contamination and 
it is significant that it is firmly ensconced in the “international” section of the 
chapter.  Scientific cooperation, Canada’s reputation as an “honest broker” and 
“environmental expertise” are other factors woven into this component of 
environmental policy.52 
7. “Climate Change”:  Climate change did not receive its own section in the 1992 
Red Book although it is mentioned a couple of times in the context of 
controlling emissions and international agreements.  In 1997, climate change is 
defined and acknowledged as being real and poses a threat to “…Canada’s 
ecological and economical well-being.”53  It is one of the longer sections in the 
policy statement.  “Thoughtful and effective action” is called for and the policy 
put forth incorporates research and development, scientific study and an 
agreement to reduce emissions.  In addition, the policy clearly states that “…we 
have a responsibility as a technologically advanced nation to take progressive 
measures and play a leadership role, both domestically and internationally…it is 
through the example we set and the efforts we make that we gain the credibility 
and authority to encourage other nations to take similar action.”  By this 
phrasing, the policy refutes other arguments, both domestic and international, 
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that developed nations cannot be expected to cut their emissions if developing 
nations will not do the same.  The necessity of working with provincial 
governments on climate change is also touched upon, touting a recent agreement 
between governments to work together to “achieve the highest standards of 
environmental quality.”54 This section also announced the formation of a “Youth 
Round Table” to advise the Minister of the Environment. 
Although the heading “Environmental Stewardship” can be construed as religious 
language, the phrase had been used enough by religious and non-religious groups alike to be 
seen as appealing to a broad spectrum of voices.  Certainly it speaks to that strain of 
reformulated Franciscan theology adopted by Christian environmentalists as justification for 
ecological activism.  The term also harkens back to the early conservationists, John Muir, 
especially, whose evangelical Christian roots are clear in the ways he writes about humanity’s 
responsibility towards creation.  The import of the term for a government wanting to stress 
its achievements in the regards to the budget and management of the economy is enormous, 
too.  “Stewardship” carries with it the connotations of sober thoughtfulness, of being 
prudent, careful and in control.  Implicitly referencing the dictum that evolved in part from 
the Protestant Reformation—that a managed, ordered society was what counted as 
civilized—the word “stewardship” conveys just that.  The very malleability of the term 
makes it a good choice for introducing the revamped environmental policies. The Liberal 
environmental policy going into Jean Chretien’s second mandate is conspicuously devoid of 
attempts to reach out to environmentalists (or any other group save the provinces), 
specifically.  The language used has the tone and effect of attempting to draw the entire polis 
into a shared vision of Canada as a vast expanse of natural beauty and bounty, the heritage 
of which is a collective legacy towards which we all have a responsibility.  The lack of 
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spiritual language can be seen as significant, as that language not only is perceived as 
speaking to environmentalists but to Aboriginals and, given the antagonism at the time 
regarding arguments over “distinct societies”, to refer to environmental issues with any 
terms that could have been construed as favouring the rights of one faction of society over 
another would not have been politic to say the least.   
The environmental policies of the Liberal government heading out of the 1990’s and 
into the 2000’s were not particularly assertive and indeed, have the air of taking a backseat to 
the more publicly salient issues of economic growth, strengthening healthcare, jobs and 
national unity.  The federal government took a fairly conservative stance, erring on the side 
of diplomacy always with an eye on the economy and national unity.  The care the federal 
government took to refrain from taking what could be construed as a radical stance towards 
environmental protection was, as Harrison has demonstrated, not new.  The federal 
government has traditionally shown a reluctance to tread on the toes of provincial 
jurisdiction in terms of natural resources.  Mindful of the ways in which environmentalists 
had used the courts to push a more aggressive agenda for the federal government, the 
Liberal government of the time crafted legislation and departments both to answer the 
mandates handed down by the judiciary and to secure their place as had traditionally been 
perceived—that as mediator and lead negotiator and as regulator of issues explicitly spelled 
out in the Constitution—fisheries, marine habitat, regulation of Crown Lands. 
 The role that environmental groups waxed and waned, as well.  Better organized 
than they had been in the 1970’s, the court battles they initiated and won were echoed in the 
legislative triumphs, particularly in the agreement by the government to offer financial 
support for independent interveners in Environment Assessment matters.  By the 1990’s 
environmental interest groups were accustomed to being consulted by the government as 
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often as private industry and the provinces were.  The power of the voices of environmental 
groups, however, was somewhat diluted when the salience of environmental concerns 
dimmed in the public consciousness.  The relationship between established environmentalist 
groups and the federal government has traditionally been adversarial, which was why, in part, 
the inclusiveness at Rio was such an important occurrence.  With a waning of public support 
in the polls, however, environmentalist groups found that their voices were given less 
credence than they had been at the negotiating table.  Even, as will be shown in the case of 
SARA, when they teamed with industry partners to present recommendations, the 
perception of them as adversarial and overly idealistic hampered discussions with the federal 
government. 
Critiques of Policy Implementation 
  The critiques levied against the federal Liberal government’s implementation of their 
environmental policy came from myriad sources.  The Commissioner of the Environment 
and Sustainable Development issued several reports that said, in essence that the lack of 
adequate funding (substantial cuts were made to environmental programs as well as to the 
Ministry of the Environment and to that of Environmental Assessments in the throes of 
budget cuts to erase the deficit and balance the federal books)55 and an inability of the 
government to effect a paradigm change within the public service that resulted in every 
department “buying in” to the importance of a sustainable development plan.  Additional 
difficulties arose with the inability of the government to develop adequate instruments for 
measuring progress in sustainable development within the government.  Accusations of a 
lack of leadership from the Prime Minister in this area have also been levied.56  
 Critiques from outside government also criticized the dearth of funding and what 
was perceived as a lack of political will to advance an agenda more in line with the 
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agreements made in Rio.  The reports cite political expediency as taking primacy over 
environmental commitments, chides the federal government for failing to put measures into 
place to reduce greenhouse gasses and argues that the 1997 Red Book does not go far 
enough in tax changes, pointing out that the fossil fuel sector would continue to get better 
breaks than that of the renewable energy sector.57 The critiques (from 1997-2002) also 
highlight a perceived lack of movement in the areas of pesticide regulation, marine habitat 
conservation, commitment to Aboriginals, and in biodiversity—the last of which will be 
dealt with at some length below.  In essence, the Sierra Club holds that the federal 
government failed to live up to international agreements, did not keep up with scheduled 
improvements to legislation (SARA, Pest Control Products Act, Environmental Assessments 
Act, etc.), did not complete the national parks in the timeframe it set for itself, and did not 
make the requisite changes in the culture of the federal government so as to implement an 
effective system of sustainable development—among other things.58  Some of the reasons 
perceived for these inadequacies were substantial cuts in funding, lack of political will, and 
in-fighting from the civil-service level to the cabinet itself.   
The Relatedness of Thing: Departments and the Cabinet 
The charges of lack of leadership in terms of the environment from the Prime 
Minister and of political in-fighting within cabinet are not unimportant for the background 
purposes of this study.59  After all, relationships between people are part of the historical fact 
of an issue and must be considered.  There is not world enough nor time in the context of 
this study to delve deeply into the rich and complex relationships that comprised the federal 
Liberal cabinets between 1992 and 2002.  However, it is important to note that the 
departments over which various cabinet ministers presided had inherent animosities towards 
other ones.  In addition, it must be remembered that MPs who were cabinet ministers were 
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also seated in Parliament to represent the interests of their constituencies and, as such, 
provincial interests were never far out of mind when issues were being discussed in cabinet.  
It is important to remember, also, that Canada’s traditional relationship with the natural 
world in the form of governmental oversight was that of regulation for the purposes of 
assuring economic development and security.  Even conservation efforts were couched in 
economic terms—it was important to maintain the national parks for tourism, big game 
must be protected so as to attract hunters from around the world, fisheries conserved for 
exploitation, forestry regulated so as to assure maximum profit without depletion of the 
resources, etc.  Therefore, the departments of Natural Resources, Parks, Fisheries and 
Oceans, the Environment, and Environmental Assessment frequently found themselves at 
odds with one another by virtue of their perceived mandate and by the political needs of the 
ministers holding the portfolios.  I will speak more directly to this below. 
 The environmental policies put forth by first the Green Plan and then by the federal 
Liberals in the first and second Red Books were suggesting a paradigm shift that was 
threatening on a number of levels to a number of people, interests and governmental 
departments.  This was thrown into a mix that already included provinces jealously guarding 
their own sovereignty over natural resources (as well as economic security, and maintaining 
the good will of the electorate), a recession and a large national deficit.  Add to this a system 
in which the federal government was used to deferring to the provinces on issues of 
constitutionality regarding the environment but had been forced from that position by newly 
and highly organized environmental groups who saw a national solution to a variety of 
environmental problems as the only way of assuaging the problem of a rapidly deteriorating 
global ecology.  The consequences were predictable: suspicion, combativeness, foot-dragging 
and out and out animosity between members of cabinet.  In addition, the electorate was also 
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being pulled in myriad directions—economic growth and availability of jobs are important to 
one’s health and happiness and the perceived immediacy of that urgency eventually 
overcame the overwhelming alarm about environmental degradation that had loomed so 
large in the public mind in the late 80’s.  Both Mulroney and Chretien showed themselves to 
be canny at interpreting polls and crafting policy that spoke to the things people wanted to 
hear.60  This is not to say that government policy should be viewed cynically, on the 
contrary, the trick is to have established goals and visions and find a way to express them 
that does not dilute their integrity but explains them in terms that resonate with the mood of 
the electorate at any given time.  That is basic electoral politics.  However, that being said, 
Harrison has pointed out the lack of real interest in the environment beyond the polls 
evinced by Mulroney’s government61  and the charges of a lack of political leadership levied 
against Jean Chretien in terms of the Environment portfolio do indicate, if nothing else, a 
certain lack of interest in advancing an aggressive environmental platform in the face of 
perceived apathy from the polis.       
Preamble to the Species at Risk Act: The Legislative Company SARA Would Keep 
 At the outset, environmental issues in Canada are difficult to negotiate, in part, 
because of the ways in which jurisdiction is divided by the constitution.  However, neither 
the public nor environmental groups were particularly concerned about these delicate legal 
negotiations between federal and provincial governments when it came to establishing 
standards for clean air, water and human health.  And, as has been shown, environmental 
legislation is grass-roots driven.  Harrison has shown that federal diligence in promoting 
such legislation correlates to its salience with the electorate.62  In the late 1960’s salience was 
high and concern about pollution and the emergence of the ecology movement in general 
prompted federal action on what, hitherto had been considered by federal politicians to be a 
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provincial concern.  Public pressure and pressure from the opposition saw a new department 
and five major pollution acts pass under Trudeau’s federal Liberal government from 1968-
1972:  Environment Canada was established by an Order in Council in November of 1970 
and affirmed in June 1971 by proclamation of the Government Organization Act.  It was 
during this time, also, that provincial departments of the Environment were created.  
Statutes were: the Canadian Water Act, the Amendments to the Fisheries Act, the Clean Air Act, 
the Northern Inland Waters Act, and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.63  From 1975 to 
1985, only two statutes were passed (the Oceans Dumping Control Act, the Environmental 
Contaminants Act).  In 1977, more amendments to the Fisheries Act   were made and in 1980 
the Clean Air Act was amended to respond to the problem of acid rain.  In 1988 the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA)  was proclaimed.  The CEPA consolidated the 
Environmental Contaminants Act, the Ocean Dumping Control Act, and portions of the Canada 
Water Act and the Clean Air Act.   
 Harrison, Toner, and George Hoberg both observe64 that the crafting of the CEPA 
represented a watershed in the process of environmental legislation development.  For the 
first time there were multi-stakeholder consultations.  Where before there had been only 
closed door negotiations between federal, provincial and perhaps industry interests, this 
process included public consultation with myriad stakeholders representing industry, 
environmental groups, and labour (among others).  This process went on to become a 
prototype for other legislative endeavours—including SARA, and would also be used as an 
approach by Canada with Canadian delegates at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.  
 CEPA  also accepts more federal responsibility for regulation and enforcement than 
did the statutes of the 1970’s, although it should be noted that the Opposition parties and 
environmental groups were unhappy with the bill, complaining that it was too deferential to 
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the provinces and had certain portions that would undermine its constitutional basis.  
Regulated industry was concerned that there would be “inconsistent federal and provincial 
regulations”, a concern also voiced by environmental groups.65  In addition, the 
“(e)nvironmentalists’ opposition to the bill was intensified by resentment of the fact that, 
just when it appeared that the public would be ranted meaningful input into federal 
environmental policy, the federal and provincial governments followed the tried and true 
approach of striking a deal behind closed doors.”66 
 While the CEPA was landmark legislation, both in process and in the theoretical 
teeth it gave to the federal government, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act was, in 
some ways, more important for the purposes of understanding the players in the SARA 
story.  The adversarial relationship between environmental groups and the federal 
government was discussed above.  The adversarial relationship exists, in part, because of a 
perception by environmental groups that the federal government is loath to exercise its 
authority in environmental matters and because, in part, the federal government sees 
environmental groups as being somewhat monomaniacal in their pursuit of meaningful, 
effective environmental legislation.  The differences have been exacerbated by several court 
cases in which the courts have ruled that the federal government has greater power and 
jurisdiction than it chooses to wield.  One such decision came down in 1989, just as the 
Mulroney government was proposing to table the Environmental Assessment Act.  In its 1989 
throne speech, the Mulroney government announced its intention to replace the 
Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) Guidelines order with legislation.  
Public consultations akin to those that had taken place with CEPA had taken place and draft 
legislation was ready to be put forward.  That same month, the Rafferty-Alameda decision was 
handed down from the Supreme Court of Canada.67  In essence, the Rafferty-Alameda 
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decision affirmed the responsibility of the federal government to conduct environmental 
assessments. This decision, in some ways, solidified the adversarial relationship between 
environmental groups and the federal government and also put the federal government at 
direct odds with the provinces.68 “The nature of the…decisions…limited the ability of the 
two levels of government to resolve their differences through compromise.  In granting 
citizens enforceable claims to federal actions, the courts effectively empowered private 
litigants to drive a wedge between the federal and provincial governments.”69  The federal 
government had, as has been shown, consistently deferred to the provinces in terms of 
enforcing environmental protection regulations and had carved out a comfortable niche for 
itself as a resource available for consultation to the provinces on these matters.  With 
Rafferty-Almeda  and the 1989 R v Quebec Hydro, the judiciary confirmed what the 
environmental groups had contended all along, that the federal government had jurisdiction 
through a variety of constitutional mandates and would not use that jurisdiction for 
enforcement unless pushed by outside parties.  In the vernacular, the environmentalists had 
held the federal government’s feet to the fire and pushed them outside their comfort zone.  
This is important for the purposes of this study because it traces the background of the 
relationships that intertwine in the telling of the SARA saga.   
 One other point of significance in regards to the consequences of the court decisions 
is it put the federal government in the position of needing to take care in the crafting of the 
Environmental Assessment Act in order to gain some modicum of control back from the courts.  
In short, the federal government’s traditional position regarding the enforcement of 
environmental legislation had been shaken and order needed to be restored.  The delicate 
balance between province, federal government, industry and environmentalists needed to be 
brought back to stability.     
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 Another way in which harmony was sought was through the  1998 “Canada-Wide 
Accord on Environmental Harmonization.”70  In part, the Accord transferred the drafting of 
environmental legislation to the Canadian Council of Ministers of Environment and also 
mandated stakeholder input  be prominent in the drafting of all new environmental 
intergovernmental agreements.71  Environmentalists were critical of the accord, believing 
that it was “an attempt by the federal government to cope with its own diminished capacity 
by transferring environmental responsibilities to the provinces.”72  The “diminished 
capacity” in this instance referred to the budget cuts that had reduced the size of the public 
service.  The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable 
Development echoed those concerns.73 
Analysis 
 There are several layers of motivation and meaning surrounding the development of 
environmental legislation in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  One is the age-old Canadian 
problem of jurisdictional tension between federal and provincial governments.74 75  Issues 
brought about by the National Energy Program, negotiations to repatriate the constitution 
and national unity/Quebec sovereignty were all in play and made the relationships between 
federal and provincial governments somewhat tenuous.76 These relationships are complex 
and not always adversarial.  In a very real sense, the provinces were (and are) concerned with 
the economic viability of the natural resources and their incumbent industries.  This is not to 
say that there is no provincial concern for conservation or environmental protection, but 
that the provinces are directly responsible for maintaining the economic viability of 
provincial economies.  The federal government has a mandate to maintain order (“peace, 
order and good government”), to regulate some resources, and to advocate for and with 
Aboriginal nations.  This is yet another layer and speaks to a kind of separation of ideologies. 
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 The exploration above of Lockean and Grotian ideas regarding how societies ought 
to work depends, in part, on government maintaining security in order that private property 
rights be protected.  Security can be understood as meaning, among other things, the 
security of persons, the security of property and the security of sovereignty.  In Canada, it 
can be said that, in a sense, the responsibility for this is divided between the provincial and 
federal governments.  The provincial governments are responsible, at least in terms of 
natural resources, for maintaining the security of the economy (which is tantamount to the 
security of property)—at least an economy based on natural resources.  The federal 
government is responsible for security of persons (to the extent that responsibility for the 
criminal code rests in federal jurisdiction) and  for the security of sovereignty (which explains 
the jurisdiction over oceans, waterways and fisheries—as these have an international 
component to them.77).  On an even deeper, philosophical level that harkens back to the 
Reformation, it can be seen that the federal government is charged, above all, with keeping 
order (“peace, order and good government”).  A civilized society is one of order.78  It can be 
argued that, on an even deeper level, there is a sense at which the federal government is also 
charged with keeping a sort of moral order.  This moral order includes standing up or 
supporting ideologies that the provincial governments—charged with economic security—
may not have the will or ability to support.  The federal government can, in some ways, be 
viewed as representing the collective conscience of the nation.  It is at this layer that 
environmentalist groups (and individuals) seem to engage with the federal government—
being more concerned with the issues of pollution control and the halt of environmental 
degradation than with jurisdiction.79   
 This in itself adds another layer to the conversation, as it highlights points of view 
regarding humanity’s relationship with the natural world.  From both governmental 
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standpoints, not only is humanity disembedded from the natural world but this world and 
society itself can be compartmentalized and held as separate.  The natural world is a tool for 
humanity to wield as each individual or corporate entity sees fit.  From the standpoint of 
environmentalists, the concept of ecology—of the natural world as a system of interrelated 
components leads to the conclusion that to compartmentalize environmental issues is to 
leave them unsolved.80  This leads to yet another layer within the environmental movement 
itself which is still evident today.  The stewardship model and the embeddedness model. 
 Briefly, the stewardship model stems, in part, from the perception of St. Francis as a 
proponent of a type of egalitarianism that sees humanity as occupying a special, privileged 
position in the cosmos—ordained by God to be stewards of creation rather than 
dominators.  In this paradigm, humanity is charged with caring for and nurturing creation.  
Humanity is seen as a part of creation, perhaps not with greater value than other creatures 
(although that is debated) but with a special value due (and this list is not exhaustive) to either 
their God-given ontology (a religious worldview) or their cognitive superiority to other 
creatures (less religious than rationalist).  In yet another subtle twist, the model of 
stewardship that is referenced in the 1997 Red Book, mandates a balanced care and concern 
for all of the natural world including, as has been shown, the socio-economic needs of 
human beings.  This shifts the model slightly away from egalitarianism and more towards a 
hierarchy of value (which could be argued to be more in line with the original St. Francis) 
with human beings at the top. 
 The embeddedness model is more akin to the worldview of Canadian Aboriginals.  
Here, stewardship is not precisely the right term because that implies a level of paternalism 
that belies true egalitarianism.  In this worldview, everything has agency and is 
interconnected.  What affects one part of the ecology has ramifications for all.  Thus, it is in 
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our own self-interest to maintain right relationships with all of creation.  There is nothing 
paternalistic about self interest, but it does breed a type of humility that precludes arrogance.  
All of the natural world is in the same boat and to put the needs of one above the others 
could tip the metaphorical canoe.  This is distinct from stewardship, in that stewardship 
implies a hierarchy, whether it is value-laden or not.  In the embeddedness model, there is 
responsibility but the responsibility is more onerous.  In the stewardship model there is the 
implication that one can simply walk away from one’s responsibilities and there may be 
ramifications, but those ramifications will not necessarily be visited directly upon the poor 
steward in this life (religious worldview) or at all—thus, the current government can argue 
that it is being a good steward of the fossil fuel resources in the Oil Sands while abrogating 
the longer term environmental effects which will not be felt directly by them but by their 
grandchildren.  In the embeddedness model to deny or ignore responsibility has a direct, if 
not an immediate effect, as all life is interdependent.    Since all life has agency, also, the 
more cognitive ability one has, the more responsibility one has to maintain a balance in the 
universe.   
 This is the domestic background to the story of the development of the Species At 
Risk Act.  There is an international component, as well beginning with the United Nations 
Convention of Biological Diversity of which Canada was the first signatory.   
 
The Species at Risk Act: Prologue: The United Nations Convention of Biological Diversity 
Canada’s environmental policies must be understood in both domestic and 
international contexts.  Domestically, as has been discussed, issues of jurisdictional divisions 
and provincial and federal politics provide the context.  Internationally, the context is one of 
various conventions and protocols to which Canada has agreed to adhere.  The convention 
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that is most pertinent for the purposes of this study is the United Nations Convention of 
Biological Diversity.  The Convention, which Canada signed in 1992, has three main objectives: 
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of the components of biological 
diversity and, the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources.81  Among other things, the Convention calls for each nation to “identify and 
monitor the important components of biological diversity that need to be conserved and 
used sustainably”82 and to “establish protected areas to conserve biological diversity while 
promoting environmentally sound development around these areas.”83  In addition, the 
Convention requires member countries to review their legislative protection for endangered 
species.84  The commitments of the Convention are legally binding and it was to this Convention 
( as well as to other commitments made in Rio) that the 1993 Red Book harkened when it 
discussed Canada’s “leadership” and “commitment to sustainable development”.  
In one very real sense, the Convention gave a collective voice to a trend towards 
ecological thinking that had started in the late 19th century with the conservation movement 
and expanded in the late 20th century with the increasingly broad dissemination of the idea 
that all life was interdependent: “ The view of the Earth (from space in 1969) symbolizes the 
changing scientific paradigm, form the atomistic approach to ‘dead and inert’ matter that 
characterized Newtonian and Baconian science to the recognition of the ecological web and 
the intricate interdependency of a very alive nature…”85   The Convention recognized the 
necessity of maintaining balanced ecosystems for the long-term health of human beings and 
of the planet in general. 
The Convention is a treaty and was crafted by legal experts with input from, among 
others, the global scientific community.  It recognizes that human beings need to exploit 
natural resources but argues that such exploitation must be done in a way that is sustainable.  
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The Convention advocates for balance and the term that is used for that balance is “sustainable 
development”, a term mentioned and defined above.   
One of the most important aspects of the Convention is the decision-making apparatus 
that it advocates:  the precautionary principle.  The precautionary principle is Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration and it states: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”86   
Thus, governments are cautioned against impeding the protection of a species or habitat (or 
other environmental issue) by using the excuse of incomplete scientific data.  The phrase 
“cost-effective” is, of course, wildly subjective and continues to be a source of 
consternation. 
And so, the stage is set for the negotiation of SARA.  The Convention requires that 
Canada put species at risk legislation into place, the Rio Earth summit engendered great 
hope among environmental groups that their voices were being heard and that a paradigm 
shift would occur—towards sustainable development, brought about, in part by the federal 
government’s stated commitment to the Rio summit and by public pressure on government 
to fulfill its commitments.  The environmental groups, it must be pointed out, were not 
idealistic and starry-eyed about the prospect of immediate paradigm shifts.  They were, 
however, hopeful that government would have no choice(especially now that it had been so 
vocal on the international stage and were under pressure from the courts) but to follow 
through on its stated goals which included a more consultative, open-door policy process.87 
Canada’s Species at Risk Act: The Players 
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 Every legislative effort is a drama unto itself, a story unfolding in the context of the 
greater policies, workings and machinations of government.  The players in the drama of 
SARA include the federal government and the Opposition—for the purposes of this study, 
the federal Liberals were in government, opposed first by the Bloc Quebecois and then, in 
their second mandate, by the Reform Party.  It is pertinent to note that during this period in 
Canadian history (early 1990’s to early 2000’s) an ideological shift occurred with right-wing 
conservatism raising a strong anti-regulation, anti-state intervention voice that “constrained 
state action…(t)hese attitudinal shifts combined with the overall downsizing of government 
as a result of the deficit fight has resulted in a diminution in federal capacity to initiate and 
implement sustainable development.”88  Federal government concerns revolved around 
erasing the debt, shrinking the deficit and maintaining national unity.  The Quebec 
Referendum in 1995 is also key in this drama, for it brought to the fore issues of provincial 
autonomy and strengthened federal reluctance to push for a stronger federal presence in 
environmental concerns.  The traditional stance of the federal government towards the 
environment has been one of dominion—exploitation of resources for economic good and 
maintenance of security and sovereignty.  In other words, natural world as tool to be used by 
human beings.  With the rise of the environmental movement in the 1960’s (more on that 
below), some aspects of the federal government’s treatment of the environment shifted 
under the pressure of the electorate and by virtue of the use of the judiciary.  The federal 
government was placed in the position of having to be defender and promoter of sustainable 
development while also maintaining its traditional role of protecting economic resources and 
its own sovereignty.  By virtue of its international agreements after Rio, the federal 
government was obliged to re-invent itself, in some ways, as steward and not as dominator 
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of the environment.  This shift in rhetoric (if not necessarily in deep ideology) is apparent in 
the 1997 Red Book. 
 The provincial governments, as was mentioned above, jealously guarded their 
jurisdiction and were suspicious of any attempts by the federal government to exercise 
control over the exploitation or monitoring of natural resources.  Both Harrison and Toner 
note that the public service facilitated this hostility, with provincial departments, most 
notably those mandated with intergovernmental relations, viewing the relationship as 
adversarial rather than complementary.  In addition, the federal government was reluctant to 
be seen as putting up barriers to economic development.  From a traditional standpoint, the 
view of the provincial governments towards the natural world has been one of protecting 
natural resources—a dominion model of disembeddedness in which economic growth is the 
measure of human flourishing and ecosystems are not so much interdependent bioregions 
but autonomous differentiated areas of designated use.89 
 Industries that rely on natural resources are the traditional backbone of the Canadian 
economy.90  A reading of the 1993 Red Book illuminates the concerns of industry: the text 
refers often to the need of the federal government to be “supportive”, “collaborative” and, 
“helpful”.91  It is clear that industry was concerned that their access to natural resources 
would be curtailed by federal involvement and that there was an underlying hint of a threat 
from industry in general to invest in parts of the globe that did not have complex, time and 
money consuming regulatory strictures.  There are also resource battles at play in the 
relationship between industry and the federal government in terms of Aboriginal land claims.  
These included differences of opinion regarding access to resources on contested Aboriginal 
lands as well as arguments over how best to exploit the resources.  In all cases, however, it is 
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important to note that industry (including fishing and agriculture) view the natural land as 
resources—commodities for human exploitation and/or consumption.  It made sense to use 
the resource sustainably if only for economic reasons. 
 The other actors in the drama are the environmental groups.  Loose associations in 
the 1960’s and later politically savvy and well-funded NGO’s in the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
environmental groups loomed large in the development of environmental legislation and 
policy in the era under study.  The activism that grew out of the dominant environmental 
concerns of the 1960’s—which Kearns identifies as “pesticides, pollution, and 
population”92—had a component in which religious worldviews were decidedly present.93  
Conservation, Ecology and Religion  
The conservation movement of the early twentieth century that was a precursor to 
the movements in the 1960’s and beyond was fed, in part, by Romanticism—itself a backlash 
to the Enlightenment.  Romanticism differed philosophically from the Enlightenment sense 
of order, laws and rules by which humanity, through reason, might free itself from the bonds 
of nature.  Romanticism viewed nature as revelatory, not as a tool of constriction but as a 
tool for seeing more deeply into the cosmos.  It is the mystical counter-point to 
Enlightenment thought.  Kearns writes, “In reaction to the Enlightenment disengagement 
from nature, and in distress over the results of technological innovation and 
industrialization…(r)omanticism sought reunification with nature as a way to religious 
inspiration, harmony, and community.”94  “Nature romanticism” also served as a sort of 
surrogate religious expression for conservationists such as John Muir, who rejected his fiery 
evangelical roots for a spirituality grounded in nature.  Kearns notes that “(n)ature as a 
source of revelation would become the most important and nuanced response to the 
disenchantment brought on by much of Protestantism and science.”95  As was shown earlier, 
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the natural world has served as revelatory vehicle for a variety of religious worldviews; this is 
merely one more permutation.  What makes it significant is that it keeps alive a religious 
view of the natural world that is somewhat stifled by Protestantism in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, keeps it alive in such a way that when it re-emerges in the 1960’s, it is accessible 
not only to those who hold conventional mainline religious worldviews, but to those who 
are seeking outside organized religion for a spirituality with which they find resonance.   
 The religious worldview in the beginning half of the twentieth century (at least in 
Canada) found itself more and more on the forefront of social (and sometimes advocating 
for economic) change.  The message of the social gospel, however, was not focused on the 
natural world, but rather the “powers and principalities” of human socio-political structures 
that perpetuated poverty, lack of dignity and wretchedness.  Like the rest of the western 
world, Christianity, also, had compartmentalized itself with the social gospel addressing the 
cause of egalitarian human flourishing and the naturalist romanticism intertwining with the 
conservation movement to keep the light of the precursors to eco-theology alive and well. 
 After the war years, and after the government incorporation of the social safety net 
once provided by the Churches in Canada several things emerged to act as catalyst for the 
inclusion of religious worldviews within the environmental movement.  One was the 
ushering in of a period of “greater economic security and more leisure time encouraged 
Canadians to concern themselves with not only the necessities of life, but the amenities—
clean air, clean water, pristine wilderness—that could only be provided by a healthy 
environment.”96  It is also possible to say that while the churches in Canada (particularly 
Protestant ones) flourished as centres for spiritual growth and community gathering in the 
1950’s, there also remained a population within the institutional churches focused on what 
we now call social justice issues.  While this mostly found its outlet in mission work overseas 
318 
 
and various outreach programs at home, the activist strain was extant within the institutional 
church.  Also, while the weight of its shadow establishment status was waning, the church 
still held a voice of moral authority in society, for some.  In addition, Kearns also points to 
the development and use of the nuclear bomb as a catalyst for disenchantment at the 
promise of science alone as a cure for all of humanity’s ills and that religious voices began to 
occupy some of the space hitherto filled only with the voices that put faith into a 
mechanistic scientific worldview, eschewing religion and other “non-rational” ways of 
knowing and being in the world.97  Some of these religious voices, according to Kearns, 
embraced a “spiritual” worldview while being critical of the institutional church and 
embracing the idea of revelation as coming from myriad sources, including nature.98  Kearns 
also provides a helpful entryway into thinking about the religious strands within the 
environmental movement by referring to a “two pronged shift” away from the authority of 
science and from a religious worldview that regards nature as completely “Other”.99  It must 
be clearly stated, however, that it was not science itself that was being criticized, but the 
worldview that accepted without question the assertion that science is objective and 
completely without bias.  The suggestion that science could solve all of humanity’s problems 
and answer all of humanity’s questions was itself being questioned.  This is not to claim that 
the churches were the drivers of the environmental movement.  Merely to point out the shift 
in social imaginary that made the inclusion of religious voices possible.   
 The beginnings of any movement are complex.  As mentioned above, there was a 
shift in the social imaginary that informed the environmental movement.  As well, there were 
strands that wove together to create the environmental movement, I will mention but two of 
them.  The peace movement that began slowly in the 1950’s in response to the nuclear bomb 
and the Cold War had both secular and religious impetus (Quakers and Unitarians, 
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especially) and the awareness of the dangers of nuclear fallout led to a greater awareness and 
activism in regards to pollution and human health.  Another strand was, as has been 
mentioned, that of the burgeoning field of ecology.  This field arose, in part, from the 
conservation movement.  Although Aldo Leopold (A Sand County Almanac, 1949), are Rachel 
Carson (Silent Spring, 1962) are often cited, and rightly so, as harbingers of the ecological 
understanding that underpins the environmental movement, Canadian conservationists also 
were raising their voices in concern.100  In Canada, the strands coalesced in myriad forms, 
the Society for Promoting Environmental Conservation formed in 1968 at Simon Fraser 
University, the “back to the land” movement began, Pollution Probe, and the Ecology 
Action Centre.  In the late 1960’s Greenpeace was formed, the most concrete example of 
peace and ecology movements intertwining to create one vision.   
 The environmental justice movement also emerged from the environmental 
movement, driven by a growing concern for the plight of Aboriginals and other marginalized 
people in society in the face of expanding development—particularly in the area of 
hydroelectric projects (i.e. James Bay) and the Mackenzie Valley pipeline which saw the 
launching of the Berger Inquiry.101  In Nova Scotia, the furor over Africville brought the 
issue home to many.  The environmental justice movement is important to note, for 
churches have been deeply involved in this aspect of environmentalism.102 
 Although many people of faith were involved in the beginnings of the environmental 
movement in the 1960’s, Kearns points out the institutionally, churches tend to run about 10 
years behind secular society.103   It should be noted, though, that concern regarding the 
“integrity of creation” were discussed at the General Council of the United Church of 
Canada in 1968 and that the United Council of Churches of the USA had introduced a Faith, 
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Man and Nature project in the 1960’s.104  It is important to note the distinction between 
institution and individual here, for it has bearing on the larger argument.  The institutional 
church in Canada was no longer a shadow establishment (in the case of the Protestant 
Church in English Canada) and, due to many factors—including the Quiet Revolution—the 
Roman Catholic Church no longer held the authority or presence that it did in French-
speaking Canada.  However, individuals who joined the environmental movement were 
often, themselves, products of institutional faith communities, though many had distanced 
themselves from the institutions, they nevertheless brought the moral framework, the ethos of 
those institutions with them into the movements they joined.  It was the activists who stayed 
affiliated, however, who eventually swayed the institutions to be aware and to, in some cases, 
become involved in the shaping of environmental policy from a global (i.e. through the 
World Council of Churches at Rio) to a local level. 
 The institutional response (including the theological scholarly response) came in the 
early 1970’s—many (and varied) in response to Lynn White’s essay mentioned earlier in this 
work.  The development of ecotheology—the interconnection of ecological thinking with 
theological knowledge—is also important to this study, as it supports the contention that 
religious voices are continuously engaged with the issues normally ascribed to the public 
sphere.  Christian eco-feminism105 arose in this period, along with a rising concern for eco-
justice, as was touched upon above.106 
 In the 1980’s religious voices of all stripes—institutionally affiliated or not—began to 
find more and more room for their voices.  Kearns ascribes this to a growing 
establishmentarianism within the environmentalist movement: “(a)s the organizational aspect 
of the movement gained access to the centers of societies, it lost much of its moral 
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imperative, or at least the ability to couch it in such terms.”107  Scientific rationalism had 
again taken an upper hand in the social imaginary and the voices of religious worldviews 
smacked somewhat of romanticism and “soft” science.  Remembering the argument at the 
beginning of this study is important at this juncture—religious worldviews couched in 
language that does not represent what the “centres of societies” (the makers of policy and 
the elite powerbrokers of society) see as relevant in the public sphere are discounted.  What 
had been both a moral (We have a duty to all creation to not pollute the water.  One 
consequence of pollution is that children get sick.) and a scientific (i.e., rational) argument 
(there is a direct correlation between the soap being dumped in the river by the soapworks 
upstream from the town and the rising number of children with stomachaches), loses the 
need for the moral imperative once it is accepted as a fact by the mainstream electorate and 
the power elite.  If soap makes children sick, this is a drain on the healthcare system and an 
economic problem to be remedied.  It is also an electoral problem—if government is known 
to be able to do something to keep my child from getting sick and does not do it; I am 
unlikely to vote for that government again.  The moral imperative, often driven by a religious 
worldview, becomes secondary in the mix.    Religious and ecological voices had intertwined, 
to an extent, at the beginning of the movement—united, in part, by disillusionment with 
science as the definitive answer to humanity’s temporal needs.  In the 1970’s, with the 
development of ecology as a discipline and a grudging acceptance within some annals of the 
scientific community that the universe might be dynamic and interdependent, science once 
again rose as an answer to environmental concerns.   
 With the focus on specific global issues such as acid rain, the ozone hole, etc.  many 
in the environmental movement saw a lack of concern for interconnectedness—for looking 
at the ways in which economic, gender and racial imbalances (to name a few) touched 
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environmental concerns.108  This is where many with religious worldviews found themselves 
concentrating their efforts.  The fields of environmental ethics and animal rights grew out of 
these rich discussions in the 1980’s.  Thomas Berry, Matthew Fox, Jurgen Moltmann and 
John Cobb all contributed works in these fields and raised the awareness of many practicing 
Christians of the importance of the natural world in the context of a religious worldview. 
 As has been mentioned elsewhere, salience of environmental issues was high in the 
late 1980’s and very early 1990’s.  Religious voices were not silent, either, nor were they 
being discounted by many scientists.  In 1990, cosmologist Carl Sagan and other scientists 
called for an alliance between science and religion.  The appeal recognized “the power to 
shape behaviour” and also stated that “Many of us have had profound experiences of awe 
and reverence before the universe…Efforts to safeguard and cherish the environment need 
to be infused with a vision of the sacred.”109  Although the actuality of the dichotomy 
between science and religion that is assumed in this document is debateable, it does show 
that religious voices were present and were seen as constructive and necessary to the 
discussion of environmental issues.  This supports, albeit in small way, a contention, often 
refuted but seldom adequately supported, that the voices of religious worldviews contribute 
to human knowledge in a way that gives policy depth and breadth.  It is important to note, 
however, that while this is acknowledged at the international level in this case, it is not 
necessarily acknowledged by government at the national level. 
 It is vital, however, to understand that religious worldviews are integrally intertwined 
with the environmental movement: 
These many, varied ecological voices are not just theologians, but are emerging 
from a variety of activist and church-related organizations, for it is in this range 
that the immense and rich variety of eco-theology is translated into action and 
problem-solving.  In other words, it is at the level of activism that the purpose 
of eco-theology—that is, to change the way Christians think about ecology—can 




With this further context laid out, the story of SARA can now be explored in the context of 
environmental legislation in general and of the religious worldviews held by two of the 
players integral to its negotiation. 
The Species At Risk Act  
Under the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity, Canada’s federal government was 
obligated to craft legislation listing and protecting species at risk.  In the course of 
ratification of the Convention, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Environment, 
under the federal conservatives, held hearings in 1992 to determine whether or not the 
federal government would need additional tools in order to comply with the terms of the 
Convention.  Environmental groups who testified to the Committee argued that endangered 
species legislation (akin to that in the United States) was necessary in order to fulfill the 
terms of the Convention.  The initial findings of the committee was that there was no 
legislative gap111 but later found that there was, indeed a gap and recommended that “the 
Government of Canada, working with the provinces and territories…take immediate steps 
to develop an integrated legislative approach to the protection of endangered species, 
habitat, ecosystems and biodiversity in Canada.”112 
The Conservative government fell in 1993 and the Liberals moved out of 
Opposition and into Government later that year.  In 1994, a coalition of environmental 
groups met with Sheila Copps, who was Environment Minister at the time.  The coalition 
brought along dozens of letters from school children all across Canada, asking the Minister 
to please enact legislation that would protect endangered species.  During the briefing, 
Minister Copps agreed that such legislation was needed and ordered that it be drafted. 
A Detour in the Interests of Chronology 
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 While endangered species legislation was being discussed, the federal government 
and the provincial and territorial wildlife ministers negotiated and then endorsed (in 1996) 
the National Accord for the Protection of Species at Risk in Canada which stated goal is “to 
prevent species in Canada from becoming extinct as a consequence of human activity.”113  
The phrase “as a consequence of human activity” is important and will be expanded upon 
below.  What is significant about the Accord is that it commits all jurisdictions to “establish 
complementary legislation and programs that effectively protect species at risk across the 
country.”114 
The White Paper: Canada’s Endangered Species Protection Act, Bill C-65 
The ensuing White Paper (first draft) was technically informed by a multi-
stakeholder advisory council and would, among other things, put into law what was currently 
only an administrative process used to list endangered species.  The bill replaced the non-
partisan, scientific Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada as the 
decision making body for that list with Cabinet.  Under the bill, COSEWIC would make the 
list, but “the legal impact of listing would only arise after Cabinet approval.”115  Shifting the 
decision-making from an objective panel to one that could not help but be politically 
motivated was unacceptable to many of the stakeholders.  The government’s argument (at 
the beginning and all through the time period it took to pass the legislation) was articulated 
by Mr. David Anderson, Minister of the Environment from 1999-2004:  “…Decisions taken 
under this proposed Act can have economic, social and legal consequences for many 
Canadians and Canadians who will be affected have the right to be heard.  In our democratic 
process, it is essential that there be political accountability for the final decisions.”116  
However, it must be stressed that COSEWIC itself did not find it wholly unacceptable and 
took a stance somewhat in the middle.  117  
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The draft proposed to make it illegal to harm or capture a member of a listed species 
or to damage its residence.  This applied only to species on federal land, aquatic species, and 
Migratory Birds Convention Acts species.118  After a species was listed as endangered, the 
government would have one year to submit a plan stating how it intended to protect a 
species and assist in its recovery.119  The draft was deemed by most environmental groups to 
be inadequate.120  Part of the criticism was that habitat was not protected (80% of species 
loss is due to loss of a place to live)121, killing of endangered species was not prohibited and 
that it only proposed to protect species that were on some federal lands.  Environmental 
groups complained that the federal government had, yet again, taken too limited a view of its 
own jurisdiction, against the advice of “numerous constitutional law experts and the 
Canadian Bar Association”.122  There were protestations also that the proposed bill did not 
take into account the recommendations from its own advisory panel, composed of myriad 
stakeholders that included environmental groups and representatives of the agricultural and 
forest industries.123  The panel agreed that it would be fortuitous to include an advance 
review process mechanism in the bill that would ensure that proposed projects did not 
threaten biodiversity.  This spoke not only to the concerns of environmental groups that 
hazardous projects not go forward, but also to industry’s concern that projects would be so 
embroiled in lawsuits and injunctions that investors would be discouraged from putting 
proposals forward.  It was thought that a “single window” (meaning one government, not 
two) at the proposal stage of a process would benefit both environment and industry.  It is 
fair to cautiously speculate that, while industry was voluntarily aligning itself with its 
traditional adversary (i.e. environmentalists) there was good reason for doing so.  Industry 
would continue to lobby the federal government for voluntary rather than regulatory 
approaches, but foresaw (with good reason—given the time and expense having gone into 
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litigation over the Endangered Species Act in the United States since its enactment in 1973) 
huge expenditures looming if they did not work with environmental groups to present a 
united front to the federal government.  The federal government, as has been discussed, was 
interested in crafting legislation that would not be litigated continually, but that would clearly 
delineate specific roles for all interested parties, thus moving the balance of power over 
discretion back into the government’s favour (and away from environmental groups and the 
courts). 
The government countered criticism of the proposed legislation by asserting that 
endangered species legislation was but one component of a “national strategy to protect 
species and their habitats throughout Canada.”124   Innovation and cooperation were also 
stressed as essential to the success of the endeavour.  The provinces, it was argued, must also 
take responsibility for the natural resources under their jurisdictions and be encouraged to 
bring in legislation that would dovetail with the limited (as interpreted by the Ministry at the 
time) jurisdictional authority of the federal government.  In essence, the federal government 
saw endangered species legislation as necessary, but only as a component to a larger strategy.  
The cautiousness of the initial legislation reflects several things, one of them being that the 
environment portfolio was not top of the priority list for this particular mandate.  Another 
important factor indicated by the cautiousness of the proposed legislation is the dissent in 
cabinet over environmental issues.  The clash between the Environment Minister and the 
Natural Resources Minister (Anne McLellan, L-Alberta)over climate change issues is well-
documented.125  It has also been seen that the Natural Resources Minister was able to 
persuade her colleagues that the economy must be given primacy over sweeping 
environmental paradigm shifts in order not to endanger the economy—a concern that was 
more and more apparent as the country felt the effects of the economic recession.126    
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As well, there is literary and precedential evidence that the bill fell prey to an 
overprotective and cautious bureaucracy from the start.  The language limiting protection to 
species on federal lands is highly indicative of a territorial protectiveness that was explored 
earlier in the chapter.  The deputy minister in charge of drafting the bill was himself from the 
Territories and well-versed in that protectiveness.  As well, the cautiousness can easily be 
seen as indicative of  parties either wishing to preserve provincial jurisdiction at all costs or 
wishing to ensure that the federal government (specifically the Ministry of the Environment 
and its sub-departments, all of which had seen their budgets cut substantially) would not 
bear the brunt of the expenses that would be incurred.  These expenses are not limited to 
monetary ones, although it is certain that budget constraints were included in the reasoning 
behind the draft.  The costs of enforcing species at risk legislation that may reduce or 
prohibit access to natural resources both to industry and to private landowners could be high 
in terms of votes and in terms of provincial-federal relations.127  Considering that the draft 
legislation proposed only to protect specific species and not habitat, it is also possible that 
there were elements in the Canadian Wildlife Services that were alarmed at the prospect of 
having to implement and enforce such legislation.  Toner observes that this type of 
legislation forces the federal government outside of the “tradition of multisectoral co-
operation that has characterized the wildlife policy area”128 into a potentially more 
confrontational positions with economic stakeholders. So in the end there were economic 
stakeholders concerned about the viability of commercial activity, environmentalists 
concerned about the protection of habitat as well as species, the provincial governments 
concerned about autonomous control over their own territories, federal departments 
concerned about their own autonomy, and the federal government concerned with balancing 
everything—and not losing political capital.   
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Some Aspects of the Federal Role 
It was clear that there were some elements within the federal government (including 
the Minister of the Environment) which saw endangered species legislation as the “right” 
thing to do.  Which is not to intimate that there was necessarily a moral impetus, merely to 
point out that not all political actions are craven and that many, many have good intentions 
at their inception.  It was also clear that the government was looking for a way to meet its 
international obligations.  The federal government is also charged, ideologically, with the job 
of attempting to see the “big picture”, of looking beyond the immediate interests of a variety 
of interests and trying to legislate for the long term, keeping those interests in mind but also 
trying to interpret how everything must fall together to facilitate an optimum future for the 
country.  This type of vision and leadership is particularly difficult in a country like Canada 
which not only is policy and program driven but also, as one politician has put it, “is 
governed (in practice) more by general consensus that ‘this is a good idea’ than it is by 
constitutional mandate.”129  That is to say that one point of view of how Canadian 
government works is a consensus facilitated, in part, by the federal government.  This has 
been demonstrated elsewhere in this discussion when looking at the ways in which federal 
and provincial governments have negotiated the murky waters of environmental jurisdiction 
in Canadian politics.  It is true that the courts have consistently affirmed that the federal 
government has greater jurisdictional clout than it often chooses to exercise.  It is also true, 
however, that exercising such clout without the impetus of the courts precludes the 
facilitation of the kinds of consensus needed to make Canadian government work 
effectively.  In addition, Harrison has opined that negotiations done in this spirit can lead to 
a “race to the bottom” and a settling for the lowest common denominator in terms of 
environmental regulations in the name of finding consensus.130   
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Between Ideology and Actuality 
While it is clear that the federal government sees a particular role for itself and has 
carved out a niche accordingly, it is also clear that there is a profound gap between ideology 
(e.g. the environment must be protected and species at risk are a component of that 
protection) and actuality.  Just as Kearns points out that the movement of environmentalist 
groups from the fringe of society to its centre necessitated a stepping back from the language 
of moral persuasion and of overtly religious worldviews and as a consequence, left an 
audience still hungering for that type of moral imperative, so too can be seen a similar case 
with the species at risk legislation.  The idea of the legislation is launched with the best of 
intentions—moral and legal imperatives, protecting endangered species is not only morally 
right (and not just from a religious standpoint), Canada also has a legal obligation under the 
Biodiversity Convention.  A gap is created when the drafters of the legislation bring their own 
biases to the crafting process and produce a document that falls short of the ideal once 
proposed.131  A creation of greater and deeper compromise, the legislation moves towards 
the centre of the process leaving behind an audience (some of the original proposers of the 
legislation) looking for the ideological components of the legislation and voices that will 
champion those components.  The point of this being that the electorate has an expectation 
that the federal government will take up the ideological/ethical/moral spirit of the proposed 
legislation and make that a central component—in this case an Act that has the ability to 
facilitate the ideology that suggested it in the first place, that is, to ensure the viability of a 
variety of species in Canada via species and habitat protection and nurturing.  This 




The Churches not only relinquished physical control of a social safety net to the 
federal government in the first half of the twentieth century.  In many ways, it also 
relinquished moral control—the State may have no place in the bedroom of the nation, but 
it does, in the eyes of many, have a place in the ethical framework of society.  One way in 
which the public assumes and sometimes demands that the federal government take charge 
of that ethical framework is by providing legislation that will facilitate greater human 
flourishing.  When the government does not—or feels it cannot, in the interests of other 
considerations—take a strong moral stance on an issue, in this case, that of endangered 
species protection, a gap is left, the position of moral spokesperson is empty and must be 
filled.  In this case, environmental groups initially filled that position.  
Moral Voices: Compromising and Not—The Saga Continues 
Convinced that legislation ready to be tabled was worth more than legislation 
promised in the Throne Speech, the coalition of environmental groups that had initially 
briefed Copps on the necessity for the legislation insisted that flaws could be ameliorated as 
the draft legislation went through committee.  Elizabeth May, who reluctantly agreed to go 
with the consensus of the coalition, later indicated her certainty that the bill would not 
improve, “…my inner voice said, ‘That’s never going to work…it never did work.  It’s a very 
bad piece of legislation.”132  The bill did not reach First Reading under Copps and was 
introduced as the Canada Endangered Species Protection Act, Bill C-65 in October of 1996 under 
the new Minister, Sergio Marchi with no revisions.  While improvements of a sort were 
made in committee hearings held by the Standing Committee on Environment and 
Sustainable Development (i.e. making federal protection of international species mandatory), 
environmental groups still argued that the bill was inherently flawed by excessive “political 
discretion133 and loopholes…the absence of automatic habitat protection…a weakening of 
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federal protection in the Territories and a series of powers to exempt activities from the 
Act…”134 135 When the amended bill returned in March of 1997, reaction from the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, resource-based industries from fisheries, agriculture 
and forestry was vehemently negative and a concentrated effort to undermine the bill was 
launched.136  Under pressure, government amended the bill yet again and in late March of 
1997, introduced a series of amendments that environmentalist groups stated weakened the 
bill further by, among other things, including a requirement that “recovery plans’ cost-
benefit analyses pay particular attention to the “socio-economic costs and benefits…”137  
Asserting that this amended bill as worse than nothing, Elizabeth May described the bill as a 
“permitting system for legal extinctions.”138   
It must be remembered here that there were several points of view regarding 
endangered species legislation, some of those views are mentioned above—I will elaborate 
on two of them here.  The government saw it as a component of a larger strategy.  It is 
important to note that the 1995 referendum in Quebec was still quite fresh in everyone’s 
minds and the necessity of proving that “flexible federalism” was not just a catch-phrase was 
paramount—in the government’s opinion.  Environmentalist groups wanted legislation like 
the Endangered Species Act in the United States.  This broad, sweeping legislation mandates 
species and habitat protection regardless of what state government or industry might say.  
Failure to comply with the Act led to expensive and mostly, for industry at least, losing 
litigation.  Environmentalist groups were not convinced that a multi-faceted approach 
towards preserving biodiversity would work if federal legislation was not as comprehensive 
as the courts averred it could be.  They saw the proposed endangered species legislation as 
needing to be the enforcer of the biodiversity rink.  Here can be seen the spectre of the  
debate mentioned in Chapter Four, with the federal government pushing towards regulation 
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and administrative recourse while the environmental groups were firm in their conviction 
that legislation with teeth must be non-discretionary so as to be concretely viable for 
potential litigation. 
That the federal government did not act more assertively in the face of inter-
governmental, inter-departmental and industry pressure is not surprising, despite polls that 
showed strong public support for assertive legislation.139  Harrison has shown that salience 
in environmental issues was low at that time period and, given the reluctance of the federal 
government to be assertive in environmental matters at periods of low salience, neither the 
lack of teeth in Bill C-65 nor the propensity of the government to give weight to arguments 
put forth by environmentalists should come as any surprise.140  The power of the voices of 
environmentalists is buoyed by salience in the electorate and that was not extant in the time 
period.  Bill C-65 died on the Order Paper when Chretien called an election for June of 
1997.   
Another Kick at the Can 
During the 1997 federal elections, The Sierra Club and other environmental groups 
ran an ad in The Globe and Mail protesting the proposed Act.  Complete with pictures of 
endangered species and a caption referring to the Red Book as the “Liberal Book of the 
Dead”, the ad was deemed “too political” by other members of the original coalition of 
environmental groups involved in the SARA process.  The Sierra Club was no longer 
affiliated with the original group of environmentalists lobbying for the legislation.141  When 
the Liberals won a new mandate, there were calls from The Sierra Club, the Sierra Legal 
Defence Fund and other environmental groups for the new Environment Minister, Christine 
Stewart to scrap C-65 and begin again.  According to one source inside the negotiations of 
the legislation, Ms. Stewart had stated that she would consider amendments from 
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environmental groups and from industry if they could put forward a consensus.142 In 1998, 
the Sierra Club formed the Species at Risk Working Group (SARWG) with the Canadian 
Pulp and Paper Association, the Canadian Nature Federation, the Mining Association of 
Canada, the National Agriculture Environment Committee, and the Canadian Wildlife 
Federation.  The mix of environmentalists and industry stakeholders was in keeping with the 
recent trend towards collaboration in crafting environmental legislation.  Two of the 
recommendations that were put forth were that COSEWIC alone would have the say in 
which species went on the list and that the killing of species anywhere in Canada would be 
prohibited.143  Before these could be considered by Ms. Stewart, Mr. David Anderson took 
over the portfolio.  An election was called in  April 2000 and bill C-33 died on the Order 
Paper amidst rumours that the new minister was not open to amending the Bill and that it 
would be re-introduced as-is.144  Hearings on the third-time proposed legislation (to become 
Bill C-5) began in front of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable 
Development in the fall of 2000.145   
The Third Kick and A Glimpse of Worldview Reflected in Policy 
In these hearings, Mr. Anderson clearly articulated first the government’s underlying 
philosophy and policy for SARA: 
…the first principle to remember is the first principle of ecology, and that is that 
all things are interdependent.  We cannot separate species out one from the 
other or species from their habitats, just as we cannot separate the people who 
live in this country and who work on the land, on the water, or in the woods 
from their relationship with the skies, the lands, and the waters where those 
species of animals and plants happen to live. 
 
The above is important to consider when reflecting on views regarding the 
relationship between humanity and the natural world.  The position articulated by Mr. 
Anderson reflects an inclusiveness that actually sees human beings as embedded in the 
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natural world.  Granted, it is also a political statement of policy that is meant to convey the 
government’s position that human needs and concerns needed to be considered on equal 
footing with those of the species with which human beings cohabitate.  It is a statement of 
pragmatism also meant to reassure industry and landowners that their concerns were being 
considered in the stated policy.  But, on the flip side, it is also a recognition (albeit somewhat 
forced) of an aboriginal worldview of absolute embeddedness and the delicate work needed 
to maintain a sustainable balance.  I am in no way equating the Chretien government’s 
environmental policy with Aboriginal spiritual traditions or worldviews, but I believe that the 
parallel is worth noting.  It goes towards supporting a contention that religious worldviews 
have a practical component to them and that Western liberal democrats are not above 
resorting to religious allusions when striving to prove a point.  Nor is the comment overtly 
religious unless one is conversant with the ways in which religious worldviews are reflected 
in everyday language within the public sphere—then the allusions become clear.  So, while 
one would be hard pressed to have most politicians in Canada assert that they are using the 
observations of a religious worldview to make a political point, the fact is that the 
articulation of the policy by the Minister does incorporate aspects of religious worldviews.  
The religious worldviews in our society are part of our intellectual heritage and a tool in the 
arsenal of politicians trying to reinforce a particular agenda.  As seen below, the 
embeddedness articulated in the policy becomes a dichotomy when species are considered to 
be at risk from two different reasons: human activity and natural selection.  It reinforces the 
traditional stance of disembeddedness, for human activity is seen as separate from “natural” 
selection.146   
The Practicalities of Policy Re-Invented as Strategy 
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In the 2000 hearings, Mr. Anderson stated the government’s “three-pronged” 
strategy for “protecting species from becoming extinct as a consequence of human activity”:  
the “cornerstone” was the proposed Species At Risk Act (SARA)—which included the 
COSEWIC list and an agreement to integral traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) into the 
process; partnership with the provinces and territories which the Minister reminded the 
Committee, “have constitutional responsibility for land and property rights…their active and 
willing participation is key.”  Mr. Anderson referred to the Accord of 1996.  The third 
component was “building partnerships with Canadians to promote stewardship programs 
for species and their habitats.”  This included the federal Habitat Stewardship Program—a 
partnership program of government, environmental non-governmental agencies (NGO’s), 
private citizens and Aboriginal peoples.  In addition there were a variety of tax incentives 
introduced to promote the donation of private lands to the government as protected 
habitats.   
During the course of the year, hearings were held by the Standing Committee that 
involved myriad stakeholders, including SARWG who stated that it had been “…working to 
develop creative solutions for the protection and recovery of species at risk that would 
reconcile the need for wildlife conservation and the needs of those whose livelihoods are 
dependent on natural resources.”147  The legislation was tabled in February of 2001 amidst 
cautious optimism that the government was amenable to cooperating with a variety of 
stakeholders (as opposed to just the provinces and economic stakeholders—an accusation 
made by several environmental groups) and would also consider the recommendations 
proposed by the Standing Committee.  Bill C-5 focused on stewardship and incentives, 
offering compensation to individuals whose land use was curtailed by the Act.  TEK and the 
input of Aboriginal peoples were entrenched.  In addition, Bill C-5 contained more 
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discretionary language than its predecessor—deferring more to the provinces and stressing 
cooperation rather than coercion.  An important aspect of Bill C-5 was the “safety net” 
which allowed the federal government to step in to protect a species and its habitat if the 
Minister of the Environment sees that the provincial government is not acting to protect the 
species.  The safety net provision requires the Minister to take the situation to Cabinet and 
request that the federal government act to protect the species.  Environmental groups 
argued that this was politically untenable as it was positing that the federal government 
would act completely against historical precedence and risk alienating a province over an 
environmental issue.148  The government countered that the provinces and territories were 
involved in the species at risk effort by virtue of their constitutional jurisdiction and to craft 
legislation that attempted to override that jurisdiction was not only doomed at the level of 
the constitution but at the practical level as well.  Legislation that was deemed untenable to a 
smooth working relationship with provincial authorities ran the risk of being repealed, 
challenged in the courts or ignored.149  Environmental groups responded that the legislation, 
but acknowledging provincial precedence might weaken a federal position should the federal 
government decide to assert jurisdiction by enacting the safety net.  Each side argued that 
theirs was the more constitutionally viable position. 
By 2001, after First Reading of  Bill C-5 and into the hearings, there were myriad 
points of contention.  Some of the most virulent were: compensation to individuals 
potentially affected by the Act, whether or not Cabinet should have the final say in which 
species identified by COSEWIC should actually go onto the official list of endangered 
species, and mandatory protection of species on federal lands (the government insisted that 
“federal lands” was too vaguely defined—in a legal sense—for the Act to make that stricture 
and be constitutionally defensible.  Environmental groups scoffed at that and asserted that 
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federal lands and jurisdiction had been defined clearly enough by the courts for the wording 
to be on sound constitutional footing.).  The Committee tabled its report in late 2001 and 
recommended that the House adopt amendments that would (among other things) make the 
COSEWIC list legal without cabinet approval (much like the Endangered Species Act in the 
US) and prohibit the killing of endangered species on federal lands.  The government 
considered and then rejected the amendments, announcing that it would call for a vote on 
Bill C-5 as tabled. 
A small group of Liberal backbenchers (40 in all) banded together and refused to 
support the Bill if substance was not changed to make the listing process non-political and 
the protection of all species on federal lands mandatory.  Karen Kraft Sloan, Charles Caccia 
and Clifford Lincoln eventually were able to come to an acceptable compromise with the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) at the last minute that allowed for the COSEWIC list to be 
the legal list, but the Cabinet reserving the right to reject the listing of any species within 
nine months.  Mandatory protection of critical habitat on federal lands was also included 
with the caveat of extensive landowner involvement and the acceptance by the federal 
government of a recovery plan.150   The Species at Risk Act passed in 2002 and was 
proclaimed as law.   
 
Some Aftermath 
 Some of the provisions of the Bill were delayed.  The COSEWIC listing was delayed 
from 30 days to 3 years so that traditional ecological knowledge could be included in the 
analysis.  The Sierra Club noted that this was admirable in species like the bowhead whale 
but perhaps not particularly helpful in cases where TEK was not directly integral to the 
species.  In addition, some of the “Green” Liberals were further disappointed when the 
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Minister of the Environment accepted COSEWIC’s first list, subject to Cabinet rejection as 
per the Act—but proceeded to post the list on the internet and solicit public comments.  
Cabinet then used the comments from the public (comments that were alleged by 
environmental groups to have been the product of campaigns engineered by industry and 
other interest groups) to reject some of the listings.  In their 2005 Rio Report Card, the Sierra 
Club went as far as to accuse the government as “ignoring the spirit of the law”.151 
 The government remained stalwart in their assertion that this was the best bill 
possible for the time and for Canada’s unique jurisdictional configuration.  Their position 
continued to be that cooperation and compromise were the only ways in which species at 
risk legislation could have any meaningful impact:  “I still believe firmly that with goodwill, 
quite pedestrian legislation will probably be very successful; with bad will the best legislation 
in the world will be unsuccessful.  It’s basically a question of attitude that is going to protect 
endangered species, not law.”152 
Some Preliminary Analysis 
 The story of the SARA, from international treaty to integration with policy to 
development of legislation to proclamation of law reveals the not-so-astonishing fact that 
development of law is labyrinthine and influenced by myriad factors.  The development of 
legislation, for instance, is quite complex and, as has been shown, quite public.  Even if the 
public at large (the electorate, for instance) is not fully cognizant of how the whole process is 
achieved (white paper, first reading, referral to committee, etc.), the players and stakeholders 
in whatever realm the proposed legislation affects are aware to some extent and either follow 
the process closely themselves or delegate someone to do so and to report back.  So public a 
process, theoretically makes it difficult for one particular ideology or worldview to become 
entrenched either in the process or in the substance of the legislation itself.  A product of 
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compromise, legislation is very rarely ideologically uni-focused.  Therefore, while the 
Minister of the Environment may state clearly in a public hearing on environmental 
legislation that, “I’ve sometimes thought we don’t really need this legislation at all; we just 
have to have the 104th Psalm, verses 26-32.  That’s all you really need for endangered species 
protections.”, he also goes on to acknowledge that, “…(t)here are other religious or 
background approaches that we could work into legislation, but I won’t go down that 
line…”153  And indeed, there is nothing overt in the language of the SARA  itself that would 
suggest that one particular religious worldview was being supported.  The closest the 
wording ever comes is in the preamble of the legislation where the environment is referred 
to as part of the “spiritual” heritage of the Canadian people.154  This is not in any surprising.  
A piece of legislation in a legal document—the wording within it is, hopefully, precise and 
vetted by the government’s legal experts.  Where religious worldviews (or any worldviews, 
for that matter) can become apparent are in the policies that drive the legislation, the ways in 
which the legislation is championed (or fought against), the ways in which the legislation is 
or is not implemented and, of course, in the ideology that undergirds the legislation itself-
integrally intertwined with policy.   
Policies and Legislative Ideology 
 As has been shown, the Liberal government in the 1990’s and the Conservative 
government in the 1980’s included the environment as components of their policy 
platforms.  It has also been demonstrated by Harrison’s work that federal governments are 
not traditionally motivated to be proactive on environmental issues except when salience of 
those issues is high with the electorate.  This is an important point to note because it goes to 
an argument that neither party had a firm ideological conviction in regards to environmental 
protection.  This is not to say that neither party has passed solid environmental legislation, 
340 
 
but it does go towards the assertion that in terms of a hierarchy of importance, relations with 
the provinces and industry related to natural resources and basic economic concerns (jobs, 
balanced budgets, etc.) combine with desire for re-election to put issues of environmental 
protection for the environment’s sake fairly low either practically or ideologically.   
 The policies of the first Liberal Red Book are clear, on the one hand, the Liberal 
Party of Canada supports sustainable development as defined and outlined in a bevy of 
international studies and documents, including the Biodiversity Convention  and the principles of 
the first Earth Summit in Rio.  Canada gained a lot of international attention and accolades 
and the public salience, while not stellar, was high enough that the Red Book took full 
advantage of the terminology (and in the popularity of the Green Plan before it) of the 
summit when it announced the paradigm shift that it wanted to effect within the federal 
government and in the country as a whole.  I have discussed the possible religious 
worldviews spoken to by the first Red Book above.  The language used reveals a saliency on 
behalf of the authors of the existence of a traditional, mainline religious worldview in the 
Canadian electorate even as it alludes to Aboriginal worldviews and to the romanticism of 
conservationism that reverberates with environmentalists who consider their relationship 
with nature spiritual while remaining denominationally unaffiliated.  The language also 
reflects, in a small way, the language of the Earth Charter which unabashedly uses some 
religious language while it ensconces itself firmly in a pluralist and humanist worldview.  In 
addition, the policies that go towards cooperation and communal responsibility are used 
both in a practical sense (we must all work together), but in a less plebeian way, as well—
there are subtle calls to a spirit of cooperation and a sense of community that belie a 
theological undertone, a religious worldview that sees humanity as collectively accountable to 
one another and to God.  This dovetails well into Locke and Grotius also, of course.  This 
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policy position was the one in which an endangered species act was first introduced at the 
federal level in Canada.  That it (and other environmental legislation) was not firmly 
championed by the PMO in the face of vociferous contention by the Fisheries Minister and 
the Minister of Natural Resources speaks volumes regarding the ideological stance behind 
the policy position.155  To be sure, the emphasis was on partnership and cooperation, self-
effacing to the extent that the federal government was positioned as an entity that needed to 
essentially lead by example—a belief that change originated from the top down.  These 
positions did not change drastically in the second Red Book.  What can be said is that, 
although there seems to be recognition of the saliency of a limited variety of religious 
worldviews that should be spoken to in terms of environmental policy, there is no firm 
evidence that religious worldviews were particularly important in the laying of environmental 
policy.  The fact that the language is used in 1992 is important, though because it does offer 
a very small indication that the tradition of referring to religion as a matter of course in 
public affairs (traditionally until the 1960’s, in both English and French-speaking Canada) 
had not become uncomfortable for mainstream politicians in the early 1990’s.  Obviously, 
one cannot build an entire theory around such an infinitesimal observation, but the 
connection is interesting nonetheless.   
 In the 1997 Red Book, overly religious language is gone completely, as was discussed 
above.  Many factors can probably be attributed to this.  The Liberal government’s focus had 
grown more and more aimed at a particular definition of fiscal responsibility, the Quebec 
Referendum in 1995 still loomed large and the rise of the Reform Party in the West bore 
watching, even if it did not yet elicit sharp alarm.  It is not surprising that the second Red 
Book concentrated heavily on fiscal responsibility and economic issues considering the 
eventual focus of the Liberal government’s first mandate on balancing the budget and 
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eliminating the deficit.  Environmental policy still focuses on sustainable development, but 
now it rests ideologically on flexible federalism, practicality and the necessity of considering 
human/industry needs to be on par with those of the environment.  While the first Red 
Book was concerned with balancing human and environmental needs, the trend towards the 
economic over the environmental is more overt.  As stated above, overtly religious language 
is missing, even as a nod towards Aboriginal Spirituality.  It is not untoward to posit that the 
rise of an American-style version of the religious right within the populist political right in 
Canada also led to a careful distancing on the part of the authors of the Book.156  Aiming for 
voters who were mainstream—politically and religiously speaking, a lack of religious 
language would do no harm, especially if those who were affiliated with the religious 
mainstream would take it as a matter of course that the values espoused in the Red Book 
incorporated those of the traditional shadow establishment.  There were, of course, voices 
on the left of the religious spectrum who argued that traditional mainstream Canadian 
Christian values were not being reflected in government policies—but these voices were 
largely raised in the realm of economic concern.157  This dovetailed quite clearly with the 
long-held view of the liberal elite that the Canadian public sphere was essentially secular and 
that it should remain so—Mr. Anderson’s remarks to the Standing Committee on 
Environment and Sustainable Development highlight that sense.  The elimination of 
religious language in a small way had the effect (intended or not) of reinforcing that point of 
view.  In short it does seem that there is a parallel—not necessarily a correlation—between 
environmental policy and overt religious language.  The federal government supported 
and/or used both when it was expedient to do so and when public salience was at a low ebb 
(i.e. with jobs and the economy looming larger than environmental issues which come to be 
seen as expensive and/or bad for the economy) or was somewhat wary of what it perceived 
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to be “extremism” (i.e. with the rise of a vocal American-style religious and political right)—
protection of the environment for any goal more abstract than that of human health or 
economic gain and overtly religious language were both quietly put aside. 
 So it can be seen that the policy position of the federal Liberal government towards 
environmental issues while SARA was being negotiated was not as a whole ideologically 
undergirded by a religious worldview.  However, it is curious to note, as I did above, that the 
first Red Book uses a stream of language that can be construed as coming from a religious 
worldview exclusively in the chapter on environmental sustainability.  It is reasonable to 
posit that, beyond the pragmatic (some might say cynical) reasons for using such language to 
attract voters from particular populations (the Red Book was, after all, an election tool), it is 
also a tacit acknowledgement that environmental issues had/have a transcendent component 
to them.  Environmental law was moving beyond the strictly regulatory phase into one 
where it was beginning to be recognized institutionally what grassroots movements across 
the globe had been saying for three or four decades, that the effect of humanity on the rest 
of the natural world was larger in scope and perhaps more dangerous in scope than was 
possible to calculate and possibly ameliorate without the input and hard work of a plurality 
of effort and expertise.  In other words, one or two groups of scientists in one or two 
countries alone could not solve the larger problems of environmental degradation.  Hence, 
the eventual Earth Summits and the preceding committees and commissions.  Religious 
worldviews are integral here.  Especially Aboriginal ones, but also the western Christian 
ones.  The first Red Book reflects, as noted above, the language of the international 
community’s workings on environmental issues.  There is a sense by the authors of this 
particular chapter that it makes sense to use the kind of language that not only had been 
integrated into the Earth Charter and the work of Rio but was familiar on an essential 
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cultural level.  The language stops short of recognizing a complete embeddedness (an 
Aboriginal worldview) but does reflect a sense of what in law is called “duty of care” where a 
responsible party is expected to do everything possible to assure the health/safety/well-
being of entities that fall into their jurisdiction of responsibility.  This is reflective of the two 
other theological points of view discussed earlier—the Franciscan (or, rather, neo-
Franciscan) view of stewardship—beings at the top of the hierarchy have a duty of care for 
the rest of creation mandated by the Creator, even if those at the top are not completely 
embedded in the natural world by virtue of their special natures; and the dominion—nature 
is our tool to use, the Creator has said so, and we must take care of our tools if we want 
them to remain effective for our use.  Neither position, it is important to note, posits 
humanity as embedded in the natural world—supporting a position of both secular and 
religious worldviews that humanity is set apart from the rest of the natural world by virtue of 
its cognitive ability and scientific acumen or by virtue of the Creator as having made 
humanity something more, something ontologically superior, to the rest of the natural world.  
However, mainstream Christian worldviews regarding the natural world and humanity are 
represented clearly alongside what could be called the secular or non-religious worldviews.  
This same clarity of representation is not, as mentioned, apparent in the 1997 Red Book.  
The religious language morphs somewhat into the quasi-religious language of 
conservationism and is represented in the notion of stewardship.  Here, there is no “vision” 
but a call for a common sense of our “heritage” and the responsibility of all to protect that 
“heritage” by being good stewards of our resources.  Where in the first Red Book it is left up 
to the individual to determine just who or what calls us to be good stewards—God, 
humanity or the State (to name a few choices)—in the second Red Book it is clear that the 
State implores all members to remember a collective bond with the natural world that gives 
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the citizenry a sense of common ownership and identity.  Again, a call towards something 
larger than the individual, but nothing that could be construed as overtly religious (unless 
one desires to explore the idea of a Canadian civil religion which this study emphatically does 
not).158  
 It can be seen, then, that issues of the environment remained ones that could be 
spoken of in terms that were quasi-religious if not overtly religious—the natural world was 
something that was seen not only as a source of economic prosperity, but also as a tool for 
national identity and unity.  We might disagree about who has jurisdiction over the grizzly 
bear’s habitat, but we can agree that the majesty and beauty of both animal and habitat are 
part of our identities as Canadians.  Therefore, the policies do reflect what is a traditional 
theological stance or religious worldview, that humanity is not embedded in the natural 
world but that it has a responsibility  towards it (either as a responsible user of tools or as a 
steward).  As well, even as humanity is not embedded in the natural world, the natural world 
notwithstanding is a transcendent force in the Canadian collective consciousness—
reminding citizens of their unity as a people, even in the midst of profound differences.  A 
romantic call to national unity, but one that had resonance, nonetheless.  
Specifically SARA 
 The development of SARA spanned two Red Books, three federal elections, and 
four Environment Ministers.  It came before Parliament and the Standing Committee on 
Environment and Sustainable Development three different times ( as C-65, C-33, and C-5—
respectively).  Although there were changes and amendments, the Bill as passed in 2002 was 
not significantly changed in its essence from the draft bill in the early 1990’s.  The policies 
behind the Bill were myriad—all of them reflected, in part, by the official policies laid out in 
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the Red Books of 1992 and 1997.  The government policies as stated were to be good 
neighbours by honouring international agreements and to be good stewards by (among other 
things) protecting biodiversity in part by protecting species at risk and their habitats.  In this, 
the government was led by polls that showed Canadians desiring to protect biodiversity.  
SARA also had to respond to other policies of the government, though—honouring the 
jurisdiction of the provinces and maintaining and promoting economic stability and growth.  
SARA had to promote the lofty goals of protecting biodiversity, maintain Canada’s 
environmental reputation abroad, satisfy environmental groups that it was effective, fulfill 
the promise of stewardship and do its part to support national unity all while not disturbing 
natural resource industries and provincial jurisdiction claims.  In addition, it had to dovetail 
with the government’s policies towards Aboriginals while also incorporating Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge into its eventual ultimate permutation.  So the policies that underlay 
SARA were not just those on the environment, but on natural resources, economic 
development, foreign policy, and intergovernmental relations.  The religious worldviews 
reflected were, initially, those covert ones of the federal government observable in the 
statements regarding humanity’s relationship with the natural world.  As more input was 
given towards the development of the bill, the underlying religious worldviews being 
reflected in it became somewhat more diverse.  While it is apparent in the bill itself, a 
dichotomy of religious worldviews (in terms of humanity occupying a singular place in 
creation) is faintly discernable.  In the preamble of the Act, paragraph one, it states that:  
“Canada’s natural heritage is an integral part of our national identity and history, wildlife, in 
all its forms has value in and of itself…” (italics mine)159  This is reflective of a religious 
worldview that holds that the natural world has value regardless of human activity or need.  
It reflects a non-Lockean point of view that gives value to an entity irrespective of human 
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agency.  It is akin to an Aboriginal sense of complete embeddedness and also reflective of a 
Christian eco-theology that can be seen as neo-Franciscan as it ascribes a complete 
egalitarianism to all of Creation.160  So it can be seen that, although religious worldviews and 
theological ideology can be traced fairly easily through the policies of the federal government 
at the time, they do not translate in an appreciable way into the legislation itself. 
Championing Legislation—the Total Story 
It bears repeating that, while worldviews certainly do come into play when 
negotiating legislation, they are unlikely to become wholly entrenched if the legislative 
process is followed in the traditional manner.161  SARA was negotiated by government 
representatives, environmental groups, private individuals and corporate interests 
representing a plethora of viewpoints.  The environmental groups, at least, were firmly 
convinced that they held the moral high ground and it is reasonable to state that other 
stakeholders did as well.  No one ideological position was wholly encapsulated in the final 
legislation, although the government’s stance was, as is to be expected since the Liberals did 
have a majority, more fully represented than was, say the Sierra Club of Canada’s.  This is 
important to note, because two key players in the story of SARA: Mr. David Anderson and 
Ms. Elizabeth May are both practicing Christians—members of the Anglican Church of 
Canada.  Both of these individuals held powerful, vocal positions during the course of the 
negotiation of SARA and both have firm, clear theologies that are reflected in their 
worldviews and stances towards humanity and the natural world (or environment).   
An exploration of these two players in the context of the SARA is instructive as it 
shows how and where the worldviews of individuals touch and influence what are 
considered to be separate spheres—public and private, with politics in one and religion in 
the other.  Mr. Anderson himself was adamant in an earlier quote in regards to the 
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separation of the two spheres.  Ms. May, as well, has been careful to delineate her personal 
religious views from her party at large and from her position as a potential public servant.  
However, this exploration will demonstrate that it is not possible to remove ones worldview 
entirely from one’s public life and that this is not, in a legislative sense, necessarily a negative 
outcome.  As will become apparent, although Mr. Anderson and Ms. May have profound 
differences, their theologies are not, in the end, incongruent—although their conviction 
regarding what constitutes workable, lasting legislation certainly is.  I will compare them on 
four points:  worldviews, theologies, anthropologies (view of humanity)—including a view of 
the natural world and humanity’s place in it, views of the political process in general and of 
SARA in particular.   
Elizabeth May, the Sierra Club, SARWG, and SARA:  
Introduction 
 Elizabeth May begins this section because it was she who was present at the 
beginning of the SARA story.  Ms. May had worked with the Conservative government 
under Brian Mulroney as an advisor to the Minister of the Environment.  She resigned her 
position over issues regarding the federal government’s disinclination to perform an 
environmental assessment. Ms. May was at Rio the Earth Summit, a participant in the 
designing of the Earth Charter and also had a hand in the  
Biodiversity Convention.  As executive director of the Sierra Club, she worked with a variety of 
coalitions, as mentioned above, to bolster, amend and improve what she and other groups 
saw as deeply flawed legislation.  Even today, as leader of the Green Party of Canada, she 
remains convinced that the legislation as passed is ineffectual and poorly constructed.162  Ms. 
May saw herself and the coalitions of which she was a part as important components of the 
entire process—a reflection of the power of cooperation of disparate interests working 
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towards a goal that they all agreed was important, even if they did not agree on the ways that 
goal should be achieved.  Her conclusions regarding the process of SARA include a 
conviction that the Liberal government in general (save for a few backbenchers who formed 
the informally named “Green Caucus), Cabinet—the Environment Minister included, were 
difficult to work with, compromising with the provinces and within Cabinet so much so as 
to render the legislation untenable and best and detrimental at worse. 
Worldview 
 The question, “What is your worldview?” was asked before questions of religious 
affiliation and theology because the term “worldview” encompasses more than theology, it is 
the construct by which individuals make meaning in their own lives and the template with 
which they use to make meaning of existence in general.  Ms. May’s worldview centres on 
her beliefs as a practicing Christian and as an environmentalist.  It would be fair to say that 
the two are integrally intertwined in her worldview.  She believes that it is important to ask 
large questions and to strive to find the meaning of our existence—for her, the natural world 
is inseparable from that quest: “I’m very focused on the survival of this planet as a moral 
responsibility and also as an aspect of our spiritual growth and development as human 
beings to think beyond our own greed and immediacy think about what does it mean for 
future generations and what does it mean for our immortal soul—how we treat this planet, 
how we treat each other.”163   Ms. May looks beyond a mechanistic universe to one that is 
organic, interdependent and dynamic.  In this worldview, humanity is both embedded in the 
natural world but also, in a sense, transcendent by virtue of humanity’s responsibility towards 
creation and towards the Creator:   “My largest sense of a worldview is in the physical plane 
of planet earth as completely unique…the notion that we’re in an evolving universe and that 
we can be participants in that creativity and in that evolving universe and that our role of 
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humans we are a species of enormous potential for obviously for good or for ill…”164  Her 
worldview includes, but it is necessary to stress that it is not governed by, a belief in an 
afterlife.  The stress here is important because it is not a point of view that relies on right 
behaviour or belief to gain salvation, but rather a sense that responsibilities for one another 
and for the natural world are responsibilities for which human beings will have to make an 
accounting, that there are expectations of us as a species that will have ramifications beyond 
our present, temporal reality.  She speaks of societal paradigm shifts as collective feats of 
human spiritual (and social) growth and touches briefly on the idea that God challenges 
humanity to grow through humanity’s mistakes and tangible ramifications of human 
brokenness (i.e. climate change, pollution, eradication of other species).165   
Theology 
 Ms. May is a theist whose commitment to the Anglican Communion is integral to 
her theological expression.  This is important to note because often persons who experience 
the sacred in the context of the natural world are seen to be (or call themselves) pan-theistic.  
It is important to state at the outset that Ms. May’s theology on one hand seems very 
traditional—that is, approached conventionally in the context of Anglican worship and 
personal prayer.  Along these lines, the God of Ms. May’s theology is not the God of 
Pentecostals or of more evangelical traditions first encountered in her youth:  
“(we called them) the ‘God Squad’—people who thought that God would help 
you pick out what shoes you would wearing in the morning, you know—‘Oh yes 
I ask God… I ask Jesus for help and the answer’s there.  And if I’m not sure 
how I’m going to do on my exam I pray to the Lord…and I thought oh boy, oh 
boy…I had a sense that there’s things you bother G about and things you 
should handle on your own…”166   
Ms. May’s theology seems to have developed along neo-Franciscan lines.  This means, in 
part, that the Abrahamic God, in all of the complexities and permutations that appellation 
carries with it has called Creation into communion with Godself and calls humanity, in 
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particular to a level of responsible stewardship, the fulfilling of which is a profound 
expression of love, devotion and completion of purpose.167   
 The commitment to Anglicanism as integral to Ms. May’s Christian theology is clear 
when she speaks of the reasons that she continues to practice.  The aspects of Anglicanism 
that seem to particularly undergird Ms. May’s theology are that of the Eucharist, sacred 
space, community and education.  In answering questions regarding why she still practices, 
Ms. May recounted the sense of continuity, welcome and communion that she experiences 
when she attends services all over the country—when the priest will sometimes call her by 
name.  She speaks of being nourished by this sense of community and by the mass itself.  
Her sense of ritual importance and of sacred space are also apparent when she recounts 
teaching English as a Second Language at her parish in Connecticut when she was a 
teenager—she recalls asking the others not to play in the sanctuary and showing them what 
the various parts of the building meant and explaining aspects of the Book of Common 
Prayer168  Her conviction that religious education is important in the life of the church is also 
apparent—as she has taught Sunday School from the time she was a young teen until the 
present.  Again, the themes of responsibility and commitment and sense of purpose appear 
and loom consistently large in her theology.  This sense of purpose seems to be both a 
collective and an individual aspect of Ms. May’s theology—that God calls humanity to grow 
and move in a particular direction and also calls individuals to responsibility and personal 
accountability.  God is personal and loving and expects partnership from humanity even as 
God is acknowledged by humanity as Creator and as Wisdom. 
Anthropology 
 In Christianity, a person’s anthropology (or their view of human nature, including 
their soteriology) is inextricably intertwined with their theology.  Traditionally, the lower 
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one’s anthropology, the higher one’s Christology and vice-versa.  A lower anthropology 
means, among other things, that one holds a belief about human nature that sees it as broken 
and depraved.  In this paradigm, the relationship between God and humanity became 
broken at the time of the fall by a lack of hubris on the part of humanity and the relationship 
can only be mended by the redemptive power of Jesus Christ—fully human, fully divine.  
This particular end of the spectrum is especially conducive to a “faith over works” construct, 
as there is nothing a human being can do to achieve redemption—salvation belongs to God 
alone. A higher anthropology—at the other end of the spectrum—sees humanity as broken, 
but not genetically flawed.  Humanity’s relationship with God is broken in the same way, but 
is not depraved, merely lost and the relationship may be mended by humanity’s realization of 
its need for God as partner and guide, as model for what it means to be redemptive in the 
world.  In this paradigm, Jesus is still Christ, but Christ as model of what true communion 
with God can achieve in the world.  Jesus Christ becomes Jesus of Nazareth, teacher, model 
of holiness, redemptive force but fully human—the spark of divinity within him 
recognizable as the spark of divinity present in all of humanity.  This end of the spectrum is 
conducive to the “works over faith” construct—human beings can achieve redemption if 
they work hard enough. Grace is present all through the spectrum as the aspect of God that 
freely gives of redemption, knowledge, whatever one deems to be necessary for the 
relationship with God (and consequently with humanity) to be made whole. 
 Ms. May’s anthropology falls somewhat in the middle of the spectrum, she quotes 
the Quaker Ursula Franklin who speaks of faith and works being intertwined—that the 
Christian must have one foot in faith and one in works.169  Ms. May’s anthropology reflects a 
deep sense that humanity is eminently teachable, that they are dynamic (like all of creation) 
and are endowed with intellect and curiosity that is to be harnessed to move forward as a 
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species.  The “moving forward” incorporates awareness that one’s “immortal soul” is 
dependent upon taking moral stands in regards to how one treats the rest of creation 
(including human beings) and remaining (as Ms. May puts it) uncorrupted in one’s pursuit of 
those goals.170  There is no indication in Ms. May’s theology or anthropology that speaks of 
eternal damnation or non-acceptance by God if one fails in one’s mandate to do all they can 
to move humanity and the cause of mending creation (in the physical and the metaphysical 
sense) forward.  It is a positive theology and anthropology that rests on the capacity of 
humanity to work with the rest of creation to fulfill God’s vision of what creation can be. 
 This anthropology has humanity firmly embedded in nature, as mentioned above.  
Humanity does not necessarily have more value than the rest of the natural world, but it has 
more responsibility.  Ms. May refers to her theological studies at St. Paul’s University in 
Ottawa as substantiating her intuitive knowledge regarding the natural world, that all of 
creation is interconnected and that it all has meaning beyond the temporal.  Humanity is part 
of the natural world and responsibility towards ones another is akin to responsibility towards 
the rest of  creation—not more valued, but more responsible.  Her anthropology and her 
theology both assume a capacity for integrity and singularity of purpose that, she believes, 
work to bring about paradigm shifts in human society—which she describes as “spiritual 
breakthroughs”.171 
The Political Process:  Vision 
 Ms. May has been an environmental activist for much of her life.172  She has a history 
of working in cooperation and in collaboration with grassroots community groups, 
environmental NGO’s, government173 and, in the case of SARA, with natural resources 
industry groups.  Ms. May is a strongly principled person who sees the mending of creation 
both as a moral and as a pragmatic imperative:  “I think that ecological awareness…is the 
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next step up for humanity as a whole and if we don’t take that step we’re doomed...”174  This 
sense of mission and of principles is vital to understanding Ms. May’s interaction with the 
political process as it pertains to SARA.  Ms May is driven by a worldview that is 
undergirded by a theology firmly rooted in God’s proscription to humanity to maintain the 
integrity of creation.  This manifests itself in action that sets environmental integrity—
balance, health of all species, preservation and nurture—as the paramount objective for 
humanity in general and for Canadians in particular.  This does not mean that Ms. May has a 
uni-focus, however.  What it does mean, in terms of the political, is that all government 
action should keep the imperative of environmental integrity (and by this I mean reversing 
global warming, not polluting the natural world, conserving species and their habitat, among 
other things) as the primary focus.  It is fair to infer that Ms. May would see as ethical 
Cabinet asking at each turn, “Does this affect the health of the natural world and if so, is it 
an adverse or positive affectation?”  If the answer cannot be in the positive, then the action 
should either be modified so that it is not adversely affective or it should not be taken at all.  
It is a different kind of bottom line thinking that is, in some ways, in keeping with the goals 
set forth in the first Red Book of 1992.  So Ms. May’s vision of the political process is that it 
be focussed on what is most important to humanity (and to the rest of the natural world) at 
this point in history and that is the health of the natural world.  Ecological awareness that 
leads to positive human action.   
The Political Process: Goals 
 Extrapolating from Ms. May’s own words and from her career, it is clear to see that 
the political goals she sets affirm the vision named above.  It is also quite clear that, although 
she espouses a Christian worldview, that worldview does not overtly inform her actions 
taken in light of her goals and vision.  That is to say that her worldview and the vision set 
355 
 
and the goals that are set in the furtherance of that vision are undergirded by a deep personal 
faith, but that the faith itself does not overtly enter into the conversations and actions of Ms. 
May in the public sphere: 
So I might be in prayer (depending on the day) a whole bunch of times during 
the day  but when I’m in negotiations or a strategic discussion or trying to 
organize or motivate people…I’d go into them with a pretty clear conviction of 
what needs to be done and that need is around survival and stewardship—
survival of species, functioning ecosystems, avoiding the climate crisis—so those 
are so integral, those decisions are already in my mind when I go into a 
negotiation…175 
 
 Goals that further the vision are supported by a “profound belief that you can 
do it right.”  And by “right” she means not just the political sense, but the moral 
sense—a “rightness” that maintains ecological integrity and metaphysical balance.  
Achieving those goals in the political arena, however, is a temporal action, one that 
depends on strategy and planning and not one religious coercion. 
The Political Process:  Compromise 
 When one holds firm convictions compromise can be considered anathema.  
And indeed, Ms. May does say that during a negotiation you must, “hold in your mind 
the crystal clear view of what it looks like when you’ve won.  You’ve got to hold onto 
that.  And if you start making compromises and saying, ‘okay, it wouldn’t be too bad if 
we got half of what we want…’, those are fatal determinations in terms of doing the 
right thing.”176  And yet, Ms. May is known for her ability and predilection for bringing 
parties together and for forming coalitions and cooperatives: “…my philosophy is 
always try to get everybody to the table…to try to get everybody to work together try 
to find a solution”177  In this paradigm, then, compromise of the vision itself  is not 
possible for it would corrupt the process by diluting the principles which would be 
temporally and spiritually detrimental.  What is important is cooperation in service of a 
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common goal.  This view requires that people hold the same vision as inviolate—even 
if they do not agree on how to get there.  There can be no compromise when it comes 
to the vision itself, but there can be compromise in terms of which goals are set and 
how one goes about achieving those goals.   
 The key concept here is the notion of compromise in terms of moral 
imperatives.  If something is truly a moral imperative, one cannot in good conscience 
compromise its principles without some sort of important, even dire, consequence.  It 
would be easy to assert at this point then, that Ms. May’s religious worldview did 
indeed have direct bearing on the ways in which the SARA negotiations took place.  If 
issues of the environment went beyond a scientific cause for her (and they do—they 
are integral to her ontology and cosmology), then would that not guide her actions in 
the entire process?  Yes and no.  I have already demonstrated that Ms. May’s religious 
worldview undergirds her environmental activism.178  The question is, does it drive her 
actions in the political sphere?  Because of who she is, yes.  But that is not the crux of 
the matter for it has been shown that religion is not overtly present in the heat of the 
battle of the negotiating table.  In this sense, Ms. May models what David Novak 
explicates in his article on Jew and secularism in modern, liberal democracies.  Novak 
says, in essence, that it is perfectly acceptable to be religiously motivated, to have your 
moral imperatives informed by a religious worldview.  But, he goes on to argue, that 
this is not enough in a secular state.  In a secular context one must expect to undergird 
one’s objectives for the most part with evidence and arguments that are objective and 
universal enough that everyone at the table can weigh them and discuss them with a 
measure of objectivity and acceptance.179  This is precisely what Ms. May recounts 
when discussing how SARA was approached by herself and the other groups with 
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which she worked during the process.  Religion enters into the discussion only to the 
extent that it motivates the participants.  It does not, as such, further or even enter the 
public discussion because it is not a powerful tool for debate in and of itself.  And a 
tool that is not powerful is not useful in the political arena.  In this way, religion is 
both present and influential as a personal motivator while at the same time being only 
one small component of the overall process.   
SARA 
 The vision held by Ms. May and by others in regards to the Species at Risk Act 
was held in tandem with the ideals spelled out in the Biodiversity Convention.  The 
Convention requires signatories to preserve biodiversity in their respective geopolitical 
arenas.  In addition, signatories also agree to adhere to the precautionary principle 
which, in this case, means that if a species is at risk, a lack of definitive scientific 
evidence should not obviate the responsibility to err on the side of caution and move 
to protect the species. 
 The vision was of a Species at Risk Act that would (much like the Endangered 
Species Act in the United States) legislate a scientific (as opposed to political) listing of 
endangered species, give legal protection to endangered species and their habitats, 
protect all species regardless of whether or not they or their habitat was on federal 
land—protection includes the prohibition of killing or destroying members of species 
on the list.   
 The way that the White Paper was originally structured, as has been noted, that 
vision was not fulfilled in its entirety.  The federal government deferred to the 
provinces in terms of jurisdiction, COSEWIC was given legal status by being 
embedded in the Act, but Cabinet had veto power. 
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 Ms. May manoeuvred through the many years of negotiation with her eye 
firmly on the vision of what would create a workable piece of legislation.  Her political 
philosophy in this regard is pragmatic, even as it is driven by a vision.  “If you leave a 
legislative hole,” she says, “politicians will work to fill it.  If you pass a bad piece of 
legislation—they will consider the hole fixed and not worry about going back to rectify 
the bill.”180  From her perspective, then, it was imperative to get the legislation in line 
with the vision the first time around.  The group with which she (in her capacity as 
director of the Sierra Club of Canada) eventually partnered, (SARWG), worked 
cooperatively and emerged from their process with recommendations for SARA that 
did not compromise the vision of what SARA was to do and be, but that suggested (in 
essence) strengthening the role of the federal government in the process: “Our core 
recommendations are founded on the federal government demonstrating strong 
leadership by taking responsibility for species at risk in areas where it has clear 
jurisdiction and by playing an active coordination role.”181  The changes that SARWG 
proposed were myriad but the underlying theme (a strong federal voice that, in clearly 
stated and tightly defined terms, embraced and wielded all of the jurisdictional power 
that the judiciary had consistently ruled it (the federal government) had) was one that 
ultimately served a vision that could be construed as having a metaphysical 
undergirding that regarded humanity as embedded firmly in the natural world with 
rights and privileges thereof.   That Environment minister of the time (David 
Anderson), along with Cabinet, did not adopt the suggestions was seen by the group as 
a defeat, even though the bill (C-33) did pass and was proclaimed.  It’s weaknesses, 
protested the group, were too large to give it effectiveness.  Ms. May had fought with 
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the moral conviction of the correctness of her vision.  Where the vision was stymied 
was at the Cabinet level of the government of the day. 
 
David Anderson, Government, Right Relationships,  and SARA  
Introduction 
 David Anderson was Minister of the Environment for five years under both 
Jean Chretien and Paul Martin.  He grew up experiencing cultures other than Canada 
first hand, spending time in Hong Kong and Switzerland.  These early experiences had 
a profound impact on his adult worldview.  He also has a twin history of public service 
(the Canadian Department of External Affairs, as an Olympic athlete, provincial and 
federal politics as an MLA and an MP) and environmental activism.  His 
environmental activism was incorporated in both his political and his non-political 
career—particularly in the area of coastal and wetland protection.  He taught at the 
University of Victoria, as well, in environmental policy (among other subjects).  As 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (his portfolio before being shuffled to Environment) 
Mr. Anderson had a reputation as a conservationist and as a skilled negotiator.   
When Mr. Anderson first came on as Environment Minister, there was some 
controversy in regards to SARA.  A remark Mr. Anderson had made regarding not 
being willing to amend the legislation to the extent that it would “…destabilize (and) 
destroy the intention of the bill.” led to the belief that the legislation would be passed 
“as is” and that the Minister was going to be intractable, despite committee hearings 
and recommendations to the contrary.182 This was in June.  When hearings resumed in 
the fall session, Mr. Anderson clarified his remarks and pronounced himself willing to 
consider amendments that would not destabilize the bill.  This incident is important as 
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it highlights Mr. Anderson’s experience as a public servant—SARA was controversial 
in Cabinet and, as has been postulated, it is not likely that Mr. Chretien would have 
gone out of his way to champion it, given other issues that were also requiring 
attention at the time.183  C-55 had been amenable to Cabinet and amending it too 
much would mean that it would have to be re-negotiated around the Cabinet table.  
Mr. Anderson, as will be shown, is a politically pragmatic.  Irrespective of an initial bad 
start, Mr. Anderson was instrumental in the eventual passage of SARA.  His 
perspective of the process differs markedly at points from Ms. May’s despite the fact 
that they both were focused on passing effective species at risk legislation.  Just as Ms. 
May’s religious worldview plays an important supporting role in her part of the SARA 
saga, so too does Mr. Anderson’s.  Once again, however, it can be seen that although 
this worldview is integral, it does not adversely affect the outcome of the process.   
 
Worldview 
 A question that was taken literally, Mr. Anderson describes his worldview as 
just that—a global perspective.  At its essence, Mr. Anderson’s worldview has to do 
with big pictures and the idea that one is responsible (either as an individual or as a 
corporate entity—like government) for more than oneself or one’s country.  His 
worldview is one of contexts and possibilities where fairness and justice are not black 
and white but complexities.  He speaks of this being established at a very young age 
when living abroad, especially in Asia.  He recounts the realization that he was not any 
better or smarter than the people he interacted with—just luckier in terms of material 
resources and opportunity.184  When pressed, Mr. Anderson condenses  the above into 
a worldview resting on the “Christian tradition of the Golden Rule—Do unto others 
what you would have them do unto you.”185  This aspiration is not always achievable, 
361 
 
he says, but one always strives towards it.186  Mr. Anderson’s worldview, then, is 
composed of a sense of responsibility towards all people and of an ethic that compels 
one to look beyond oneself and one’s own backyard to the implication one’s actions 
have on the global community.  It is not a paternalistic worldview, but rather a sense 
of mutual obligation with one’s fellow creatures (especially humanity) towards one 
another.   
 This contrasts with Ms. May’s worldview in that Mr. Anderson, while he does 
see the interconnectedness and interdependence of the natural world, does not form 
his worldview around that precept.  Yes, humanity is part of the natural world, even 
embedded in it and humanity has a responsibility to protect it.  But Mr. Anderson does 
not see the protection of the natural world as the spiritual exercise that Ms. May does.  
He is passionate and does care about the natural world in and of itself, not just as a 
tool for human use.  But his worldview is exceedingly complex—he remarks 
frequently that there are myriad answers to problems and myriad paths to the truth 
and each answer and path has ramifications that are not immediately apparent to the 
outside observer.  So there is a pragmatism and a complexity to Mr. Anderson’s world 
view that differs from Ms. May’s—this difference is important, for it informs the ways 
in which each sees God, humanity and the legislative process. 
 In terms of SARA, this came into play as a commitment to trying to see all 
sides of the issue and to find compromises that would assure the most effective 
balance of protection, regulation and compensation.  Not in the sense that SARA had 
to be all things to all people, but in the sense that it was responsible to look beyond 
the species at risk and protection of habitat to the lifestyle consequences for people 
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and for the ways in which everyone could be brought on board to adhere to the 
legislation rather than ignoring it.   
Theology 
 Mr. Anderson does not come from a highly religious family, although his 
grandmother was a practicing Anglican and the grandchildren went with her to church 
and also attended Sunday School.  As a young adult, Mr. Anderson remained loosely 
affiliated, attending services occasionally as it felt “comfortable”.187   When he met and 
married his partner, he became more involved as she was quite active in her parish.  
They had two children and attended church regularly as a family-both in Victoria and 
in Ottawa.  Now that the children are grown, Mr. Anderson and his partner still attend 
church regularly.  Mr. Anderson voices appreciation for his religious tradition on 
several levels.  On one level is the aesthetic of the service itself—the music, the liturgy, 
the literature of the Bible.  Another level is that of the intellect, where one listens to 
sermons and the scripture readings.  Intertwined with this is what Mr. Anderson refers 
to as the “moral discipline” of not only listening to sermon and scripture but allowing 
oneself to be “pushed into different ways of thinking.”188   
 Although Mr. Anderson does not speak on metaphysical terms nor mention 
God per se, some cautious conclusions can be made in regards to his theology.  God, 
in the paradigm that Mr. Anderson seems to construct, is more interested in how one 
behaves in regards to one’s morals than God is interested in “show”.  For example, 
Mr. Anderson was somewhat dismissive when discussing the issues of Parliamentary 
Prayer breakfasts.  “We are here in a partisan capacity,” he says, “if you’re not going to 
extend the ‘we’re all Christians here’ attitude to the House, why pretend?”189  In that 
same vein, Mr. Anderson believes that religion teaches one to look beyond one’s own 
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interests, to try to find the good for others and to see a broader perspective.  Religion 
is the sphere in which humanity is invited to stretch oneself and to gain the capacity to 
think and act outside of one’s own narrow, single-minded perspective.  At the same 
time, although humanity is compelled to act in the public sphere—God and religion 
are private, not in the sense that they are shameful, but in the sense that they provide 
insight, fortitude and instruction for work in the more public sphere.   
 In terms of public and private spheres, it is interesting to note that while Mr. 
Anderson is suspicious of religion espoused overtly in the current domestic political 
arena, he speaks more favourably of its being referenced in the international arena 
where religion is not so much one’s political stance, but the invocation of which is 
more a statement of cultural perspective that should be considered equally among 
other such perspectives.190  It is easy to draw the conclusion that Mr. Anderson feels 
that religion invoked in the international arena has more substance than when it is 
invoked by a Canadian politician.  This reflects the traditional conviction of the 
Canadian elite that religion invoked in domestic politics is not desirable nor should it 
be taken seriously as public invocation of it is not only polarizing (which is detrimental 
to the legislative process which is, after all, all about negotiating) but a cynical attempt 
to curry favour with a particular constituency.  To be clear, I am in no way putting 
these words into Mr. Anderson’s mouth or intimating that he does not take religion or 
religious people seriously.  I am, however, extrapolating from our discussions an 
example of the paradigm of thought present in the Canadian elite described in Chapter 
One. 
 Mr. Anderson’s theology contrasts somewhat with Ms. May’s at several points 
although there are points in common that are important.  They are both, as has been 
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mentioned, practicing Anglicans.  Anglicans do share, by and large, an appreciation of 
the sacred as manifest in ritual and ambience and this appreciation is evinced by Mr. 
Anderson and Ms. May.  And for both people, the educational aspect of their faith is 
important.  Ms. May is not only a life-long Sunday School teacher, but is engaged in 
theological studies.  Mr. Anderson speaks clearly about the intellectual stimulation of 
the sermons and of the scripture readings.  And they have a common bond in their 
belief that their religious praxis calls them to look beyond themselves and to consider 
issues of morality and ethical frameworks that lie beyond their personal needs and 
experiences.  They both have a moral framework that is inextricably intertwined with 
their Christianity.  It is also interesting to note that, while both Mr. Anderson and Ms. 
May are firmly rooted in the Christian tradition, both appear to be pluralist in the 
sense that they remain open to the truths and worldviews of other faiths.  Mr. 
Anderson remarks at several points that one of the results of religious practice is that it 
“broadens the picture,” that it keeps one from being narrow because one learns to 
look beyond oneself.191  This is important because it places both of them close to the 
middle of the theological spectrum—neither fundamentalist-get-right-or-get-left 
Christianity nor completely relativist.192   
 What is also interesting is that they also share a conviction born of the 
Reformation in which society is seen as needing to be put in order.  This has been 
discussed in length elsewhere but it bears a brief repetition in the context of both Ms. 
May’s and Mr. Anderson’s vision of a moral order that is intertwined in their 
theologies.  Ms. May speaks of remaining “incorrupt and incorruptible” and trying to 
“bring back order and sanity to the world and what is fair.”193  Mr. Anderson, too, 
speaks of the responsibility of fairness and of the mandate of a government to see the 
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bigger picture of society and a vision of the future and to try to shape that so it might 
render a more equitable and just society.194  This fits with a theology that reflects a 
God who expects one to do the right and proper thing.  A God that is not necessarily 
judgemental, but who has provided one with the equipment to do justice in the world 
and expects one to move forward and do just that.   
 Where Mr. Anderson and Ms. May appear to differ most is in their theology of 
ecology and, as a consequence, in their anthropology.  Although it is still theological in 
nature, since anthropology is integral to the discussion, ecological theology and 
anthropology will be discussed together under the next heading.. 
Anthropology 
Ms. May, as has been discussed, sees humanity as embedded in the natural 
world.  Mr. Anderson does also—to a point.  Mr. Anderson has a different metaphysic 
than does Ms. May.  His theology is rooted, as mentioned above, in moral precepts 
and issues of justice, fairness and good judgement.  He looks upon environmental 
issues very much as moral issues, but not as the metaphysical teaching tool that Ms. 
May posits.  Mr. Anderson very much evinces a classic stewardship perspective 
whereby the natural world is the responsibility of humanity and, though it most 
certainly has intrinsic value, it is a tool.  Humanity is part of the ecology, but humanity 
is also disembedded to the extent that it can (and must, in the interest of human 
flourishing) assign value to the components of the natural world. By “value” I do not 
mean economic measurements exclusively.  I mean also the value of a species in the 
context of human needs.  For example, there are two highly endangered subspecies of 
Pacific Salmon that spawn in a particular lake in British Columbia.  They are sub-
species, not the entire species itself.  Environmental groups are deeply concerned that 
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these sub-species will be extinct.  Industry and others have argued that to protect 
those sub-species would entail complications to the fisheries that would result in a 
severe lack of income for the communities that depend upon the species in general for 
their livelihood.  Mr. Anderson has stated that the continuation of that sub-species is 
not particularly important, given the context and the bigger picture.  Now, it is 
important to remember that Mr. Anderson has been recognized nationally and 
internationally for his work in protecting salmon and salmon habitat so one cannot say 
that he is callous when it comes to the protection of species.195  But what this does 
show is that Mr. Anderson’s theology differs at this point from Ms. May’s.  A 
stewardship model is one that invites care and nurture but that permits a hierarchy of 
needs within the natural world with humanity being at the top of that hierarchy.  Ms. 
May’s notion of complete embeddedness implies a hierarchy only where responsibility 
is concerned, not in terms of value.  Humanity may be special and thus have more 
required of it, but it remains part of the natural world so much so that to value one 
part over another is not ethical.  Again, it is vital to be careful at this juncture and not 
overstate the case.  Ms. May does not de-value human life.  What she argues is that 
humanity is so embedded in the natural world that to refrain from protecting any 
habitat or species or aspect of biodiversity is to ultimately hurt humanity in a 
pragmatic as well as in a metaphysical sense.  Human needs are important in both 
systems, but in with important differences. 
 Mr. Anderson, like Ms. May, has a high anthropology.  This is common in 
people who hold moderate, mainstream theologies.  Mr. Anderson sees humanity as 
capable of not only understanding its mistakes but of correcting them.  There is a 
sense that Mr. Anderson believes that human beings are not completely capable of 
367 
 
following the Golden Rule perfectly and consistently, but that they are able to aspire to 
that achievement and that the redemption (my words, not his) is in the aspiration, not 
necessarily in the culmination.  Mr. Anderson reveals an anthropology that is 
compassionate in that he believes that human beings are equal in value, that it is 
circumstance that creates inequality.  As well, this anthropology lends itself to a belief 
in the role of government that is not quite paternalistic—as it is (in theory, at least) 
collaborative to the extent that myriad voices and concerns are heard and 
considered—but that rests in government being vested with the power to make 
decisions in light of a vision that should see a bigger picture than that beheld by the 
electorate.  I say that this is not paternalistic as there is no connotation of “Daddy 
knows best, don’t ask questions.” On the other hand there is a strong component of 
“You hired us to do the job and it is our business to be more informed about the 
complexities than you are.”  All in all, this is an anthropology that sees humanity as 
mandated to be one another’s “keeper” and which has the tools to carry out that 
mandate. 
In terms of the compare/contrast, it is the theology and the anthropology 
surrounding the natural world that marks the most difference between Ms. May and 
Mr. Anderson.  And those theological stances were clear and present in the debates 
over SARA.  Mr. Anderson believed in the morality of species protection.  His 
arguments against the vision held by Ms. May and SARWG and other environmental 
groups had less to do with the vision itself as it did with scope and implementation.  
His actions were highly motivated by his anthropology (human capacity to look after 
one another and to be good stewards) and view of the political process. 
The Political Process: Vision 
368 
 
 Mr. Anderson is a career public servant as well as a consultant and an 
environmental activist.  His activism appears to be shaped by his experience in the 
public sector.  His vision is highly tempered (which is not at all to say corrupted) by 
pragmatism—long experience with how people work hierarchical systems.  Mr. 
Anderson’s political vision is informed by his religious worldview to the extent that he 
holds a moral conviction that human beings have a responsibility towards one another 
and towards the greater good of humanity.  Protection of the natural world beyond 
humanity is a component of that vision. 
 Pragmatism born of experience is the other component of Mr. Anderson’s 
political vision.  While he and Ms. May both emphasize the importance of mediation, 
negotiation and cooperation, Mr. Anderson incorporates into his vision a belief that, 
as was stated above, the legislative process is just that, a process.  Although 
environmental issues are no less urgent for him than for Ms. May, his vision of the 
place of legislation as an important component of the answer to the problem is less all-
encompassing.  While Ms. May uses consultation and cooperation to further a vision 
that must remain inviolate, Mr. Anderson uses consultation and cooperation to modify 
and become informed about the motivations and possible pitfalls that certain clauses 
or assertions may dissuade potential allies.  This is not to say that one person is more 
canny or more astute—these are two viable ways of proceeding politically and simply 
two ways of being effective.  They are both undergirded by the religious worldviews—
the one of a humanity embedded in the natural world and the other of a humanity 
with tiered levels of responsibility towards the natural world.  Whereas Ms. May’s 
vision revolves around the strong axis of a moral certainty, Mr. Anderson’s vision is 
more like a cross-section of mica, each layer painstakingly built upon the other until 
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the whole has been composed.  Some layers are stronger than others, some almost 
translucent, but each layer adds to the eventual solidity of the whole. 
  A deep awareness of the complexity of human society and the natural world 
also informs Mr. Anderson’s experience of the political process.  For example, when 
asked about what frustrations he faced as a person with a religious worldview in the 
political arena he replied that the lack of the ability to be nuanced and to frame issues 
in terms of their complexities rather than in terms of sound bites.196  There is a strong 
feeling that in politics one must be less than candid when discussing issues publically 
and that, to a religious person, this feels uncomfortable.197  So knowledge of the 
complexities, the place an issue has within the bigger societal picture and the religious 
worldview that provide part of the impetus for public service undergird Mr. 
Anderson’s vision of the political process but are not overtly obvious  
Thus, for Mr. Anderson, the vision one brings to the political process is 
principled, but tempered by the knowledge that it must be flexible if it is to be 
manoeuvred through the perilous waters of party politics and public consultations.  
Mr. Anderson remarks that the ideologies and/or vision that first inspired a piece of 
legislation will always be modified and will never reach proclamation intact.  He points 
to the review process (SARA passed with a mandate to review it in 5 years—the 
review is still in progress at the time of this writing) as the place where amendments 
can be guided through and holes can be remedied.198  
 Mr. Anderson’s vision of the political process is also anthropocentric.  Unlike 
Ms. May’s which puts the natural world at the centre of each political decision, Mr. 
Anderson’s places people and the natural world.  He states that he was always pushing 
to look beyond the economic to what he called the “lifestyle” component—the human 
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and the natural world component.199  How will the political decision affect the lifestyle 
of the people who are connected with that ecology?  There are two questions to be 
asked in Mr. Anderson’s vision, with the human one being primary and the natural 
world one a very, very close second. 
 The essential core belief that Mr. Anderson seems to bring to the legislative 
process in terms of a vision is that it is government’s responsibility to see the bigger 
picture and to plan for the future with that bigger picture in mind—to determine what 
is in the public interest in the long term.  To be sure, one must consult broadly, but to 
rely completely on public opinion is not sustainable, for public opinion will change 
over time.200  This vision reflects Mr. Anderson’s theology and his anthropology in 
that it firmly rests in the belief that human beings have a responsibility to look after 
one another.  In terms of SARA, this vision was manifest first in the sense that such 
legislation was a component of a moral imperative.  Not only was it the right thing to do, 
to protect biodiversity, but it was an international treaty obligation and mandated by 
the Red Book.  Mr. Anderson’s vision of SARA, then, was different than Ms. May’s in 
that he saw it as a component of a broader picture of environmental stewardship—not 
a moral imperative in and of itself.  
 And so Mr. Anderson’s vision of the political process is that of a process—it 
ties with his belief in the Golden Rule being a principle towards which one strives.  
This contrasts somewhat with Ms. May’s vision of SARA, for example, as being the 
personification of a principle that must be embraced and codified.  Unlike Ms. May, 
who needed to form the vision and compel others to embrace it and find ways to work 
towards it, Mr. Anderson saw SARA as a stepping stone towards a potentially more 
complete piece of legislation in the future. 
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 In addition, Mr. Anderson brought a pragmatism to the process that was 
different than Ms. May’s.201  His vision of the political process is one of flexibility, the 
bigger environmental, political and socio-economic picture and of compromise.  There 
are right things to do, but myriad ways to get to the right things.  While morality is 
always undergirding the vision encapsulated in the legislation (in this case, SARA), the 
details of the legislation must be allowed to work within the political framework and 
the social-economic context of the day. 
 In this way, Mr. Anderson and Ms. May disagreed vehemently on the vision of 
SARA.  Mr. Anderson viewed environmental groups as special interest groups that 
were too narrow in scope to be helpful in the process.  He has stated that he actually 
found the environmental groups detrimental to the process in part because the 
narrowness of focus led them to suggest changes that would have been unacceptable 
to other stakeholders in industry, in the House and in Cabinet.202 203  The inflexibility 
of the vision put forth by environmental groups and even by SARWG, Mr. Anderson 
intimates, would result in legislation that would be ignored at best and blatantly defied, 
at worse.204 
The Political Process: Goal 
 In terms of SARA, Mr. Anderson was intent upon passing legislation that 
would be effective in what he deemed “Canadian” terms.  One argument against what 
he perceived as a politically unworkable vision and goal held by environmental groups 
is one that was discussed in a previous chapter.205  Mr. Anderson states that the 
environmental groups wanted the legislation crafted in an “American” way—that is 
legislation that was ultimately interpreted and enforced by the courts.206  In Mr. 
Anderson’s view, the only effective way to implement SARA was to adhere to the 
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Canadian tradition of society run by policy and programs.  In other words, to 
empower the public service to implement and enforce the precepts of the 
legislation.207   The goal was to put forth legislation and get it passed so that 
components of the larger vision of environmental protection could start to be put in 
place.  Again, it is process-driven rather than vision-driven at the outset—the layers as 
opposed to the axis, the slow working towards a moral goal. 
The Political Process: Compromise 
 It is in this section on political process that the most marked difference 
between Mr. Anderson and Ms. May can be seen.  For Mr. Anderson, politics are all 
about compromise—this is the heart of the whole process.  For Ms. May, compromise 
has the connotation of corruption.  I want to be careful here, though, for the words 
“compromise” and “corruption” can be easily misconstrued in this context.  
Compromise here is used (for Ms. May) in the sense that one can compromise a 
position or one’s values—it is a willingness to allow a chink into the armour of one’s 
moral certitude and is thus a negative.  Corruption is not used here in the sense that 
one often finds it used in the context of politics.  Rather, it is like the connotation of 
compromise—a corruption of the moral imperative, the allowing of a half-hearted 
effort when only a full effort will do. For Mr. Anderson, compromise is negotiation, 
cooperation, a willingness to give when the other party gives, an acknowledgement 
that no one gets exactly what they want in the political process and that ideologies 
must be modified to fit the reality of human imperfections.  And this is where 
anthropologies come to bear on the process for both Mr. Anderson and Ms. May.  
Both of them have high anthropologies, as was mentioned and both see human beings 
as ultimately responsible for the moral choices they make as a species.  The difference 
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lies in Ms May’s conviction that humanity must, as a whole, make a paradigm shift in 
its view of the natural world in order to achieve spiritual growth (and also to just 
survive).    Mr. Anderson sees the dire nature of the situation and is also convinced of 
the need for humanity to step forward and do something.  But he sees this as a 
responsibility that humanity has towards one another.  It is one more layer in 
achieving that responsibility—it is not a paradigm shift causing spiritual growth, it is 
another layer of understanding what it means to follow the Golden Rule.   
 In a pragmatic sense, in terms of SARA, Mr. Anderson remains adamant that 
the bill could not have been modified any further and still found support within 
Cabinet.  Cabinet had already compromised with him on the “safety net”—the clause 
that gave the Environment Minister the power to bring an emergency listing to 
Cabinet, should a provincial government be reluctant or recalcitrant in its moving to 
protect a species or a habitat.  The provinces were chary of a bill that could potentially 
limit their ability to foster economic growth through natural resources industries, and 
the Chretien government was keenly aware of this tension.  It is possible that, although 
SARWG proposed amendments vetted both by industry and by environmental 
groups, Mr. Anderson saw the majority of these suggestions as too narrowly focused 
and potentially threatening to the provinces.  In addition, there was internal fighting 
over adequate funding for implementation. 
 Funding was another reason that Mr. Anderson felt the bill had to be passed 
with alacrity.  Money had been allocated in the budget before C-33 had even been 
passed and the likelihood of retaining that money for SARA was slim if the legislation 
was not proclaimed quickly.  Compromises were necessary, according to Mr. 
Anderson, if the legislation was to be funded. 
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 On the question of jurisdiction and the failure of the bill to protect species not 
found on federal lands that were neither covered by the Migratory Birds Act or that were 
not marine aquatic species (something that environmental groups were determined 
could not be compromised), Mr. Anderson states that geographic limits were 
misleading and that the protection of species could not be confined to that kind of 
argument.  SARA’s job was to prevent the elimination of species by human means 
(Mr. Anderson is quite clear on the need to differentiate human-caused species 
depletion and natural selection).208  The focus of SARA, from the government’s 
perspective, was more on cooperation with stakeholders and concern with out and out 
endangerment rather than with extirpation.  The compromises, in the government’s 
eyes, meant that SARA could be a viable component of a multi-faceted effort to 
preserve biodiversity because it emphasized cooperation with the provinces, 
stewardship by all Canadians, especially landowners, and a scientifically initiated list of 
species at risk which precipitated the composition of an action plan to protect the 
listed species.  The plan would be binding on all stakeholders. 
 So it can be seen that Mr. Anderson’s religious worldview does inform his 
view of the political process to the extent that it guides the principles by which he 
manoeuvres between interest groups, stakeholders, Cabinet and caucus.  His deep 
concern for the environment and for people is intrinsic to that worldview and is 
manifest in his belief that compromise in a political context is one way in which one 
gains perspective and allows oneself to be principled and flexible at the same time.  
“Doing unto others what you would have them do unto you” is a dictum that can have 
many nuances and manifestations.  The flexibility of Mr. Anderson’s political vision 
(especially in the case of SARA) reflects that. 
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 It is also quite clear that, although undergirded, in part, by a religious 
worldview, Mr. Anderson’s political movement in the public sphere is not affected in a 
detrimental way by that worldview.  Again, he even states in his comments before the 
Standing Committee that “religion and politics must be kept separate” directly after 
quoting the Psalms.  He is entirely comfortable with his own religious worldview and 
those of his colleagues but remains sceptical (as has been shown) of religious 
worldviews that are espoused publically and in concert with political statements.  I will 
touch on this more completely in the conclusion to the overall study. 
Conclusions 
The language of the SARA, which, even in the preamble is fairly devoid of overtly 
religious language, adheres more closely to the stewardship language of the second Red 
Book.  The implementation of SARA, also is not particularly revealing in regards to religious 
worldviews being upheld.  The safety net has only been successfully invoked once and that at 
the insistence of a court order.  Even still, that court order is itself being challenged by the 
original litigants who are eager to see salmon habitat protected in order that an Orca 
population begin to thrive.  The vision of SARA held by both Ms. May and Mr. Anderson 
has not been sustained in a meaningful way—which one could point to as a sort of dismal 
triumph of the kind of anthropology that posits the worst about human nature in its 
propensity to chase the short-term gain at the expense of a sustainable future.  In this sense, 
neither religious worldview has had an impact. 
What eventually comes to be the more difficult component in negotiating SARA is 
not a difference in religious worldviews, but a fundamental difference of opinion regarding 
what works in Canadian legislation and what does not—this also includes the legislative 
process.  This may seem like an obvious conclusion, but in a political climate where religion 
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has come to be seen as the banner waved by social conservatives, creationists, intolerant 
homophobes and laissez faire market capitalists who shift ever closer to libertarianism, a 
conclusion that lays the bones of contention at the feet of pedestrian reasons such as 
differences in economic, political and social theories rather than at the feet of religious 
ideology is somewhat fresh.  As I will show in the conclusion to this study, it is not religion 
in the public sphere (at least in Canada) that is so much the issue as it is political expediency 
and the desire to acquire and hold onto power that makes religion and politics behind- the-
scenes political bedfellows and it is this desire for power and votes and an ideology beyond  
religious social conservatism (although that has been co-opted and integrated) that it might 
be wise to track in general rather than one MP or another’s predilection for creationism if 
Canadians truly desire an open, pluralist, secular society. 
Mr. Anderson and Ms. May are examples of persons with religious worldviews who 
live, move, and have their being in the public sphere of Canadian politics.  While neither is 
shy about stating their religious views (Ms. May even less so than Mr. Anderson), both are 
clear about the fact that while their religious worldviews inform the ethical framework out of 
which they operate, their religious worldviews do not directly inform the minutiae of their 
negotiations in the legislative process.  This is consistent with what has already been 
discussed in terms of Canadian environmental policy and legislation which reflects, in 
different times and places, both a dominion and a stewardship perspective that has deep 
roots in earlier theological constructions of humanity’s relationship to and with the natural 
world. 
The earlier phases of environmental research, phases one and two that were 
discussed in chapter four, can be said to have firm underpinnings of dominion theology, 
although with phase two, the stirrings of a stewardship model begin to be formed.  These 
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policies focused on regulating the natural world in order that human beings might be able to 
better utilize it as a tool—regulating resource use and reflecting a confidence that human 
beings are capable of cleaning up whatever mess they make quickly and with great efficiency 
so that the resource can be made available again to further human flourishing.  Phase three 
recognized that environmental protection is a long-term process and it is here that the 
underpinnings of a stewardship theology are more apparent than those of dominion.  The 
natural world might still be a tool, a pool of resources necessary to human flourishing, but 
humanity has responsibility towards itself and towards the rest of the natural world to ensure 
the continuity of these resources.  Two important ideologies underlying this phase are an 
embracing of ecology as a discipline, which stressed the interrelatedness of the natural world, 
humans included, and the development of and the increasing dispersion of eco-theology 
which, among other things, presented and pushed a model of stewardship that was in line 
with other theological developments arising out of the 1960’s and 1970’s as part of the 
Christian church’s search for transformation and new relevance in Canadian society.  This 
theology is clear in both Ms. May and Mr. Anderson’s approach. 
In the forth phase of environmental law which is theoretically moving towards 
comprehensive approaches, planning and assessment is underpinned by a theology that is 
moving towards a worldview of embeddedness rather than disembeddedness, but there is 
still conflict over the costs (economic and social, mainly) of this shift and, as such, 
environmental policy and policy makers appear to be in the throes of entering, rather than 
being ensconced in, this worldview.  At this point, those with the kind of vision embraced by 
Ms May are being frustrated in their efforts by a vast public service and system of 
government that is (like most institutions) slow to accept small changes, let alone a paradigm 






theology of interrelated systems is also apparent.  Where one difference seems to lie is, as 
was shown above, is in their concept of how governmental power should be exercised:  
through persuasion and the total adherence to a single, focused vision or through 
compromise and flexibility of purpose.  Thus it is the way in which power should be 
exercised and focused that the arguments really lie, not in theological debates or the desire to 
convince the other based on a purely religious grounds.  To be sure, there is the insistence of 
a moral imperative, but this moral imperative, although it is firmly rooted in theological 
substance, is not to be seen as authoritative by others in the public sphere because of divine 
mandate but because it is the “right” thing to do to further human flourishing.  Thus the 
theologically-grounded moral imperative speaks to the modern quest for creating order out 
of chaos so that human flourishing can be furthered.  This is effectively a secular end to a 
theologically-motivated ideal. 
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2010.  Other requests for the safety net to be applied have been made—most notably on behalf of the spotted 
owl, again in British Columbia.  Some careful reading shows that reluctance to apply the safety net seems 
mostly based on the rationale that the species under discussion appear to be in danger of extirpation 
(disappearing from Canada, but not from other countries) rather than extinction.  The spotted owl, for 
instance, is extant in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. 
149 David Anderson, Evidence.  1705 
150 Sierra Club of Canada. Rio Report Card: Rio +10 (Ottawa: Sierra Club of Canada, 2002) 6. 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/rio/rio2002-federal.html. Accessed 31 July 2010. 
151 Sierra Club of Canada. Rio Report Card: Rio +13. (Ottawa: Sierra Club of Canada, 2005).  
http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/rio/rio2005-federal.html. Accessed 31 July 2010. 
152 David Anderson, Evidence. 1705. 
153 Ibid, 1645.  In the same quote, Mr. Anderson is quite clear about his own position when he states that “we 
must separate religion and politics.” 
154 Government of Canada, The Species at Risk Act (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002) 
155 To be fair, it must be pointed out that Jean Chretien championed environmental legislation in the 1970’s 
that ushered in the mandatory use of unleaded gasoline in Canada in the face of strong provincial opposition.  
One key to a government deciding to weather provincial displeasure seems to be in finding an environmental 
issue that can be linked clearly and concisely to human health.    
156 It should be noted that the religious right in Canada is quite complex and cannot be reduced to simple, 
American-style fundamentalist, “moral majority” faction.  In fact, the traditional Canadian religious right 
tended to be more “red Tory” in ideology: fiscally conservative, Biblically conservative but socially progressive. 
157 Not that the environment was not an issue embraced by the religious left—far from it.  I merely point out 
that social justice in the late 1990’s was still seen by the mainstream Christian establishment as revolving around 
the issues of poverty, education and healthcare. 
158 It should be noted that this is due to a lack of world enough and time and not to a paucity of interest on the 
subject. 
159 Species at Risk Act. 
160 I say “neo-Franciscan” because, as has been shown, there was little that was non-hierarchical about St. 
Francis and so this view of his take on spirituality and stewardship that ascribes egalitarianism to him is 
anachronistic. 
161 i.e. by having a government that legislates and negotiates rather than proroguing at the slightest hint of 
controversy or dissention.   










172 For more details regarding Ms. May’s environmental activism and her background see Elizabeth May, How to 
Save the World in Your Spare Time () 
173 Ms. May was, in fact, a consultant to the Mulroney government on issues of the environment—resigning her 
position in the throes of the ____controversy.  She was compelled to tender her resignation over the 
disagreements regarding the federal government’s role in conducting environmental assessments. 




178 Although I believe that it could be argued that her environmental activism and sense of 
embeddedness in the natural world transcends her Christianity and would be part of her ontology 






181 Species at Risk Working Group, Conserving Species at Risk Cooperatively: A Response to the Species At Risk Act:  
Brief Presented to the Standing Committee on Sustainable Development and the Environment (Ottawa: Sierra Club of 
Canada, 1998) http: www.sierraclub.ca/national/programs/biodiversity/wilderness/sarwg-comments-sara-09-
00.pdf Accessed 30 July 2010. 
182 David Anderson, Evidence, 1715. 
183 Not the least of which was political intrigue within the Liberal party itself. 






190 I say “current” because Mr. Anderson-who began his federal career in Trudeau’s government—feels that 
religion manifests itself differently since the early 1980’s, becoming almost part of a politician’s “check list” 
along with an attractive family, as things that voters look for in their potential representatives.  And outward 
trapping rather than an interior conviction, as it were. 
191 David Anderson, Interview. 
192 “Get right or get left” is a reference to a fundamentalist slogan that encapsulates the point of view that if 
one does not repent and accept Jesus Christ as one’s personal saviour, one will find oneself left behind on earth 
when Jesus returns to take the faithful “home”. 
193 Elizabeth May, Interview. 
194 David Anderson, Interview. 
195 Ibid.   





201 It is important to say at this point that the pragmatism was just that—different.  Ms. May also brought a 
pragmatism; it was just from a very different perspective. 
202 David Anderson, Interview. 
203 Indeed, Mr. Anderson remarked that industry was much easier to deal with in SARA negotiations than were 
the environmental groups.  Industry, he explained knew the importance of being flexible, had institutional 
memory and sent negotiators who were more professional to negotiations.   
204 Ibid.  For example, Mr. Anderson voices the concern that legislation that was too restrictive could result in a 
farmer, upon discovery of an endangered species on her land, quietly destroying the species and its habitat 
rather than attempting to preserve it, for fear of prohibitive bureaucratic processes or costs. 
205 The discussions regarding what was legally and practically workable for the implementation of SARA to be 
a success are myriad.  For further insight, see the Minutes of the Evidence from the Standing Committee on 
Environment and Sustainable Development, esp. the briefs provided by the Sierra Club, SARWG, COSEWIC 
and the Minister of the Environment. 
206 Ibid.  Indeed, the American Endangered Species Act (passed in 1973) was pointed to time and again as the 
legislative model for SARA.  The argument of the Chretien government against this approach was the 
contention that the Endangered Species Act, first off, was passed as a completely uncontroversial bill and as 
such did not have nearly the hurdles that SARA would have.  Secondly, the Endangered Species Act engenders 
so much litigation that is estimated that a disproportionate amount of its budget goes to legal fees every year.  
Mr. Anderson argued that to place the Canadian public service in that same predicament was unfeasible. 
207 It must be noted that Mr. Anderson and the Chretien government held different points of view regarding 
jurisdiction than did Ms. May and other environmental groups.  This, as has been shown, is nothing new in 
Canadian politics and policy—merely a continuation of a traditional argument. 
208 David Anderson, Interview. 
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